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blind.cpp
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blind.cpp
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// Copyright (c) 2017-2019 The Elements Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include <blind.h>
#include <hash.h>
#include <primitives/transaction.h>
#include <primitives/confidential.h>
#include <issuance.h>
#include <random.h>
#include <util/system.h>
static secp256k1_context* secp256k1_blind_context = NULL;
class Blind_ECC_Init {
public:
Blind_ECC_Init() {
assert(secp256k1_blind_context == NULL);
secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY);
assert(ctx != NULL);
secp256k1_blind_context = ctx;
}
~Blind_ECC_Init() {
secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_blind_context;
secp256k1_blind_context = NULL;
if (ctx) {
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
}
}
};
static Blind_ECC_Init ecc_init_on_load;
bool UnblindConfidentialPair(const CKey& blinding_key, const CConfidentialValue& conf_value, const CConfidentialAsset& conf_asset, const CConfidentialNonce& nonce_commitment, const CScript& committedScript, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchRangeproof, CAmount& amount_out, uint256& blinding_factor_out, CAsset& asset_out, uint256& asset_blinding_factor_out)
{
if (!blinding_key.IsValid() || vchRangeproof.size() == 0) {
return false;
}
CPubKey ephemeral_key(nonce_commitment.vchCommitment);
if (nonce_commitment.vchCommitment.size() > 0 && !ephemeral_key.IsFullyValid()) {
return false;
}
// ECDH or not depending on if nonce commitment is non-empty
uint256 nonce;
bool blank_nonce = false;
if (nonce_commitment.vchCommitment.size() > 0) {
nonce = blinding_key.ECDH(ephemeral_key);
CSHA256().Write(nonce.begin(), 32).Finalize(nonce.begin());
} else {
// Use blinding key directly, and don't commit to a scriptpubkey
// This is used for issuance inputs.
blank_nonce = true;
nonce = uint256(std::vector<unsigned char>(blinding_key.begin(), blinding_key.end()));
}
// API-prescribed sidechannel maximum size, though we only use 64 bytes
unsigned char msg[4096] = {0};
// 32 bytes of asset type, 32 bytes of asset blinding factor in sidechannel
size_t msg_size = 64;
// If value is unblinded, we don't support unblinding just the asset
if (!conf_value.IsCommitment()) {
return false;
}
// Valid asset commitment?
secp256k1_generator observed_gen;
if (conf_asset.IsCommitment()) {
if (secp256k1_generator_parse(secp256k1_blind_context, &observed_gen, &conf_asset.vchCommitment[0]) != 1)
return false;
} else if (conf_asset.IsExplicit()) {
if (secp256k1_generator_generate(secp256k1_blind_context, &observed_gen, conf_asset.GetAsset().begin()) != 1)
return false;
}
// Valid value commitment?
secp256k1_pedersen_commitment value_commit;
if (secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_parse(secp256k1_blind_context, &value_commit, conf_value.vchCommitment.data()) != 1) {
return false;
}
// Rewind rangeproof
uint64_t min_value, max_value, amount;
if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_rewind(secp256k1_blind_context, blinding_factor_out.begin(), &amount, msg, &msg_size, nonce.begin(), &min_value, &max_value, &value_commit, &vchRangeproof[0], vchRangeproof.size(), (committedScript.size() && !blank_nonce)? &committedScript.front(): NULL, blank_nonce ? 0 : committedScript.size(), &observed_gen)) {
return false;
}
// Value sidechannel must be a transaction-valid amount (should be belt-and-suspenders check)
if (amount > (uint64_t)MAX_MONEY || !MoneyRange((CAmount)amount)) {
return false;
}
// Convenience pointers to starting point of each recovered 32 byte message
unsigned char *asset_type = msg;
unsigned char *asset_blinder = msg+32;
// Asset sidechannel of asset type + asset blinder
secp256k1_generator recalculated_gen;
if (msg_size != 64 || secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(secp256k1_blind_context, &recalculated_gen, asset_type, asset_blinder) != 1) {
