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Title
The
Art
of
War
Author
active
century
B
C
Sunzi
Translator
Lionel
Giles
Release
date
May
eBook
Most
recently
updated
October
Language
English
Original
publication
START
OF
THE
PROJECT
GUTENBERG
EBOOK
THE
ART
OF
WAR
Sun
Tzŭ
on
The
Art
of
War
THE
OLDEST
MILITARY
TREATISE
IN
THE
WORLD
Translated
from
the
Chinese
with
Introduction
and
Critical
Notes
BY
LIONEL
GILES
M
A
Assistant
in
the
Department
of
Oriental
Printed
Books
and
MSS
in
the
British
Museum
To
my
brother
Captain
Valentine
Giles
R
G
in
the
hope
that
a
work
years
old
may
yet
contain
lessons
worth
consideration
by
the
soldier
of
today
this
translation
is
affectionately
dedicated
Contents
Preface
to
the
Project
Gutenberg
Etext
Preface
by
Lionel
Giles
INTRODUCTION
Sun
Wu
and
his
Book
The
Text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
The
Commentators
Appreciations
of
Sun
Tzŭ
Apologies
for
War
Bibliography
Chapter
I
Laying
plans
Chapter
II
Waging
War
Chapter
III
Attack
by
Stratagem
Chapter
IV
Tactical
Dispositions
Chapter
V
Energy
Chapter
VI
Weak
Points
and
Strong
Chapter
VII
Manœuvring
Chapter
VIII
Variation
of
Tactics
Chapter
IX
The
Army
on
the
March
Chapter
X
Terrain
Chapter
XI
The
Nine
Situations
Chapter
XII
The
Attack
by
Fire
Chapter
XIII
The
Use
of
Spies
Preface
to
the
Project
Gutenberg
Etext
When
Lionel
Giles
began
his
translation
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
Art
of
War
the
work
was
virtually
unknown
in
Europe
Its
introduction
to
Europe
began
in
when
a
French
Jesuit
Father
living
in
China
Joseph
Amiot
acquired
a
copy
of
it
and
translated
it
into
French
It
was
not
a
good
translation
because
according
to
Dr
Giles
I
t
contains
a
great
deal
that
Sun
Tzŭ
did
not
write
and
very
little
indeed
of
what
he
did
The
first
translation
into
English
was
published
in
in
Tokyo
by
Capt
E
F
Calthrop
R
F
A
However
this
translation
is
in
the
words
of
Dr
Giles
excessively
bad
He
goes
further
in
this
criticism
It
is
not
merely
a
question
of
downright
blunders
from
which
none
can
hope
to
be
wholly
exempt
Omissions
were
frequent
hard
passages
were
willfully
distorted
or
slurred
over
Such
offenses
are
less
pardonable
They
would
not
be
tolerated
in
any
edition
of
a
Latin
or
Greek
classic
and
a
similar
standard
of
honesty
ought
to
be
insisted
upon
in
translations
from
Chinese
In
a
new
edition
of
Capt
Calthrop’s
translation
was
published
in
London
It
was
an
improvement
on
the
first—omissions
filled
up
and
numerous
mistakes
corrected—but
new
errors
were
created
in
the
process
Dr
Giles
in
justifying
his
translation
wrote
It
was
not
undertaken
out
of
any
inflated
estimate
of
my
own
powers
but
I
could
not
help
feeling
that
Sun
Tzŭ
deserved
a
better
fate
than
had
befallen
him
and
I
knew
that
at
any
rate
I
could
hardly
fail
to
improve
on
the
work
of
my
predecessors
Clearly
Dr
Giles’
work
established
much
of
the
groundwork
for
the
work
of
later
translators
who
published
their
own
editions
Of
the
later
editions
of
the
Art
of
War
I
have
examined
two
feature
Giles’
edited
translation
and
notes
the
other
two
present
the
same
basic
information
from
the
ancient
Chinese
commentators
found
in
the
Giles
edition
Of
these
four
Giles’
edition
is
the
most
scholarly
and
presents
the
reader
an
incredible
amount
of
information
concerning
Sun
Tzŭ’s
text
much
more
than
any
other
translation
The
Giles’
edition
of
the
Art
of
War
as
stated
above
was
a
scholarly
work
Dr
Giles
was
a
leading
sinologue
at
the
time
and
an
assistant
in
the
Department
of
Oriental
Printed
Books
and
Manuscripts
in
the
British
Museum
Apparently
he
wanted
to
produce
a
definitive
edition
superior
to
anything
else
that
existed
and
perhaps
something
that
would
become
a
standard
translation
It
was
the
best
translation
available
for
years
But
apparently
there
was
not
much
interest
in
Sun
Tzŭ
in
English
speaking
countries
since
it
took
the
start
of
the
Second
World
War
to
renew
interest
in
his
work
Several
people
published
unsatisfactory
English
translations
of
Sun
Tzŭ
In
Dr
Giles’
translation
was
edited
and
published
in
the
United
States
in
a
series
of
military
science
books
But
it
wasn’t
until
that
a
good
English
translation
by
Samuel
B
Griffith
and
still
in
print
was
published
that
was
an
equal
to
Giles’
translation
While
this
translation
is
more
lucid
than
Dr
Giles’
translation
it
lacks
his
copious
notes
that
make
his
so
interesting
Dr
Giles
produced
a
work
primarily
intended
for
scholars
of
the
Chinese
civilization
and
language
It
contains
the
Chinese
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
the
English
translation
and
voluminous
notes
along
with
numerous
footnotes
Unfortunately
some
of
his
notes
and
footnotes
contain
Chinese
characters
some
are
completely
Chinese
Thus
a
conversion
to
a
Latin
alphabet
etext
was
difficult
I
did
the
conversion
in
complete
ignorance
of
Chinese
except
for
what
I
learned
while
doing
the
conversion
Thus
I
faced
the
difficult
task
of
paraphrasing
it
while
retaining
as
much
of
the
important
text
as
I
could
Every
paraphrase
represents
a
loss
thus
I
did
what
I
could
to
retain
as
much
of
the
text
as
possible
Because
the
text
contains
a
Chinese
concordance
I
was
able
to
transliterate
proper
names
books
and
the
like
at
the
risk
of
making
the
text
more
obscure
However
the
text
on
the
whole
is
quite
satisfactory
for
the
casual
reader
a
transformation
made
possible
by
conversion
to
an
etext
However
I
come
away
from
this
task
with
the
feeling
of
loss
because
I
know
that
someone
with
a
background
in
Chinese
can
do
a
better
job
than
I
did
any
such
attempt
would
be
welcomed
Bob
Sutton
Preface
by
Lionel
Giles
The
seventh
volume
of
Mémoires
concernant
l’histoire
les
sciences
les
arts
les
mœurs
les
usages
c
des
Chinois
is
devoted
to
the
Art
of
War
and
contains
amongst
other
treatises
“Les
Treize
Articles
de
Sun
tse
”
translated
from
the
Chinese
by
a
Jesuit
Father
Joseph
Amiot
Père
Amiot
appears
to
have
enjoyed
no
small
reputation
as
a
sinologue
in
his
day
and
the
field
of
his
labours
was
certainly
extensive
But
his
so
called
translation
of
the
Sun
Tzŭ
if
placed
side
by
side
with
the
original
is
seen
at
once
to
be
little
better
than
an
imposture
It
contains
a
great
deal
that
Sun
Tzŭ
did
not
write
and
very
little
indeed
of
what
he
did
Here
is
a
fair
specimen
taken
from
the
opening
sentences
of
chapter
—
De
l’habileté
dans
le
gouvernement
des
Troupes
Sun
tse
dit
Ayez
les
noms
de
tous
les
Officiers
tant
généraux
que
subalternes
inscrivez
les
dans
un
catalogue
à
part
avec
la
note
des
talents
de
la
capacité
de
chacun
d’eux
afin
de
pouvoir
les
employer
avec
avantage
lorsque
l’occasion
en
sera
venue
Faites
en
sorte
que
tous
ceux
que
vous
devez
commander
soient
persuadés
que
votre
principale
attention
est
de
les
préserver
de
tout
dommage
Les
troupes
que
vous
ferez
avancer
contre
l’ennemi
doivent
être
comme
des
pierres
que
vous
lanceriez
contre
des
œufs
De
vous
à
l’ennemi
il
ne
doit
y
avoir
d’autre
différence
que
celle
du
fort
au
faible
du
vide
au
plein
Attaquez
à
découvert
mais
soyez
vainqueur
en
secret
Voilà
en
peu
de
mots
en
quoi
consiste
l’habileté
toute
la
perfection
même
du
gouvernement
des
troupes
Throughout
the
nineteenth
century
which
saw
a
wonderful
development
in
the
study
of
Chinese
literature
no
translator
ventured
to
tackle
Sun
Tzŭ
although
his
work
was
known
to
be
highly
valued
in
China
as
by
far
the
oldest
and
best
compendium
of
military
science
It
was
not
until
the
year
that
the
first
English
translation
by
Capt
E
F
Calthrop
R
F
A
appeared
at
Tokyo
under
the
title
“Sonshi”
the
Japanese
form
of
Sun
Tzŭ
Unfortunately
it
was
evident
that
the
translator’s
knowledge
of
Chinese
was
far
too
scanty
to
fit
him
to
grapple
with
the
manifold
difficulties
of
Sun
Tzŭ
He
himself
plainly
acknowledges
that
without
the
aid
of
two
Japanese
gentlemen
“the
accompanying
translation
would
have
been
impossible
”
We
can
only
wonder
then
that
with
their
help
it
should
have
been
so
excessively
bad
It
is
not
merely
a
question
of
downright
blunders
from
which
none
can
hope
to
be
wholly
exempt
Omissions
were
frequent
hard
passages
were
wilfully
distorted
or
slurred
over
Such
offences
are
less
pardonable
They
would
not
be
tolerated
in
any
edition
of
a
Greek
or
Latin
classic
and
a
similar
standard
of
honesty
ought
to
be
insisted
upon
in
translations
from
Chinese
From
blemishes
of
this
nature
at
least
I
believe
that
the
present
translation
is
free
It
was
not
undertaken
out
of
any
inflated
estimate
of
my
own
powers
but
I
could
not
help
feeling
that
Sun
Tzŭ
deserved
a
better
fate
than
had
befallen
him
and
I
knew
that
at
any
rate
I
could
hardly
fail
to
improve
on
the
work
of
my
predecessors
Towards
the
end
of
a
new
and
revised
edition
of
Capt
Calthrop’s
translation
was
published
in
London
this
time
however
without
any
allusion
to
his
Japanese
collaborators
My
first
three
chapters
were
then
already
in
the
printer’s
hands
so
that
the
criticisms
of
Capt
Calthrop
therein
contained
must
be
understood
as
referring
to
his
earlier
edition
This
is
on
the
whole
an
improvement
on
the
other
thought
there
still
remains
much
that
cannot
pass
muster
Some
of
the
grosser
blunders
have
been
rectified
and
lacunae
filled
up
but
on
the
other
hand
a
certain
number
of
new
mistakes
appear
The
very
first
sentence
of
the
introduction
is
startlingly
inaccurate
and
later
on
while
mention
is
made
of
“an
army
of
Japanese
commentators”
on
Sun
Tzŭ
who
are
these
by
the
way
not
a
word
is
vouchsafed
about
the
Chinese
commentators
who
nevertheless
I
venture
to
assert
form
a
much
more
numerous
and
infinitely
more
important
“army
”
A
few
special
features
of
the
present
volume
may
now
be
noticed
In
the
first
place
the
text
has
been
cut
up
into
numbered
paragraphs
both
in
order
to
facilitate
cross
reference
and
for
the
convenience
of
students
generally
The
division
follows
broadly
that
of
Sun
Hsing
yen’s
edition
but
I
have
sometimes
found
it
desirable
to
join
two
or
more
of
his
paragraphs
into
one
In
quoting
from
other
works
Chinese
writers
seldom
give
more
than
the
bare
title
by
way
of
reference
and
the
task
of
research
is
apt
to
be
seriously
hampered
in
consequence
With
a
view
to
obviating
this
difficulty
so
far
as
Sun
Tzŭ
is
concerned
I
have
also
appended
a
complete
concordance
of
Chinese
characters
following
in
this
the
admirable
example
of
Legge
though
an
alphabetical
arrangement
has
been
preferred
to
the
distribution
under
radicals
which
he
adopted
Another
feature
borrowed
from
“The
Chinese
Classics”
is
the
printing
of
text
translation
and
notes
on
the
same
page
the
notes
however
are
inserted
according
to
the
Chinese
method
immediately
after
the
passages
to
which
they
refer
From
the
mass
of
native
commentary
my
aim
has
been
to
extract
the
cream
only
adding
the
Chinese
text
here
and
there
when
it
seemed
to
present
points
of
literary
interest
Though
constituting
in
itself
an
important
branch
of
Chinese
literature
very
little
commentary
of
this
kind
has
hitherto
been
made
directly
accessible
by
translation
I
may
say
in
conclusion
that
owing
to
the
printing
off
of
my
sheets
as
they
were
completed
the
work
has
not
had
the
benefit
of
a
final
revision
On
a
review
of
the
whole
without
modifying
the
substance
of
my
criticisms
I
might
have
been
inclined
in
a
few
instances
to
temper
their
asperity
Having
chosen
to
wield
a
bludgeon
however
I
shall
not
cry
out
if
in
return
I
am
visited
with
more
than
a
rap
over
the
knuckles
Indeed
I
have
been
at
some
pains
to
put
a
sword
into
the
hands
of
future
opponents
by
scrupulously
giving
either
text
or
reference
for
every
passage
translated
A
scathing
review
even
from
the
pen
of
the
Shanghai
critic
who
despises
“mere
translations
”
would
not
I
must
confess
be
altogether
unwelcome
For
after
all
the
worst
fate
I
shall
have
to
dread
is
that
which
befell
the
ingenious
paradoxes
of
George
in
The
Vicar
of
Wakefield
INTRODUCTION
Sun
Wu
and
his
Book
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
gives
the
following
biography
of
Sun
Tzŭ
Sun
Tzŭ
Wu
was
a
native
of
the
Ch’i
State
His
Art
of
War
brought
him
to
the
notice
of
Ho
Lu
King
of
Wu
Ho
Lu
said
to
him
I
have
carefully
perused
your
chapters
May
I
submit
your
theory
of
managing
soldiers
to
a
slight
test
Sun
Tzŭ
replied
You
may
Ho
Lu
asked
May
the
test
be
applied
to
women
The
answer
was
again
in
the
affirmative
so
arrangements
were
made
to
bring
ladies
out
of
the
Palace
Sun
Tzŭ
divided
them
into
two
companies
and
placed
one
of
the
King’s
favourite
concubines
at
the
head
of
each
He
then
bade
them
all
take
spears
in
their
hands
and
addressed
them
thus
I
presume
you
know
the
difference
between
front
and
back
right
hand
and
left
hand
The
girls
replied
Yes
Sun
Tzŭ
went
on
When
I
say
Eyes
front
you
must
look
straight
ahead
When
I
say
Left
turn
you
must
face
towards
your
left
hand
When
I
say
Right
turn
you
must
face
towards
your
right
hand
When
I
say
About
turn
you
must
face
right
round
towards
your
back
Again
the
girls
assented
The
words
of
command
having
been
thus
explained
he
set
up
the
halberds
and
battle
axes
in
order
to
begin
the
drill
Then
to
the
sound
of
drums
he
gave
the
order
Right
turn
But
the
girls
only
burst
out
laughing
Sun
Tzŭ
said
If
words
of
command
are
not
clear
and
distinct
if
orders
are
not
thoroughly
understood
then
the
general
is
to
blame
So
he
started
drilling
them
again
and
this
time
gave
the
order
Left
turn
whereupon
the
girls
once
more
burst
into
fits
of
laughter
Sun
Tzŭ
If
words
of
command
are
not
clear
and
distinct
if
orders
are
not
thoroughly
understood
the
general
is
to
blame
But
if
his
orders
are
clear
and
the
soldiers
nevertheless
disobey
then
it
is
the
fault
of
their
officers
So
saying
he
ordered
the
leaders
of
the
two
companies
to
be
beheaded
Now
the
king
of
Wu
was
watching
the
scene
from
the
top
of
a
raised
pavilion
and
when
he
saw
that
his
favourite
concubines
were
about
to
be
executed
he
was
greatly
alarmed
and
hurriedly
sent
down
the
following
message
We
are
now
quite
satisfied
as
to
our
general’s
ability
to
handle
troops
If
we
are
bereft
of
these
two
concubines
our
meat
and
drink
will
lose
their
savor
It
is
our
wish
that
they
shall
not
be
beheaded
Sun
Tzŭ
replied
Having
once
received
His
Majesty’s
commission
to
be
the
general
of
his
forces
there
are
certain
commands
of
His
Majesty
which
acting
in
that
capacity
I
am
unable
to
accept
Accordingly
he
had
the
two
leaders
beheaded
and
straightway
installed
the
pair
next
in
order
as
leaders
in
their
place
When
this
had
been
done
the
drum
was
sounded
for
the
drill
once
more
and
the
girls
went
through
all
the
evolutions
turning
to
the
right
or
to
the
left
marching
ahead
or
wheeling
back
kneeling
or
standing
with
perfect
accuracy
and
precision
not
venturing
to
utter
a
sound
Then
Sun
Tzŭ
sent
a
messenger
to
the
King
saying
Your
soldiers
Sire
are
now
properly
drilled
and
disciplined
and
ready
for
your
majesty’s
inspection
They
can
be
put
to
any
use
that
their
sovereign
may
desire
bid
them
go
through
fire
and
water
and
they
will
not
disobey
But
the
King
replied
Let
our
general
cease
drilling
and
return
to
camp
As
for
us
We
have
no
wish
to
come
down
and
inspect
the
troops
Thereupon
Sun
Tzŭ
said
The
King
is
only
fond
of
words
and
cannot
translate
them
into
deeds
After
that
Ho
Lu
saw
that
Sun
Tzŭ
was
one
who
knew
how
to
handle
an
army
and
finally
appointed
him
general
In
the
west
he
defeated
the
Ch’u
State
and
forced
his
way
into
Ying
the
capital
to
the
north
he
put
fear
into
the
States
of
Ch’i
and
Chin
and
spread
his
fame
abroad
amongst
the
feudal
princes
And
Sun
Tzŭ
shared
in
the
might
of
the
King
About
Sun
Tzŭ
himself
this
is
all
that
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
has
to
tell
us
in
this
chapter
But
he
proceeds
to
give
a
biography
of
his
descendant
Sun
Pin
born
about
a
hundred
years
after
his
famous
ancestor’s
death
and
also
the
outstanding
military
genius
of
his
time
The
historian
speaks
of
him
too
as
Sun
Tzŭ
and
in
his
preface
we
read
Sun
Tzŭ
had
his
feet
cut
off
and
yet
continued
to
discuss
the
art
of
war
It
seems
likely
then
that
Pin
was
a
nickname
bestowed
on
him
after
his
mutilation
unless
the
story
was
invented
in
order
to
account
for
the
name
The
crowning
incident
of
his
career
the
crushing
defeat
of
his
treacherous
rival
P’ang
Chuan
will
be
found
briefly
related
in
Chapter
V
§
note
To
return
to
the
elder
Sun
Tzŭ
He
is
mentioned
in
two
other
passages
of
the
Shih
Chi
—
In
the
third
year
of
his
reign
B
C
Ho
Lu
king
of
Wu
took
the
field
with
Tzŭ
hsu
i
e
Wu
Yuan
and
Po
P’ei
and
attacked
Ch’u
He
captured
the
town
of
Shu
and
slew
the
two
prince’s
sons
who
had
formerly
been
generals
of
Wu
He
was
then
meditating
a
descent
on
Ying
the
capital
but
the
general
Sun
Wu
said
The
army
is
exhausted
It
is
not
yet
possible
We
must
wait
…
After
further
successful
fighting
in
the
ninth
year
