

First Open Source DDoS Protection System

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








Motivation -- Relevance of DDoS attacks





Motivation -- Largest DDoS attacks of 2020

Who	Peak	When
AWS	2.3 Tbps	February
Akamai	809 Mpps	June
Cloudflare	754 Mpps	June

809 Mpps is the newest packet-rate record

2.3 Tbps is close to the bandwidth record: 2.54 Tbps in Sep 2017



Motivation -- Why Gatekeeper?

Unparalleled multi-vector protection

⇒ All flows are monitored and all filters are active; alternative solutions have limited filtering capacity; See paper "The Catch-22 Attack" for details

Scalable

⇒ 1 Tbps deployment underway at Mail.ru

Mitigation in seconds

⇒ More than 80% of attacks last ≤ 4 min according to Kaspersky;
There is not much time for human intervention



Outline




How Gatekeeper works

How to write a destination policy

Mitigating a SYN flood


Conclusion





Vantage points: well-provisioned and geographically distributed locations






Vantage points:
well-provisioned and
geographically distributed
locations

Requirements:

- computing capacity
- cheap ingress bandwidth
- BGP peering
- private links to the protected AS





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
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Examples:

- Internet exchanges
- Peering link
- Some cloud providers





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
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
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


Gatekeeper servers: upstream policy enforcement

Responsibilities:

- Forwarding requests (new flows)
- Dropping or rate-limiting according to per-flow policy enforcement program
- Encapsulating






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Grantor servers: centralized policy decision making

Responsibilities:

- Making policy decisions about requests and installing those decisions at Gatekeeper
- Decapsulating and sending to destination server



Quick summary

- 1. Packets from clients are forwarded to the closest VPs
- Gatekeeper servers forward packets of new flows to Grantor servers, or run BPF programs to decide what to do
- 3. Grantor servers run a policy to map flows to BPF programs, and forward granted packets to destinations
- 4. Grantor servers notify Gatekeeper servers of all policy decisions
- 5. Gatekeeper servers enforce the police decisions



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- ✓ How Gatekeeper works

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Step 1: identify ALL your network profiles

A profile may apply:

to a single server, a group of servers, or to blocks of IP addresses

Example of a profile: outgoing email servers

- No listening sockets
- Very small ingress traffic footprints

Sources: config files, production servers, docs

Step 1: Network profiles → Step 2: BPF programs → Step 3: Lua Policy



Step 2: write an BPF program for each profile

Classify packets into one of these bins:

Primary: main purpose of the service

Secondary: needed packets (e.g. TCP SYN, ICMP)

Unwanted: please guess :-)

Enforce primary bandwidth limit <u>before</u> classification Enforce secondary bandwidth limit <u>after</u> classification on secondary packets

Step 1: Network profiles → Step 2: BPF programs → Step 3: Lua Policy



Step 3: map flows to your BPF programs

Just classify flows using the destination IP address

Example: 10.99.99.128/25 are outgoing email servers
This information is a byproduct of Step 1

Grantor servers run this part of the policy (Lua policy)



Step 3: map flows to your BPF programs (bonus)

Classify source IP addresses too!

- Reject bogons, abusers, malware
- Tune bandwidth to partners, countries, end users
- Return different profiles to CDNs, crawlers, offices

Manage all your IP ranges with Drib:

https://github.com/andrenth/drib

Step 1: Network profiles → Step 2: BPF programs → Step 3: Lua Policy



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A modest testbed on AWS

2x Packet generators forging 16K source IP addresses 1x Legit client uploading a 20KB file 50 times

1x Gatekeeper server


1x Router

1x Grantor server

1x Destination web server




Blind limits per flow are effective





Secondary limits thwart SYN floods





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Some future work

Supporting 100 Gbps NICs at line speed

⇒ Cheaper deployments

Supporting load balancing in policies

⇒ Better return on investment

Flow orchestration

⇒ Insurance for endgame





Unparalleled multi-vector protection

Mitigation in seconds

Scalable, open source, and ready for deployment

Impactful features in store for the future



https://github.com/AltraMayor/gatekeeper