return false;
}
// Serialize both generators then compare
unsigned char observed_generator[33];
unsigned char derived_generator[33];
secp256k1_generator_serialize(secp256k1_blind_context, observed_generator, &observed_gen);
secp256k1_generator_serialize(secp256k1_blind_context, derived_generator, &recalculated_gen);
if (memcmp(observed_generator, derived_generator, sizeof(observed_generator))) {
return false;
}
amount_out = (CAmount)amount;
asset_out = CAsset(std::vector<unsigned char>(asset_type, asset_type+32));
asset_blinding_factor_out = uint256(std::vector<unsigned char>(asset_blinder, asset_blinder+32));
return true;
}
// Create surjection proof
bool SurjectOutput(CTxOutWitness& txoutwit, const std::vector<secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag>& surjection_targets, const std::vector<secp256k1_generator>& target_asset_generators, const std::vector<uint256 >& target_asset_blinders, const std::vector<const unsigned char*> asset_blindptrs, const secp256k1_generator& output_asset_gen, const CAsset& asset)
{
int ret;
// 1 to 3 targets
size_t nInputsToSelect = std::min((size_t)3, surjection_targets.size());
unsigned char randseed[32];
GetStrongRandBytes(randseed, 32);
size_t input_index;
secp256k1_surjectionproof proof;
secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag tag;
memcpy(&tag, asset.begin(), 32);
// Find correlation between asset tag and listed input tags
if (secp256k1_surjectionproof_initialize(secp256k1_blind_context, &proof, &input_index, &surjection_targets[0], surjection_targets.size(), nInputsToSelect, &tag, 100, randseed) == 0) {
return false;
}
// Using the input chosen, build proof
ret = secp256k1_surjectionproof_generate(secp256k1_blind_context, &proof, target_asset_generators.data(), target_asset_generators.size(), &output_asset_gen, input_index, target_asset_blinders[input_index].begin(), asset_blindptrs[asset_blindptrs.size()-1]);
assert(ret == 1);
// Double-check answer
ret = secp256k1_surjectionproof_verify(secp256k1_blind_context, &proof, target_asset_generators.data(), target_asset_generators.size(), &output_asset_gen);
assert(ret != 0);
// Serialize into output witness structure
size_t output_len = secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialized_size(secp256k1_blind_context, &proof);
txoutwit.vchSurjectionproof.resize(output_len);
secp256k1_surjectionproof_serialize(secp256k1_blind_context, &txoutwit.vchSurjectionproof[0], &output_len, &proof);
assert(output_len == txoutwit.vchSurjectionproof.size());
return true;
}
// Creates ECDH nonce commitment using ephemeral key and output_pubkey
uint256 GenerateOutputRangeproofNonce(CTxOut& out, const CPubKey output_pubkey)
{
// Generate ephemeral key for ECDH nonce generation
CKey ephemeral_key;
ephemeral_key.MakeNewKey(true);
CPubKey ephemeral_pubkey = ephemeral_key.GetPubKey();
assert(ephemeral_pubkey.size() == CConfidentialNonce::nCommittedSize);
out.nNonce.vchCommitment.resize(ephemeral_pubkey.size());
memcpy(&out.nNonce.vchCommitment[0], &ephemeral_pubkey[0], ephemeral_pubkey.size());
// Generate nonce
uint256 nonce = ephemeral_key.ECDH(output_pubkey);
CSHA256().Write(nonce.begin(), 32).Finalize(nonce.begin());
return nonce;
}
bool GenerateRangeproof(std::vector<unsigned char>& rangeproof, const std::vector<unsigned char*>& value_blindptrs, const uint256& nonce, const CAmount amount, const CScript& scriptPubKey, const secp256k1_pedersen_commitment& value_commit, const secp256k1_generator& gen, const CAsset& asset, std::vector<const unsigned char*>& asset_blindptrs)
{
// Prep range proof
size_t nRangeProofLen = 5134;
rangeproof.resize(nRangeProofLen);
// Compose sidechannel message to convey asset info (ID and asset blinds)
unsigned char asset_message[64];
memcpy(asset_message, asset.begin(), 32);
memcpy(asset_message+32, asset_blindptrs[asset_blindptrs.size()-1], 32);
// Sign rangeproof
