This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 17, 2020. It is now read-only.
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
/
ch6-3.html
224 lines (198 loc) · 10.3 KB
/
ch6-3.html
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch6-3</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Tailoring the Cockpit</h2>
<p>
The lunar module's interior was as different from that of other manned
spacecraft as its exterior. And it also took two years to design. A home
on the moon required some very special features besides visibility:
equipment and procedures for rendezvous and docking, environmental
control for living, an easy means for leaving and reentering while on
the moon, and the capability of operating in a low-gravity or no-gravity
environment.<a href = "#source10"><b>10</b></a><p>
With an internal volume of 60 cubic meters, the lunar module would be
the largest American spacecraft yet developed. It would also be the most
spacious, except for the command module when the pilot was there alone.
To lessen already formidable crew training demands, Houston pressed
Grumman to make the cabin instruments and displays as similar as
possible to those of the command module. Complete duplication was
impossible, however, because the two craft were so unlike. Ground rules
were laid down governing the degree of redundancy required in controls
and panels. Although these controls would be duplicated on each side of
the cockpit, some of the instrument displays would have to be shared by
the crewmen. Above all, Grumman was told, the spacecraft must be
designed so that the hover and touchdown could be flown manually and so
that no single failure of the controls or displays could cause a mission
abort.<a href = "#source11"><b>11</b></a><p>
Because the lunar module was a means of transportation, as well as
shelter and living quarters for the crew while on the moon, cockpit
design presented interesting problems to human factor engineers. The
man-machine interface embraced such items as stowage of space suits and
personal equipment and room for the pilots to move about within the
cabin. In a mockup in mid-1964, two crewmen demonstrated that they could
put on and take off their portable life support systems with suits
either pressurized or deflated, reach for and attach umbilical hoses,
and recharge their backpacks. The MSC Crew Systems Division drew up a
document governing spacecraft-spacesuit interface and change procedures.
This was used by NASA to supplement spacecraft specifications and
interface control documents. It was also an important managerial tool
between Grumman and North American and their major associates, MIT and
Hamilton Standard (developers of the guidance and navigation system and
the life support system).<a href = "#source12"><b>12</b></a><p>
The astronauts were an essential "subsystem" on the lunar
module, and they were very much in evidence at Bethpage, as well as at
Downey, where they helped in the design of the command module. Scott
Carpenter, Charles Conrad, and Donn F. Eisele drew the lunar module as
their special assignment, and William F. Rector, the lunar module
project officer, frequently called upon them for help. He also urged
other astronauts to take part in the periodic mockup reviews and
significant design decisions: "They should be [part] of it,"
Rector said. "They're going to fly it." This was not an
unusual arrangement; astronauts, being both engineers and test pilots,
have played an active role in the design and development of every manned
American space vehicle.<a href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a><p>
Conrad probably worked more on the vehicle's basic design than any other
pilot, as the configuration evolved. Rector relied on him to sound out
the crews on cockpit features - controls, switch locations, and
visibility, among others. One innovation which Grumman favored, and
which Conrad was instrumental in getting incorporated, was
electroluminescent lighting. An inherent problem in both aircraft and
spacecraft had been light intensity that varied from panel to panel.
This uneven lighting made it difficult for a pilot to scan his
instruments rapidly and to adjust quickly to low-level exterior light
conditions. Electroluminescence, a wholly new concept that used
phosphors instead of conventional filament bulbs, afforded an evenness
in intensities hitherto unequaled in any flying craft. At the same time,
it weighed less and used far less power than incandescent lighting.
Conrad also got this new system into the Block II command module.<a href
= "#source13"><b>13</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c150a.jpg" width=536 height=408 ALT="Seats in LM mockup">
<p>
<cite>Mockup of lunar module cabin with seats.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
The seating arrangement in the lunar module was perhaps the most radical
departure from tradition in tailoring the cockpit. It soon became
apparent that seats would be heavy, as well as restrictive for the bulky
space suits. Bar stools and metal cagelike structures were also
considered and discarded. Then an idea dawned. Why have seats in the
lander at all? Its flight would be brief, and the g loads moderate (one
g during powered flight and about five on landing). Since human legs
were good shock absorbers, why not let the crew fly the lunar module
standing up?
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c150b.jpg" width=583 height=406 ALT="LM cockpit interior - drawing">
<p>
<cite>NASA engineers in 1964 decided that astronauts could stand in the
lunar module cabin during the trip to the lunar surface. Note triangular
windows.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
This concept was bandied about rather casually at first by two Houston
engineers, George C. Franklin and Louie G. Richard. Franklin then went
with Conrad to talk to Howard Sherman and John Rigsby at Bethpage. These
Grumman employees, in turn, passed the idea along to Kelly and Robert
Mullaney. At this point, the seat and window problems merged. Standing
up, the crew would be close enough to the windows to get a larger field
of view (one engineer estimated it at 20 times greater) than with any
seating arrangement yet suggested. Moreover, since cockpit designers
would not have to worry about knee room, the cabin could be shortened,
saving 27 kilograms and improving the structure. Conrad called it a
"trolley car configuration," and said, "We get much
closer to the instruments without our knees getting in the way, and our
vision downward toward the moon's surface is greatly improved."
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c150c.gif" width=521 height=392 ALT="LM sleeping positions">
<p>
<cite>Proposed sleeping positions for astronauts on the moon.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Grumman technicians later devised a restraint system to hold the pilots
in place during weightless flight and prevent them from being jostled
about the cabin during landing. Resembling the harness used by window
washers and linked to a pulley and cable arrangement under constant
tension, it was augmented by handholds and arm rests and by Velcro
strips to keep the pilots' feet on the floor.<a href =
"#source14"><b>14</b></a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> An interesting example of pilot
preference influencing spacecraft design revolved around including an
"eight-ball" (an artificial-horizon instrument used for
attitude reference) in the lunar module. Grumman had proposed an
eight-ball, assuming that the astronauts would want it. Arnold Whitaker
recalled, "The first thing NASA did was to say that there's no
operational requirement for it - take it out. So we took it out. Then
the astronauts came along and said, 'That's ridiculous. We must have
it.' So we put it [back] in. By this time, we're late. Dr. Shea had a
program review and said, 'What's holding you up?' And we said, 'This is
one of the things. . . .' And he said, 'Take it out. I'll accept the
responsibility for it.' The astronauts found out about it and said, 'We
won't fly a vehicle until you put it in.' And NASA put it in, this time
with a kit [for easy removal later]."
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source10"><b>10</b>.</a> T. J. Kelly, "Technical
Development Status of the Project Apollo Lunar Excursion Module,"
paper presented at 10th Annual Meeting, American Astronautical Society,
AAS Preprint 64-16, 4–7 May 1964, pp. 28-29.<p>
<a name = "source11"><b>11</b>.</a> Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, <cite>NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966: Hearings
on S.927,</cite> 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 254; ASPO Status Report
for period ending 23 Oct. 1963; Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney,
"Requirements for Dual Flight Controls and Displays in the
LEM," 14 Jan. 1964; Andrew J. Farkas, "Lunar Module Display
and Control Subsystem," AER TN S-285 (MSC-04371), review copy, May
1971; F. John Bailey, Jr., to LEM Eng. Off., "Single-failure
Criterion," 22 Oct. 1963.<p>
<a name = "source12"><b>12</b>.</a> Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney,
"Stowage volume requirements for Lunar Excursion Module," 27
Nov. 1964; MSC, Consolidated Activity Report, 19 July–22 Aug. 1964, p.
21; Richard S. Johnston TWX to Hamilton Standard, Attn.: R. D.
Weatherbee, 17 July 1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn.: Mullaney,
"Memorandum of Understanding," 13 July 1964.<p>
<a name = "source13"><b>13</b>.</a> MSC news release 64-125, 9 July
1964; Rector interview; Arnold E. Whitaker, interview, Bethpage, 12 Feb.
1970; Rector TWX to Grumman, Attn.: C. William Rathke, "Inspection
of Lighted LM-1 Mockup," 9 July 1964; Rector to Grumman, Attn.:
Mullaney, "Lighting Mockup Review," 4 Aug. 1964, with enc.,
abstract of LEM Crew Integration Meeting, 16 July 1964; ASPO Weekly
Management Report, 8–15 Oct. 1964; Howard Sherman, interview, Bethpage,
11 Feb. 1970; Charles D. Wheelwright, "Crew Station Integration:
Volume V - Lighting Considerations," AER TN S-360 (MSC-07015),
review copy, November 1972.<p>
<a name = "source14"><b>14</b>.</a> Sherman interview; Kelly,
"Technical Development Status," p. 29; MSC news release 64-27,
12 Feb. 1964; Kelly interview; "Some Notes on Evolution of
LEM," p. 3.
<P>
<HR>
<P>
<CENTER><A HREF="ch6-2.html">
<IMG SRC="previous.gif" ALIGN="left"
ALT="Previous Page">
</A>
<A HREF="ch6-4.html">
<IMG SRC="next.gif" ALIGN="right"
ALT="Next Page">
</A>
<A HREF="contents.html">
<IMG SRC="index.gif" ALIGN="middle"
ALT="Table of Contents"></A>
</CENTER><BR>
<HR>
<P>
</BODY>
<!--ADA TEAM 2001-->
</HTML>