This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 17, 2020. It is now read-only.
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
/
ch4-4.html
532 lines (469 loc) · 28.4 KB
/
ch4-4.html
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch4-4</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Pressures by PSAC </h2>
<p>
The Space Vehicle Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee
(PSAC) was apprehensive about lunar-orbit rendezvous well before NASA
picked that approach. After the decision was made public in July 1962,
Nicholas Golovin, at the behest of Jerome Wiesner, probed deeply into
NASA's planning activities. If NASA was to reverse its decision,
pressure would have to be applied before the development contract was
awarded. Once that had been done, the course of Apollo would be
virtually impossible to change.<p>
PSAC's interest in manned space flight had begun with the Mercury
program and had led to the establishment of the Space Vehicle Panel in
the fall of 1961. Headed by Franklin A. Long of Cornell University, the
panel had met in October and December for briefings by NASA officials on
the agency's plans for launch vehicles. Long reported in January 1962
the group's observations and recommendations for strengthening the
country's booster capabilities. Since Apollo planning had by then
shifted from direct flight to earth-orbit rendezvous, the panel also
pressed for the development of rendezvous and docking techniques.<a href
= "#source36"><b>36</b></a><p>
Thus, 1961 had closed with some degree of harmony between NASA and PSAC;
but that soon changed. As the space agency began to waver on its mode
choice during the first half of 1962, Wiesner, Golovin, and the panel
wedged themselves into the daily activities of spacecraft development.
When NASA began to look more favorably on lunar rendezvous, relations
between the two organizations deteriorated rapidly.<p>
Panel members visited Los Angeles during February for discussions on
spacecraft and launch vehicle development by North American and then
went on to Washington and several of the NASA centers later, looking
closely at the mode comparison studies then in progress. They grew
resentful of NASA's refusal to supply them with every draft document,
both government and industry, the agency had on the subject. NASA, on
the other hand, chafed at the panel's snooping into internal and
contractual relationships, insisting that these activities lay outside
PSAC's advisory authority.<a href = "#source37"><b>37</b></a><p>
During May and June, Golovin asked for detailed information on launch
vehicles and spacecraft for all approaches under consideration; he also
requested progress reports from all Apollo spacecraft contractors and on
engine development programs. Shea did not want to release this material
while the mode comparison studies were in progress, and he sent a staff
member to tell Golovin that schedules were not firm and that his request
was premature. Golovin was, as a matter of fact, at something of a
personal disadvantage in his pursuit of NASA information. He had stirred
up controversy during the 1960–1961 period of Project Mercury with his
statistical reliability analysis methods, which many Mercury engineers
considered merely a "numbers game."<a href =
"#source38"><b>38</b></a><p>
Just before the lunar rendezvous selection was publicly endorsed, the
Space Vehicle Panel met with NASA officials in Washington on 5 and 6
July. In preparation for this meeting, Golovin again asked Shea for the
draft documents that had been used to produce the mode comparison
studies. Shea advised Golovin that this material was still subject to
final editing. Golovin said that all the panel wanted was a preview of
the technical data and analyses of various mode alternatives, their
feasibility, and advantages.<p>
On 3 July, after examining some papers Shea had sent the day before,
Wiesner and Golovin thought they had found a flaw. One table showed a
higher probability of disaster for lunar rendezvous than for either
earth rendezvous or direct flight. Wiesner called Webb, who, in turn,
telephoned Shea and suggested that he see Wiesner immediately.<p>
Shea tried to persuade Wiesner and Golovin that the reliability numbers
based on Marshall's computations contained an error. The PSAC officials
were also told that figures from the report of the Large Launch Vehicle
Planning Group (of which Golovin himself had been chairman) were invalid
because of unduly pessimistic assumptions about the reliability of
rendezvous and the difficulties of abort. Calculations made within the
Office of Manned Space Flight, Shea argued, showed success-failure
probabilities essentially the same for all three modes. Shea got nowhere
with his assertions, and he left the meeting discouraged. But he was
still hopeful that the forthcoming session with the space panel would
"allow us to get the facts squared away."<a href =
"#source39"><b>39</b></a><p>
At the 5–6 July assembly, Shea's hopes for clearing the air were dashed
when panel member Lester Lees distributed a memorandum presaging the
adverse tone of the panel's final report, to be issued later that month.