// If min_value is 0, scriptPubKey must be unspendable
int res = secp256k1_rangeproof_sign(secp256k1_blind_context, rangeproof.data(), &nRangeProofLen, scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable() ? 0 : 1, &value_commit, value_blindptrs.back(), nonce.begin(), std::min(std::max((int)gArgs.GetArg("-ct_exponent", 0), -1),18), std::min(std::max((int)gArgs.GetArg("-ct_bits", 36), 1), 51), amount, asset_message, sizeof(asset_message), scriptPubKey.size() ? &scriptPubKey.front() : NULL, scriptPubKey.size(), &gen);
rangeproof.resize(nRangeProofLen);
return (res == 1);
}
void BlindAsset(CConfidentialAsset& conf_asset, secp256k1_generator& asset_gen, const CAsset& asset, const unsigned char* asset_blindptr)
{
conf_asset.vchCommitment.resize(CConfidentialAsset::nCommittedSize);
int ret = secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(secp256k1_blind_context, &asset_gen, asset.begin(), asset_blindptr);
assert(ret == 1);
ret = secp256k1_generator_serialize(secp256k1_blind_context, conf_asset.vchCommitment.data(), &asset_gen);
assert(ret != 0);
}
void CreateValueCommitment(CConfidentialValue& conf_value, secp256k1_pedersen_commitment& value_commit, const unsigned char* value_blindptr, const secp256k1_generator& asset_gen, const CAmount amount)
{
int ret;
conf_value.vchCommitment.resize(CConfidentialValue::nCommittedSize);
ret = secp256k1_pedersen_commit(secp256k1_blind_context, &value_commit, value_blindptr, amount, &asset_gen);
assert(ret != 0);
secp256k1_pedersen_commitment_serialize(secp256k1_blind_context, conf_value.vchCommitment.data(), &value_commit);
assert(conf_value.IsValid());
}
size_t GetNumIssuances(const CTransaction& tx)
{
unsigned int num_issuances = 0;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) {
if (!tx.vin[i].assetIssuance.IsNull()) {
if (!tx.vin[i].assetIssuance.nAmount.IsNull()) {
num_issuances++;
}
if (!tx.vin[i].assetIssuance.nInflationKeys.IsNull()) {
num_issuances++;
}
}
}
return num_issuances;
}
int BlindTransaction(std::vector<uint256 >& input_value_blinding_factors, const std::vector<uint256 >& input_asset_blinding_factors, const std::vector<CAsset >& input_assets, const std::vector<CAmount >& input_amounts, std::vector<uint256 >& out_val_blind_factors, std::vector<uint256 >& out_asset_blind_factors, const std::vector<CPubKey>& output_pubkeys, const std::vector<CKey>& issuance_blinding_privkey, const std::vector<CKey>& token_blinding_privkey, CMutableTransaction& tx, std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> >* auxiliary_generators)
{
// Sanity check input data and output_pubkey size, clear other output data
assert(tx.vout.size() >= output_pubkeys.size());
assert(tx.vin.size()+GetNumIssuances(CTransaction(tx)) >= issuance_blinding_privkey.size());
assert(tx.vin.size()+GetNumIssuances(CTransaction(tx)) >= token_blinding_privkey.size());
out_val_blind_factors.clear();
out_val_blind_factors.resize(tx.vout.size());
out_asset_blind_factors.clear();
out_asset_blind_factors.resize(tx.vout.size());
assert(tx.vin.size() == input_value_blinding_factors.size());
assert(tx.vin.size() == input_asset_blinding_factors.size());
assert(tx.vin.size() == input_assets.size());
assert(tx.vin.size() == input_amounts.size());
std::vector<unsigned char*> value_blindptrs;
std::vector<const unsigned char*> asset_blindptrs;
std::vector<uint64_t> blinded_amounts;
value_blindptrs.reserve(tx.vout.size() + tx.vin.size());
asset_blindptrs.reserve(tx.vout.size() + tx.vin.size());
int ret;
int num_blind_attempts = 0, num_issuance_blind_attempts = 0, num_blinded = 0;
//Surjection proof prep
// Needed to surj init, only matches to output asset matters, rest can be garbage
std::vector<secp256k1_fixed_asset_tag> surjection_targets;
// Needed to construct the proof itself. Generators must match final transaction to be valid
std::vector<secp256k1_generator> target_asset_generators;
// maxTargets is a strict upper-bound for the size of target vectors.
