2022-06-28-baudin22a.md

title	booktitle	abstract	layout	series	publisher	issn	id	month	tex_title	firstpage	lastpage	page	order	cycles	bibtex_author	author	date	address	container-title	volume	genre	issued	pdf	extras
Fictitious Play and Best-Response Dynamics in Identical Interest and Zero-Sum Stochastic Games	Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning	This paper proposes an extension of a popular decentralized discrete-time learning procedure when repeating a static game called fictitious play (FP) (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951) to a dynamic model called discounted stochastic game (Shapley, 1953). Our family of discrete-time FP procedures is proven to converge to the set of stationary Nash equilibria in identical interest discounted stochastic games. This extends similar convergence results for static games (Monderer & Shapley, 1996a). We then analyze the continuous-time counterpart of our FP procedures, which include as a particular case the best-response dynamic introduced and studied by Leslie et al. (2020) in the context of zero-sum stochastic games. We prove the converge of this dynamics to stationary Nash equilibria in identical-interest and zero-sum discounted stochastic games. Thanks to stochastic approximations, we can infer from the continuous-time convergence some discrete time results such as the convergence to stationary equilibria in zero-sum and team stochastic games (Holler, 2020).	inproceedings	Proceedings of Machine Learning Research	PMLR	2640-3498	baudin22a	0	Fictitious Play and Best-Response Dynamics in Identical Interest and Zero-Sum Stochastic Games	1664	1690	1664-1690	1664	false	Baudin, Lucas and Laraki, Rida	given family Lucas Baudin given family Rida Laraki	2022-06-28		Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning	162	inproceedings	date-parts 2022 6 28	https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/baudin22a/baudin22a.pdf