

ELC 2015



Security Architecture in the IoT Age

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Why do I need to worry about the security of cheesy little embedded devices?



Seriously?

- Stuxnet *
- Other recent/glaring examples of vulnerabilities being exploited in "enterprise" IT architectures (Sony, Anthem, etc)

Refresher

- Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability =>
 - Authentication users, hosts, nodes
 - Integrity services, data
 - Non-repudiation more legal than technical?
 - WRT digital security, the cryptological meaning and application of non-repudiation usually means:
 - proof of both integrity and origin of data
 - high assurance and genuine authentication

What's your risk?



What is all this about?



Where do you go for credible cybersecurity information?

- Vendors? Upstream docs? ISC2?
- ACM? IEEE?
- NIST? NSA? DoD?

Previous requirements and implementation guidance was scattered, duplicative, overlapping, conflicting...

Several factors have led to converge in all sectors, ie, federal govt, commercial, open source.

Although relatively recent, current cybersecurity guidance is now much more unified, standards-based, and integrated to fit within a modern risk management framework.



So where do we go?



A great place to get started is the Information Assurance Support Environment site, "your one-stop shop for cybersecurity information":

https://public.cyber.mil/cyber-training/

Help page, FAQs, acronym list, more, eg:

https://public.cyber.mil/acronyms/

Contains information and guidance documents, training materials, and guides/tools for everything from requirements to technical implementation to risk management and operations.



Risk Management Framework



Date: Mar 28, 2014 New - "Cybersecurity Guidance for DoD! - The new cybersecurity overarching guidance for DoD has been published. Included are two new DoD instructions":

DoDI 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," replacing previous information assurance (IA) guidance.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001_2014.pdf

DoDI 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT)," replacing the previous DIACAP guidance with an assessment and authorization (A&A) process.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/851001_2014.pdf

RMF Training Video Presentation: Cybersecurity and Risk Management Framework Implementation - Date: May 8, 2014



http://iasecontent.disa.mil/rmf/rmf_v3.wmv

RMF Training Slide Presentations: Cybersecurity and the Risk Management Framework - Date: April 4, 2014



http://iase.disa.mil/rmf/Documents/02_RMF_for_DoD_IT_Implementation v4.pptx

Risk Management Framework Implementation - Date: April 4, 2014



http://iase.disa.mil/rmf/Documents/01_RMF_for_DoD_IT_v3.pptx



Security Requirements Guides



Security Requirements Guides (SRGs)

https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/

Security Requirement Guide (SRG) - "A compilation of Control Correlation Identifiers (CCIs) grouped into more applicable, specific technology areas at various levels of technology and product specificity. An SRG provides DoD specificity to CCI requirements (organizationally defined parameters). An SRG is used by DISA FSO and vendor guide developers to build Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs). There are basically two types of SRGs. The first group are the four CORE SRGs which deal with Applications, Networking Devices, Operating Systems, and Policy. The second group are the Technology specific SRGs. A Technology specific SRG is a child of a CORE SRG. For example, the Database SRG was derived from the requirements in the Application SRG."



SRGs - Current List



Security Requirements Guides

- Application Server SRG
- Database Security Requirements Guide (SRG)
- Domain Name System (DNS) SRG
- Firewall SRG
- Intrusion Detection and Prevention System SRG
- Mobile Applications SRG
- Mobile Application Store SRG
- Mobile Policy SRG
- Network Device Management SRG (Draft)
- Router SRG (Draft)
- UNIX OS SRG
- Web Server SRG



Control Correlation Identifier (CCI)



Control Correlation Identifier (CCI)

https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/cci/

"The Control Correlation Identifier (CCI) provides a standard identifier and description for each of the singular, actionable statements that comprise an IA control or IA best practice. CCI bridges the gap between high-level policy expressions and low-level technical implementations. CCI allows a security requirement that is expressed in a high-level policy framework to be decomposed and explicitly associated with the low-level security setting(s) that must be assessed to determine compliance with the objectives of that specific security control. This ability to trace security requirements from their origin (e.g., regulations, IA frameworks) to their low-level implementation allows organizations to readily demonstrate compliance to multiple IA compliance frameworks. CCI also provides a means to objectively rollup and compare related compliance assessment results across disparate technologies."