// The vectors will be shrunk later according to final count of totalTargets
size_t maxTargets = tx.vin.size()*3;
if (auxiliary_generators) {
assert(auxiliary_generators->size() >= tx.vin.size());
maxTargets += auxiliary_generators->size() - tx.vin.size();
}
surjection_targets.resize(maxTargets);
target_asset_generators.resize(maxTargets);
// input_asset_blinding_factors is only for inputs, not for issuances(0 by def)
// but we need to create surjection proofs against this list so we copy and insert 0's
// where issuances occur.
std::vector<uint256> target_asset_blinders;
size_t totalTargets = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) {
// For each input we either need the asset/blinds or the generator
if (input_assets[i].IsNull()) {
// If non-empty generator exists, parse
if (auxiliary_generators) {
// Parse generator here
ret = secp256k1_generator_parse(secp256k1_blind_context, &target_asset_generators[totalTargets], &(*auxiliary_generators)[i][0]);
if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
ret = secp256k1_generator_generate_blinded(secp256k1_blind_context, &target_asset_generators[totalTargets], input_assets[i].begin(), input_asset_blinding_factors[i].begin());
assert(ret == 1);
}
memcpy(&surjection_targets[totalTargets], input_assets[i].begin(), 32);
target_asset_blinders.push_back(input_asset_blinding_factors[i]);
totalTargets++;
// Create target generators for issuances
CAssetIssuance& issuance = tx.vin[i].assetIssuance;
uint256 entropy;
CAsset asset;
CAsset token;
if (!issuance.IsNull()) {
if (issuance.nAmount.IsCommitment() || issuance.nInflationKeys.IsCommitment()) {
return -1;
}
// New Issuance
if (issuance.assetBlindingNonce.IsNull()) {
bool blind_issuance = (token_blinding_privkey.size() > i && token_blinding_privkey[i].IsValid()) ? true : false;
GenerateAssetEntropy(entropy, tx.vin[i].prevout, issuance.assetEntropy);
CalculateAsset(asset, entropy);
CalculateReissuanceToken(token, entropy, blind_issuance);
} else {
CalculateAsset(asset, issuance.assetEntropy);
}
if (!issuance.nAmount.IsNull()) {
memcpy(&surjection_targets[totalTargets], asset.begin(), 32);
ret = secp256k1_generator_generate(secp256k1_blind_context, &target_asset_generators[totalTargets], asset.begin());
assert(ret != 0);
// Issuance asset cannot be blinded by definition
target_asset_blinders.push_back(uint256());
totalTargets++;
}
if (!issuance.nInflationKeys.IsNull()) {
assert(!token.IsNull());
memcpy(&surjection_targets[totalTargets], token.begin(), 32);
ret = secp256k1_generator_generate(secp256k1_blind_context, &target_asset_generators[totalTargets], token.begin());
assert(ret != 0);
// Issuance asset cannot be blinded by definition
target_asset_blinders.push_back(uint256());
totalTargets++;
}
}
}
if (auxiliary_generators) {
// Process any additional targets from auxiliary_generators
// we know nothing about it other than the generator itself
for (size_t i = tx.vin.size(); i < auxiliary_generators->size(); i++) {
ret = secp256k1_generator_parse(secp256k1_blind_context, &target_asset_generators[totalTargets], &(*auxiliary_generators)[i][0]);
if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
memset(&surjection_targets[totalTargets], 0, 32);
target_asset_blinders.push_back(uint256());
totalTargets++;
}
}
// Resize the target surjection lists to how many actually exist
assert(totalTargets == target_asset_blinders.size());
surjection_targets.resize(totalTargets);
target_asset_generators.resize(totalTargets);
//Total blinded inputs that you own (that you are balancing against)
int num_known_input_blinds = 0;
//Number of outputs and issuances to blind
int num_to_blind = 0;
// Make sure witness lengths are correct
tx.witness.vtxoutwit.resize(tx.vout.size());
tx.witness.vtxinwit.resize(tx.vin.size());
size_t txoutwitsize = tx.witness.vtxoutwit.size();
for (size_t nIn = 0; nIn < tx.vin.size(); nIn++) {
if (!input_value_blinding_factors[nIn].IsNull() || !input_asset_blinding_factors[nIn].IsNull()) {
if (input_amounts[nIn] < 0) {
return -1;
}
value_blindptrs.push_back(input_value_blinding_factors[nIn].begin());
asset_blindptrs.push_back(input_asset_blinding_factors[nIn].begin());
blinded_amounts.push_back(input_amounts[nIn]);
num_known_input_blinds++;
}
// Count number of issuance pseudo-inputs to blind
CAssetIssuance& issuance = tx.vin[nIn].assetIssuance;
if (!issuance.IsNull()) {
// Marked for blinding
if (issuance_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && issuance_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid()) {
if(issuance.nAmount.IsExplicit() && tx.witness.vtxinwit[nIn].vchIssuanceAmountRangeproof.empty()) {
num_to_blind++;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
if (token_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && token_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid()) {
if(issuance.nInflationKeys.IsExplicit() && tx.witness.vtxinwit[nIn].vchInflationKeysRangeproof.empty()) {
num_to_blind++;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
}
}
for (size_t nOut = 0; nOut < output_pubkeys.size(); nOut++) {
if (output_pubkeys[nOut].IsValid()) {
// Keys must be valid and outputs completely unblinded or else call fails
if (!output_pubkeys[nOut].IsFullyValid() ||
(!tx.vout[nOut].nValue.IsExplicit() || !tx.vout[nOut].nAsset.IsExplicit()) ||
(txoutwitsize > nOut && !tx.witness.vtxoutwit[nOut].IsNull())
|| tx.vout[nOut].IsFee()) {
return -1;
}
num_to_blind++;
}
}
//Running total of newly blinded outputs
static const unsigned char diff_zero[32] = {0};
assert(num_to_blind <= 10000); // More than 10k outputs? Stop spamming.