(Lees, from the California Institute of Technology's Guggenheim
Aeronautical Laboratory, was a paid consultant to North American, which
did not favor lunar rendezvous. Shea was convinced that this was the
reason for his antagonism to lunar-orbit rendezvous.) Lees agreed that
all four mission modes were technically feasible. But, he asked,
"which of these risky adventures involves the least risk to the
astronauts, provides the greatest growth potential for the manned space
program, and at the same time gives us the best chance of fulfilling the
President's [goal] to land an American on the moon by 1970?" Lees
recommended earth-orbit rendezvous with the Saturn C-5 as the prime mode
and direct flight using an uprated C-5 as backup. He disputed NASA's
claims that the lighter, more maneuverable landing craft was
significantly better than the command module for being set down on the
moon. Lees also discounted NASA's demands for extensive visibility for
the hover and touchdown maneuver, which was looked on by some pilots, he
said, as "probably similar . . . to landing 'on instruments' here
on Earth."<a href = "#source40"><b>40</b></a><p>
The Space Vehicle Panel's reservations about lunar-orbit rendezvous were
reemphasized by Wiesner in Webb's office on 6 July. Shea, Brainerd
Holmes, and Robert Seamans listened as Webb was forced to equivocate, to
agree that the lunar rendezvous decision was only tentative. Later in
the year, following additional mode studies, NASA would either reaffirm
its July preference or pick one of PSAC's favored approaches.<a href =
"#source41"><b>41</b></a><p>
During the last half of July, the formal positions of the two sides were
staked out. On the 17th Wiesner wrote to Webb spelling out PSAC's
opinions of NASA's manned programs, particularly lunar rendezvous in
relation to booster capabilities and America's military posture in
space. Wiesner accused NASA of not adequately assessing such hazards as
radiation and the potential problems of weightlessness. He had, Wiesner
told Webb, "assured [President Kennedy] that there is ample time to
make the additional studies . . . agreed upon before the contracts for
the lunar landing vehicle need be awarded."<p>
Webb assured Wiesner that NASA was, and had been, investigating
weightlessness and radiation. The Administrator defended lunar
rendezvous as a contribution to American space capabilities: "It is
our considered opinion," Webb wrote, "that the LOR mode . . .
provides as comprehensive a base of knowledge and experience for
application to other possible space programs, either military or
civilian, as either the EOR mode or the C-5 direct mode."<a href =
"#source42"><b>42</b></a><p>
The PSAC panel issued its final report on 26 July, still contesting
NASA's justification for lunar rendezvous and affirming once again the
desirability of two-man direct flight. "We can only note that the
Panel was originally widely divided in its opinions, but that after
hearing and discussing the evidence presented to us, there is no dissent
in the Panel to the views presented here."<a href =
"#source43"><b>43</b></a><p>
Thus, in July, President Kennedy found the space agency and his
scientific advisory body firmly entrenched in separate camps. The
situation remained static until lunar module procurement activities
accelerated. Then Wiesner and his panel tried once more to block lunar
rendezvous.<p>
Golovin knew that the Manned Spacecraft Center was getting ready to let
the lander contract. In mid-July, he asked NASA to arrange a briefing at
Downey so he could review the technical details of North American's
studies of direct and rendezvous mission modes. Most North American
officials favored almost any mode except lunar-orbit rendezvous, which
kept the command module from actually landing on the moon. A humorous
cartoon on the company walls during August 1962 depicted a rather bored
and disgruntled man-in-the-moon eyeing an approaching command module
with lander attached. The caption read, "Don't bug me, man."