B
C
King
Ho
Lu
addressed
Wu
Tzŭ
hsu
and
Sun
Wu
saying
Formerly
you
declared
that
it
was
not
yet
possible
for
us
to
enter
Ying
Is
the
time
ripe
now
The
two
men
replied
Ch’u’s
general
Tzŭ
ch’ang
is
grasping
and
covetous
and
the
princes
of
T’ang
and
Ts’ai
both
have
a
grudge
against
him
If
Your
Majesty
has
resolved
to
make
a
grand
attack
you
must
win
over
T’ang
and
Ts’ai
and
then
you
may
succeed
Ho
Lu
followed
this
advice
beat
Ch’u
in
five
pitched
battles
and
marched
into
Ying
This
is
the
latest
date
at
which
anything
is
recorded
of
Sun
Wu
He
does
not
appear
to
have
survived
his
patron
who
died
from
the
effects
of
a
wound
in
In
another
chapter
there
occurs
this
passage
From
this
time
onward
a
number
of
famous
soldiers
arose
one
after
the
other
Kao
fan
who
was
employed
by
the
Chin
State
Wang
tzu
in
the
service
of
Ch’i
and
Sun
Wu
in
the
service
of
Wu
These
men
developed
and
threw
light
upon
the
principles
of
war
It
is
obvious
enough
that
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
at
least
had
no
doubt
about
the
reality
of
Sun
Wu
as
an
historical
personage
and
with
one
exception
to
be
noticed
presently
he
is
by
far
the
most
important
authority
on
the
period
in
question
It
will
not
be
necessary
therefore
to
say
much
of
such
a
work
as
the
Wu
Yüeh
Ch’un
Ch’iu
which
is
supposed
to
have
been
written
by
Chao
Yeh
of
the
century
A
D
The
attribution
is
somewhat
doubtful
but
even
if
it
were
otherwise
his
account
would
be
of
little
value
based
as
it
is
on
the
Shih
Chi
and
expanded
with
romantic
details
The
story
of
Sun
Tzŭ
will
be
found
for
what
it
is
worth
in
chapter
The
only
new
points
in
it
worth
noting
are
Sun
Tzŭ
was
first
recommended
to
Ho
Lu
by
Wu
Tzŭ
hsu
He
is
called
a
native
of
Wu
He
had
previously
lived
a
retired
life
and
his
contemporaries
were
unaware
of
his
ability
The
following
passage
occurs
in
the
Huai
nan
Tzŭ
When
sovereign
and
ministers
show
perversity
of
mind
it
is
impossible
even
for
a
Sun
Tzŭ
to
encounter
the
foe
Assuming
that
this
work
is
genuine
and
hitherto
no
doubt
has
been
cast
upon
it
we
have
here
the
earliest
direct
reference
for
Sun
Tzŭ
for
Huai
nan
Tzŭ
died
in
B
C
many
years
before
the
Shih
Chi
was
given
to
the
world
Liu
Hsiang
B
C
says
The
reason
why
Sun
Tzŭ
at
the
head
of
men
beat
Ch’u
with
is
that
the
latter
were
undisciplined
Teng
Ming
shih
informs
us
that
the
surname
Sun
was
bestowed
on
Sun
Wu’s
grandfather
by
Duke
Ching
of
Ch’i
B
C
Sun
Wu’s
father
Sun
P’ing
rose
to
be
a
Minister
of
State
in
Ch’i
and
Sun
Wu
himself
whose
style
was
Ch’ang
ch’ing
fled
to
Wu
on
account
of
the
rebellion
which
was
being
fomented
by
the
kindred
of
T’ien
Pao
He
had
three
sons
of
whom
the
second
named
Ming
was
the
father
of
Sun
Pin
According
to
this
account
then
Pin
was
the
grandson
of
Wu
which
considering
that
Sun
Pin’s
victory
over
Wei
was
gained
in
B
C
may
be
dismissed
as
chronologically
impossible
Whence
these
data
were
obtained
by
Teng
Ming
shih
I
do
not
know
but
of
course
no
reliance
whatever
can
be
placed
in
them
An
interesting
document
which
has
survived
from
the
close
of
the
Han
period
is
the
short
preface
written
by
the
Great
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
or
Wei
Wu
Ti
for
his
edition
of
Sun
Tzŭ
I
shall
give
it
in
full
—
I
have
heard
that
the
ancients
used
bows
and
arrows
to
their
advantage
The
Lun
Yu
says
“There
must
be
a
sufficiency
of
military
strength
”
The
Shu
Ching
mentions
the
army
among
the
eight
objects
of
government
The
I
Ching
says
‘army’
indicates
firmness
and
justice
the
experienced
leader
will
have
good
fortune
The
Shih
Ching
says
The
King
rose
majestic
in
his
wrath
and
he
marshalled
his
troops
The
Yellow
Emperor
T’ang
the
Completer
and
Wu
Wang
all
used
spears
and
battle
axes
in
order
to
succour
their
generation
The
Ssu
ma
Fa
says
If
one
man
slay
another
of
set
purpose
he
himself
may
rightfully
be
slain
He
who
relies
solely
on
warlike
measures
shall
be
exterminated
he
who
relies
solely
on
peaceful
measures
shall
perish
Instances
of
this
are
Fu
Ch’ai
on
the
one
hand
and
Yen
Wang
on
the
other
In
military
matters
the
Sage’s
rule
is
normally
to
keep
the
peace
and
to
move
his
forces
only
when
occasion
requires
He
will
not
use
armed
force
unless
driven
to
it
by
necessity
Many
books
have
I
read
on
the
subject
of
war
and
fighting
but
the
work
composed
by
Sun
Wu
is
the
profoundest
of
them
all
Sun
Tzŭ
was
a
native
of
the
Ch’i
state
his
personal
name
was
Wu
He
wrote
the
Art
of
War
in
chapters
for
Ho
Lu
King
of
Wu
Its
principles
were
tested
on
women
and
he
was
subsequently
made
a
general
He
led
an
army
westwards
crushed
the
Ch’u
state
and
entered
Ying
the
capital
In
the
north
he
kept
Ch’i
and
Chin
in
awe
A
hundred
years
and
more
after
his
time
Sun
Pin
lived
He
was
a
descendant
of
Wu
In
his
treatment
of
deliberation
and
planning
the
importance
of
rapidity
in
taking
the
field
clearness
of
conception
and
depth
of
design
Sun
Tzŭ
stands
beyond
the
reach
of
carping
criticism
My
contemporaries
however
have
failed
to
grasp
the
full
meaning
of
his
instructions
and
while
putting
into
practice
the
smaller
details
in
which
his
work
abounds
they
have
overlooked
its
essential
purport
That
is
the
motive
which
has
led
me
to
outline
a
rough
explanation
of
the
whole
One
thing
to
be
noticed
in
the
above
is
the
explicit
statement
that
the
chapters
were
specially
composed
for
King
Ho
Lu
This
is
supported
by
the
internal
evidence
of
I
§
in
which
it
seems
clear
that
some
ruler
is
addressed
In
the
bibliographic
section
of
the
Han
Shu
there
is
an
entry
which
has
given
rise
to
much
discussion
The
works
of
Sun
Tzŭ
of
Wu
in
p’ien
or
chapters
with
diagrams
in
chuan
It
is
evident
that
this
cannot
be
merely
the
chapters
known
to
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
or
those
we
possess
today
Chang
Shou
chieh
refers
to
an
edition
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
Art
of
War
of
which
the
chapters
formed
the
first
chuan
adding
that
there
were
two
other
chuan
besides
This
has
brought
forth
a
theory
that
the
bulk
of
these
chapters
consisted
of
other
writings
of
Sun
Tzŭ—we
should
call
them
apocryphal—similar
to
the
Wen
Ta
of
which
a
specimen
dealing
with
the
Nine
Situations
is
preserved
in
the
T’ung
Tien
and
another
in
Ho
Shin’s
commentary
It
is
suggested
that
before
his
interview
with
Ho
Lu
Sun
Tzŭ
had
only
written
the
chapters
but
afterwards
composed
a
sort
of
exegesis
in
the
form
of
question
and
answer
between
himself
and
the
King
Pi
I
hsun
the
author
of
the
Sun
Tzŭ
Hsu
Lu
backs
this
up
with
a
quotation
from
the
Wu
Yüeh
Ch’un
Ch’iu
The
King
of
Wu
summoned
Sun
Tzŭ
and
asked
him
questions
about
the
art
of
war
Each
time
he
set
forth
a
chapter
of
his
work
the
King
could
not
find
words
enough
to
praise
him
As
he
points
out
if
the
whole
work
was
expounded
on
the
same
scale
as
in
the
above
mentioned
fragments
the
total
number
of
chapters
could
not
fail
to
be
considerable
Then
the
numerous
other
treatises
attributed
to
Sun
Tzŭ
might
be
included
The
fact
that
the
Han
Chih
mentions
no
work
of
Sun
Tzŭ
except
the
p’ien
whereas
the
Sui
and
T’ang
bibliographies
give
the
titles
of
others
in
addition
to
the
chapters
is
good
proof
Pi
I
hsun
thinks
that
all
of
these
were
contained
in
the
p’ien
Without
pinning
our
faith
to
the
accuracy
of
details
supplied
by
the
Wu
Yüeh
Ch’un
Ch’iu
or
admitting
the
genuineness
of
any
of
the
treatises
cited
by
Pi
I
hsun
we
may
see
in
this
theory
a
probable
solution
of
the
mystery
Between
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
and
Pan
Ku
there
was
plenty
of
time
for
a
luxuriant
crop
of
forgeries
to
have
grown
up
under
the
magic
name
of
Sun
Tzŭ
and
the
p’ien
may
very
well
represent
a
collected
edition
of
these
lumped
together
with
the
original
work
It
is
also
possible
though
less
likely
that
some
of
them
existed
in
the
time
of
the
earlier
historian
and
were
purposely
ignored
by
him
Tu
Mu’s
conjecture
seems
to
be
based
on
a
passage
which
states
Wei
Wu
Ti
strung
together
Sun
Wu’s
Art
of
War
which
in
turn
may
have
resulted
from
a
misunderstanding
of
the
final
words
of
Ts’ao
King’s
preface
This
as
Sun
Hsing
yen
points
out
is
only
a
modest
way
of
saying
that
he
made
an
explanatory
paraphrase
or
in
other
words
wrote
a
commentary
on
it
On
the
whole
this
theory
has
met
with
very
little
acceptance
Thus
the
Ssu
K’u
Ch’uan
Shu
says
The
mention
of
the
chapters
in
the
Shih
Chi
shows
that
they
were
in
existence
before
the
Han
Chih
and
that
latter
accretions
are
not
to
be
considered
part
of
the
original
work
Tu
Mu’s
assertion
can
certainly
not
be
taken
as
proof
There
is
every
reason
to
suppose
then
that
the
chapters
existed
in
the
time
of
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
practically
as
we
have
them
now
That
the
work
was
then
well
known
he
tells
us
in
so
many
words
Sun
Tzŭ’s
Chapters
and
Wu
Ch’i’s
Art
of
War
are
the
two
books
that
people
commonly
refer
to
on
the
subject
of
military
matters
Both
of
them
are
widely
distributed
so
I
will
not
discuss
them
here
But
as
we
go
further
back
serious
difficulties
begin
to
arise
The
salient
fact
which
has
to
be
faced
is
that
the
Tso
Chuan
the
greatest
contemporary
record
makes
no
mention
whatsoever
of
Sun
Wu
either
as
a
general
or
as
a
writer
It
is
natural
in
view
of
this
awkward
circumstance
that
many
scholars
should
not
only
cast
doubt
on
the
story
of
Sun
Wu
as
given
in
the
Shih
Chi
but
even
show
themselves
frankly
skeptical
as
to
the
existence
of
the
man
at
all
The
most
powerful
presentment
of
this
side
of
the
case
is
to
be
found
in
the
following
disposition
by
Yeh
Shui
hsin
—
It
is
stated
in
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien’s
history
that
Sun
Wu
was
a
native
of
the
Ch’i
State
and
employed
by
Wu
and
that
in
the
reign
of
Ho
Lu
he
crushed
Ch’u
entered
Ying
and
was
a
great
general
But
in
Tso’s
Commentary
no
Sun
Wu
appears
at
all
It
is
true
that
Tso’s
Commentary
need
not
contain
absolutely
everything
that
other
histories
contain
But
Tso
has
not
omitted
to
mention
vulgar
plebeians
and
hireling
ruffians
such
as
Ying
K’ao
shu
Ts’ao
Kuei
Chu
Chih
wu
and
Chuan
She
chu
In
the
case
of
Sun
Wu
whose
fame
and
achievements
were
so
brilliant
the
omission
is
much
more
glaring
Again
details
are
given
in
their
due
order
about
his
contemporaries
Wu
Yuan
and
the
Minister
P’ei
Is
it
credible
that
Sun
Wu
alone
should
have
been
passed
over
In
point
of
literary
style
Sun
Tzŭ’s
work
belongs
to
the
same
school
as
Kuan
Tzŭ
Liu
T’ao
and
the
Yüeh
Yu
and
may
have
been
the
production
of
some
private
scholar
living
towards
the
end
of
the
Spring
and
Autumn
or
the
beginning
of
the
Warring
States
period
The
story
that
his
precepts
were
actually
applied
by
the
Wu
State
is
merely
the
outcome
of
big
talk
on
the
part
of
his
followers
From
the
flourishing
period
of
the
Chou
dynasty
down
to
the
time
of
the
Spring
and
Autumn
all
military
commanders
were
statesmen
as
well
and
the
class
of
professional
generals
for
conducting
external
campaigns
did
not
then
exist
It
was
not
until
the
period
of
the
Six
States
that
this
custom
changed
Now
although
Wu
was
an
uncivilized
State
it
is
conceivable
that
Tso
should
have
left
unrecorded
the
fact
that
Sun
Wu
was
a
great
general
and
yet
held
no
civil
office
What
we
are
told
therefore
about
Jang
chu
and
Sun
Wu
is
not
authentic
matter
but
the
reckless
fabrication
of
theorizing
pundits
The
story
of
Ho
Lu’s
experiment
on
the
women
in
particular
is
utterly
preposterous
and
incredible
Yeh
Shui
hsin
represents
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
as
having
said
that
Sun
Wu
crushed
Ch’u
and
entered
Ying
This
is
not
quite
correct
No
doubt
the
impression
left
on
the
reader’s
mind
is
that
he
at
least
shared
in
these
exploits
The
fact
may
or
may
not
be
significant
but
it
is
nowhere
explicitly
stated
in
the
Shih
Chi
either
that
Sun
Tzŭ
was
general
on
the
occasion
of
the
taking
of
Ying
or
that
he
even
went
there
at
all
Moreover
as
we
know
that
Wu
Yuan
and
Po
P’ei
both
took
part
in
the
expedition
and
also
that
its
success
was
largely
due
to
the
dash
and
enterprise
of
Fu
Kai
Ho
Lu’s
younger
brother
it
is
not
easy
to
see
how
yet
another
general
could
have
played
a
very
prominent
part
in
the
same
campaign
Ch’en
Chen
sun
of
the
Sung
dynasty
has
the
note
—
Military
writers
look
upon
Sun
Wu
as
the
father
of
their
art
But
the
fact
that
he
does
not
appear
in
the
Tso
Chuan
although
he
is
said
to
have
served
under
Ho
Lu
King
of
Wu
makes
it
uncertain
what
period
he
really
belonged
to
He
also
says
—
The
works
of
Sun
Wu
and
Wu
Ch’i
may
be
of
genuine
antiquity
It
is
noticeable
that
both
Yeh
Shui
hsin
and
Ch’en
Chen
sun
while
rejecting
the
personality
of
Sun
Wu
as
he
figures
in
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien’s
history
are
inclined
to
accept
the
date
traditionally
assigned
to
the
work
which
passes
under
his
name
The
author
of
the
Hsu
Lu
fails
to
appreciate
this
distinction
and
consequently
his
bitter
attack
on
Ch’en
Chen
sun
really
misses
its
mark
He
makes
one
of
two
points
however
which
certainly
tell
in
favour
of
the
high
antiquity
of
our
chapters
Sun
Tzŭ
he
says
must
have
lived
in
the
age
of
Ching
Wang
because
he
is
frequently
plagiarized
in
subsequent
works
of
the
Chou
Ch’in
and
Han
dynasties
The
two
most
shameless
offenders
in
this
respect
are
Wu
Ch’i
and
Huai
nan
Tzŭ
both
of
them
important
historical
personages
in
their
day
The
former
lived
only
a
century
after
the
alleged
date
of
Sun
Tzŭ
and
his
death
is
known
to
have
taken
place
in
B
C
It
was
to
him
according
to
Liu
Hsiang
that
Tseng
Shen
delivered
the
Tso
Chuan
which
had
been
entrusted
to
him
by
its
author
Now
the
fact
that
quotations
from
the
Art
of
War
acknowledged
or
otherwise
are
to
be
found
in
so
many
authors
of
different
epochs
establishes
a
very
strong
anterior
to
them
all
—in
other
words
that
Sun
Tzŭ’s
treatise
was
already
in
existence
towards
the
end
of
the
century
B
C
Further
proof
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
antiquity
is
furnished
by
the
archaic
or
wholly
obsolete
meanings
attaching
to
a
number
of
the
words
he
uses
A
list
of
these
which
might
perhaps
be
extended
is
given
in
the
Hsu
Lu
and
though
some
of
the
interpretations
are
doubtful
the
main
argument
is
hardly
affected
thereby
Again
it
must
not
be
forgotten
that
Yeh
Shui
hsin
a
scholar
and
critic
of
the
first
rank
deliberately
pronounces
the
style
of
the
chapters
to
belong
to
the
early
part
of
the
fifth
century
Seeing
that
he
is
actually
engaged
in
an
attempt
to
disprove
the
existence
of
Sun
Wu
himself
we
may
be
sure
that
he
would
not
have
hesitated
to
assign
the
work
to
a
later
date
had
he
not
honestly
believed
the
contrary
And
it
is
precisely
on
such
a
point
that
the
judgment
of
an
educated
Chinaman
will
carry
most
weight
Other
internal
evidence
is
not
far
to
seek
Thus
in
XIII
§
there
is
an
unmistakable
allusion
to
the
ancient
system
of
land
tenure
which
had
already
passed
away
by
the
time
of
Mencius
who
was
anxious
to
see
it
revived
in
a
modified
form
The
only
warfare
Sun
Tzŭ
knows
is
that
carried
on
between
the
various
feudal
princes
in
which
armored
chariots
play
a
large
part
Their
use
seems
to
have
entirely
died
out
before
the
end
of
the
Chou
dynasty
He
speaks
as
a
man
of
Wu
a
state
which
ceased
to
exist
as
early
as
B
C
On
this
I
shall
touch
presently
But
once
refer
the
work
to
the
century
or
earlier
and
the
chances
of
its
being
other
than
a
bonâ
fide
production
are
sensibly
diminished
The
great
age
of
forgeries
did
not
come
until
long
after
That
it
should
have
been
forged
in
the
period
immediately
following
is
particularly
unlikely
for
no
one
as
a
rule
hastens
to
identify
himself
with
a
lost
cause
As
for
Yeh
Shui
hsin’s
theory
that
the
author
was
a
literary
recluse
that
seems
to
me
quite
untenable
If
one
thing
is
more
apparent
than
another
after
reading
the
maxims
of
Sun
Tzŭ
it
is
that
their
essence
has
been
distilled
from
a
large
store
of
personal
observation
and
experience
They
reflect
the
mind
not
only
of
a
born
strategist
gifted
with
a
rare
faculty
of
generalization
but
also
of
a
practical
soldier
closely
acquainted
with
the
military
conditions
of
his
time
To
say
nothing
of
the
fact
that
these
sayings
have
been
accepted
and
endorsed
by
all
the
greatest
captains
of
Chinese
history
they
offer
a
combination
of
freshness
and
sincerity
acuteness
and
common
sense
which
quite
excludes
the
idea
that
they
were
artificially
concocted
in
the
study
If
we
admit
then
that
the
chapters
were
the
genuine
production
of
a
military
man
living
towards
the
end
of
the
Ch’un
Ch’iu
period
are
we
not
bound
in
spite
of
the
silence
of
the
Tso
Chuan
to
accept
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien’s
account
in
its
entirety
In
view
of
his
high
repute
as
a
sober
historian
must
we
not
hesitate
to
assume
that
the
records
he
drew
upon
for
Sun
Wu’s
biography
were
false
and
untrustworthy