unsigned char blind[10000][32];
unsigned char asset_blind[10000][32];
secp256k1_pedersen_commitment value_commit;
secp256k1_generator asset_gen;
CAsset asset;
// First blind issuance pseudo-inputs
for (size_t nIn = 0; nIn < tx.vin.size(); nIn++) {
for (size_t nPseudo = 0; nPseudo < 2; nPseudo++) {
if ((nPseudo == 0 && issuance_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && issuance_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid()) ||
(nPseudo == 1 && token_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && token_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid())) {
num_blind_attempts++;
num_issuance_blind_attempts++;
CAssetIssuance& issuance = tx.vin[nIn].assetIssuance;
// First iteration does issuance asset, second inflation keys
CConfidentialValue& conf_value = nPseudo ? issuance.nInflationKeys : issuance.nAmount;
if (conf_value.IsNull()) {
continue;
}
CAmount amount = conf_value.GetAmount();
blinded_amounts.push_back(amount);
// Derive the asset of the issuance asset/token
if (issuance.assetBlindingNonce.IsNull()) {
uint256 entropy;
GenerateAssetEntropy(entropy, tx.vin[nIn].prevout, issuance.assetEntropy);
if (nPseudo == 0) {
CalculateAsset(asset, entropy);
} else {
bool blind_issuance = (token_blinding_privkey.size() > nIn && token_blinding_privkey[nIn].IsValid()) ? true : false;
CalculateReissuanceToken(asset, entropy, blind_issuance);
}
} else {
if (nPseudo == 0) {
CalculateAsset(asset, issuance.assetEntropy);
} else {
// Re-issuance only has one pseudo-input maximum
continue;
}
}
// Fill out the value blinders and blank asset blinder
GetStrongRandBytes(&blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0], 32);
// Issuances are not asset-blinded
memset(&asset_blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0], 0, 32);
value_blindptrs.push_back(&blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0]);
asset_blindptrs.push_back(&asset_blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0]);
if (num_blind_attempts == num_to_blind) {
// All outputs we own are unblinded, we don't support this type of blinding
// though it is possible. No privacy gained here, incompatible with secp api
return num_blinded;
}
if (tx.witness.vtxinwit.size() <= nIn) {
tx.witness.vtxinwit.resize(tx.vin.size());
}
CTxInWitness& txinwit = tx.witness.vtxinwit[nIn];
// Create unblinded generator. We throw away all but `asset_gen`
CConfidentialAsset conf_asset;
BlindAsset(conf_asset, asset_gen, asset, asset_blindptrs.back());
// Create value commitment
CreateValueCommitment(conf_value, value_commit, value_blindptrs.back(), asset_gen, amount);
// nonce should just be blinding key
uint256 nonce = nPseudo ? uint256(std::vector<unsigned char>(token_blinding_privkey[nIn].begin(), token_blinding_privkey[nIn].end())) : uint256(std::vector<unsigned char>(issuance_blinding_privkey[nIn].begin(), issuance_blinding_privkey[nIn].end()));
// Generate rangeproof, no script committed for issuances
bool rangeresult = GenerateRangeproof((nPseudo ? txinwit.vchInflationKeysRangeproof : txinwit.vchIssuanceAmountRangeproof), value_blindptrs, nonce, amount, CScript(), value_commit, asset_gen, asset, asset_blindptrs);
assert(rangeresult);
// Successfully blinded this issuance
num_blinded++;
}
}
}
// This section of code *only* deals with unblinded outputs
// that we want to blind
for (size_t nOut = 0; nOut < output_pubkeys.size(); nOut++) {
if (output_pubkeys[nOut].IsFullyValid()) {
CTxOut& out = tx.vout[nOut];
num_blind_attempts++;
CConfidentialAsset& conf_asset = out.nAsset;
CConfidentialValue& conf_value = out.nValue;
CAmount amount = conf_value.GetAmount();
asset = out.nAsset.GetAsset();
blinded_amounts.push_back(conf_value.GetAmount());
GetStrongRandBytes(&blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0], 32);
GetStrongRandBytes(&asset_blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0], 32);
value_blindptrs.push_back(&blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0]);
asset_blindptrs.push_back(&asset_blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0]);
// Last blinding factor r' is set as -(output's (vr + r') - input's (vr + r')).