Golovin, hoping for a negative response from these contractor studies,
insisted that NASA allow the briefing. Webb complained to Wiesner that
NASA "had rather complex relationships with North American"
and "did not want a disturbing influence brought to bear."
When Wiesner offered to withdraw the request for the visit, however,
Webb declined, saying he just wanted to be sure that Wiesner was aware
of his concerns.<p>
Golovin had his California briefing at the end of July. On the way back
to Washington, he stopped off at Cleveland to see what the Lewis
Research Center was doing on the mission mode comparisons. Associate
Director Bruce Lundin told Golovin that if he wanted this kind of
information he should ask NASA Headquarters for it.<a href =
"#source44"><b>44</b></a><p>
In August, Wiesner told Webb of the Space Panel's conviction that NASA
had not selected lunar-orbit rendezvous because of any overriding
technical reasons and had not satisfactorily justified its decision to
PSAC. The Administrator admitted that he saw "some real value [in
having PSAC's] independent judgment," but added, "we [are] an
operating agency and [can] not submit . . . our decisions for this
independent judgment." Webb said that NASA "would have to find
some [other] method of review that did not prevent [our] moving
ahead." Wiesner conceded that "it was . . . important to keep
in motion."<a href = "#source45"><b>45</b></a> Tacitly, then, he
acknowledged the priority of President Kennedy's deadline.<p>
But Wiesner and Golovin still did not stop their sorties. Golovin
visited Shea on 22 August to suggest that NASA invite a number of
independent experts to decide who was right on the mode question. Shea
responded that NASA was already using outside help. This session with
Golovin "reinforced [Shea's] feeling that we are in for another
go-around with the PSAC Committee," He was certain that Golovin and
Wiesner still believed that they could overturn the mode decision.<a
href = "#source46"><b>46</b></a><p>
The Webb-Wiesner and Shea-Golovin discussions had, if anything, widened
the gap between NASA and PSAC. Early in September, Wiesner again wrote
Webb, reiterating his concerns about lunar-orbit rendezvous and this
nation's inferiority to Russia in the big booster field. PSAC, he
assured Webb, stood ready to assist NASA in gathering "the best
talents nationally available" to study the mode question. Wiesner
sent a copy of this letter to the President, perhaps hoping that Kennedy
might step in to settle their differences.<a href =
"#source47"><b>47</b></a><p>
President Kennedy did, in fact, become involved while on a two-day visit
to NASA's space facilities on 11 and 12 September 1962. After viewing
the Apollo spaceport being built in Florida, Kennedy flew on to
Huntsville, Alabama. There, during a tour of Marshall and a briefing on
the Saturn V and the lunar-rendezvous mission by von Braun, Wiesner
interrupted the Marshall director in front of reporters, saying,
"No, that's no good." Webb immediately defended von Braun and
lunar-orbit rendezvous. The adversaries engaged in a heated exchange
until Kennedy stopped them, stating that the matter was still subject to
final review. But what had been a private disagreement had become public
knowledge. Editorial criticism stemming from the confrontation - including
the question, "Is our technology sound?" - forced NASA to
justify its selection of lunar-orbit rendezvous to the public, as well
as to PSAC.<a href = "#source48"><b>48</b></a><p>
Accusations by Wiesner that lunar rendezvous had not been thoroughly
studied particularly galled Shea. He compiled material for Webb to use
in refuting this charge, outlining the many studies leading to the
selection. Shea estimated that more than 700 scientists and engineers at
Headquarters, at the field centers, and among contractors had spent a
million man-hours working on the route comparisons.<a href =
"#source49"><b>49</b></a><p>
In early August, Shea formed a team to monitor contracts awarded to
Space Technology Laboratories and McDonnell to rehash the feasibility of
a direct flight by two men in either a scaled-down Apollo or a modified
Gemini spacecraft. Gilruth worried that these studies might impede
McDonnell's work on Gemini, especially after a NASA visitor reported
that the St. Louis contractor apparently wanted to expand the scope of
the study as much as NASA would allow.<p>
Shea and his staff reviewed these studies and presented the results to
the rest of the manned space flight organization early in October. The
contractors agreed that either two-man direct flight or earth-orbit
rendezvous was feasible but both were less attractive than lunar
rendezvous because the probability for mission success was lower, the
first landing would be later, and the developmental complexity would be
greater. The vote was still for three-man, lunar-orbit rendezvous.<a
href = "#source50"><b>50</b></a><p>
Among the strongest criticisms of the PSAC-preferred two-man direct
flights was an analysis that indicated they would be marginally feasible
with cryogenic propellants in the braking stages and with storable
propellants for the lunar takeoff and return to earth. Such flights were
clearly possible only if cryogenics were used on the return leg as well.
