This protocol assumes an underlying authenticated and ordered transport mechanism that takes care of framing individual messages. BOLT #8 specifies the canonical transport layer used in Lightning, though it can be replaced by any transport that fulfills the above guarantees.
The default TCP port is 9735. This corresponds to hexadecimal 0x2607
: the Unicode code point for LIGHTNING.1
All data fields are unsigned big-endian unless otherwise specified.
- Connection Handling and Multiplexing
- Lightning Message Format
- Setup Messages
- Control Messages
- Acknowledgments
- References
- Authors
Implementations MUST use a single connection per peer; channel messages (which include a channel ID) are multiplexed over this single connection.
After decryption, all Lightning messages are of the form:
type
: a 2-byte big-endian field indicating the type of messagepayload
: a variable-length payload that comprises the remainder of the message and that conforms to a format matching thetype
The type
field indicates how to interpret the payload
field.
The format for each individual type is defined by a specification in this repository.
The type follows the it's ok to be odd rule, so nodes MAY send odd-numbered types without ascertaining that the recipient understands it.
A sending node:
- MUST NOT send an evenly-typed message not listed here without prior negotiation.
A receiving node:
- upon receiving a message of odd, unknown type:
- MUST ignore the received message.
- upon receiving a message of even, unknown type:
- MUST fail the channels.
The messages are grouped logically into four groups, ordered by the most significant bit that is set:
- Setup & Control (types
0
-31
): messages related to connection setup, control, supported features, and error reporting (described below) - Channel (types
32
-127
): messages used to setup and tear down micropayment channels (described in BOLT #2) - Commitment (types
128
-255
): messages related to updating the current commitment transaction, which includes adding, revoking, and settling HTLCs as well as updating fees and exchanging signatures (described in BOLT #2) - Routing (types
256
-511
): messages containing node and channel announcements, as well as any active route exploration (described in BOLT #7)
The size of the message is required by the transport layer to fit into a 2-byte unsigned int; therefore, the maximum possible size is 65535 bytes.
A node:
- MUST ignore any additional data within a message beyond the length that it expects for that type.
- upon receiving a known message with insufficient length for the contents:
- MUST fail the channels.
- that understands an option in this specification:
- MUST include all the fields annotated with that option.
By default SHA2
and Bitcoin public keys are both encoded as
big endian, thus it would be unusual to use a different endian for
other fields.
Length is limited to 65535 bytes by the cryptographic wrapping, and messages in the protocol are never more than that length anyway.
The it's ok to be odd rule allows for future optional extensions without negotiation or special coding in clients. The "ignore additional data" rule similarly allows for future expansion.
Implementations may prefer to have message data aligned on an 8-byte boundary (the largest natural alignment requirement of any type here); however, adding a 6-byte padding after the type field was considered wasteful: alignment may be achieved by decrypting the message into a buffer with 6-bytes of pre-padding.
Once authentication is complete, the first message reveals the features supported or required by this node, even if this is a reconnection.
BOLT #9 specifies lists of global and local features. Each feature is generally represented in globalfeatures
or localfeatures
by 2 bits. The least-significant bit is numbered 0, which is even, and the next most significant bit is numbered 1, which is odd.
Both fields globalfeatures
and localfeatures
MUST be padded to bytes with 0s.
- type: 16 (
init
) - data:
- [
2
:gflen
] - [
gflen
:globalfeatures
] - [
2
:lflen
] - [
lflen
:localfeatures
]
- [
The 2-byte gflen
and lflen
fields indicate the number of bytes in the immediately following field.
The sending node:
- MUST send
init
as the first Lightning message for any connection. - MUST set feature bits as defined in BOLT #9.
- MUST set any undefined feature bits to 0.
- SHOULD use the minimum lengths required to represent the feature fields.
The receiving node:
- MUST wait to receive
init
before sending any other messages. - MUST respond to known feature bits as specified in BOLT #9.
- upon receiving unknown odd feature bits that are non-zero:
- MUST ignore the bit.
- upon receiving unknown even feature bits that are non-zero:
- MUST fail the connection.
This semantic allows both future incompatible changes and future backward compatible changes. Bits should generally be assigned in pairs, in order that optional features may later become compulsory.
Nodes wait for receipt of the other's features to simplify error diagnosis when features are incompatible.
The feature masks are split into local features (which only affect the protocol between these two nodes) and global features (which can affect HTLCs and are thus also advertised to other nodes).
For simplicity of diagnosis, it's often useful to tell a peer that something is incorrect.
- type: 17 (
error
) - data:
- [
32
:channel_id
] - [
2
:len
] - [
len
:data
]
- [
The 2-byte len
field indicates the number of bytes in the immediately following field.
