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+### #[01]  No validation of legs being sorted with longs first
+
+The SFPM has the following code:
+
+```js
+unchecked {
+    // Reverse the order of the legs if this call is burning a position (LIFO)
+    // We loop in reverse order if burning a position so that any dependent long liquidity is returned
+    // to the pool first,
+    // allowing the corresponding short liquidity to be removed
+    _leg = _isBurn ? numLegs - leg - 1 : leg;
+}
+```
+
+However when validating a position it is not enforced that longs or shorts are in any particular order, see [TokenId.validate](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-panoptic/blob/aa86461c9d6e60ef75ed5a1fe36a748b952c8666/contracts/types/TokenId.sol#L463)
+
+# [02] Tokens that contain legs with same tokenType and TickRange can not be transferred
+
+[registerTransfer](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-panoptic/blob/aa86461c9d6e60ef75ed5a1fe36a748b952c8666/contracts/SemiFungiblePositionManager.sol#L578) reverts if the liquidity of `positionKey_to` is not 0:
+
+```js
+if (
+    (s_accountLiquidity[positionKey_to] != 0) ||
+    (s_accountFeesBase[positionKey_to] != 0)
+) revert Errors.TransferFailed();
+```
+
+Since the position key is determined by target address, tokenType and tickRange. This will disallow a token transfer of tokenIds that contain legs with same tokenType and TickRange. As the transfer of 1 leg in the loop will set that value, causing a revert of the next iteration
+
+# [03] Denial of tokenTransfers by frontRunning
+
+Related to issue [2], a transfer of tokens can be denied by frontrunning, since [registerTransfer](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-panoptic/blob/aa86461c9d6e60ef75ed5a1fe36a748b952c8666/contracts/SemiFungiblePositionManager.sol#L578) revert if the `positionKey_to` already has liquidy.
+
+# [04] Negative amountToCollect will be casted to large number
+
+`_collectAndWritePositionData` casts the left and right slot of `amountToCollect` to uint128:
+
+```js
+(uint128 receivedAmount0, uint128 receivedAmount1) = univ3pool.collect(
+    msg.sender,
+    liquidityChunk.tickLower(),
+    liquidityChunk.tickUpper(),
+    uint128(amountToCollect.rightSlot()),
+    uint128(amountToCollect.leftSlot())
+);
+```
+
+As explained in `_getFeesBase`. The values can be negative:
+
+```js
+// (feegrowth * liquidity) / 2 ** 128
+/// @dev here we're converting the value to an int128 even though all values (feeGrowth, liquidity, Q128) 
+// are strictly positive.
+/// That's because of the way feeGrowthInside works in Uniswap v3, where it can underflow when stored for the
+// first time.
+/// This is not a problem in Uniswap v3 because the fees are always calculated by taking the difference of th
+// feeGrowths,
+/// so that the net different is always positive.
+/// So by using int128 instead of uint128, we remove the need to handle extremely large underflows and simply 
+//allow it to be negative
+feesBase = int256(0)
+    .toRightSlot(int128(int256(Math.mulDiv128(feeGrowthInside0LastX128, liquidity))))
+    .toLeftSlot(int128(int256(Math.mulDiv128(feeGrowthInside1LastX128, liquidity))));
+```
+
+In practice there shouldnt be a negative impact, because collecting if the collected fees are negative will just yield 0. To be safe, only casting if the slot values are > 0 would probably be a good idea.
+