But Houston was unalterably opposed to cryogenics, which required
complicated equipment and special handling, for the lunar takeoff
stage.<p>
Another indictment of PSAC's choice was that the panel members persisted
in claiming that lunar rendezvous had no time advantage over the other
modes. NASA was equally obdurate in its belief that adopting one of the
other modes would mean a lag of ten months. A space tanker would have to
be developed, critical refueling techniques would have to be perfected,
and changes in the S-IVB stage would have to be made to permit long-term
storage of cryogenic propellants. All of this would mean more money,
perhaps as much as an additional $3 billion.<a href =
"#source51"><b>51</b></a><p>
The Office of Manned Space Flight assembled the meat of these studies
into another "final" version of the mode comparison, which was
issued on 24 October 1962. Earlier arguments for lunar rendezvous, the
report stated, were as valid in October as they had been in July. That
approach was still "the best opportunity of meeting the U.S. goal
of manned lunar landing within this decade."<a href =
"#source52"><b>52</b></a><p>
The day NASA released this report, Webb wrote Wiesner that, unless the
science adviser had objections serious enough to be taken to the White
House for arbitration, a contract would be awarded for development of
the lunar excursion module. He told Wiesner:
<blockquote><p>My understanding is that you . . . and your staff . . . will
examine this and that you will let me know your views as to whether we
should ask for an appointment with the President.<p>
My own view is that we should proceed with the lunar orbit plan, should
announce our selection of the contractor for the lunar excursion
vehicle, and should play the whole thing in a low key. . . .<p>
If you agree, I would like to get before you any facts, over and above
the report, perhaps in a thorough briefing, which you believe you should
have in order to put me in [a] position to advise Mr. [Kenneth]
O'Donnell [one of the President's aides] that [you do not wish] to
interpose a formal objection. . . . In that case, I believe Mr.
O'Donnell will not feel it wise to schedule the President's time and
that the President will confirm this judgment.<a href =
"#source53"><b>53</b></a></blockquote>
<p>
Wiesner and Golovin were not reconciled by NASA's latest justification.