CCI List (draft)



A draft version of the CCI List conforming to the CCI version 2 has been available since last year, containing CCIs derived from NIST SP 800-53.

- http://iasecontent.disa.mil/stigs/zip/u_cci_list.zip
- http://iasecontent.disa.mil/stigs/pdf/u_cci_process_v1r0.1.pdf
- http://iasecontent.disa.mil/stigs/zip/u_draft_cci_specification_v2r0.2.zip
- http://iasecontent.disa.mil/stigs/xls/u_cci_comment_matrix.xls



Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)



Security Technical Implementation Guides

https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/

"The Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and the NSA Guides are the configuration standards for DoD IA and IA-enabled devices/systems. Since 1998, DISA Field Security Operations (FSO) has played a critical role enhancing the security posture of DoD's security systems by providing the Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs). The STIGs contain technical guidance to "lock down" information systems/software that might otherwise be vulnerable to a malicious computer attack."



STIG Documents



STIG Viewing Guide Quick Ref

http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/downloads/pdf/u_stig_viewer_quick_reference_guide_v1.0.1.pdf

STIGs Master List (A to Z)

http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/a-z.aspx

Automate everything:

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Content and Tools. Various SCAP benchmarks are available, but specific SCAP content is *PKI only

http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/scap/Pages/index.aspx



Architecture Examples (frameworks, etc)



- DoD / NATO / MOD, NASA, NIST
 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Department_of_Defense_Architecture_Framework
 - DoDAF, MODAF, other derivatives
- OpenGroup
 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Open_Group_Architecture_Framework
 - TOGAF, ADML
 - Model Driven Architecture
- Archie
 - http://archi.cetis.ac.uk/
 - ArchieMate
- CMM, EA, other guidance
 - eg, http://www.sei.cmu.edu/architecture/
 - http://www.enterprise-architecture.info/index.htm



Architecture Tools



Open Source Tools

- Essential Project
- Archie
- Eclipse
 - EPF, EMF, GMT
 - Polarsys, Capella, Kitalpha
- ArgoUML
 - Supports DoDAF notation

Other tools

- IBM System Architect
- SEI Tools page



NASA "All" Viewpoint



SN User

- User Mission
 Operations Centers
- User Platforms

External Support

- SCaN/SN Mgmt
- · TDRS Fleet Vendor
- · Flight Dynamics
- Near Earth Network
- · Deep Space Network
- NISN Network
 Operations
 Management Center
- GSFC Network Interface & Management Office

Space Network (SN)



SN Space Segment

- Atlantic Ocean Region
 Spares
- Pacific Ocean Region Planned
- · Indian Ocean Region

SN Ground Segment (SNGS)



- Existing Facilities
- User Local Equipment
- Existing S/Ku & End To End Antenna Mechanical Systems
- Bilateral Ranging & Tracking System
- Australian TDRS Facility
- SNGS Physical Plant



SN Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS)

- Functions Maintained & Enhanced
 - Space Network Ops Center
 - Fleet & Ground Management
 - Service Management
 - User Service Segment
 - User Service Access
 - Maintenance & Test
- Primary, Secondary & Remote Backup SNOC Capabilities
- Interfaces to other SN elements
- SN Engineering Facility
- NIMO / Network Interface Console



Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS)

SGSS Context Diagram, Scoping SGSS Within SN & SNGS

Type: DoDAF AV-1

Revision 11 (June 2, 2009)

SGSS

User

Other SN

Other External



NASA Ops Concept Viewpoint







Figure 2 – Overview of the Concept of Operations for the CEV-ISS mission represented using the OV-1



NASA SCaN Architecture








High-end Embedded Linux Camera (generic)







What are the take-aways?



- Architecture tools and the RMF are pretty much architecture-independent
- Modern embedded and IoT products aren't just opaque devices, but more likely to be a complex system-of-systems
- Modern engineering projects are hard, but you can't just throw up your hands and wave it away



Where next?



Communicate

- Assess your project
- Defining and understanding your architecture is key
 - Classify business/mission-critical systems
 - Categorize data sensitivity
 - Define your operational environment
 - Map requirements to controls
 - Implement, Test, Verify
 - Monitor operations, Collect & Analyze data
 - Feedback lessons learned, Reassess risk

 Integrate RMF with procurement / project management guidance and operations





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