The
answer
I
fear
must
be
in
the
negative
There
is
still
one
grave
if
not
fatal
objection
to
the
chronology
involved
in
the
story
as
told
in
the
Shih
Chi
which
so
far
as
I
am
aware
nobody
has
yet
pointed
out
There
are
two
passages
in
Sun
Tzŭ
in
which
he
alludes
to
contemporary
affairs
The
first
in
in
VI
§
—
Though
according
to
my
estimate
the
soldiers
of
Yüeh
exceed
our
own
in
number
that
shall
advantage
them
nothing
in
the
matter
of
victory
I
say
then
that
victory
can
be
achieved
The
other
is
in
XI
§
—
Asked
if
an
army
can
be
made
to
imitate
the
shuai
jan
I
should
answer
Yes
For
the
men
of
Wu
and
the
men
of
Yüeh
are
enemies
yet
if
they
are
crossing
a
river
in
the
same
boat
and
are
caught
by
a
storm
they
will
come
to
each
other’s
assistance
just
as
the
left
hand
helps
the
right
These
two
paragraphs
are
extremely
valuable
as
evidence
of
the
date
of
composition
They
assign
the
work
to
the
period
of
the
struggle
between
Wu
and
Yüeh
So
much
has
been
observed
by
Pi
I
hsun
But
what
has
hitherto
escaped
notice
is
that
they
also
seriously
impair
the
credibility
of
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien’s
narrative
As
we
have
seen
above
the
first
positive
date
given
in
connection
with
Sun
Wu
is
B
C
He
is
then
spoken
of
as
a
general
acting
as
confidential
adviser
to
Ho
Lu
so
that
his
alleged
introduction
to
that
monarch
had
already
taken
place
and
of
course
the
chapters
must
have
been
written
earlier
still
But
at
that
time
and
for
several
years
after
down
to
the
capture
of
Ying
in
Ch’u
and
not
Yüeh
was
the
great
hereditary
enemy
of
Wu
The
two
states
Ch’u
and
Wu
had
been
constantly
at
war
for
over
half
a
century
whereas
the
first
war
between
Wu
and
Yüeh
was
waged
only
in
and
even
then
was
no
more
than
a
short
interlude
sandwiched
in
the
midst
of
the
fierce
struggle
with
Ch’u
Now
Ch’u
is
not
mentioned
in
the
chapters
at
all
The
natural
inference
is
that
they
were
written
at
a
time
when
Yüeh
had
become
the
prime
antagonist
of
Wu
that
is
after
Ch’u
had
suffered
the
great
humiliation
of
At
this
point
a
table
of
dates
may
be
found
useful
B
C
Accession
of
Ho
Lu
Ho
Lu
attacks
Ch’u
but
is
dissuaded
from
entering
Ying
the
capital
Shih
Chi
mentions
Sun
Wu
as
general
Another
attack
on
Ch’u
Wu
makes
a
successful
attack
on
Yüeh
This
is
the
first
war
between
the
two
states
or
Ch’u
invades
Wu
but
is
signally
defeated
at
Yu
chang
Ho
Lu
attacks
Ch’u
with
the
aid
of
T’ang
and
Ts’ai
Decisive
battle
of
Po
chu
and
capture
of
Ying
Last
mention
of
Sun
Wu
in
Shih
Chi
Yüeh
makes
a
raid
on
Wu
in
the
absence
of
its
army
Wu
is
beaten
by
Ch’in
and
evacuates
Ying
Ho
Lu
sends
Fu
Ch’ai
to
attack
Ch’u
Kou
Chien
becomes
King
of
Yüeh
Wu
attacks
Yüeh
but
is
defeated
by
Kou
Chien
at
Tsui
li
Ho
Lu
is
killed
Fu
Ch’ai
defeats
Kou
Chien
in
the
great
battle
of
Fu
chaio
and
enters
the
capital
of
Yüeh
or
Kou
Chien
renders
homage
to
Wu
Death
of
Wu
Tzŭ
hsu
Kou
Chien
invades
Wu
in
the
absence
of
Fu
Ch’ai
to
Further
attacks
by
Yüeh
on
Wu
Kou
Chien
lays
siege
to
the
capital
of
Wu
Final
defeat
and
extinction
of
Wu
The
sentence
quoted
above
from
VI
§
hardly
strikes
me
as
one
that
could
have
been
written
in
the
full
flush
of
victory
It
seems
rather
to
imply
that
for
the
moment
at
least
the
tide
had
turned
against
Wu
and
that
she
was
getting
the
worst
of
the
struggle
Hence
we
may
conclude
that
our
treatise
was
not
in
existence
in
before
which
date
Yüeh
does
not
appear
to
have
scored
any
notable
success
against
Wu
Ho
Lu
died
in
so
that
if
the
book
was
written
for
him
it
must
have
been
during
the
period
when
there
was
a
lull
in
the
hostilities
Wu
having
presumably
exhausted
by
its
supreme
effort
against
Ch’u
On
the
other
hand
if
we
choose
to
disregard
the
tradition
connecting
Sun
Wu’s
name
with
Ho
Lu
it
might
equally
well
have
seen
the
light
between
and
or
possibly
in
the
period
when
Yüeh
was
once
again
becoming
a
very
serious
menace
We
may
feel
fairly
certain
that
the
author
whoever
he
may
have
been
was
not
a
man
of
any
great
eminence
in
his
own
day
On
this
point
the
negative
testimony
of
the
Tso
Chuan
far
outweighs
any
shred
of
authority
still
attaching
to
the
Shih
Chi
if
once
its
other
facts
are
discredited
Sun
Hsing
yen
however
makes
a
feeble
attempt
to
explain
the
omission
of
his
name
from
the
great
commentary
It
was
Wu
Tzŭ
hsu
he
says
who
got
all
the
credit
of
Sun
Wu’s
exploits
because
the
latter
being
an
alien
was
not
rewarded
with
an
office
in
the
State
How
then
did
the
Sun
Tzŭ
legend
originate
It
may
be
that
the
growing
celebrity
of
the
book
imparted
by
degrees
a
kind
of
factitious
renown
to
its
author
It
was
felt
to
be
only
right
and
proper
that
one
so
well
versed
in
the
science
of
war
should
have
solid
achievements
to
his
credit
as
well
Now
the
capture
of
Ying
was
undoubtedly
the
greatest
feat
of
arms
in
Ho
Lu’s
reign
it
made
a
deep
and
lasting
impression
on
all
the
surrounding
states
and
raised
Wu
to
the
short
lived
zenith
of
her
power
Hence
what
more
natural
as
time
went
on
than
that
the
acknowledged
master
of
strategy
Sun
Wu
should
be
popularly
identified
with
that
campaign
at
first
perhaps
only
in
the
sense
that
his
brain
conceived
and
planned
it
afterwards
that
it
was
actually
carried
out
by
him
in
conjunction
with
Wu
Yuan
Po
P’ei
and
Fu
Kai
It
is
obvious
that
any
attempt
to
reconstruct
even
the
outline
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
life
must
be
based
almost
wholly
on
conjecture
With
this
necessary
proviso
I
should
say
that
he
probably
entered
the
service
of
Wu
about
the
time
of
Ho
Lu’s
accession
and
gathered
experience
though
only
in
the
capacity
of
a
subordinate
officer
during
the
intense
military
activity
which
marked
the
first
half
of
the
prince’s
reign
If
he
rose
to
be
a
general
at
all
he
certainly
was
never
on
an
equal
footing
with
the
three
above
mentioned
He
was
doubtless
present
at
the
investment
and
occupation
of
Ying
and
witnessed
Wu’s
sudden
collapse
in
the
following
year
Yüeh’s
attack
at
this
critical
juncture
when
her
rival
was
embarrassed
on
every
side
seems
to
have
convinced
him
that
this
upstart
kingdom
was
the
great
enemy
against
whom
every
effort
would
henceforth
have
to
be
directed
Sun
Wu
was
thus
a
well
seasoned
warrior
when
he
sat
down
to
write
his
famous
book
which
according
to
my
reckoning
must
have
appeared
towards
the
end
rather
than
the
beginning
of
Ho
Lu’s
reign
The
story
of
the
women
may
possibly
have
grown
out
of
some
real
incident
occurring
about
the
same
time
As
we
hear
no
more
of
Sun
Wu
after
this
from
any
source
he
is
hardly
likely
to
have
survived
his
patron
or
to
have
taken
part
in
the
death
struggle
with
Yüeh
which
began
with
the
disaster
at
Tsui
li
If
these
inferences
are
approximately
correct
there
is
a
certain
irony
in
the
fate
which
decreed
that
China’s
most
illustrious
man
of
peace
should
be
contemporary
with
her
greatest
writer
on
war
The
Text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
I
have
found
it
difficult
to
glean
much
about
the
history
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
text
The
quotations
that
occur
in
early
authors
go
to
show
that
the
chapters
of
which
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
speaks
were
essentially
the
same
as
those
now
extant
We
have
his
word
for
it
that
they
were
widely
circulated
in
his
day
and
can
only
regret
that
he
refrained
from
discussing
them
on
that
account
Sun
Hsing
yen
says
in
his
preface
—
During
the
Ch’in
and
Han
dynasties
Sun
Tzŭ’s
Art
of
War
was
in
general
use
amongst
military
commanders
but
they
seem
to
have
treated
it
as
a
work
of
mysterious
import
and
were
unwilling
to
expound
it
for
the
benefit
of
posterity
Thus
it
came
about
that
Wei
Wu
was
the
first
to
write
a
commentary
on
it
As
we
have
already
seen
there
is
no
reasonable
ground
to
suppose
that
Ts’ao
Kung
tampered
with
the
text
But
the
text
itself
is
often
so
obscure
and
the
number
of
editions
which
appeared
from
that
time
onward
so
great
especially
during
the
T’ang
and
Sung
dynasties
that
it
would
be
surprising
if
numerous
corruptions
had
not
managed
to
creep
in
Towards
the
middle
of
the
Sung
period
by
which
time
all
the
chief
commentaries
on
Sun
Tzŭ
were
in
existence
a
certain
Chi
T’ien
pao
published
a
work
in
chuan
entitled
Sun
Tzŭ
with
the
collected
commentaries
of
ten
writers
There
was
another
text
with
variant
readings
put
forward
by
Chu
Fu
of
Ta
hsing
which
also
had
supporters
among
the
scholars
of
that
period
but
in
the
Ming
editions
Sun
Hsing
yen
tells
us
these
readings
were
for
some
reason
or
other
no
longer
put
into
circulation
Thus
until
the
end
of
the
century
the
text
in
sole
possession
of
the
field
was
one
derived
from
Chi
T’ien
pao’s
edition
although
no
actual
copy
of
that
important
work
was
known
to
have
survived
That
therefore
is
the
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
which
appears
in
the
War
section
of
the
great
Imperial
encyclopedia
printed
in
the
Ku
Chin
T’u
Shu
Chi
Ch’eng
Another
copy
at
my
disposal
of
what
is
practically
the
same
text
with
slight
variations
is
that
contained
in
the
Eleven
philosophers
of
the
Chou
and
Ch’in
dynasties
And
the
Chinese
printed
in
Capt
Calthrop’s
first
edition
is
evidently
a
similar
version
which
has
filtered
through
Japanese
channels
So
things
remained
until
Sun
Hsing
yen
a
distinguished
antiquarian
and
classical
scholar
who
claimed
to
be
an
actual
descendant
of
Sun
Wu
accidentally
discovered
a
copy
of
Chi
T’ien
pao’s
long
lost
work
when
on
a
visit
to
the
library
of
the
Hua
yin
temple
Appended
to
it
was
the
I
Shuo
of
Cheng
Yu
Hsien
mentioned
in
the
T’ung
Chih
and
also
believed
to
have
perished
This
is
what
Sun
Hsing
yen
designates
as
the
original
edition
or
text
—a
rather
misleading
name
for
it
cannot
by
any
means
claim
to
set
before
us
the
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
in
its
pristine
purity
Chi
T’ien
pao
was
a
careless
compiler
and
appears
to
have
been
content
to
reproduce
the
somewhat
debased
version
current
in
his
day
without
troubling
to
collate
it
with
the
earliest
editions
then
available
Fortunately
two
versions
of
Sun
Tzŭ
even
older
than
the
newly
discovered
work
were
still
extant
one
buried
in
the
T’ung
Tien
Tu
Yu’s
great
treatise
on
the
Constitution
the
other
similarly
enshrined
in
the
T’ai
P’ing
Yu
Lan
encyclopedia
In
both
the
complete
text
is
to
be
found
though
split
up
into
fragments
intermixed
with
other
matter
and
scattered
piecemeal
over
a
number
of
different
sections
Considering
that
the
Yu
Lan
takes
us
back
to
the
year
and
the
T’ung
Tien
about
years
further
still
to
the
middle
of
the
T’ang
dynasty
the
value
of
these
early
transcripts
of
Sun
Tzŭ
can
hardly
be
overestimated
Yet
the
idea
of
utilizing
them
does
not
seem
to
have
occurred
to
anyone
until
Sun
Hsing
yen
acting
under
Government
instructions
undertook
a
thorough
recension
of
the
text
This
is
his
own
account
—
Because
of
the
numerous
mistakes
in
the
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
which
his
editors
had
handed
down
the
Government
ordered
that
the
ancient
edition
of
Chi
T’ien
pao
should
be
used
and
that
the
text
should
be
revised
and
corrected
throughout
It
happened
that
Wu
Nien
hu
the
Governor
Pi
Kua
and
Hsi
a
graduate
of
the
second
degree
had
all
devoted
themselves
to
this
study
probably
surpassing
me
therein
Accordingly
I
have
had
the
whole
work
cut
on
blocks
as
a
textbook
for
military
men
The
three
individuals
here
referred
to
had
evidently
been
occupied
on
the
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
prior
to
Sun
Hsing
yen’s
commission
but
we
are
left
in
doubt
as
to
the
work
they
really
accomplished
At
any
rate
the
new
edition
when
ultimately
produced
appeared
in
the
names
of
Sun
Hsing
yen
and
only
one
co
editor
Wu
Jen
shi
They
took
the
original
edition
as
their
basis
and
by
careful
comparison
with
older
versions
as
well
as
the
extant
commentaries
and
other
sources
of
information
such
as
the
I
Shuo
succeeded
in
restoring
a
very
large
number
of
doubtful
passages
and
turned
out
on
the
whole
what
must
be
accepted
as
the
closest
approximation
we
are
ever
likely
to
get
to
Sun
Tzŭ’s
original
work
This
is
what
will
hereafter
be
denominated
the
standard
text
The
copy
which
I
have
used
belongs
to
a
reissue
dated
It
is
in
pen
forming
part
of
a
well
printed
set
of
early
philosophical
works
in
pen
It
opens
with
a
preface
by
Sun
Hsing
yen
largely
quoted
in
this
introduction
vindicating
the
traditional
view
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
life
and
performances
and
summing
up
in
remarkably
concise
fashion
the
evidence
in
its
favour
This
is
followed
by
Ts’ao
Kung’s
preface
to
his
edition
and
the
biography
of
Sun
Tzŭ
from
the
Shih
Chi
both
translated
above
Then
come
firstly
Cheng
Yu
hsien’s
I
Shuo
with
author’s
preface
and
next
a
short
miscellany
of
historical
and
bibliographical
information
entitled
Sun
Tzŭ
Hsu
Lu
compiled
by
Pi
I
hsun
As
regards
the
body
of
the
work
each
separate
sentence
is
followed
by
a
note
on
the
text
if
required
and
then
by
the
various
commentaries
appertaining
to
it
arranged
in
chronological
order
These
we
shall
now
proceed
to
discuss
briefly
one
by
one
The
Commentators
Sun
Tzŭ
can
boast
an
exceptionally
long
distinguished
roll
of
commentators
which
would
do
honour
to
any
classic
Ou
yang
Hsiu
remarks
on
this
fact
though
he
wrote
before
the
tale
was
complete
and
rather
ingeniously
explains
it
by
saying
that
the
artifices
of
war
being
inexhaustible
must
therefore
be
susceptible
of
treatment
in
a
great
variety
of
ways
TS’AO
TS’AO
or
Ts’ao
Kung
afterwards
known
as
Wei
Wu
Ti
A
D
There
is
hardly
any
room
for
doubt
that
the
earliest
commentary
on
Sun
Tzŭ
actually
came
from
the
pen
of
this
extraordinary
man
whose
biography
in
the
San
Kuo
Chih
reads
like
a
romance
One
of
the
greatest
military
geniuses
that
the
world
has
seen
and
Napoleonic
in
the
scale
of
his
operations
he
was
especially
famed
for
the
marvelous
rapidity
of
his
marches
which
has
found
expression
in
the
line
Talk
of
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
and
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
will
appear
Ou
yang
Hsiu
says
of
him
that
he
was
a
great
captain
who
measured
his
strength
against
Tung
Cho
Lu
Pu
and
the
two
Yuan
father
and
son
and
vanquished
them
all
whereupon
he
divided
the
Empire
of
Han
with
Wu
and
Shu
and
made
himself
king
It
is
recorded
that
whenever
a
council
of
war
was
held
by
Wei
on
the
eve
of
a
far
reaching
campaign
he
had
all
his
calculations
ready
those
generals
who
made
use
of
them
did
not
lose
one
battle
in
ten
those
who
ran
counter
to
them
in
any
particular
saw
their
armies
incontinently
beaten
and
put
to
flight
Ts’ao
Kung’s
notes
on
Sun
Tzŭ
models
of
austere
brevity
are
so
thoroughly
characteristic
of
the
stern
commander
known
to
history
that
it
is
hard
indeed
to
conceive
of
them
as
the
work
of
a
mere
littérateur
Sometimes
indeed
owing
to
extreme
compression
they
are
scarcely
intelligible
and
stand
no
less
in
need
of
a
commentary
than
the
text
itself
MENG
SHIH
The
commentary
which
has
come
down
to
us
under
this
name
is
comparatively
meager
and
nothing
about
the
author
is
known
Even
his
personal
name
has
not
been
recorded
Chi
T’ien
pao’s
edition
places
him
after
Chia
Lin
and
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
also
assigns
him
to
the
T’ang
dynasty
but
this
is
a
mistake
In
Sun
Hsing
yen’s
preface
he
appears
as
Meng
Shih
of
the
Liang
dynasty
Others
would
identify
him
with
Meng
K’ang
of
the
century
He
is
named
in
one
work
as
the
last
of
the
Five
Commentators
the
others
being
Wei
Wu
Ti
Tu
Mu
Ch’en
Hao
and
Chia
Lin
LI
CH’UAN
of
the
century
was
a
well
known
writer
on
military
tactics
One
of
his
works
has
been
in
constant
use
down
to
the
present
day
The
T’ung
Chih
mentions
Lives
of
famous
generals
from
the
Chou
to
the
T’ang
dynasty
as
written
by
him
According
to
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
and
the
T’ien
i
ko
catalogue
he
followed
a
variant
of
the
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
which
differs
considerably
from
those
now
extant
His
notes
are
mostly
short
and
to
the
point
and
he
frequently
illustrates
his
remarks
by
anecdotes
from
Chinese
history
TU
YU
died
did
not
publish
a
separate
commentary
on
Sun
Tzŭ
his
notes
being
taken
from
the
T’ung
Tien
the
encyclopedic
treatise
on
the
Constitution
which
was
his
life
work
They
are
largely
repetitions
of
Ts’ao
Kung
and
Meng
Shih
besides
which
it
is
believed
that
he
drew
on
the
ancient
commentaries
of
Wang
Ling
and
others
Owing
to
the
peculiar
arrangement
of
T’ung
Tien
he
has
to
explain
each
passage
on
its
merits
apart
from
the
context
and
sometimes
his
own
explanation
does
not
agree
with
that
of
Ts’ao
Kung
whom
he
always
quotes
first
Though
not
strictly
to
be
reckoned
as
one
of
the
Ten
Commentators
he
was
added
to
their
number
by
Chi
T’ien
pao
being
wrongly
placed
after
his
grandson
Tu
Mu
TU
MU
is
perhaps
the
best
known
as
a
poet—a
bright
star
even
in
the
glorious
galaxy
of
the
T’ang
period
We
learn
from
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
that
although
he
had
no
practical
experience
of
war
he
was
extremely
fond
of
discussing
the
subject
and
was
moreover
well
read
in
the
military
history
of
the
Ch’un
Ch’iu
and
Chan
Kuo
eras
His
notes
therefore
are
well
worth
attention
They
are
very
copious
and
replete
with
historical
parallels
The
gist
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
work
is
thus
summarized
by
him
Practice
benevolence
and
justice
but
on
the
other
hand
make
full
use
of
artifice
and
measures
of
expediency
He
further
declared
that
all
the
military
triumphs
and
disasters
of
the
thousand
years
which
had
elapsed
since
Sun
Tzŭ’s
death
would
upon
examination
be
found
to
uphold
and
corroborate
in
every
particular
the
maxims
contained
in
his
book
Tu
Mu’s
somewhat
spiteful
charge
against
Ts’ao
Kung
has
already
been
considered
elsewhere
CH’EN
HAO
appears
to
have
been
a
contemporary
of
Tu
Mu
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
says
that
he
was
impelled
to
write
a
new
commentary
on
Sun
Tzŭ
because
Ts’ao
Kung’s
on
the
one
hand
was
too
obscure
and
subtle
and
that
of
Tu
Mu
on
the
other
too
long
winded
and
diffuse
Ou
yang
Hsiu
writing
in
the
middle
of
the
century
calls
Ts’ao
Kung
Tu
Mu
and
Ch’en
Hao
the
three
chief
commentators
on
Sun
Tzŭ
and
observes
that
Ch’en
Hao
is
continually
attacking
Tu
Mu’s
shortcomings
His
commentary
though
not
lacking
in
merit
must
rank
below
those
of
his
predecessors
CHIA
LIN
is
known
to
have
lived
under
the
T’ang
dynasty
for
his
commentary
on
Sun
Tzŭ
is
mentioned
in
the
T’ang
Shu
and
was
afterwards
republished
by
Chi
Hsieh
of
the
same
dynasty
together
with
those
of
Meng
Shih
and
Tu
Yu
It
is
of
somewhat
scanty
texture
and
in
point
of
quality
too
perhaps
the
least
valuable
of
the
eleven
MEI
YAO
CH’EN
commonly
known
by
his
style
as
Mei
Sheng
yu
was
like
Tu
Mu
a
poet
of
distinction
His
commentary
was
published
with
a
laudatory
preface
by
the
great
Ou
yang
Hsiu
from
which
we
may
cull
the
following
—
Later
scholars
have
misread
Sun
Tzŭ
distorting
his
words
and
trying
to
make
them
square
with
their
own
one
sided
views
Thus
though
commentators
have
not
been
lacking
only
a
few
have
proved
equal
to
the
task
My
friend
Sheng
yu
has
not
fallen
into
this
mistake
In
attempting
to
provide
a
critical
commentary
for
Sun
Tzŭ’s
work
he
does
not
lose
sight
of
the
fact
that
these
sayings
were
intended
for
states
engaged
in
internecine
warfare
that
the
author
is
not
concerned
with
the
military
conditions
prevailing
under
the
sovereigns
of
the
three
ancient
dynasties
nor
with
the
nine
punitive
measures
prescribed
to
the
Minister
of
War
Again
Sun
Wu
loved
brevity
of
diction
but
his
meaning
is
always
deep
Whether
the
subject
be
marching
an
army
or
handling
soldiers
or
estimating
the
enemy
or
controlling
the
forces
of
victory
it
is
always
systematically
treated
the
sayings
are
bound
together
in
strict
logical
sequence
though
this
has
been
obscured
by
commentators
who
have
probably
failed
to
grasp
their
meaning
In
his
own
commentary
Mei
Sheng
yu
has
brushed
aside
all
the
obstinate
prejudices
of
these
critics
and
has
tried
to
bring
out
the
true
meaning
of
Sun
Tzŭ
himself
In
this
way
the
clouds
of
confusion
have
been
dispersed
and
the
sayings
made
clear
I
am
convinced
that
the
present
work
deserves
to
be
handed
down
side
by
side
with
the
three
great
commentaries
and
for
a
great
deal
that
they
find
in
the
sayings
coming
generations
will
have
constant
reason
to
thank
my
friend
Sheng
yu
Making
some
allowance
for
the
exuberance
of
friendship
I
am
inclined
to
endorse
this
favourable
judgment
and
would
certainly
place
him
above
Ch’en
Hao
in
order
of
merit
WANG
HSI
also
of
the
Sung
dynasty
is
decidedly
original
in
some
of
his
interpretations
but
much
less
judicious
than
Mei
Yao
ch’en
and
on
the
whole
not
a
very
trustworthy
guide
He
is
fond
of
comparing
his
own
commentary
with
that
of
Ts’ao
Kung
but
the
comparison
is
not
often
flattering
to
him
We
learn
from
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
that
Wang
Hsi
revised
the
ancient
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
filling
up
lacunae
and
correcting
mistakes
HO
YEN
HSI
of
the
Sung
dynasty
The
personal
name
of
this
commentator
is
given
as
above
by
Cheng
Ch’iao
in
the
Tung
Chih
written
about
the
middle
of
the
twelfth
century
but
he
appears
simply
as
Ho
Shih
in
the
Yu
Hai
and
Ma
Tuan
lin
quotes
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
as
saying
that
his
personal
name
is
unknown
There
seems
to
be
no
reason
to
doubt
Cheng
Ch’iao’s
statement
otherwise
I
should
have
been
inclined
to
hazard
a
guess
and
identify
him
with
one
Ho
Ch’u
fei
the
author
of
a
short
treatise
on
war
who
lived
in
the
latter
part
of
the
century
Ho
Shih’s
commentary
in
the
words
of
the
T’ien
i
ko
catalogue
contains
helpful
additions
here
and
there
but
is
chiefly
remarkable
for
the
copious
extracts
taken
in
adapted
form
from
the
dynastic
histories
and
other
sources
CHANG
YU
The
list
closes
with
a
commentator
of
no
great
originality
perhaps
but
gifted
with
admirable
powers
of
lucid
exposition
His
commentator
is
based
on
that
of
Ts’ao
Kung
whose
terse
sentences
he
contrives
to
expand
and
develop
in
masterly
fashion
Without
Chang
Yu
it
is
safe
to
say
that
much
of
Ts’ao
Kung’s
commentary
would
have
remained
cloaked
in
its
pristine
obscurity
and
therefore
valueless
His
work
is
not
mentioned
in
the
Sung
history
the
T’ung
K’ao
or
the
Yu
Hai
but
it
finds
a
niche
in
the
T’ung
Chih
which
also
names
him
as
the
author
of
the
Lives
of
Famous
Generals
It
is
rather
remarkable
that
the
last
named
four
should
all
have
flourished
within
so
short
a
space
of
time
Ch’ao
Kung
wu
accounts
for
it
by
saying
During
the
early
years
of
the
Sung
dynasty
the
Empire
enjoyed
a
long
spell
of
peace
and
men
ceased
to
practice
the
art
of
war
but
when
Chao
Yuan
hao’s
rebellion
came
and
the
frontier
generals
were
defeated
time
after
time
the
Court
made
strenuous
inquiry
for
men
skilled
in
war
and
military
topics
became
the
vogue
amongst
all
the
high
officials
Hence
it
is
that
the
commentators
of
Sun
Tzŭ
in
our
dynasty
belong
mainly
to
that
period
Besides
these
eleven
commentators
there
are
several
others
whose
work
has
not
come
down
to
us
The
Sui
Shu
mentions
four
namely
Wang
Ling
often
quoted
by
Tu
Yu
as
Wang
Tzŭ
Chang
Tzŭ
shang
Chia
Hsu
of
Wei
and
Shen
Yu
of
Wu
The
T’ang
Shu
adds
Sun
Hao
and
the
T’ung
Chih
Hsiao
Chi
while
the
T’u
Shu
mentions
a
Ming
commentator
Huang
Jun
yu
It
is
possible
that
some
of
these
may
have
been
merely
collectors
and
editors
of
other
commentaries
like
Chi
T’ien
pao
and
Chi
Hsieh
mentioned
above
Appreciations
of
Sun
Tzŭ
Sun
Tzŭ
has
exercised
a
potent
fascination
over
the
minds
of
some
of
China’s
greatest
men
Among
the
famous
generals
who
are
known
to
have
studied
his
pages
with
enthusiasm
may
be
mentioned
Han
Hsin
d
B
C
Feng
I
d
A
D
Lu
Meng
d
and
Yo
Fei
The
opinion
of
Ts’ao
Kung
who
disputes
with
Han
Hsin
the
highest
place
in
Chinese
military
annals
has
already
been
recorded
Still
more
remarkable
in
one
way
is
the
testimony
of
purely
literary
men
such
as
Su
Hsun
the
father
of
Su
Tung
p’o
who
wrote
several
essays
on
military
topics
all
of
which
owe
their
chief
inspiration
to
Sun
Tzŭ
The
following
short
passage
by
him
is
preserved
in
the
Yu
Hai
—
Sun
Wu’s
saying
that
in
war
one
cannot
make
certain
of
conquering
is
very
different
indeed
from
what
other
books
tell
us
Wu
Ch’i
was
a
man
of
the
same
stamp
as
Sun
Wu
they
both
wrote
books
on
war
and
they
are
linked
together
in
popular
speech
as
Sun
and
Wu
But
Wu
Ch’i’s
remarks
on
war
are
less
weighty
his
rules
are
rougher
and
more
crudely
stated
and
there
is
not
the
same
unity
of
plan
as
in
Sun
Tzŭ’s
work
where
the
style
is
terse
but
the
meaning
fully
brought
out
The
following
is
an
extract
from
the
Impartial
Judgments
in
the
Garden
of
Literature
by
Cheng
Hou
—
Sun
Tzŭ’s
chapters
are
not
only
the
staple
and
base
of
all
military
men’s
training
but
also
compel
the
most
careful
attention
of
scholars
and
men
of
letters
His
sayings
are
terse
yet
elegant
simple
yet
profound
perspicuous
and
eminently
practical
Such
works
as
the
Lun
Yu
the
I
Ching
and
the
great
Commentary
as
well
as
the
writings
of
Mencius
Hsun
K’uang
and
Yang
Chu
all
fall
below
the
level
of
Sun
Tzŭ
Chu
Hsi
commenting
on
this
fully
admits
the
first
part
of
the
criticism
although
he
dislikes
the
audacious
comparison
with
the
venerated
classical
works
Language
of
this
sort
he
says
encourages
a
ruler’s
bent
towards
unrelenting
warfare
and
reckless
militarism
Apologies
for
War
Accustomed
as
we
are
to
think
of
China
as
the
greatest
peace
loving
nation
on
earth
we
are
in
some
danger
of
forgetting
that
her
experience
of
war
in
all
its
phases
has
also
been
such
as
no
modern
State
can
parallel
Her
long
military
annals
stretch
back
to
a
point
at
which
they
are
lost
in
the
mists
of
time
She
had
built
the
Great
Wall
and
was
maintaining
a
huge
standing
army
along
her
frontier
centuries
before
the
first
Roman
legionary
was
seen
on
the
Danube
What
with
the
perpetual
collisions
of
the
ancient
feudal
States
the
grim
conflicts
with
Huns
Turks
and
other
invaders
after
the
centralization
of
government
the
terrific
upheavals
which
accompanied
the
overthrow
of
so
many
dynasties
besides
the
countless
rebellions
and
minor
disturbances
that
have
flamed
up
and
flickered
out
again
one
by
one
it
is
hardly
too
much
to
say
that
the
clash
of
arms
has
never
ceased
to
resound
in
one
portion
or
another
of
the
Empire
No
less
remarkable
is
the
succession
of
illustrious
captains
to
whom
China
can
point
with
pride
As
in
all
countries
the
greatest
are
fond
of
emerging
at
the
most
fateful
crises
of
her
history
Thus
Po
Ch’i
stands
out
conspicuous
in
the
period
when
Ch’in
was
entering
upon
her
final
struggle
with
the
remaining
independent
states
The
stormy
years
which
followed
the
break
up
of
the
Ch’in
dynasty
are
illuminated
by
the
transcendent
genius
of
Han
Hsin
When
the
House
of
Han
in
turn
is
tottering
to
its
fall
the
great
and
baleful
figure
of
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
dominates
the
scene
And
in
the
establishment
of
the
T’ang
dynasty
one
of
the
mightiest
tasks
achieved
by
man
the
superhuman
energy
of
Li
Shih
min
afterwards
the
Emperor
T’ai
Tsung
was
seconded
by
the
brilliant
strategy
of
Li
Ching
None
of
these
generals
need
fear
comparison
with
the
greatest
names
in
the
military
history
of
Europe
In
spite
of
all
this
the
great
body
of
Chinese
sentiment
from
Lao
Tzŭ
downwards
and
especially
as
reflected
in
the
standard
literature
of
Confucianism
has
been
consistently
pacific
and
intensely
opposed
to
militarism
in
any
form
It
is
such
an
uncommon
thing
to
find
any
of
the
literati
defending
warfare
on
principle
that
I
have
thought
it
worth
while
to
collect
and
translate
a
few
passages
in
which
the
unorthodox
view
is
upheld
The
following
by
Ssu
ma
Ch’ien
shows
that
for
all
his
ardent
admiration
of
Confucius
he
was
yet
no
advocate
of
peace
at
any
price
—
Military
weapons
are
the
means
used
by
the
Sage
to
punish
violence
and
cruelty
to
give
peace
to
troublous
times
to
remove
difficulties
and
dangers
and
to
succour
those
who
are
in
peril
Every
animal
with
blood
in
its
veins
and
horns
on
its
head
will
fight
when
it
is
attacked
How
much
more
so
will
man
who
carries
in
his
breast
the
faculties
of
love
and
hatred
joy
and
anger
When
he
is
pleased
a
feeling
of
affection
springs
up
within
him
when
angry
his
poisoned
sting
is
brought
into
play
That
is
the
natural
law
which
governs
his
being…
What
then
shall
be
said
of
those
scholars
of
our
time
blind
to
all
great
issues
and
without
any
appreciation
of
relative
values
who
can
only
bark
out
their
stale
formulas
about
virtue
and
civilization
condemning
the
use
of
military
weapons
They
will
surely
bring
our
country
to
impotence
and
dishonour
and
the
loss
of
her
rightful
heritage
or
at
the
very
least
they
will
bring
about
invasion
and
rebellion
sacrifice
of
territory
and
general
enfeeblement
Yet
they
obstinately
refuse
to
modify
the
position
they
have
taken
up
The
truth
is
that
just
as
in
the
family
the
teacher
must
not
spare
the
rod
and
punishments
cannot
be
dispensed
with
in
the
State
so
military
chastisement
can
never
be
allowed
to
fall
into
abeyance
in
the
Empire
All
one
can
say
is
that
this
power
will
be
exercised
wisely
by
some
foolishly
by
others
and
that
among
those
who
bear
arms
some
will
be
loyal
and
others
rebellious
The
next
piece
is
taken
from
Tu
Mu’s
preface
to
his
commentary
on
Sun
Tzŭ
—
War
may
be
defined
as
punishment
which
is
one
of
the
functions
of
government
It
was
the
profession
of
Chung
Yu
and
Jan
Ch’iu
both
disciples
of
Confucius
Nowadays
the
holding
of
trials
and
hearing
of
litigation
the
imprisonment
of
offenders
and
their
execution
by
flogging
in
the
market
place
are
all
done
by
officials
But
the
wielding
of
huge
armies
the
throwing
down
of
fortified
cities
the
hauling
of
women
and
children
into
captivity
and
the
beheading
of
traitors—this
is
also
work
which
is
done
by
officials
The
objects
of
the
rack
and
of
military
weapons
are
essentially
the
same
There
is
no
intrinsic
difference
between
the
punishment
of
flogging
and
cutting
off
heads
in
war
For
the
lesser
infractions
of
law
which
are
easily
dealt
with
only
a
small
amount
of
force
need
be
employed
hence
the
use
of
military
weapons
and
wholesale
decapitation
In
both
cases
however
the
end
in
view
is
to
get
rid
of
wicked
people
and
to
give
comfort
and
relief
to
the
good…
Chi
sun
asked
Jan
Yu
saying
Have
you
Sir
acquired
your
military
aptitude
by
study
or
is
it
innate
Jan
Yu
replied
It
has
been
acquired
by
study
How
can
that
be
so
said
Chi
sun
seeing
that
you
are
a
disciple
of
Confucius
It
is
a
fact
replied
Jan
Yu
I
was
taught
by
Confucius
It
is
fitting
that
the
great
Sage
should
exercise
both
civil
and
military
functions
though
to
be
sure
my
instruction
in
the
art
of
fighting
has
not
yet
gone
very
far
Now
who
the
author
was
of
this
rigid
distinction
between
the
civil
and
the
military
and
the
limitation
of
each
to
a
separate
sphere
of
action
or
in
what
year
of
which
dynasty
it
was
first
introduced
is
more
than
I
can
say
But
at
any
rate
it
has
come
about
that
the
members
of
the
governing
class
are
quite
afraid
of
enlarging
on
military
topics
or
do
so
only
in
a
shamefaced
manner
If
any
are
bold
enough
to
discuss
the
subject
they
are
at
once
set
down
as
eccentric
individuals
of
coarse
and
brutal
propensities
This
is
an
extraordinary
instance
in
which
through
sheer
lack
of
reasoning
men
unhappily
lose
sight
of
fundamental
principles
When
the
Duke
of
Chou
was
minister
under
Ch’eng
Wang
he
regulated
ceremonies
and
made
music
and
venerated
the
arts
of
scholarship
and
learning
yet
when
the
barbarians
of
the
River
Huai
revolted
he
sallied
forth
and
chastised
them
When
Confucius
held
office
under
the
Duke
of
Lu
and
a
meeting
was
convened
at
Chia
ku
he
said
If
pacific
negotiations
are
in
progress
warlike
preparations
should
have
been
made
beforehand
He
rebuked
and
shamed
the
Marquis
of
Ch’i
who
cowered
under
him
and
dared
not
proceed
to
violence
How
can
it
be
said
that
these
two
great
Sages
had
no
knowledge
of
military
matters
We
have
seen
that
the
great
Chu
Hsi
held
Sun
Tzŭ
in
high
esteem
He
also
appeals
to
the
authority
of
the
Classics
—
Our
Master
Confucius
answering
Duke
Ling
of
Wei
said
I
have
never
studied
matters
connected
with
armies
and
battalions
Replying
to
K’ung
Wen
tzu
he
said
I
have
not
been
instructed
about
buff
coats
and
weapons
But
if
we
turn
to
the
meeting
at
Chia
ku
we
find
that
he
used
armed
force
against
the
men
of
Lai
so
that
the
marquis
of
Ch’i
was
overawed
Again
when
the
inhabitants
of
Pi
revolted
he
ordered
his
officers
to
attack
them
whereupon
they
were
defeated
and
fled
in
confusion
He
once
uttered
the
words
If
I
fight
I
conquer
And
Jan
Yu
also
said
The
Sage
exercises
both
civil
and
military
functions
Can
it
be
a
fact
that
Confucius
never
studied
or
received
instruction
in
the
art
of
war
We
can
only
say
that
he
did
not
specially
choose
matters
connected
with
armies
and
fighting
to
be
the
subject
of
his
teaching
Sun
Hsing
yen
the
editor
of
Sun
Tzŭ
writes
in
similar
strain
—
Confucius
said
I
am
unversed
in
military
matters
He
also
said
If
I
fight
I
conquer
Confucius
ordered
ceremonies
and
regulated
music
Now
war
constitutes
one
of
the
five
classes
of
State
ceremonial
and
must
not
be
treated
as
an
independent
branch
of
study
Hence
the
words
I
am
unversed
in
must
be
taken
to
mean
that
there
are
things
which
even
an
inspired
Teacher
does
not
know
Those
who
have
to
lead
an
army
and
devise
stratagems
must
learn
the
art
of
war
But
if
one
can
command
the
services
of
a
good
general
like
Sun
Tzŭ
who
was
employed
by
Wu
Tzŭ
hsu
there
is
no
need
to
learn
it
oneself
Hence
the
remark
added
by
Confucius
If
I
fight
I
conquer
The
men
of
the
present
day
however
willfully
interpret
these
words
of
Confucius
in
their
narrowest
sense
as
though
he
meant
that
books
on
the
art
of
war
were
not
worth
reading
With
blind
persistency
they
adduce
the
example
of
Chao
Kua
who
pored
over
his
father’s
books
to
no
purpose
as
a
proof
that
all
military
theory
is
useless
Again
seeing
that
books
on
war
have
to
do
with
such
things
as
opportunism
in
designing
plans
and
the
conversion
of
spies
they
hold
that
the
art
is
immoral
and
unworthy
of
a
sage
These
people
ignore
the
fact
that
the
studies
of
our
scholars
and
the
civil
administration
of
our
officials
also
require
steady
application
and
practice
before
efficiency
is
reached
The
ancients
were
particularly
chary
of
allowing
mere
novices
to
botch
their
work
Weapons
are
baneful
and
fighting
perilous
and
useless
unless
a
general
is
in
constant
practice
he
ought
not
to
hazard
other
men’s
lives
in
battle
Hence
it
is
essential
that
Sun
Tzŭ’s
chapters
should
be
studied
Hsiang
Liang
used
to
instruct
his
nephew
Chi
in
the
art
of
war
Chi
got
a
rough
idea
of
the
art
in
its
general
bearings
but
would
not
pursue
his
studies
to
their
proper
outcome
the
consequence
being
that
he
was
finally
defeated
and
overthrown
He
did
not
realize
that
the
tricks
and
artifices
of
war
are
beyond
verbal
computation
Duke
Hsiang
of
Sung
and
King
Yen
of
Hsu
were
brought
to
destruction
by
their
misplaced
humanity
The
treacherous
and
underhand
nature
of
war
necessitates
the
use
of
guile
and
stratagem
suited
to
the
occasion
There
is
a
case
on
record
of
Confucius
himself
having
violated
an
extorted
oath
and
also
of
his
having
left
the
Sung
State
in
disguise
Can
we
then
recklessly
arraign
Sun
Tzŭ
for
disregarding
truth
and
honesty
Bibliography
The
following
are
the
oldest
Chinese
treatises
on
war
after
Sun
Tzŭ
The
notes
on
each
have
been
drawn
principally
from
the
Ssu
k’u
ch’uan
shu
chien
ming
mu
lu
ch
fol
sqq
Wu
Tzŭ
in
chuan
or
chapters
By
Wu
Ch’i
d
B
C
A
genuine
work
See
Shih
Chi
ch
Ssu
ma
Fa
in
chuan
or
chapters
Wrongly
attributed
to
Ssu
ma
Jang
chu
of
the
century
B
C
Its
date
however
must
be
early
as
the
customs
of
the
three
ancient
dynasties
are
constantly
to
be
met
within
its
pages
See
Shih
Chi
ch
The
Ssu
K’u
Ch’uan
Shu
ch
f
remarks
that
the
oldest
three
treatises
on
war
Sun
Tzŭ
Wu
Tzŭ
and
Ssu
ma
Fa
are
generally
speaking
only
concerned
with
things
strictly
military—the
art
of
producing
collecting
training
and
drilling
troops
and
the
correct
theory
with
regard
to
measures
of
expediency
laying
plans
transport
of
goods
and
the
handling
of
soldiers—in
strong
contrast
to
later
works
in
which
the
science
of
war
is
usually
blended
with
metaphysics
divination
and
magical
arts
in
general
Liu
T’ao
in
chuan
or
chapters
Attributed
to
Lu
Wang
or
Lu
Shang
also
known
as
T’ai
Kung
of
the
century
B
C
But
its
style
does
not
belong
to
the
era
of
the
Three
Dynasties
Lu
Te
ming
A
D
mentions
the
work
and
enumerates
the
headings
of
the
six
sections
so
that
the
forgery
cannot
have
been
later
than
Sui
dynasty
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
in
chuan
Attributed
to
Wei
Liao
cent
B
C
who
studied
under
the
famous
Kuei
ku
Tzŭ
The
work
appears
to
have
been
originally
in
chapters
whereas
the
text
we
possess
contains
only
Its
matter
is
sound
enough
in
the
main
though
the
strategical
devices
differ
considerably
from
those
of
the
Warring
States
period
It
is
been
furnished
with
a
commentary
by
the
well
known
Sung
philosopher
Chang
Tsai
San
Lueh
in
chuan
Attributed
to
Huang
shih
Kung
a
legendary
personage
who
is
said
to
have
bestowed
it
on
Chang
Liang
d
B
C
in
an
interview
on
a
bridge
But
here
again
the
style
is
not
that
of
works
dating
from
the
Ch’in
or
Han
period
The
Han
Emperor
Kuang
Wu
A
D
apparently
quotes
from
it
in
one
of
his
proclamations
but
the
passage
in
question
may
have
been
inserted
later
on
in
order
to
prove
the
genuineness
of
the
work
We
shall
not
be
far
out
if
we
refer
it
to
the
Northern
Sung
period
A
D
or
somewhat
earlier
Li
Wei
Kung
Wen
Tui
in
sections
Written
in
the
form
of
a
dialogue
between
T’ai
Tsung
and
his
great
general
Li
Ching
it
is
usually
ascribed
to
the
latter
Competent
authorities
consider
it
a
forgery
though
the
author
was
evidently
well
versed
in
the
art
of
war
Li
Ching
Ping
Fa
not
to
be
confounded
with
the
foregoing
is
a
short
treatise
in
chapters
preserved
in
the
T’ung
Tien
but
not
published
separately
This
fact
explains
its
omission
from
the
Ssu
K’u
Ch’uan
Shu
Wu
Ch’i
Ching
in
chuan
Attributed
to
the
legendary
minister
Feng
Hou
with
exegetical
notes
by
Kung
sun
Hung
of
the
Han
dynasty
d
B
C
and
said
to
have
been
eulogized
by
the
celebrated
general
Ma
Lung
d
A
D
Yet
the
earliest
mention
of
it
is
in
the
Sung
Chih
Although
a
forgery
the
work
is
well
put
together
Considering
the
high
popular
estimation
in
which
Chu
ko
Liang
has
always
been
held
it
is
not
surprising
to
find
more
than
one
work
on
war
ascribed
to
his
pen
Such
are
the
Shih
Liu
Ts’e
chuan
preserved
in
the
Yung
Lo
Ta
Tien
Chiang
Yuan
chuan
and
Hsin
Shu
chuan
which
steals
wholesale
from
Sun
Tzŭ
None
of
these
has
the
slightest
claim
to
be
considered
genuine
Most
of
the
large
Chinese
encyclopedias
contain
extensive
sections
devoted
to
the
literature
of
war
The
following
references
may
be
found
useful
—
T’ung
Tien
circa
A
D
ch
T’ai
P’ing
Yu
Lan
ch
Wen
Hsien
Tung
K’ao
cent
ch
Yu
Hai
cent
ch
San
Ts’ai
T’u
Hui
cent
Kuang
Po
Wu
Chih
ch
Ch’ien
Ch’io
Lei
Shu
ch
Yuan
Chien
Lei
Han
ch
Ku
Chin
T’u
Shu
Chi
Ch’eng
section
XXX
esp
ch
Hsu
Wen
Hsien
T’ung
K’ao
ch
Huang
Ch’ao
Ching
Shih
Wen
Pien
ch
The
bibliographical
sections
of
certain
historical
works
also
deserve
mention
—
Ch’ien
Han
Shu
ch
Sui
Shu
ch
Chiu
T’ang
Shu
ch
Hsin
T’ang
Shu
ch
Sung
Shih
ch
T’ung
Chih
circa
ch
To
these
of
course
must
be
added
the
great
Catalogue
of
the
Imperial
Library
—
Ssu
K’u
Ch’uan
Shu
Tsung
Mu
T’i
Yao
ch
Footnotes
Shih
Chi
ch
He
reigned
from
to
B
C
Shih
Chi
ch
The
appellation
of
Nang
Wa
Shih
Chi
ch
Shih
Chi
ch
The
appellation
of
Hu
Yen
mentioned
in
ch
under
the
year
Wang
tzu
Ch’eng
fu
ch
year
The
mistake
is
natural
enough
Native
critics
refer
to
a
work
of
the
Han
dynasty
which
says
Ten
li
outside
the
Wu
gate
of
the
city
of
Wu
now
Soochow
in
Kiangsu
there
is
a
great
mound
raised
to
commemorate
the
entertainment
of
Sun
Wu
of
Ch’i
who
excelled
in
the
art
of
war
by
the
King
of
Wu
They
attached
strings
to
wood
to
make
bows
and
sharpened
wood
to
make
arrows
The
use
of
bows
and
arrows
is
to
keep
the
Empire
in
awe
The
son
and
successor
of
Ho
Lu
He
was
finally
defeated
and
overthrown
by
Kou
chien
King
of
Yüeh
in
B
C
See
post
King
Yen
of
Hsu
a
fabulous
being
of
whom
Sun
Hsing
yen
says
in
his
preface
His
humanity
brought
him
to
destruction
The
passage
I
have
put
in
brackets
is
omitted
in
the
T’u
Shu
and
may
be
an
interpolation
It
was
known
however
to
Chang
Shou
chieh
of
the
T’ang
dynasty
and
appears
in
the
T’ai
P’ing
Yu
Lan
Ts’ao
Kung
seems
to
be
thinking
of
the
first
part
of
chap
II
perhaps
especially
of
§
See
chap
XI
On
the
other
hand
it
is
noteworthy
that
Wu
Tzŭ
which
is
not
in
chapters
has
assigned
to
it
in
the
Han
Chih
Likewise
the
Chung
Yung
is
credited
with
chapters
though
now
only
in
one
only
In
the
case
of
very
short
works
one
is
tempted
to
think
that
p’ien
might
simply
mean
leaves
Yeh
Shih
of
the
Sung
dynasty
He
hardly
deserves
to
be
bracketed
with
assassins
See
Chapter
§
and
Chapter
§
See
Chapter
§
Chuan
Chu
is
the
abbreviated
form
of
his
name
I
e
Po
P’ei
See
ante
The
nucleus
of
this
work
is
probably
genuine
though
large
additions
have
been
made
by
later
hands
Kuan
chung
died
in
B
C
See
infra
beginning
of
INTRODUCTION
I
do
not
know
what
this
work
unless
it
be
the
last
chapter
of
another
work
Why
that
chapter
should
be
singled
out
however
is
not
clear
About
B
C
That
is
I
suppose
the
age
of
Wu
Wang
and
Chou
Kung
In
the
century
B
C
Ssu
ma
Jang
chu
whose
family
name
was
T’ien
lived
in
the
latter
half
of
the
century
B
C
and
is
also
believed
to
have
written
a
work
on
war
See
Shih
Chi
ch
and
infra
at
the
beginning
of
the
INTRODUCTION
See
Legge’s
Classics
vol
V
Prolegomena
p
Legge
thinks
that
the
Tso
Chuan
must
have
been
written
in
the
century
but
not
before
B
C
See
Mencius
III
iii
When
Wu
first
appears
in
the
Ch’un
Ch’iu
in
it
is
already
at
variance
with
its
powerful
neighbour
The
Ch’un
Ch’iu
first
mentions
Yüeh
in
the
Tso
Chuan
in
This
is
explicitly
stated
in
the
Tso
Chuan
XXXII
There
is
this
to
be
said
for
the
later
period
that
the
feud
would
tend
to
grow
more
bitter
after
each
encounter
and
thus
more
fully
justify
the
language
used
in
XI
§
With
Wu
Yuan
himself
the
case
is
just
the
reverse
—a
spurious
treatise
on
war
has
been
fathered
on
him
simply
because
he
was
a
great
general
Here
we
have
an
obvious
inducement
to
forgery
Sun
Wu
on
the
other
hand
cannot
have
been
widely
known
to
fame
in
the
century
From
Tso
Chuan
From
the
date
of
King
Chao’s
accession
there
was
no
year
in
which
Ch’u
was
not
attacked
by
Wu
Preface
ad
fin
My
family
comes
from
Lo
an
and
we
are
really
descended
from
Sun
Tzŭ
I
am
ashamed
to
say
that
I
only
read
my
ancestor’s
work
from
a
literary
point
of
view
without
comprehending
the
military
technique
So
long
have
we
been
enjoying
the
blessings
of
peace
Hoa
yin
is
about
miles
from
T’ung
kuan
on
the
eastern
border
of
Shensi
The
temple
in
question
is
still
visited
by
those
about
the
ascent
of
the
Western
Sacred
Mountain
It
is
mentioned
in
a
text
as
being
situated
five
li
east
of
the
district
city
of
Hua
yin
The
temple
contains
the
Hua
shan
tablet
inscribed
by
the
T’ang
Emperor
Hsuan
Tsung
See
my
Catalogue
of
Chinese
Books
Luzac
Co
no
This
is
a
discussion
of
difficult
passages
in
Sun
Tzŭ
Cf
Catalogue
of
the
library
of
Fan
family
at
Ningpo
His
commentary
is
frequently
obscure
it
furnishes
a
clue
but
does
not
fully
develop
the
meaning
Wen
Hsien
T’ung
K’ao
ch
It
is
interesting
to
note
that
M
Pelliot
has
recently
discovered
chapters
and
of
this
lost
work
in
the
Grottos
of
the
Thousand
Buddhas
See
B
E
F
E
O
t
VIII
nos
p
The
Hsia
the
Shang
and
the
Chou
Although
the
last
named
was
nominally
existent
in
Sun
Tzŭ’s
day
it
retained
hardly
a
vestige
of
power
and
the
old
military
organization
had
practically
gone
by
the
board
I
can
suggest
no
other
explanation
of
the
passage
See
Chou
Li
xxix
T’ung
K’ao
ch
This
appears
to
be
still
extant
See
Wylie’s
Notes
p
new
edition
T’ung
K’ao
loc
cit
A
notable
person
in
his
day
His
biography
is
given
in
the
San
Kuo
Chih
ch
See
XI
§
note
Hou
Han
Shu
ch
ad
init
San
Kuo
Chih
ch
Sung
Shih
ch
ad
init
The
few
Europeans
who
have
yet
had
an
opportunity
of
acquainting
themselves
with
Sun
Tzŭ
are
not
behindhand
in
their
praise
In
this
connection
I
may
perhaps
be
excused
for
quoting
from
a
letter
from
Lord
Roberts
to
whom
the
sheets
of
the
present
work
were
submitted
previous
to
publication
Many
of
Sun
Wu’s
maxims
are
perfectly
applicable
to
the
present
day
and
no
in
Chapter
VIII
is
one
that
the
people
of
this
country
would
do
well
to
take
to
heart
Ch
See
IV
§
The
allusion
may
be
to
Mencius
VI
ix
The
Tso
Chuan
Shih
Chi
ch
fol
I
Cf
Shih
Chi
ch
See
Shu
Ching
preface
§
See
Shih
Chi
ch
Lun
Yu
XV
I
failed
to
trace
this
utterance
Supra
Supra
The
other
four
being
worship
mourning
entertainment
of
guests
and
festive
rites
See
Shu
Ching
ii
III
and
Chou
Li
IX
fol
See
XIII
§
note
This
is
a
rather
obscure
allusion
to
the
Tso
Chuan
where
Tzŭ
ch’an
says
If
you
have
a
piece
of
beautiful
brocade
you
will
not
employ
a
mere
learner
to
make
it
up
Cf
Tao
Te
Ching
ch
Sun
Hsing
yen
might
have
quoted
Confucius
again
See
Lun
Yu
XIII
Better
known
as
Hsiang
Yu
B
C
Shih
Chi
ch
Shih
Chi
ch
See
XIII
§
note
Further
details
on
T’ai
Kung
will
be
found
in
the
Shih
Chi
ch
ad
init
Besides
the
tradition
which
makes
him
a
former
minister
of
Chou
Hsin
two
other
accounts
of
him
are
there
given
according
to
which
he
would
appear
to
have
been
first
raised
from
a
humble
private
station
by
Wen
Wang
Chapter
I
LAYING
PLANS
Ts’ao
Kung
in
defining
the
meaning
of
the
Chinese
for
the
title
of
this
chapter
says
it
refers
to
the
deliberations
in
the
temple
selected
by
the
general
for
his
temporary
use
or
as
we
should
say
in
his
tent
See
§
Sun
Tzŭ
said
The
art
of
war
is
of
vital
importance
to
the
State
It
is
a
matter
of
life
and
death
a
road
either
to
safety
or
to
ruin
Hence
it
is
a
subject
of
inquiry
which
can
on
no
account
be
neglected
The
art
of
war
then
is
governed
by
five
constant
factors
to
be
taken
into
account
in
one’s
deliberations
when
seeking
to
determine
the
conditions
obtaining
in
the
field
These
are
The
Moral
Law
Heaven
Earth
The
Commander
Method
and
discipline
It
appears
from
what
follows
that
Sun
Tzŭ
means
by
Moral
Law
a
principle
of
harmony
not
unlike
the
Tao
of
Lao
Tzŭ
in
its
moral
aspect
One
might
be
tempted
to
render
it
by
morale
were
it
not
considered
as
an
attribute
of
the
ruler
in
§
The
Moral
Law
causes
the
people
to
be
in
complete
accord
with
their
ruler
so
that
they
will
follow
him
regardless
of
their
lives
undismayed
by
any
danger
Tu
Yu
quotes
Wang
Tzŭ
as
saying
Without
constant
practice
the
officers
will
be
nervous
and
undecided
when
mustering
for
battle
without
constant
practice
the
general
will
be
wavering
and
irresolute
when
the
crisis
is
at
hand
Heaven
signifies
night
and
day
cold
and
heat
times
and
seasons
The
commentators
I
think
make
an
unnecessary
mystery
of
two
words
here
Meng
Shih
refers
to
the
hard
and
the
soft
waxing
and
waning
of
Heaven
Wang
Hsi
however
may
be
right
in
saying
that
what
is
meant
is
the
general
economy
of
Heaven
including
the
five
elements
the
four
seasons
wind
and
clouds
and
other
phenomena
Earth
comprises
distances
great
and
small
danger
and
security
open
ground
and
narrow
passes
the
chances
of
life
and
death
The
Commander
stands
for
the
virtues
of
wisdom
sincerity
benevolence
courage
and
strictness
The
five
cardinal
virtues
of
the
Chinese
are
humanity
or
benevolence
uprightness
of
mind
self
respect
self
control
or
proper
feeling
wisdom
sincerity
or
good
faith
Here
wisdom
and
sincerity
are
put
before
humanity
or
benevolence
and
the
two
military
virtues
of
courage
and
strictness
substituted
for
uprightness
of
mind
and
self
respect
self
control
or
‘proper
feeling
’
By
Method
and
discipline
are
to
be
understood
the
marshalling
of
the
army
in
its
proper
subdivisions
the
gradations
of
rank
among
the
officers
the
maintenance
of
roads
by
which
supplies
may
reach
the
army
and
the
control
of
military
expenditure
These
five
heads
should
be
familiar
to
every
general
he
who
knows
them
will
be
victorious
he
who
knows
them
not
will
fail
Therefore
in
your
deliberations
when
seeking
to
determine
the
military
conditions
let
them
be
made
the
basis
of
a
comparison
in
this
wise
—
Which
of
the
two
sovereigns
is
imbued
with
the
Moral
law
I
e
is
in
harmony
with
his
subjects
Cf
§
Which
of
the
two
generals
has
most
ability
With
whom
lie
the
advantages
derived
from
Heaven
and
Earth
See
§§
On
which
side
is
discipline
most
rigorously
enforced
Tu
Mu
alludes
to
the
remarkable
story
of
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
A
D
who
was
such
a
strict
disciplinarian
that
once
in
accordance
with
his
own
severe
regulations
against
injury
to
standing
crops
he
condemned
himself
to
death
for
having
allowed
his
horse
to
shy
into
a
field
of
corn
However
in
lieu
of
losing
his
head
he
was
persuaded
to
satisfy
his
sense
of
justice
by
cutting
off
his
hair
Ts’ao
Ts’ao’s
own
comment
on
the
present
passage
is
characteristically
curt
when
you
lay
down
a
law
see
that
it
is
not
disobeyed
if
it
is
disobeyed
the
offender
must
be
put
to
death
Which
army
is
the
stronger
Morally
as
well
as
physically
As
Mei
Yao
ch’en
puts
it
freely
rendered
esprit
de
corps
and
‘big
battalions
’
On
which
side
are
officers
and
men
more
highly
trained
Tu
Yu
quotes
Wang
Tzŭ
as
saying
Without
constant
practice
the
officers
will
be
nervous
and
undecided
when
mustering
for
battle
without
constant
practice
the
general
will
be
wavering
and
irresolute
when
the
crisis
is
at
hand
In
which
army
is
there
the
greater
constancy
both
in
reward
and
punishment
On
which
side
is
there
the
most
absolute
certainty
that
merit
will
be
properly
rewarded
and
misdeeds
summarily
punished
By
means
of
these
seven
considerations
I
can
forecast
victory
or
defeat
The
general
that
hearkens
to
my
counsel
and
acts
upon
it
will
conquer
—let
such
a
one
be
retained
in
command
The
general
that
hearkens
not
to
my
counsel
nor
acts
upon
it
will
suffer
defeat
—let
such
a
one
be
dismissed
The
form
of
this
paragraph
reminds
us
that
Sun
Tzŭ’s
treatise
was
composed
expressly
for
the
benefit
of
his
patron
Ho
Lu
king
of
the
Wu
State
While
heeding
the
profit
of
my
counsel
avail
yourself
also
of
any
helpful
circumstances
over
and
beyond
the
ordinary
rules
According
as
circumstances
are
favourable
one
should
modify
one’s
plans
Sun
Tzŭ
as
a
practical
soldier
will
have
none
of
the
bookish
theoric
He
cautions
us
here
not
to
pin
our
faith
to
abstract
principles
for
as
Chang
Yu
puts
it
while
the
main
laws
of
strategy
can
be
stated
clearly
enough
for
the
benefit
of
all
and
sundry
you
must
be
guided
by
the
actions
of
the
enemy
in
attempting
to
secure
a
favourable
position
in
actual
warfare
On
the
eve
of
the
battle
of
Waterloo
Lord
Uxbridge
commanding
the
cavalry
went
to
the
Duke
of
Wellington
in
order
to
learn
what
his
plans
and
calculations
were
for
the
morrow
because
as
he
explained
he
might
suddenly
find
himself
Commander
in
chief
and
would
be
unable
to
frame
new
plans
in
a
critical
moment
The
Duke
listened
quietly
and
then
said
Who
will
attack
the
first
tomorrow—I
or
Bonaparte
Bonaparte
replied
Lord
Uxbridge
Well
continued
the
Duke
Bonaparte
has
not
given
me
any
idea
of
his
projects
and
as
my
plans
will
depend
upon
his
how
can
you
expect
me
to
tell
you
what
mine
are
All
warfare
is
based
on
deception
The
truth
of
this
pithy
and
profound
saying
will
be
admitted
by
every
soldier
Col
Henderson
tells
us
that
Wellington
great
in
so
many
military
qualities
was
especially
distinguished
by
the
extraordinary
skill
with
which
he
concealed
his
movements
and
deceived
both
friend
and
foe
Hence
when
able
to
attack
we
must
seem
unable
when
using
our
forces
we
must
seem
inactive
when
we
are
near
we
must
make
the
enemy
believe
we
are
far
away
when
far
away
we
must
make
him
believe
we
are
near
Hold
out
baits
to
entice
the
enemy
Feign
disorder
and
crush
him
All
commentators
except
Chang
Yu
say
When
he
is
in
disorder
crush
him
It
is
more
natural
to
suppose
that
Sun
Tzŭ
is
still
illustrating
the
uses
of
deception
in
war
If
he
is
secure
at
all
points
be
prepared
for
him
If
he
is
in
superior
strength
evade
him
If
your
opponent
is
of
choleric
temper
seek
to
irritate
him
Pretend
to
be
weak
that
he
may
grow
arrogant
Wang
Tzŭ
quoted
by
Tu
Yu
says
that
the
good
tactician
plays
with
his
adversary
as
a
cat
plays
with
a
mouse
first
feigning
weakness
and
immobility
and
then
suddenly
pouncing
upon
him
If
he
is
taking
his
ease
give
him
no
rest
This
is
probably
the
meaning
though
Mei
Yao
ch’en
has
the
note
while
we
are
taking
our
ease
wait
for
the
enemy
to
tire
himself
out
The
Yu
Lan
has
Lure
him
on
and
tire
him
out
If
his
forces
are
united
separate
them
Less
plausible
is
the
interpretation
favoured
by
most
of
the
commentators
If
sovereign
and
subject
are
in
accord
put
division
between
them
Attack
him
where
he
is
unprepared
appear
where
you
are
not
expected
These
military
devices
leading
to
victory
must
not
be
divulged
beforehand
Now
the
general
who
wins
a
battle
makes
many
calculations
in
his
temple
ere
the
battle
is
fought
Chang
Yu
tells
us
that
in
ancient
times
it
was
customary
for
a
temple
to
be
set
apart
for
the
use
of
a
general
who
was
about
to
take
the
field
in
order
that
he
might
there
elaborate
his
plan
of
campaign
The
general
who
loses
a
battle
makes
but
few
calculations
beforehand
Thus
do
many
calculations
lead
to
victory
and
few
calculations
to
defeat
how
much
more
no
calculation
at
all
It
is
by
attention
to
this
point
that
I
can
foresee
who
is
likely
to
win
or
lose
Words
on
Wellington
by
Sir
W
Fraser
Chapter
II
WAGING
WAR
Ts’ao
Kung
has
the
note
He
who
wishes
to
fight
must
first
count
the
cost
which
prepares
us
for
the
discovery
that
the
subject
of
the
chapter
is
not
what
we
might
expect
from
the
title
but
is
primarily
a
consideration
of
ways
and
means
Sun
Tzŭ
said
In
the
operations
of
war
where
there
are
in
the
field
a
thousand
swift
chariots
as
many
heavy
chariots
and
a
hundred
thousand
mail
clad
soldiers
The
swift
chariots
were
lightly
built
and
according
to
Chang
Yu
used
for
the
attack
the
heavy
chariots
were
heavier
and
designed
for
purposes
of
defence
Li
Ch’uan
it
is
true
says
that
the
latter
were
light
but
this
seems
hardly
probable
It
is
interesting
to
note
the
analogies
between
early
Chinese
warfare
and
that
of
the
Homeric
Greeks
In
each
case
the
war
chariot
was
the
important
factor
forming
as
it
did
the
nucleus
round
which
was
grouped
a
certain
number
of
foot
soldiers
With
regard
to
the
numbers
given
here
we
are
informed
that
each
swift
chariot
was
accompanied
by
footmen
and
each
heavy
chariot
by
footmen
so
that
the
whole
army
would
be
divided
up
into
a
thousand
battalions
each
consisting
of
two
chariots
and
a
hundred
men
with
provisions
enough
to
carry
them
a
thousand
li
modern
li
go
to
a
mile
The
length
may
have
varied
slightly
since
Sun
Tzŭ’s
time
the
expenditure
at
home
and
at
the
front
including
entertainment
of
guests
small
items
such
as
glue
and
paint
and
sums
spent
on
chariots
and
armour
will
reach
the
total
of
a
thousand
ounces
of
silver
per
day
Such
is
the
cost
of
raising
an
army
of
men
When
you
engage
in
actual
fighting
if
victory
is
long
in
coming
the
men’s
weapons
will
grow
dull
and
their
ardour
will
be
damped
If
you
lay
siege
to
a
town
you
will
exhaust
your
strength
Again
if
the
campaign
is
protracted
the
resources
of
the
State
will
not
be
equal
to
the
strain
Now
when
your
weapons
are
dulled
your
ardour
damped
your
strength
exhausted
and
your
treasure
spent
other
chieftains
will
spring
up
to
take
advantage
of
your
extremity
Then
no
man
however
wise
will
be
able
to
avert
the
consequences
that
must
ensue
Thus
though
we
have
heard
of
stupid
haste
in
war
cleverness
has
never
been
seen
associated
with
long
delays
This
concise
and
difficult
sentence
is
not
well
explained
by
any
of
the
commentators
Ts’ao
Kung
Li
Ch’uan
Meng
Shih
Tu
Yu
Tu
Mu
and
Mei
Yao
ch’en
have
notes
to
the
effect
that
a
general
though
naturally
stupid
may
nevertheless
conquer
through
sheer
force
of
rapidity
Ho
Shih
says
Haste
may
be
stupid
but
at
any
rate
it
saves
expenditure
of
energy
and
treasure
protracted
operations
may
be
very
clever
but
they
bring
calamity
in
their
train
Wang
Hsi
evades
the
difficulty
by
remarking
Lengthy
operations
mean
an
army
growing
old
wealth
being
expended
an
empty
exchequer
and
distress
among
the
people
true
cleverness
insures
against
the
occurrence
of
such
calamities
Chang
Yu
says
So
long
as
victory
can
be
attained
stupid
haste
is
preferable
to
clever
dilatoriness
Now
Sun
Tzŭ
says
nothing
whatever
except
possibly
by
implication
about
ill
considered
haste
being
better
than
ingenious
but
lengthy
operations
What
he
does
say
is
something
much
more
guarded
namely
that
while
speed
may
sometimes
be
injudicious
tardiness
can
never
be
anything
but
foolish—if
only
because
it
means
impoverishment
to
the
nation
In
considering
the
point
raised
here
by
Sun
Tzŭ
the
classic
example
of
Fabius
Cunctator
will
inevitably
occur
to
the
mind
That
general
deliberately
measured
the
endurance
of
Rome
against
that
of
Hannibals’s
isolated
army
because
it
seemed
to
him
that
the
latter
was
more
likely
to
suffer
from
a
long
campaign
in
a
strange
country
But
it
is
quite
a
moot
question
whether
his
tactics
would
have
proved
successful
in
the
long
run
Their
reversal
it
is
true
led
to
Cannae
but
this
only
establishes
a
negative
presumption
in
their
favour
There
is
no
instance
of
a
country
having
benefited
from
prolonged
warfare
It
is
only
one
who
is
thoroughly
acquainted
with
the
evils
of
war
that
can
thoroughly
understand
the
profitable
way
of
carrying
it
on
That
is
with
rapidity
Only
one
who
knows
the
disastrous
effects
of
a
long
war
can
realize
the
supreme
importance
of
rapidity
in
bringing
it
to
a
close
Only
two
commentators
seem
to
favour
this
interpretation
but
it
fits
well
into
the
logic
of
the
context
whereas
the
rendering
He
who
does
not
know
the
evils
of
war
cannot
appreciate
its
benefits
is
distinctly
pointless
The
skilful
soldier
does
not
raise
a
second
levy
neither
are
his
supply
waggons
loaded
more
than
twice
Once
war
is
declared
he
will
not
waste
precious
time
in
waiting
for
reinforcements
nor
will
he
return
his
army
back
for
fresh
supplies
but
crosses
the
enemy’s
frontier
without
delay
This
may
seem
an
audacious
policy
to
recommend
but
with
all
great
strategists
from
Julius
Caesar
to
Napoleon
Bonaparte
the
value
of
time—that
is
being
a
little
ahead
of
your
opponent—has
counted
for
more
than
either
numerical
superiority
or
the
nicest
calculations
with
regard
to
commissariat
Bring
war
material
with
you
from
home
but
forage
on
the
enemy
Thus
the
army
will
have
food
enough
for
its
needs
The
Chinese
word
translated
here
as
war
material
literally
means
things
to
be
used
and
is
meant
in
the
widest
sense
It
includes
all
the
impedimenta
of
an
army
apart
from
provisions
Poverty
of
the
State
exchequer
causes
an
army
to
be
maintained
by
contributions
from
a
distance
Contributing
to
maintain
an
army
at
a
distance
causes
the
people
to
be
impoverished
The
beginning
of
this
sentence
does
not
balance
properly
with
the
next
though
obviously
intended
to
do
so
The
arrangement
moreover
is
so
awkward
that
I
cannot
help
suspecting
some
corruption
in
the
text
It
never
seems
to
occur
to
Chinese
commentators
that
an
emendation
may
be
necessary
for
the
sense
and
we
get
no
help
from
them
there
The
Chinese
words
Sun
Tzŭ
used
to
indicate
the
cause
of
the
people’s
impoverishment
clearly
have
reference
to
some
system
by
which
the
husbandmen
sent
their
contributions
of
corn
to
the
army
direct
But
why
should
it
fall
on
them
to
maintain
an
army
in
this
way
except
because
the
State
or
Government
is
too
poor
to
do
so
On
the
other
hand
the
proximity
of
an
army
causes
prices
to
go
up
and
high
prices
cause
the
people’s
substance
to
be
drained
away
Wang
Hsi
says
high
prices
occur
before
the
army
has
left
its
own
territory
Ts’ao
Kung
understands
it
of
an
army
that
has
already
crossed
the
frontier
When
their
substance
is
drained
away
the
peasantry
will
be
afflicted
by
heavy
exactions
With
this
loss
of
substance
and
exhaustion
of
strength
the
homes
of
the
people
will
be
stripped
bare
and
three
tenths
of
their
incomes
will
be
dissipated
Tu
Mu
and
Wang
Hsi
agree
that
the
people
are
not
mulcted
not
of
but
of
of
their
income
But
this
is
hardly
to
be
extracted
from
our
text
Ho
Shih
has
a
characteristic
tag
The
people
being
regarded
as
the
essential
part
of
the
State
and
food
as
the
people’s
heaven
is
it
not
right
that
those
in
authority
should
value
and
be
careful
of
both
while
Government
expenses
for
broken
chariots
worn
out
horses
breast
plates
and
helmets
bows
and
arrows
spears
and
shields
protective
mantlets
draught
oxen
and
heavy
waggons
will
amount
to
four
tenths
of
its
total
revenue
Hence
a
wise
general
makes
a
point
of
foraging
on
the
enemy
One
cartload
of
the
enemy’s
provisions
is
equivalent
to
twenty
of
one’s
own
and
likewise
a
single
picul
of
his
provender
is
equivalent
to
twenty
from
one’s
own
store
Because
twenty
cartloads
will
be
consumed
in
the
process
of
transporting
one
cartload
to
the
front
A
picul
is
a
unit
of
measure
equal
to
pounds
kilograms
Now
in
order
to
kill
the
enemy
our
men
must
be
roused
to
anger
that
there
may
be
advantage
from
defeating
the
enemy
they
must
have
their
rewards
Tu
Mu
says
Rewards
are
necessary
in
order
to
make
the
soldiers
see
the
advantage
of
beating
the
enemy
thus
when
you
capture
spoils
from
the
enemy
they
must
be
used
as
rewards
so
that
all
your
men
may
have
a
keen
desire
to
fight
each
on
his
own
account
Therefore
in
chariot
fighting
when
ten
or
more
chariots
have
been
taken
those
should
be
rewarded
who
took
the
first
Our
own
flags
should
be
substituted
for
those
of
the
enemy
and
the
chariots
mingled
and
used
in
conjunction
with
ours
The
captured
soldiers
should
be
kindly
treated
and
kept
This
is
called
using
the
conquered
foe
to
augment
one’s
own
strength
In
war
then
let
your
great
object
be
victory
not
lengthy
campaigns
As
Ho
Shih
remarks
War
is
not
a
thing
to
be
trifled
with
Sun
Tzŭ
here
reiterates
the
main
lesson
which
this
chapter
is
intended
to
enforce
Thus
it
may
be
known
that
the
leader
of
armies
is
the
arbiter
of
the
people’s
fate
the
man
on
whom
it
depends
whether
the
nation
shall
be
in
peace
or
in
peril
Chapter
III
ATTACK
BY
STRATAGEM
Sun
Tzŭ
said
In
the
practical
art
of
war
the
best
thing
of
all
is
to
take
the
enemy’s
country
whole
and
intact
to
shatter
and
destroy
it
is
not
so
good
So
too
it
is
better
to
capture
an
army
entire
than
to
destroy
it
to
capture
a
regiment
a
detachment
or
a
company
entire
than
to
destroy
them
The
equivalent
to
an
army
corps
according
to
Ssu
ma
Fa
consisted
nominally
of
men
according
to
Ts’ao
Kung
the
equivalent
of
a
regiment
contained
men
the
equivalent
to
a
detachment
consists
from
any
number
between
and
and
the
equivalent
of
a
company
contains
from
to
men
For
the
last
two
however
Chang
Yu
gives
the
exact
figures
of
and
respectively
Hence
to
fight
and
conquer
in
all
your
battles
is
not
supreme
excellence
supreme
excellence
consists
in
breaking
the
enemy’s
resistance
without
fighting
Here
again
no
modern
strategist
but
will
approve
the
words
of
the
old
Chinese
general
Moltke’s
greatest
triumph
the
capitulation
of
the
huge
French
army
at
Sedan
was
won
practically
without
bloodshed
Thus
the
highest
form
of
generalship
is
to
baulk
the
enemy’s
plans
Perhaps
the
word
balk
falls
short
of
expressing
the
full
force
of
the
Chinese
word
which
implies
not
an
attitude
of
defence
whereby
one
might
be
content
to
foil
the
enemy’s
stratagems
one
after
another
but
an
active
policy
of
counter
attack
Ho
Shih
puts
this
very
clearly
in
his
note
When
the
enemy
has
made
a
plan
of
attack
against
us
we
must
anticipate
him
by
delivering
our
own
attack
first
the
next
best
is
to
prevent
the
junction
of
the
enemy’s
forces
Isolating
him
from
his
allies
We
must
not
forget
that
Sun
Tzŭ
in
speaking
of
hostilities
always
has
in
mind
the
numerous
states
or
principalities
into
which
the
China
of
his
day
was
split
up
the
next
in
order
is
to
attack
the
enemy’s
army
in
the
field
When
he
is
already
at
full
strength
and
the
worst
policy
of
all
is
to
besiege
walled
cities
The
rule
is
not
to
besiege
walled
cities
if
it
can
possibly
be
avoided
Another
sound
piece
of
military
theory
Had
the
Boers
acted
upon
it
in
and
refrained
from
dissipating
their
strength
before
Kimberley
Mafeking
or
even
Ladysmith
it
is
more
than
probable
that
they
would
have
been
masters
of
the
situation
before
the
British
were
ready
seriously
to
oppose
them
The
preparation
of
mantlets
movable
shelters
and
various
implements
of
war
will
take
up
three
whole
months
It
is
not
quite
clear
what
the
Chinese
word
here
translated
as
mantlets
described
Ts’ao
Kung
simply
defines
them
as
large
shields
but
we
get
a
better
idea
of
them
from
Li
Ch’uan
who
says
they
were
to
protect
the
heads
of
those
who
were
assaulting
the
city
walls
at
close
quarters
This
seems
to
suggest
a
sort
of
Roman
testudo
ready
made
Tu
Mu
says
they
were
wheeled
vehicles
used
in
repelling
attacks
but
this
is
denied
by
Ch’en
Hao
See
supra
II
The
name
is
also
applied
to
turrets
on
city
walls
Of
the
movable
shelters
we
get
a
fairly
clear
description
from
several
commentators
They
were
wooden
missile
proof
structures
on
four
wheels
propelled
from
within
covered
over
with
raw
hides
and
used
in
sieges
to
convey
parties
of
men
to
and
from
the
walls
for
the
purpose
of
filling
up
the
encircling
moat
with
earth
Tu
Mu
adds
that
they
are
now
called
wooden
donkeys
and
the
piling
up
of
mounds
over
against
the
walls
will
take
three
months
more
These
were
great
mounds
or
ramparts
of
earth
heaped
up
to
the
level
of
the
enemy’s
walls
in
order
to
discover
the
weak
points
in
the
defence
and
also
to
destroy
the
fortified
turrets
mentioned
in
the
preceding
note
The
general
unable
to
control
his
irritation
will
launch
his
men
to
the
assault
like
swarming
ants
This
vivid
simile
of
Ts’ao
Kung
is
taken
from
the
spectacle
of
an
army
of
ants
climbing
a
wall
The
meaning
is
that
the
general
losing
patience
at
the
long
delay
may
make
a
premature
attempt
to
storm
the
place
before
his
engines
of
war
are
ready
with
the
result
that
one
third
of
his
men
are
slain
while
the
town
still
remains
untaken
Such
are
the
disastrous
effects
of
a
siege
We
are
reminded
of
the
terrible
losses
of
the
Japanese
before
Port
Arthur
in
the
most
recent
siege
which
history
has
to
record
Therefore
the
skilful
leader
subdues
the
enemy’s
troops
without
any
fighting
he
captures
their
cities
without
laying
siege
to
them
he
overthrows
their
kingdom
without
lengthy
operations
in
the
field
Chia
Lin
notes
that
he
only
overthrows
the
Government
but
does
no
harm
to
individuals
The
classical
instance
is
Wu
Wang
who
after
having
put
an
end
to
the
Yin
dynasty
was
acclaimed
Father
and
mother
of
the
people
With
his
forces
intact
he
will
dispute
the
mastery
of
the
Empire
and
thus
without
losing
a
man
his
triumph
will
be
complete
Owing
to
the
double
meanings
in
the
Chinese
text
the
latter
part
of
the
sentence
is
susceptible
of
quite
a
different
meaning
And
thus
the
weapon
not
being
blunted
by
use
its
keenness
remains
perfect
This
is
the
method
of
attacking
by
stratagem
It
is
the
rule
in
war
if
our
forces
are
ten
to
the
enemy’s
one
to
surround
him
if
five
to
one
to
attack
him
Straightway
without
waiting
for
any
further
advantage
if
twice
as
numerous
to
divide
our
army
into
two
Tu
Mu
takes
exception
to
the
saying
and
at
first
sight
indeed
it
appears
to
violate
a
fundamental
principle
of
war
Ts’ao
Kung
however
gives
a
clue
to
Sun
Tzŭ’s
meaning
Being
two
to
the
enemy’s
one
we
may
use
one
part
of
our
army
in
the
regular
way
and
the
other
for
some
special
diversion
Chang
Yu
thus
further
elucidates
the
point
If
our
force
is
twice
as
numerous
as
that
of
the
enemy
it
should
be
split
up
into
two
divisions
one
to
meet
the
enemy
in
front
and
one
to
fall
upon
his
rear
if
he
replies
to
the
frontal
attack
he
may
be
crushed
from
behind
if
to
the
rearward
attack
he
may
be
crushed
in
front
This
is
what
is
meant
by
saying
that
‘one
part
may
be
used
in
the
regular
way
and
the
other
for
some
special
diversion
’
Tu
Mu
does
not
understand
that
dividing
one’s
army
is
simply
an
irregular
just
as
concentrating
it
is
the
regular
strategical
method
and
he
is
too
hasty
in
calling
this
a
mistake
If
equally
matched
we
can
offer
battle
Li
Ch’uan
followed
by
Ho
Shih
gives
the
following
paraphrase
If
attackers
and
attacked
are
equally
matched
in
strength
only
the
able
general
will
fight
if
slightly
inferior
in
numbers
we
can
avoid
the
enemy
The
meaning
we
can
watch
the
enemy
is
certainly
a
great
improvement
on
the
above
but
unfortunately
there
appears
to
be
no
very
good
authority
for
the
variant
Chang
Yu
reminds
us
that
the
saying
only
applies
if
the
other
factors
are
equal
a
small
difference
in
numbers
is
often
more
than
counterbalanced
by
superior
energy
and
discipline
if
quite
unequal
in
every
way
we
can
flee
from
him
Hence
though
an
obstinate
fight
may
be
made
by
a
small
force
in
the
end
it
must
be
captured
by
the
larger
force
Now
the
general
is
the
bulwark
of
the
State
if
the
bulwark
is
complete
at
all
points
the
State
will
be
strong
if
the
bulwark
is
defective
the
State
will
be
weak
As
Li
Ch’uan
tersely
puts
it
Gap
indicates
deficiency
if
the
general’s
ability
is
not
perfect
i
e
if
he
is
not
thoroughly
versed
in
his
profession
his
army
will
lack
strength
There
are
three
ways
in
which
a
ruler
can
bring
misfortune
upon
his
army
—
By
commanding
the
army
to
advance
or
to
retreat
being
ignorant
of
the
fact
that
it
cannot
obey
This
is
called
hobbling
the
army
Li
Ch’uan
adds
the
comment
It
is
like
tying
together
the
legs
of
a
thoroughbred
so
that
it
is
unable
to
gallop
One
would
naturally
think
of
the
ruler
in
this
passage
as
being
at
home
and
trying
to
direct
the
movements
of
his
army
from
a
distance
But
the
commentators
understand
just
the
reverse
and
quote
the
saying
of
T’ai
Kung
A
kingdom
should
not
be
governed
from
without
and
army
should
not
be
directed
from
within
Of
course
it
is
true
that
during
an
engagement
or
when
in
close
touch
with
the
enemy
the
general
should
not
be
in
the
thick
of
his
own
troops
but
a
little
distance
apart
Otherwise
he
will
be
liable
to
misjudge
the
position
as
a
whole
and
give
wrong
orders
By
attempting
to
govern
an
army
in
the
same
way
as
he
administers
a
kingdom
being
ignorant
of
the
conditions
which
obtain
in
an
army
This
causes
restlessness
in
the
soldier’s
minds
Ts’ao
Kung’s
note
is
freely
translated
The
military
sphere
and
the
civil
sphere
are
wholly
distinct
you
can’t
handle
an
army
in
kid
gloves
And
Chang
Yu
says
Humanity
and
justice
are
the
principles
on
which
to
govern
a
state
but
not
an
army
opportunism
and
flexibility
on
the
other
hand
are
military
rather
than
civil
virtues
to
assimilate
the
governing
of
an
army
—to
that
of
a
State
understood
By
employing
the
officers
of
his
army
without
discrimination
That
is
he
is
not
careful
to
use
the
right
man
in
the
right
place
through
ignorance
of
the
military
principle
of
adaptation
to
circumstances
This
shakes
the
confidence
of
the
soldiers
I
follow
Mei
Yao
ch’en
here
The
other
commentators
refer
not
to
the
ruler
as
in
§§
but
to
the
officers
he
employs
Thus
Tu
Yu
says
If
a
general
is
ignorant
of
the
principle
of
adaptability
he
must
not
be
entrusted
with
a
position
of
authority
Tu
Mu
quotes
The
skilful
employer
of
men
will
employ
the
wise
man
the
brave
man
the
covetous
man
and
the
stupid
man
For
the
wise
man
delights
in
establishing
his
merit
the
brave
man
likes
to
show
his
courage
in
action
the
covetous
man
is
quick
at
seizing
advantages
and
the
stupid
man
has
no
fear
of
death
But
when
the
army
is
restless
and
distrustful
trouble
is
sure
to
come
from
the
other
feudal
princes
This
is
simply
bringing
anarchy
into
the
army
and
flinging
victory
away
Thus
we
may
know
that
there
are
five
essentials
for
victory
He
will
win
who
knows
when
to
fight
and
when
not
to
fight
Chang
Yu
says
If
he
can
fight
he
advances
and
takes
the
offensive
if
he
cannot
fight
he
retreats
and
remains
on
the
defensive
He
will
invariably
conquer
who
knows
whether
it
is
right
to
take
the
offensive
or
the
defensive
He
will
win
who
knows
how
to
handle
both
superior
and
inferior
forces
This
is
not
merely
the
general’s
ability
to
estimate
numbers
correctly
as
Li
Ch’uan
and
others
make
out
Chang
Yu
expounds
the
saying
more
satisfactorily
By
applying
the
art
of
war
it
is
possible
with
a
lesser
force
to
defeat
a
greater
and
vice
versa
The
secret
lies
in
an
eye
for
locality
and
in
not
letting
the
right
moment
slip
Thus
Wu
Tzŭ
says
‘With
a
superior
force
make
for
easy
ground
with
an
inferior
one
make
for
difficult
ground
’
He
will
win
whose
army
is
animated
by
the
same
spirit
throughout
all
its
ranks
He
will
win
who
prepared
himself
waits
to
take
the
enemy
unprepared
He
will
win
who
has
military
capacity
and
is
not
interfered
with
by
the
sovereign
Tu
Yu
quotes
Wang
Tzŭ
as
saying
It
is
the
sovereign’s
function
to
give
broad
instructions
but
to
decide
on
battle
it
is
the
function
of
the
general
It
is
needless
to
dilate
on
the
military
disasters
which
have
been
caused
by
undue
interference
with
operations
in
the
field
on
the
part
of
the
home
government
Napoleon
undoubtedly
owed
much
of
his
extraordinary
success
to
the
fact
that
he
was
not
hampered
by
central
authority
Victory
lies
in
the
knowledge
of
these
five
points
Literally
“These
five
things
are
knowledge
of
the
principle
of
victory
”
Hence
the
saying
If
you
know
the
enemy
and
know
yourself
you
need
not
fear
the
result
of
a
hundred
battles
If
you
know
yourself
but
not
the
enemy
for
every
victory
gained
you
will
also
suffer
a
defeat
Li
Ch’uan
cites
the
case
of
Fu
Chien
prince
of
Ch’in
who
in
A
D
marched
with
a
vast
army
against
the
Chin
Emperor
When
warned
not
to
despise
an
enemy
who
could
command
the
services
of
such
men
as
Hsieh
An
and
Huan
Ch’ung
he
boastfully
replied
I
have
the
population
of
eight
provinces
at
my
back
infantry
and
horsemen
to
the
number
of
one
million
why
they
could
dam
up
the
Yangtsze
River
itself
by
merely
throwing
their
whips
into
the
stream
What
danger
have
I
to
fear
Nevertheless
his
forces
were
soon
after
disastrously
routed
at
the
Fei
River
and
he
was
obliged
to
beat
a
hasty
retreat
If
you
know
neither
the
enemy
nor
yourself
you
will
succumb
in
every
battle
Chang
Yu
said
Knowing
the
enemy
enables
you
to
take
the
offensive
knowing
yourself
enables
you
to
stand
on
the
defensive
He
adds
Attack
is
the
secret
of
defence
defence
is
the
planning
of
an
attack
It
would
be
hard
to
find
a
better
epitome
of
the
root
principle
of
war
Chapter
IV
TACTICAL
DISPOSITIONS
Ts’ao
Kung
explains
the
Chinese
meaning
of
the
words
for
the
title
of
this
chapter
marching
and
countermarching
on
the
part
of
the
two
armies
with
a
view
to
discovering
each
other’s
condition
Tu
Mu
says
It
is
through
the
dispositions
of
an
army
that
its
condition
may
be
discovered
Conceal
your
dispositions
and
your
condition
will
remain
secret
which
leads
to
victory
show
your
dispositions
and
your
condition
will
become
patent
which
leads
to
defeat
Wang
Hsi
remarks
that
the
good
general
can
secure
success
by
modifying
his
tactics
to
meet
those
of
the
enemy
Sun
Tzŭ
said
The
good
fighters
of
old
first
put
themselves
beyond
the
possibility
of
defeat
and
then
waited
for
an
opportunity
of
defeating
the
enemy
To
secure
ourselves
against
defeat
lies
in
our
own
hands
but
the
opportunity
of
defeating
the
enemy
is
provided
by
the
enemy
himself
That
is
of
course
by
a
mistake
on
the
enemy’s
part
Thus
the
good
fighter
is
able
to
secure
himself
against
defeat
Chang
Yu
says
this
is
done
By
concealing
the
disposition
of
his
troops
covering
up
his
tracks
and
taking
unremitting
precautions
but
cannot
make
certain
of
defeating
the
enemy
Hence
the
saying
One
may
know
how
to
conquer
without
being
able
to
do
it
Security
against
defeat
implies
defensive
tactics
ability
to
defeat
the
enemy
means
taking
the
offensive
I
retain
the
sense
found
in
a
similar
passage
in
§§
in
spite
of
the
fact
that
the
commentators
are
all
against
me
The
meaning
they
give
He
who
cannot
conquer
takes
the
defensive
is
plausible
enough
Standing
on
the
defensive
indicates
insufficient
strength
attacking
a
superabundance
of
strength
The
general
who
is
skilled
in
defence
hides
in
the
most
secret
recesses
of
the
earth
Literally
hides
under
the
ninth
earth
which
is
a
metaphor
indicating
the
utmost
secrecy
and
concealment
so
that
the
enemy
may
not
know
his
whereabouts
he
who
is
skilled
in
attack
flashes
forth
from
the
topmost
heights
of
heaven
Another
metaphor
implying
that
he
falls
on
his
adversary
like
a
thunderbolt
against
which
there
is
no
time
to
prepare
This
is
the
opinion
of
most
of
the
commentators
Thus
on
the
one
hand
we
have
ability
to
protect
ourselves
on
the
other
a
victory
that
is
complete
To
see
victory
only
when
it
is
within
the
ken
of
the
common
herd
is
not
the
acme
of
excellence
As
Ts’ao
Kung
remarks
the
thing
is
to
see
the
plant
before
it
has
germinated
to
foresee
the
event
before
the
action
has
begun
Li
Ch’uan
alludes
to
the
story
of
Han
Hsin
who
when
about
to
attack
the
vastly
superior
army
of
Chao
which
was
strongly
entrenched
in
the
city
of
Ch’eng
an
said
to
his
officers
Gentlemen
we
are
going
to
annihilate
the
enemy
and
shall
meet
again
at
dinner
The
officers
hardly
took
his
words
seriously
and
gave
a
very
dubious
assent
But
Han
Hsin
had
already
worked
out
in
his
mind
the
details
of
a
clever
stratagem
whereby
as
he
foresaw
he
was
able
to
capture
the
city
and
inflict
a
crushing
defeat
on
his
adversary
Neither
is
it
the
acme
of
excellence
if
you
fight
and
conquer
and
the
whole
Empire
says
Well
done
True
excellence
being
as
Tu
Mu
says
To
plan
secretly
to
move
surreptitiously
to
foil
the
enemy’s
intentions
and
balk
his
schemes
so
that
at
last
the
day
may
be
won
without
shedding
a
drop
of
blood
Sun
Tzŭ
reserves
his
approbation
for
things
that
the
world’s
coarse
thumb
And
finger
fail
to
plumb
To
lift
an
autumn
hair
is
no
sign
of
great
strength
Autumn
hair
is
explained
as
the
fur
of
a
hare
which
is
finest
in
autumn
when
it
begins
to
grow
afresh
The
phrase
is
a
very
common
one
in
Chinese
writers
to
see
sun
and
moon
is
no
sign
of
sharp
sight
to
hear
the
noise
of
thunder
is
no
sign
of
a
quick
ear
Ho
Shih
gives
as
real
instances
of
strength
sharp
sight
and
quick
hearing
Wu
Huo
who
could
lift
a
tripod
weighing
stone
Li
Chu
who
at
a
distance
of
a
hundred
paces
could
see
objects
no
bigger
than
a
mustard
seed
and
Shih
K’uang
a
blind
musician
who
could
hear
the
footsteps
of
a
mosquito
What
the
ancients
called
a
clever
fighter
is
one
who
not
only
wins
but
excels
in
winning
with
ease
The
last
half
is
literally
one
who
conquering
excels
in
easy
conquering
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
He
who
only
sees
the
obvious
wins
his
battles
with
difficulty
he
who
looks
below
the
surface
of
things
wins
with
ease
Hence
his
victories
bring
him
neither
reputation
for
wisdom
nor
credit
for
courage
Tu
Mu
explains
this
very
well
Inasmuch
as
his
victories
are
gained
over
circumstances
that
have
not
come
to
light
the
world
as
large
knows
nothing
of
them
and
he
wins
no
reputation
for
wisdom
inasmuch
as
the
hostile
state
submits
before
there
has
been
any
bloodshed
he
receives
no
credit
for
courage
He
wins
his
battles
by
making
no
mistakes
Ch’en
Hao
says
He
plans
no
superfluous
marches
he
devises
no
futile
attacks
The
connection
of
ideas
is
thus
explained
by
Chang
Yu
One
who
seeks
to
conquer
by
sheer
strength
clever
though
he
may
be
at
winning
pitched
battles
is
also
liable
on
occasion
to
be
vanquished
whereas
he
who
can
look
into
the
future
and
discern
conditions
that
are
not
yet
manifest
will
never
make
a
blunder
and
therefore
invariably
win
Making
no
mistakes
is
what
establishes
the
certainty
of
victory
for
it
means
conquering
an
enemy
that
is
already
defeated
Hence
the
skilful
fighter
puts
himself
into
a
position
which
makes
defeat
impossible
and
does
not
miss
the
moment
for
defeating
the
enemy
A
counsel
of
perfection
as
Tu
Mu
truly
observes
Position
need
not
be
confined
to
the
actual
ground
occupied
by
the
troops
It
includes
all
the
arrangements
and
preparations
which
a
wise
general
will
make
to
increase
the
safety
of
his
army
Thus
it
is
that
in
war
the
victorious
strategist
only
seeks
battle
after
the
victory
has
been
won
whereas
he
who
is
destined
to
defeat
first
fights
and
afterwards
looks
for
victory
Ho
Shih
thus
expounds
the
paradox
In
warfare
first
lay
plans
which
will
ensure
victory
and
then
lead
your
army
to
battle
if
you
will
not
begin
with
stratagem
but
rely
on
brute
strength
alone
victory
will
no
longer
be
assured
The
consummate
leader
cultivates
the
moral
law
and
strictly
adheres
to
method
and
discipline
thus
it
is
in
his
power
to
control
success
In
respect
of
military
method
we
have
firstly
Measurement
secondly
Estimation
of
quantity
thirdly
Calculation
fourthly
Balancing
of
chances
fifthly
Victory
Measurement
owes
its
existence
to
Earth
Estimation
of
quantity
to
Measurement
Calculation
to
Estimation
of
quantity
Balancing
of
chances
to
Calculation
and
Victory
to
Balancing
of
chances
It
is
not
easy
to
distinguish
the
four
terms
very
clearly
in
the
Chinese
The
first
seems
to
be
surveying
and
measurement
of
the
ground
which
enable
us
to
form
an
estimate
of
the
enemy’s
strength
and
to
make
calculations
based
on
the
data
thus
obtained
we
are
thus
led
to
a
general
weighing
up
or
comparison
of
the
enemy’s
chances
with
our
own
if
the
latter
turn
the
scale
then
victory
ensues
The
chief
difficulty
lies
in
third
term
which
in
the
Chinese
some
commentators
take
as
a
calculation
of
numbers
thereby
making
it
nearly
synonymous
with
the
second
term
Perhaps
the
second
term
should
be
thought
of
as
a
consideration
of
the
enemy’s
general
position
or
condition
while
the
third
term
is
the
estimate
of
his
numerical
strength
On
the
other
hand
Tu
Mu
says
The
question
of
relative
strength
having
been
settled
we
can
bring
the
varied
resources
of
cunning
into
play
Ho
Shih
seconds
this
interpretation
but
weakens
it
However
it
points
to
the
third
term
as
being
a
calculation
of
numbers
A
victorious
army
opposed
to
a
routed
one
is
as
a
pound’s
weight
placed
in
the
scale
against
a
single
grain
Literally
a
victorious
army
is
like
an
i
oz
weighed
against
a
shu
oz
a
routed
army
is
a
shu
weighed
against
an
i
The
point
is
simply
the
enormous
advantage
which
a
disciplined
force
flushed
with
victory
has
over
one
demoralized
by
defeat
Legge
in
his
note
on
Mencius
I
ix
makes
the
i
to
be
Chinese
ounces
and
corrects
Chu
Hsi’s
statement
that
it
equaled
oz
only
But
Li
Ch’uan
of
the
T’ang
dynasty
here
gives
the
same
figure
as
Chu
Hsi
The
onrush
of
a
conquering
force
is
like
the
bursting
of
pent
up
waters
into
a
chasm
a
thousand
fathoms
deep
So
much
for
tactical
dispositions
Chapter
V
ENERGY
Sun
Tzŭ
said
The
control
of
a
large
force
is
the
same
principle
as
the
control
of
a
few
men
it
is
merely
a
question
of
dividing
up
their
numbers
That
is
cutting
up
the
army
into
regiments
companies
etc
with
subordinate
officers
in
command
of
each
Tu
Mu
reminds
us
of
Han
Hsin’s
famous
reply
to
the
first
Han
Emperor
who
once
said
to
him
How
large
an
army
do
you
think
I
could
lead
Not
more
than
men
your
Majesty
And
you
asked
the
Emperor
Oh
he
answered
the
more
the
better
Fighting
with
a
large
army
under
your
command
is
nowise
different
from
fighting
with
a
small
one
it
is
merely
a
question
of
instituting
signs
and
signals
To
ensure
that
your
whole
host
may
withstand
the
brunt
of
the
enemy’s
attack
and
remain
unshaken—this
is
effected
by
manœuvers
direct
and
indirect
We
now
come
to
one
of
the
most
interesting
parts
