You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
@pitbulk I just wanted to follow up on #269; using a hashing algorithm that's been broken in an authentication library isn't a reasonable default, even for backwards-compatibility. The right thing to do is to do a release that changes the default (and document that the SHA-1 algorithms are deprecated).
To add a bit more information here, what should be changed is not only the default setting that python-saml and python3-saml use for generating signatures, but also the logic for validating signatures on SAMLResponses/LogoutRequests received, which currently accepts these rsa-sha1 signatures. Arguably, there should at least be a setting to reject these signatures (and I think ideally it would be on by default because as mentioned above, backward compatibility doesn't seem like a stronger reason that the insecurity of the algorithm).
Ok, I will implement such change on next release of python-saml / python3-saml and on rest of toolkits.
I will also implement the "reject unsecure algorithms" by default enable
@pitbulk I just wanted to follow up on #269; using a hashing algorithm that's been broken in an authentication library isn't a reasonable default, even for backwards-compatibility. The right thing to do is to do a release that changes the default (and document that the SHA-1 algorithms are deprecated).
See https://duo.com/decipher/sha-1-fully-and-practically-broken-by-new-collision and https://duo.com/decipher/openssh-will-deprecate-sha-1 for background -- SHA-1 is deprecated and should not be used.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: