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Synapse does not check that the chain in X-Forwarded-For is trusted, and so an attacker can spoof their IP address if the reverse proxy does not sanitize X-Forwarded-For. Ideally, we should be able to pass a set of trusted IP addresses, and synapse should only trust X-Forwarded-For if: 1) the request comes from a trusted IP address, and 2) every IP address in X-Forwarded-For, other than the first one, is trusted.
This can be mitigated by ensuring that the X-Forwarded-For header is sanitized before it hits synapse. For example, the public-facing reverse-proxy should remove any X-Forwarded-For header that it receives.
The IP address seems to be used for:
checking that AS requests come from trusted IP addresses
rate limiting registration requests
UI auth (maybe?)
request logging
last-seen IP address for devices
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
This issue has been migrated from #9471.
Synapse does not check that the chain in
X-Forwarded-For
is trusted, and so an attacker can spoof their IP address if the reverse proxy does not sanitizeX-Forwarded-For
. Ideally, we should be able to pass a set of trusted IP addresses, and synapse should only trustX-Forwarded-For
if: 1) the request comes from a trusted IP address, and 2) every IP address in X-Forwarded-For, other than the first one, is trusted.This can be mitigated by ensuring that the
X-Forwarded-For
header is sanitized before it hits synapse. For example, the public-facing reverse-proxy should remove anyX-Forwarded-For
header that it receives.The IP address seems to be used for:
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: