From a7bb4cfb6fd22a097a17baae0061ded88f5ceb7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: wxiaoguang Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 12:09:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Improve the host checking for migration --- custom/conf/app.example.ini | 1 + .../doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md | 2 +- modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go | 8 ++-- services/migrations/migrate.go | 11 +++-- services/migrations/migrate_test.go | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/custom/conf/app.example.ini b/custom/conf/app.example.ini index fb43ea95a1d44..08708948940fa 100644 --- a/custom/conf/app.example.ini +++ b/custom/conf/app.example.ini @@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ ROUTER = console ;BLOCKED_DOMAINS = ;; ;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default) +;; If a domain is allowed by ALLOWED_DOMAINS, this option will be ignored. ;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; diff --git a/docs/content/doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md b/docs/content/doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md index 84e3c6ae33df3..a0e6fb8f13b1b 100644 --- a/docs/content/doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md +++ b/docs/content/doc/advanced/config-cheat-sheet.en-us.md @@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ Task queue configuration has been moved to `queue.task`. However, the below conf - `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds) - `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`. - `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported. -- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 +- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291. If a domain is allowed by `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, this option will be ignored. - `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify ## Federation (`federation`) diff --git a/modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go b/modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go index 00bbc6cb0a83f..81c4202fcd98c 100644 --- a/modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go +++ b/modules/hostmatcher/hostmatcher.go @@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) checkIP(ip net.IP) bool { // MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool { + if hl == nil { + return false + } + hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host) if err != nil { hostname = host } - - if hl == nil { - return false - } if hl.checkPattern(hostname) { return true } diff --git a/services/migrations/migrate.go b/services/migrations/migrate.go index ce76733bd51a8..f2542173a0ee6 100644 --- a/services/migrations/migrate.go +++ b/services/migrations/migrate.go @@ -84,7 +84,10 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error { // some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName) + return checkByAllowBlockList(hostName, addrList) +} +func checkByAllowBlockList(hostName string, addrList []net.IP) error { var ipAllowed bool var ipBlocked bool for _, addr := range addrList { @@ -93,12 +96,12 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error { } var blockedError error if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked { - blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true} + blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true} } - // if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list first + // if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list before return to get the more accurate error if !allowList.IsEmpty() { if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed { - return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true} + return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true} } } // otherwise, we always follow the blocked list @@ -474,5 +477,7 @@ func Init() error { allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate) allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback) } + // TODO: at the moment, if ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false, ALLOWED_DOMAINS=domain.com, and domain.com has IP 127.0.0.1, then it's still allowed. + // if we want to block such case, the private&loopback should be added to the blockList when ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false return nil } diff --git a/services/migrations/migrate_test.go b/services/migrations/migrate_test.go index d09c184d91e0d..53cfe6d3ebe84 100644 --- a/services/migrations/migrate_test.go +++ b/services/migrations/migrate_test.go @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package migrations import ( + "net" "path/filepath" "testing" @@ -74,3 +75,42 @@ func TestMigrateWhiteBlocklist(t *testing.T) { setting.ImportLocalPaths = old } + +func TestAllowBlockList(t *testing.T) { + init := func(allow, block string, local bool) { + setting.Migrations.AllowedDomains = allow + setting.Migrations.BlockedDomains = block + setting.Migrations.AllowLocalNetworks = local + assert.NoError(t, Init()) + } + + // default, allow all external, block none, no local networks + init("", "", false) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")})) + + // allow all including local networks (it could lead to SSRF in production) + init("", "", true) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")})) + + // allow wildcard, block some subdomains. if the domain name is allowed, then the local network check is skipped + init("*.domain.com", "blocked.domain.com", false) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")})) + assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("blocked.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.other.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + + // allow wildcard (it could lead to SSRF in production) + init("*", "", false) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")})) + + // local network can still be blocked + init("*", "127.0.0.*", false) + assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")})) + assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")})) + + // reset + init("", "", false) +}