Upon reviewing the report, Wiesner asked Holmes for material to expand
on that abstracted from the proposals of those aerospace companies
responding to the request for bids to develop the lunar lander. Not too
surprisingly, the bidders had all emphasized the advantages of a lunar
excursion vehicle and had played down the difficulty of rendezvous as an
added operational step. All the proposals cited the benefits from lunar
rendezvous, chiefly mission success and crew safety, with a craft
specifically designed for lunar landing and the need for only one Saturn
C-5.<p>
Wiesner now wanted to examine these contractor documents in full, which
Webb refused to allow because of the proprietary information they
contained. Next, Wiesner asked that certain material be given Golovin
without identification of the contractors. What the pair was seeking,
Webb confided to Seamans, were the lunar weight estimates, but "I
cannot see how the contractors' estimates can help [them] decide whether
you, I, and Dryden have made the correct decision."<a href =
"#source54"><b>54</b></a><p>
Holmes did send Wiesner those sections of the proposals that dealt with
estimated weights for the lander. Most of the figures assumed a target
weight of around 10,000 kilograms. But, Holmes pointed out, estimates of
the different subsystems had varied widely. More knowledge of the lunar
surface and of radiation and meteoroid fluxes would probably "force
weight increases in the landing gear and shields." Both Mercury and
Gemini had demonstrated the need for keeping a margin of weight for
additional equipment and redundancy, Holmes added.<a href =
"#source55"><b>55</b></a><p>
On 2 November, Wiesner and Golovin met with Webb and his staff once
again. It was obvious that the two organizations still occupied opposing
camps. Golovin presented a detailed re-analysis of the 24 October mode
study, challenging both payload margins and reliability and safety
considerations. He still contended that, of the two modes capable of
using only storable propellants, earth-orbit rendezvous had a somewhat
higher performance margin. Moreover, with cryogenic propellants in the
landing stage (and for this he cited research done at Lewis), two-man
direct flight was quite feasible.<p>
But Golovin found more serious faults in NASA's stance on reliability
and crew safety. As he wrote Shea later that day, "It has been
surprising to [read in the report] that the Direct Ascent case is less
likely to be successful, and to be more dangerous to the crew than the
obviously more complicated LOR mode."<a href =
"#source56"><b>56</b></a><p>
Members of Shea's staff disputed Golovin's estimates of performance
margins and reliability factors that made earth-orbit rendezvous and
direct flight appear safer than lunar rendezvous. This exchange - NASA's
final technical response to outside criticism of the agency's handling
of the mode question - was actually a postmortem. After Webb's letter of
24 October, Wiesner decided not to take his objections to Kennedy, since
the President was occupied with the Cuban missile crisis. Subsequently,
Wiesner took the position that had the situation been different, his
actions might not have been the same. Webb then advised the White House
that Apollo was committed to lunar rendezvous.<a href =
"#source57"><b>57</b></a>
Wiesner had never argued that this mode was impossible; he had simply
preferred other methods. He realized the depth of Webb's commitment to
his technical organization. If Wiesner had carried the question to
President Kennedy, Webb would have insisted that NASA alone must make
crucial program decisions. The Chief Executive almost certainly would
have backed the man he had appointed to run NASA. So, presumably,
Wiesner decided to let the issue die. At the end of the first week in
November 1962, NASA announced its selection of a manufacturer for the
lunar module.<a href = "#source58"><b>58</b></a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source36"><b>36</b>.</a> Donald H. Heaton to Seamans,
"Forwarding of Fleming and Heaton Summary Reports to Space Vehicle
Panel," 20 Oct. 1961; Douglas R. Lord to Seamans, 5 Dec. 1961;
Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, <cite>This New Ocean,</cite> p. 82;
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) panel, "Report of the
Space Vehicle Panel," 3 Jan. 1962, p. 1; Jerome B. Wiesner to Webb,
5 Jan. 1962, with enc., "Report of the Space Vehicle
Panel."<p>
<a name = "source37"><b>37</b>.</a> Franklyn W. Phillips to Seamans,
"Meeting of the [PSAC] Space Vehicle Panel . . . at Aerospace
Corporation, Los Angeles, Calif., February 23 and 24," 3 Feb. 1962;
Webb to Wiesner, 22 Feb. 1962; agendas for PSAC Space Vehicle Panel
meetings at MSFC, 5–6 June 1962, and at MSC, 26–27 June 1962; Nicholas
E. Golovin to Phillips, "Agenda for PSAC Space Vehicle Panel
Meeting at Houston, Texas, June 26–27, 1962," 11 June 1962; Bothmer
for record, "Relationships with PSAC (Dr. Golovin)," 13 July
1962.<p>
<a name = "source38"><b>38</b>.</a> Golovin to D. Brainerd Holmes,
"Request for Schedule Information on the Manned Space Flight
Program," 4 May 1962; Phillips to Holmes et al., "Request for
Contractor's Reports on Major NASA Projects," 22 May 1962; Bothmer
to Golovin, "Request for Schedule Information on the Manned Space
Flight Program," 16 May 1962; memo, Golovin to Bothmer, "Your
Memorandum dated May 16, 1962, Concerning Schedule Information Requested
by this Office," 22 May 1962; Bothmer memo, 13 July 1962; Swenson,
Grimwood, and Alexander,<cite> This New Ocean,</cite> pp. 266-457.<p>
<a name = "source39"><b>39</b>.</a> Agenda for PSAC Space Vehicle Panel
meeting, 5–6 July 1962; Golovin to Phillips, "Data Relevant to
Choice of Mission Mode for the Manned Lunar Landing Program," 29
June 1962; Joseph F. Shea to Golovin, no subj., 2 July 1962; Golovin to
Phillips, "PSAC Space Vehicle Panel Meeting, July 11–12, . .
." 28 June 1962; Shea memo for record, no. subj., 5 July 1962;
Wiesner, interview, 7 July 1969, as cited in John M. Logsdon,
"NASA's Implementation of the Lunar Landing Decision," NASA
HHN-81, August 1969, pp. 73-74.<p>
<a name = "source40"><b>40</b>.</a> Lester Lees to Chm. and members,
Space Vehicle Panel, "Comparison of Apollo Mission Modes," 2
July 1962; Shea memo for record, no subj., 9 July 1962; Bothmer memo, 13
July 1962; Bothmer memo for record, "Relationships with PSAC (Dr.
Golovin)," 27 July 1962.<p>
<a name = "source41"><b>41</b>.</a> Logsdon, "NASA's
Implementation," pp. 74-75; Bothmer memos, 13 and 27 July 1962.<p>
<a name = "source42"><b>42</b>.</a> Wiesner to Webb, 17 July 1962, with
enc., Donald F. Hornig to Wiesner, "Summary of Views of Space
Vehicle Panel," 11 July 1962; Webb to Wiesner, 20 July 1962.<p>
<a name = "source43"><b>43</b>.</a> Hornig et al., "Report of the
Space Vehicle Panel (On the Matter of Lunar Mission Mode
Selection)," PSAC, 26 July 1962.<p>
<a name = "source44"><b>44</b>.</a> Golovin to Phillips, "Space
Vehicle Panel Meeting Downey, Calif. July 23–24," 16 July 1962;
George M. Low to Eugene M. Emme, NASA Historical Off., 2 Sept. 1969;
Webb to Phillips, no subj., 18 July 1962; Rector interview; letter,
Bruce T. Lundin to Golovin, 30 July 1962.<p>
<a name = "source45"><b>45</b>.</a> Webb to Holmes, no subj., 7 Aug.
1962.<p>
<a name = "source46"><b>46</b>.</a> Shea memo for record, no subj., 24
Aug. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source47"><b>47</b>.</a> Wiesner to Webb, 5 Sept. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source48"><b>48</b>.</a> Carroll Kilpatrick, "President
Schedules Two-Day Tour to Inspect U.S. Space Installations,"
<cite>Washington Post,</cite> 6 Sept. 1962; NASA, "Trip of the
President: Huntsville, Alabama; Cape Canaveral, Florida; Houston, Texas;
St. Louis, Missouri: September 11–12, 1962," brochure, n.d.;
"Space: Moon Spat," <cite>Time,</cite> 21 Sept. 1962; E. W.
Kenworthy, "Kennedy Asserts Nation Must Lead in Probing
Space," <cite>New York Times,</cite> 13 Sept. 1962; Philip T.