The channel is referred to by channel_id
, unless channel_id
is 0 (i.e. all bytes are 0), in which case it refers to all channels.
The funding node:
- for all error messages sent before (and including) the
funding_created
message:- MUST use
temporary_channel_id
in lieu ofchannel_id
.
- MUST use
The fundee node:
- for all error messages sent before (and not including) the
funding_signed
message:- MUST use
temporary_channel_id
in lieu ofchannel_id
.
- MUST use
A sending node:
- when sending
error
:- MUST fail the channel referred to by the error message.
- SHOULD send
error
for protocol violations or internal errors that make channels unusable or that make further communication unusable. - MAY send an empty
data
field. - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
- SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply to a
funding_created
,funding_signed
,closing_signed
, orcommitment_signed
message.
- SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply to a
- when
channel_id
is 0:- MUST fail all channels.
- MUST close the connection.
- MUST set
len
equal to the length ofdata
.
The receiving node:
- upon receiving
error
:- MUST fail the channel referred to by the error message.
- if no existing channel is referred to by the message:
- MUST ignore the message.
- MUST truncate
len
to the remainder of the packet (if it's larger). - if
data
is not composed solely of printable ASCII characters (For reference: the printable character set includes byte values 32 through 126, inclusive):- SHOULD NOT print out
data
verbatim.
- SHOULD NOT print out
There are unrecoverable errors that require an abort of conversations; if the connection is simply dropped, then the peer may retry the connection. It's also useful to describe protocol violations for diagnosis, as this indicates that one peer has a bug.
It may be wise not to distinguish errors in production settings, lest
it leak information — hence, the optional data
field.
In order to allow for the existence of long-lived TCP connections, at times it may be required that both ends keep alive the TCP connection at the application level. Such messages also allow obfuscation of traffic patterns.
- type: 18 (
ping
) - data:
- [
2
:num_pong_bytes
] - [
2
:byteslen
] - [
byteslen
:ignored
]
- [
The pong
message is to be sent whenever a ping
message is received. It
serves as a reply and also serves to keep the connection alive, while
explicitly notifying the other end that the receiver is still active. Within
the received ping
message, the sender will specify the number of bytes to be
included within the data payload of the pong
message.
- type: 19 (
pong
) - data:
- [
2
:byteslen
] - [
byteslen
:ignored
]
- [
A node sending a ping
message:
- SHOULD set
ignored
to 0s. - MUST NOT set
ignored
to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized memory. - if it doesn't receive a corresponding
pong
:- MAY terminate the network connection,
- and MUST NOT fail the channels in this case.
- MAY terminate the network connection,
- SHOULD NOT send
ping
messages more often than once every 30 seconds.
A node sending a pong
message:
- SHOULD set
ignored
to 0s. - MUST NOT set
ignored
to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized memory.
A node receiving a ping
message:
- SHOULD fail the channels if it has received significantly in excess of one
ping
per 30 seconds. - if
num_pong_bytes
is less than 65532:- MUST respond by sending a
pong
message, withbyteslen
equal tonum_pong_bytes
.
- MUST respond by sending a
- otherwise (
num_pong_bytes
is not less than 65532):- MUST ignore the
ping
.
- MUST ignore the
A node receiving a pong
message:
- if
byteslen
does not correspond to anyping
'snum_pong_bytes
value it has sent:- MAY fail the channels.
The largest possible message is 65535 bytes; thus, the maximum sensible byteslen
is 65531 — in order to account for the type field (pong
) and the byteslen
itself. This allows
a convenient cutoff for num_pong_bytes
to indicate that no reply should be sent.
Connections between nodes within the network may be long lived, as payment
channels have an indefinite lifetime. However, it's likely that
no new data will be
exchanged for a
significant portion of a connection's lifetime. Also, on several platforms it's possible that Lightning
clients will be put to sleep without prior warning. Hence, a
distinct ping
message is used, in order to probe for the liveness of the connection on
the other side, as well as to keep the established connection active.
Additionally, the ability for a sender to request that the receiver send a response with a particular number of bytes enables nodes on the network to create synthetic traffic. Such traffic can be used to partially defend against packet and timing analysis — as nodes can fake the traffic patterns of typical exchanges without applying any true updates to their respective channels.
When combined with the onion routing protocol defined in BOLT #4, careful statistically driven synthetic traffic can serve to further bolster the privacy of participants within the network.
Limited precautions are recommended against ping
flooding, however some
latitude is given because of network delays. Note that there are other methods
of incoming traffic flooding (e.g. sending odd unknown message types, or padding
every message maximally).
Finally, the usage of periodic ping
messages serves to promote frequent key
rotations as specified within BOLT #8.
[ TODO: (roasbeef); fin ]
[ FIXME: Insert Author List ]
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.