Strategy visualizations and example tournaments for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma library Axelrod.
The first strategy visualization displays how often a strategy cooperates with every other strategy per round, averaged over many interactions (~200 repeated games between every pair of strategies).
ZDGTFT2
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Calculator
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
As you can see, the introduction of noise alters the efficacy of Calculator's cycle detection algorithm.
We can also visualize the average payoff per round earned by each strategy versus every other strategy per round, averaged over many interactions (~200 repeated games between every pair of strategies).
Alternator
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05
Mean Score Heatmap
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Click to see all the renderings for each strategy.
- $\phi$
- $\pi$
- $e$
- ALLCorALLD
- Adaptive
- Adaptive Pavlov 2006
- Adaptive Pavlov 2011
- Adaptive Tit For Tat: 0.5
- Aggravater
- Alexei: ('D',)
- Alternator
- Alternator Hunter
- Anti Tit For Tat
- AntiCycler
- Appeaser
- Arrogant QLearner
- Average Copier
- BackStabber: ('D', 'D')
- Better and Better
- Bully
- Calculator
- Cautious QLearner
- Champion
- CollectiveStrategy
- Contrite Tit For Tat
- Cooperator
- Cooperator Hunter
- Cycle Hunter
- Cycler CCCCCD
- Cycler CCCD
- Cycler CCCDCD
- Cycler CCD
- Cycler DC
- Cycler DDC
- DBS: 0.75, 3, 4, 3, 5
- Davis: 10
- Defector
- Defector Hunter
- Desperate
- DoubleCrosser: ('D', 'D')
- DoubleResurrection
- Doubler
- Dynamic Two Tits For Tat
- EasyGo
- Eatherley
- EugineNier: ('D',)
- Eventual Cycle Hunter
- Evolved ANN
- Evolved ANN 5
- Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05
- Evolved FSM 16
- Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05
- Evolved FSM 4
- Evolved HMM 5
- EvolvedLookerUp1_1_1
- EvolvedLookerUp2_2_2
- Feld: 1.0, 0.5, 200
- Firm But Fair
- Fool Me Forever
- Fool Me Once
- Forgetful Fool Me Once: 0.05
- Forgetful Grudger
- Forgiver
- Forgiving Tit For Tat
- Fortress3
- Fortress4
- GTFT: 0.33
- General Soft Grudger: n=1,d=4,c=2
- Gradual
- Gradual Killer: ('D', 'D', 'D', 'D', 'D', 'C', 'C')
- Grofman
- Grudger
- GrudgerAlternator
- Grumpy: Nice, 10, -10
- Handshake
- Hard Go By Majority
- Hard Go By Majority: 10
- Hard Go By Majority: 20
- Hard Go By Majority: 40
- Hard Go By Majority: 5
- Hard Prober
- Hard Tit For 2 Tats
- Hard Tit For Tat
- Hesitant QLearner
- Hopeless
- Inverse
- Inverse Punisher
- Joss: 0.9
- Knowledgeable Worse and Worse
- Level Punisher
- Limited Retaliate 2: 0.08, 15
- Limited Retaliate 3: 0.05, 20
- Limited Retaliate: 0.1, 20
- MEM2
- Math Constant Hunter
- Naive Prober: 0.1
- Negation
- Nice Average Copier
- Nydegger
- Omega TFT: 3, 8
- Once Bitten
- Opposite Grudger
- PSO Gambler 1_1_1
- PSO Gambler 2_2_2
- PSO Gambler 2_2_2 Noise 05
- PSO Gambler Mem1
- Predator
- Prober
- Prober 2
- Prober 3
- Prober 4
- Pun1
- Punisher
- Raider
- Random Hunter
- Random: 0.5
- Remorseful Prober: 0.1
- Resurrection
- Retaliate 2: 0.08
- Retaliate 3: 0.05
- Retaliate: 0.1
- Revised Downing: True
- Ripoff
- Risky QLearner
- SelfSteem
- ShortMem
- Shubik
- Slow Tit For Two Tats
- Slow Tit For Two Tats 2
- Sneaky Tit For Tat
- Soft Go By Majority
- Soft Go By Majority: 10
- Soft Go By Majority: 20
- Soft Go By Majority: 40
- Soft Go By Majority: 5
- Soft Grudger
- Soft Joss: 0.9
- SolutionB1
- SolutionB5
- Spiteful Tit For Tat
- Stalker: D
- Stein and Rapoport: 0.05: ('D', 'D')
- Stochastic Cooperator
- Stochastic WSLS: 0.05
- Suspicious Tit For Tat
- TF1
- TF2
- TF3
- Tester
- ThueMorse
- ThueMorseInverse
- Thumper
- Tit For 2 Tats
- Tit For Tat
- Tricky Cooperator
- Tricky Defector
- Tullock: 11
- Two Tits For Tat
- VeryBad
- Willing
- Win-Shift Lose-Stay: D
- Win-Stay Lose-Shift: C
- Winner12
- Winner21
- Worse and Worse
- Worse and Worse 2
- Worse and Worse 3
- ZD-Extort-2 v2: 0.125, 0.5, 1
- ZD-Extort-2: 0.1111111111111111, 0.5
- ZD-Extort-4: 0.23529411764705882, 0.25, 1
- ZD-GEN-2: 0.125, 0.5, 3
- ZD-GTFT-2: 0.25, 0.5
- ZD-SET-2: 0.25, 0.0, 2
See the python script example_tournaments.py for the exact details of each tournament.
This tournament covers all strategies in the Axelrod library that follow the standard Axelrod rules.
Score Distributions
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Win Distributions
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Pairwise Payoffs
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Click to see all the renderings for each tournament.
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All Fair Strategies This tournament covers all strategies in the Axelrod library that follow the standard Axelrod rules.
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Deterministic All deterministic strategies.
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Stochastic All stochastic strategies.
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Finite Memory The players in this tournament are all strategies that remember a finite number of rounds (i.e. do not retain history indefinitely).
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Memory One The players in this tournament are all memoryone strategies (having memory depth 0 or 1).
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Stewart & Plotkin 2012 This tournament covers the same strategies in Stewart and Plotkin's 2012 tournament
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Tyler Singer-Clark This tournament's players are those used in Tyler Singer-Clark's paper Morality Metrics On Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Players