Drotning to Bothmer, "Comments by Mr. Webb on LOR mode
selection," 20 Sept. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source49"><b>49</b>.</a> Shea to Bothmer, "Comments by
Mr. Webb on LOR Mode Selection," 5 Oct. 1962, with encs., "LOR
Mode Selection Considerations," "Study Reports Generated
During Mission Mode Comparison Studies," "Apollo Mission Mode
Comparison Studies-Manpower Estimates," and "Apollo Mission
Mode Comparison Studies-Key Personnel."<p>
<a name = "source50"><b>50</b>.</a> See two documents with same title,
"Direct Flight Study Using Saturn C-5 for Project Apollo: Statement
of Work," n.d. These documents differed mostly in that one (to
McDonnell) required the assistance of the Gemini Project Office in
Houston, whereas the other (to Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.)
depended on derivations from North American's three-man concept. Edward
Andrews and Marshall E. Alper to Lord, "MAC - Two Man, Direct Flight
Study," 9 Aug. 1962; Lord to Shea, "Direct Flight
Studies," 10 Aug. 1962; Raymond L. Zavasky, recorder, minutes of
MSC Senior Staff Meeting, 3 Aug. 1962, p. 4; Alper draft memo [to Shea],
"Re Summary of Results of Two Man Direct Flight Studies," 28
Sept. 1962; Alper draft memo, no subj., 1 Oct. 1962; E. Phelps to
William A. Lee, "Variations of Maximum and Minimum Weights of
Command Module, Service Module Equipment, and Summation of Command
Module and Service Module Equipment," 8 Oct. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source51"><b>51</b>.</a> William B. Taylor, "Feasibility
of Two-Man Direct Flight and EOR Manned Lunar Missions," 15 Oct.
1962; "Summary of Findings," unidentified collection of
miscellaneous items and charts, [ca. 3 October 1962].<p>
<a name = "source52"><b>52</b>.</a> NASA OMSF, "Manned Lunar
Landing Mode Comparison," 24 Oct. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source53"><b>53</b>.</a> Webb to Wiesner, 24 Oct. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source54"><b>54</b>.</a> Holmes to Wiesner, 26 Oct. 1962,
with encs., abstracts of proposals submitted by bidders on the REP; Webb
to Seamans, no subj., 29 Oct. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source55"><b>55</b>.</a> Holmes to Wiesner, 30 Oct. 1962,
with encs., LEM weight estimates contained in bidders' proposals.<p>
<a name = "source56"><b>56</b>.</a> Golovin to Shea, 2 Nov. 1962, with
encs., rough draft of material under headings "Performance
Considerations and Payload Margins" and "Mission Success
Probability and Crew Safety."<p>
<a name = "source57"><b>57</b>.</a> Alper and Geoffrey Robillard to
Shea, "OS + T Evaluation of the Mode Comparison Study Report, dated
24 October 1962," 5 Nov. 1962; Eldon W. Hall to Shea,
"Comments on OS&T weight comparison (Table I)," 5 Nov.
1962; Shea to Seamans, "OST Calculations of Mode Feasibility and
Reliability," 6 Nov. 1962; Lee to Shea, "Draft memo for Dr.
Seamans on OST Calculations," 23 Nov. 1962; Logsdon, "NASA's
Implementation," pp. 80-81. In his book <cite>Where Science and
Politics Meet</cite> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Wiesner is
surprisingly silent on all matters connected with space.<p>
<a name = "source58"><b>58</b>.</a> James L. Neal TWX to Grumman, Attn.:
Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., 7 Nov. 1962; NASA Hq. TWX to all NASA centers,
"Grumman Selected to Build LEM," NASA news release 62-240, 7
Nov. 1962.
<P>
<HR>
<P>
<CENTER><A HREF="ch4-3.html">
<IMG SRC="previous.gif" ALIGN="left"
ALT="Previous Page">
</A>
<A HREF="ch4-5.html">
<IMG SRC="next.gif" ALIGN="right"
ALT="Next Page">
</A>
<A HREF="contents.html">
<IMG SRC="index.gif" ALIGN="middle"
ALT="Table of Contents"></A>
</CENTER><BR>
<HR>
<P>
</BODY>
<!--ADA TEAM 2001-->
</HTML>