// Before modifying the transaction or return arguments we must
// ensure the final blinding factor to not be its corresponding -vr (aka unblinded),
// or 0, in the case of 0-value output, insisting on additional output to blind.
if (num_blind_attempts == num_to_blind) {
// Can't successfully blind in this case, since -vr = r
// This check is assuming blinds are generated randomly
// Adversary would need to create all input blinds
// therefore would already know all your summed output amount anyways.
if (num_blind_attempts == 1 && num_known_input_blinds == 0) {
return num_blinded;
}
// Generate value we intend to insert
ret = secp256k1_pedersen_blind_generator_blind_sum(secp256k1_blind_context, &blinded_amounts[0], &asset_blindptrs[0], &value_blindptrs[0], num_blind_attempts + num_known_input_blinds, num_issuance_blind_attempts + num_known_input_blinds);
assert(ret);
// Resulting blinding factor can sometimes be 0
// where inputs are the negations of each other
// and the unblinded value of the output is 0.
// e.g. 1 unblinded input to 2 blinded outputs,
// then spent to 1 unblinded output. (vr + r')
// becomes just (r'), if this is 0, we can just
// abort and not blind and the math adds up.
// Count as success(to signal caller that nothing wrong) and return early
if (memcmp(diff_zero, &blind[num_blind_attempts-1][0], 32) == 0) {
return ++num_blinded;
}
}
CTxOutWitness& txoutwit = tx.witness.vtxoutwit[nOut];
out_val_blind_factors[nOut] = uint256(std::vector<unsigned char>(value_blindptrs[value_blindptrs.size()-1], value_blindptrs[value_blindptrs.size()-1]+32));
out_asset_blind_factors[nOut] = uint256(std::vector<unsigned char>(asset_blindptrs[asset_blindptrs.size()-1], asset_blindptrs[asset_blindptrs.size()-1]+32));
//Blind the asset ID
BlindAsset(conf_asset, asset_gen, asset, asset_blindptrs.back());
// Create value commitment
CreateValueCommitment(conf_value, value_commit, value_blindptrs.back(), asset_gen, amount);
// Generate nonce for rewind by owner
uint256 nonce = GenerateOutputRangeproofNonce(out, output_pubkeys[nOut]);
// Generate rangeproof
bool rangeresult = GenerateRangeproof(txoutwit.vchRangeproof, value_blindptrs, nonce, amount, out.scriptPubKey, value_commit, asset_gen, asset, asset_blindptrs);
assert(rangeresult);
// Create surjection proof for this output
if (!SurjectOutput(txoutwit, surjection_targets, target_asset_generators, target_asset_blinders, asset_blindptrs, asset_gen, asset)) {
continue;
}
// Successfully blinded this output
num_blinded++;
}
}
return num_blinded;
}
void RawFillBlinds(CMutableTransaction& tx, std::vector<uint256>& output_value_blinds, std::vector<uint256>& output_asset_blinds, std::vector<CPubKey>& output_pubkeys) {
for (size_t nOut = 0; nOut < tx.vout.size(); nOut++) {
// Any place-holder blinding pubkeys are extracted
if (tx.vout[nOut].nValue.IsExplicit()) {
CPubKey pubkey(tx.vout[nOut].nNonce.vchCommitment);
if (pubkey.IsFullyValid()) {
output_pubkeys.push_back(pubkey);
} else {
output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey());
}
} else {
output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey());
}
// No way to unblind anything, just fill out
output_value_blinds.push_back(uint256());
output_asset_blinds.push_back(uint256());
}
assert(output_pubkeys.size() == tx.vout.size());
// We cannot unwind issuance inputs because there is no nonce placeholder for pubkeys
}