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
treatise
the
discussion
of
the
cheng
and
the
ch’i
As
it
is
by
no
means
easy
to
grasp
the
full
significance
of
these
two
terms
or
to
render
them
consistently
by
good
English
equivalents
it
may
be
as
well
to
tabulate
some
of
the
commentators’
remarks
on
the
subject
before
proceeding
further
Li
Ch’uan
Facing
the
enemy
is
cheng
making
lateral
diversion
is
ch’i
Chia
Lin
In
presence
of
the
enemy
your
troops
should
be
arrayed
in
normal
fashion
but
in
order
to
secure
victory
abnormal
manœuvers
must
be
employed
Mei
Yao
ch’en
Ch’i
is
active
cheng
is
passive
passivity
means
waiting
for
an
opportunity
activity
brings
the
victory
itself
Ho
Shih
We
must
cause
the
enemy
to
regard
our
straightforward
attack
as
one
that
is
secretly
designed
and
vice
versa
thus
cheng
may
also
be
ch’i
and
ch’i
may
also
be
cheng
He
instances
the
famous
exploit
of
Han
Hsin
who
when
marching
ostensibly
against
Lin
chin
now
Chao
i
in
Shensi
suddenly
threw
a
large
force
across
the
Yellow
River
in
wooden
tubs
utterly
disconcerting
his
opponent
Ch’ien
Han
Shu
ch
Here
we
are
told
the
march
on
Lin
chin
was
cheng
and
the
surprise
manœuver
was
ch’i
Chang
Yu
gives
the
following
summary
of
opinions
on
the
words
Military
writers
do
not
agree
with
regard
to
the
meaning
of
ch’i
and
cheng
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
cent
B
C
says
‘Direct
warfare
favours
frontal
attacks
indirect
warfare
attacks
from
the
rear
’
Ts’ao
Kung
says
‘Going
straight
out
to
join
battle
is
a
direct
operation
appearing
on
the
enemy’s
rear
is
an
indirect
manœuver
’
Li
Wei
kung
and
cent
A
D
says
‘In
war
to
march
straight
ahead
is
cheng
turning
movements
on
the
other
hand
are
ch’i
’
These
writers
simply
regard
cheng
as
cheng
and
ch’i
as
ch’i
they
do
not
note
that
the
two
are
mutually
interchangeable
and
run
into
each
other
like
the
two
sides
of
a
circle
see
infra
§
A
comment
on
the
T’ang
Emperor
T’ai
Tsung
goes
to
the
root
of
the
matter
‘A
ch’i
manœuver
may
be
cheng
if
we
make
the
enemy
look
upon
it
as
cheng
then
our
real
attack
will
be
ch’i
and
vice
versa
The
whole
secret
lies
in
confusing
the
enemy
so
that
he
cannot
fathom
our
real
intent
’
To
put
it
perhaps
a
little
more
clearly
any
attack
or
other
operation
is
cheng
on
which
the
enemy
has
had
his
attention
fixed
whereas
that
is
ch’i
which
takes
him
by
surprise
or
comes
from
an
unexpected
quarter
If
the
enemy
perceives
a
movement
which
is
meant
to
be
ch’i
it
immediately
becomes
cheng
That
the
impact
of
your
army
may
be
like
a
grindstone
dashed
against
an
egg—this
is
effected
by
the
science
of
weak
points
and
strong
In
all
fighting
the
direct
method
may
be
used
for
joining
battle
but
indirect
methods
will
be
needed
in
order
to
secure
victory
Chang
Yu
says
Steadily
develop
indirect
tactics
either
by
pounding
the
enemy’s
flanks
or
falling
on
his
rear
A
brilliant
example
of
indirect
tactics
which
decided
the
fortunes
of
a
campaign
was
Lord
Roberts’
night
march
round
the
Peiwar
Kotal
in
the
second
Afghan
war
Indirect
tactics
efficiently
applied
are
inexhausible
as
Heaven
and
Earth
unending
as
the
flow
of
rivers
and
streams
like
the
sun
and
moon
they
end
but
to
begin
anew
like
the
four
seasons
they
pass
away
but
to
return
once
more
Tu
Yu
and
Chang
Yu
understand
this
of
the
permutations
of
ch’i
and
cheng
But
at
present
Sun
Tzŭ
is
not
speaking
of
cheng
at
all
unless
indeed
we
suppose
with
Cheng
Yu
hsien
that
a
clause
relating
to
it
has
fallen
out
of
the
text
Of
course
as
has
already
been
pointed
out
the
two
are
so
inextricably
interwoven
in
all
military
operations
that
they
cannot
really
be
considered
apart
Here
we
simply
have
an
expression
in
figurative
language
of
the
almost
infinite
resource
of
a
great
leader
There
are
not
more
than
five
musical
notes
yet
the
combinations
of
these
five
give
rise
to
more
melodies
than
can
ever
be
heard
There
are
not
more
than
five
primary
colours
blue
yellow
red
white
and
black
yet
in
combination
they
produce
more
hues
than
can
ever
be
seen
There
are
not
more
than
five
cardinal
tastes
sour
acrid
salt
sweet
bitter
yet
combinations
of
them
yield
more
flavours
than
can
ever
be
tasted
In
battle
there
are
not
more
than
two
methods
of
attack—the
direct
and
the
indirect
yet
these
two
in
combination
give
rise
to
an
endless
series
of
manœuvers
The
direct
and
the
indirect
lead
on
to
each
other
in
turn
It
is
like
moving
in
a
circle—you
never
come
to
an
end
Who
can
exhaust
the
possibilities
of
their
combination
The
onset
of
troops
is
like
the
rush
of
a
torrent
which
will
even
roll
stones
along
in
its
course
The
quality
of
decision
is
like
the
well
timed
swoop
of
a
falcon
which
enables
it
to
strike
and
destroy
its
victim
The
Chinese
here
is
tricky
and
a
certain
key
word
in
the
context
it
is
used
defies
the
best
efforts
of
the
translator
Tu
Mu
defines
this
word
as
the
measurement
or
estimation
of
distance
But
this
meaning
does
not
quite
fit
the
illustrative
simile
in
§
Applying
this
definition
to
the
falcon
it
seems
to
me
to
denote
that
instinct
of
self
restraint
which
keeps
the
bird
from
swooping
on
its
quarry
until
the
right
moment
together
with
the
power
of
judging
when
the
right
moment
has
arrived
The
analogous
quality
in
soldiers
is
the
highly
important
one
of
being
able
to
reserve
their
fire
until
the
very
instant
at
which
it
will
be
most
effective
When
the
Victory
went
into
action
at
Trafalgar
at
hardly
more
than
drifting
pace
she
was
for
several
minutes
exposed
to
a
storm
of
shot
and
shell
before
replying
with
a
single
gun
Nelson
coolly
waited
until
he
was
within
close
range
when
the
broadside
he
brought
to
bear
worked
fearful
havoc
on
the
enemy’s
nearest
ships
Therefore
the
good
fighter
will
be
terrible
in
his
onset
and
prompt
in
his
decision
The
word
decision
would
have
reference
to
the
measurement
of
distance
mentioned
above
letting
the
enemy
get
near
before
striking
But
I
cannot
help
thinking
that
Sun
Tzŭ
meant
to
use
the
word
in
a
figurative
sense
comparable
to
our
own
idiom
short
and
sharp
Cf
Wang
Hsi’s
note
which
after
describing
the
falcon’s
mode
of
attack
proceeds
This
is
just
how
the
‘psychological
moment’
should
be
seized
in
war
Energy
may
be
likened
to
the
bending
of
a
crossbow
decision
to
the
releasing
of
the
trigger
None
of
the
commentators
seem
to
grasp
the
real
point
of
the
simile
of
energy
and
the
force
stored
up
in
the
bent
cross
bow
until
released
by
the
finger
on
the
trigger
Amid
the
turmoil
and
tumult
of
battle
there
may
be
seeming
disorder
and
yet
no
real
disorder
at
all
amid
confusion
and
chaos
your
array
may
be
without
head
or
tail
yet
it
will
be
proof
against
defeat
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
The
subdivisions
of
the
army
having
been
previously
fixed
and
the
various
signals
agreed
upon
the
separating
and
joining
the
dispersing
and
collecting
which
will
take
place
in
the
course
of
a
battle
may
give
the
appearance
of
disorder
when
no
real
disorder
is
possible
Your
formation
may
be
without
head
or
tail
your
dispositions
all
topsy
turvy
and
yet
a
rout
of
your
forces
quite
out
of
the
question
Simulated
disorder
postulates
perfect
discipline
simulated
fear
postulates
courage
simulated
weakness
postulates
strength
In
order
to
make
the
translation
intelligible
it
is
necessary
to
tone
down
the
sharply
paradoxical
form
of
the
original
Ts’ao
Kung
throws
out
a
hint
of
the
meaning
in
his
brief
note
These
things
all
serve
to
destroy
formation
and
conceal
one’s
condition
But
Tu
Mu
is
the
first
to
put
it
quite
plainly
If
you
wish
to
feign
confusion
in
order
to
lure
the
enemy
on
you
must
first
have
perfect
discipline
if
you
wish
to
display
timidity
in
order
to
entrap
the
enemy
you
must
have
extreme
courage
if
you
wish
to
parade
your
weakness
in
order
to
make
the
enemy
over
confident
you
must
have
exceeding
strength
Hiding
order
beneath
the
cloak
of
disorder
is
simply
a
question
of
subdivision
See
supra
§
concealing
courage
under
a
show
of
timidity
presupposes
a
fund
of
latent
energy
The
commentators
strongly
understand
a
certain
Chinese
word
here
differently
than
anywhere
else
in
this
chapter
Thus
Tu
Mu
says
seeing
that
we
are
favourably
circumstanced
and
yet
make
no
move
the
enemy
will
believe
that
we
are
really
afraid
masking
strength
with
weakness
is
to
be
effected
by
tactical
dispositions
Chang
Yu
relates
the
following
anecdote
of
Kao
Tsu
the
first
Han
Emperor
“Wishing
to
crush
the
Hsiung
nu
he
sent
out
spies
to
report
on
their
condition
But
the
Hsiung
nu
forewarned
carefully
concealed
all
their
able
bodied
men
and
well
fed
horses
and
only
allowed
infirm
soldiers
and
emaciated
cattle
to
be
seen
The
result
was
that
spies
one
and
all
recommended
the
Emperor
to
deliver
his
attack
Lou
Ching
alone
opposed
them
saying
‘When
two
countries
go
to
war
they
are
naturally
inclined
to
make
an
ostentatious
display
of
their
strength
Yet
our
spies
have
seen
nothing
but
old
age
and
infirmity
This
is
surely
some
ruse
on
the
part
of
the
enemy
and
it
would
be
unwise
for
us
to
attack
’
The
Emperor
however
disregarding
this
advice
fell
into
the
trap
and
found
himself
surrounded
at
Po
teng
”
Thus
one
who
is
skilful
at
keeping
the
enemy
on
the
move
maintains
deceitful
appearances
according
to
which
the
enemy
will
act
Ts’ao
Kung’s
note
is
Make
a
display
of
weakness
and
want
Tu
Mu
says
If
our
force
happens
to
be
superior
to
the
enemy’s
weakness
may
be
simulated
in
order
to
lure
him
on
but
if
inferior
he
must
be
led
to
believe
that
we
are
strong
in
order
that
he
may
keep
off
In
fact
all
the
enemy’s
movements
should
be
determined
by
the
signs
that
we
choose
to
give
him
Note
the
following
anecdote
of
Sun
Pin
a
descendent
of
Sun
Wu
In
B
C
the
Ch’i
State
being
at
war
with
Wei
sent
T’ien
Chi
and
Sun
Pin
against
the
general
P’ang
Chuan
who
happened
to
be
a
deadly
personal
enemy
of
the
later
Sun
Pin
said
The
Ch’i
State
has
a
reputation
for
cowardice
and
therefore
our
adversary
despises
us
Let
us
turn
this
circumstance
to
account
Accordingly
when
the
army
had
crossed
the
border
into
Wei
territory
he
gave
orders
to
show
fires
on
the
first
night
on
the
next
and
the
night
after
only
P’ang
Chuan
pursued
them
hotly
saying
to
himself
I
knew
these
men
of
Ch’i
were
cowards
their
numbers
have
already
fallen
away
by
more
than
half
In
his
retreat
Sun
Pin
came
to
a
narrow
defile
which
he
calculated
that
his
pursuers
would
reach
after
dark
Here
he
had
a
tree
stripped
of
its
bark
and
inscribed
upon
it
the
words
Under
this
tree
shall
P’ang
Chuan
die
Then
as
night
began
to
fall
he
placed
a
strong
body
of
archers
in
ambush
near
by
with
orders
to
shoot
directly
if
they
saw
a
light
Later
on
P’ang
Chuan
arrived
at
the
spot
and
noticing
the
tree
struck
a
light
in
order
to
read
what
was
written
on
it
His
body
was
immediately
riddled
by
a
volley
of
arrows
and
his
whole
army
thrown
into
confusion
The
above
is
Tu
Mu’s
version
of
the
story
the
Shih
Chi
less
dramatically
but
probably
with
more
historical
truth
makes
P’ang
Chuan
cut
his
own
throat
with
an
exclamation
of
despair
after
the
rout
of
his
army
He
sacrifices
something
that
the
enemy
may
snatch
at
it
By
holding
out
baits
he
keeps
him
on
the
march
then
with
a
body
of
picked
men
he
lies
in
wait
for
him
With
an
emendation
suggested
by
Li
Ching
this
then
reads
He
lies
in
wait
with
the
main
body
of
his
troops
The
clever
combatant
looks
to
the
effect
of
combined
energy
and
does
not
require
too
much
from
individuals
Tu
Mu
says
He
first
of
all
considers
the
power
of
his
army
in
the
bulk
afterwards
he
takes
individual
talent
into
account
and
uses
each
men
according
to
his
capabilities
He
does
not
demand
perfection
from
the
untalented
Hence
his
ability
to
pick
out
the
right
men
and
utilise
combined
energy
When
he
utilises
combined
energy
his
fighting
men
become
as
it
were
like
unto
rolling
logs
or
stones
For
it
is
the
nature
of
a
log
or
stone
to
remain
motionless
on
level
ground
and
to
move
when
on
a
slope
if
four
cornered
to
come
to
a
standstill
but
if
round
shaped
to
go
rolling
down
Ts’au
Kung
calls
this
the
use
of
natural
or
inherent
power
Thus
the
energy
developed
by
good
fighting
men
is
as
the
momentum
of
a
round
stone
rolled
down
a
mountain
thousands
of
feet
in
height
So
much
on
the
subject
of
energy
The
chief
lesson
of
this
chapter
in
Tu
Mu’s
opinion
is
the
paramount
importance
in
war
of
rapid
evolutions
and
sudden
rushes
Great
results
he
adds
can
thus
be
achieved
with
small
forces
Forty
one
Years
in
India
chapter
Chapter
VI
WEAK
POINTS
AND
STRONG
Chang
Yu
attempts
to
explain
the
sequence
of
chapters
as
follows
Chapter
IV
on
Tactical
Dispositions
treated
of
the
offensive
and
the
defensive
chapter
V
on
Energy
dealt
with
direct
and
indirect
methods
The
good
general
acquaints
himself
first
with
the
theory
of
attack
and
defence
and
then
turns
his
attention
to
direct
and
indirect
methods
He
studies
the
art
of
varying
and
combining
these
two
methods
before
proceeding
to
the
subject
of
weak
and
strong
points
For
the
use
of
direct
or
indirect
methods
arises
out
of
attack
and
defence
and
the
perception
of
weak
and
strong
points
depends
again
on
the
above
methods
Hence
the
present
chapter
comes
immediately
after
the
chapter
on
Energy
Sun
Tzŭ
said
Whoever
is
first
in
the
field
and
awaits
the
coming
of
the
enemy
will
be
fresh
for
the
fight
whoever
is
second
in
the
field
and
has
to
hasten
to
battle
will
arrive
exhausted
Therefore
the
clever
combatant
imposes
his
will
on
the
enemy
but
does
not
allow
the
enemy’s
will
to
be
imposed
on
him
One
mark
of
a
great
soldier
is
that
he
fight
on
his
own
terms
or
fights
not
at
all
By
holding
out
advantages
to
him
he
can
cause
the
enemy
to
approach
of
his
own
accord
or
by
inflicting
damage
he
can
make
it
impossible
for
the
enemy
to
draw
near
In
the
first
case
he
will
entice
him
with
a
bait
in
the
second
he
will
strike
at
some
important
point
which
the
enemy
will
have
to
defend
If
the
enemy
is
taking
his
ease
he
can
harass
him
This
passage
may
be
cited
as
evidence
against
Mei
Yao
Ch’en’s
interpretation
of
I
§
if
well
supplied
with
food
he
can
starve
him
out
if
quietly
encamped
he
can
force
him
to
move
Appear
at
points
which
the
enemy
must
hasten
to
defend
march
swiftly
to
places
where
you
are
not
expected
An
army
may
march
great
distances
without
distress
if
it
marches
through
country
where
the
enemy
is
not
Ts’ao
Kung
sums
up
very
well
Emerge
from
the
void
q
d
like
a
bolt
from
the
blue
strike
at
vulnerable
points
shun
places
that
are
defended
attack
in
unexpected
quarters
You
can
be
sure
of
succeeding
in
your
attacks
if
you
only
attack
places
which
are
undefended
Wang
Hsi
explains
undefended
places
as
weak
points
that
is
to
say
where
the
general
is
lacking
in
capacity
or
the
soldiers
in
spirit
where
the
walls
are
not
strong
enough
or
the
precautions
not
strict
enough
where
relief
comes
too
late
or
provisions
are
too
scanty
or
the
defenders
are
variance
amongst
themselves
You
can
ensure
the
safety
of
your
defence
if
you
only
hold
positions
that
cannot
be
attacked
I
e
where
there
are
none
of
the
weak
points
mentioned
above
There
is
rather
a
nice
point
involved
in
the
interpretation
of
this
later
clause
Tu
Mu
Ch’en
Hao
and
Mei
Yao
ch’en
assume
the
meaning
to
be
In
order
to
make
your
defence
quite
safe
you
must
defend
even
those
places
that
are
not
likely
to
be
attacked
and
Tu
Mu
adds
How
much
more
then
those
that
will
be
attacked
Taken
thus
however
the
clause
balances
less
well
with
the
preceding—always
a
consideration
in
the
highly
antithetical
style
which
is
natural
to
the
Chinese
Chang
Yu
therefore
seems
to
come
nearer
the
mark
in
saying
He
who
is
skilled
in
attack
flashes
forth
from
the
topmost
heights
of
heaven
see
IV
§
making
it
impossible
for
the
enemy
to
guard
against
him
This
being
so
the
places
that
I
shall
attack
are
precisely
those
that
the
enemy
cannot
defend…
He
who
is
skilled
in
defence
hides
in
the
most
secret
recesses
of
the
earth
making
it
impossible
for
the
enemy
to
estimate
his
whereabouts
This
being
so
the
places
that
I
shall
hold
are
precisely
those
that
the
enemy
cannot
attack
Hence
that
general
is
skilful
in
attack
whose
opponent
does
not
know
what
to
defend
and
he
is
skilful
in
defence
whose
opponent
does
not
know
what
to
attack
An
aphorism
which
puts
the
whole
art
of
war
in
a
nutshell
O
divine
art
of
subtlety
and
secrecy
Through
you
we
learn
to
be
invisible
through
you
inaudible
Literally
without
form
or
sound
but
it
is
said
of
course
with
reference
to
the
enemy
and
hence
we
can
hold
the
enemy’s
fate
in
our
hands
You
may
advance
and
be
absolutely
irresistible
if
you
make
for
the
enemy’s
weak
points
you
may
retire
and
be
safe
from
pursuit
if
your
movements
are
more
rapid
than
those
of
the
enemy
If
we
wish
to
fight
the
enemy
can
be
forced
to
an
engagement
even
though
he
be
sheltered
behind
a
high
rampart
and
a
deep
ditch
All
we
need
do
is
attack
some
other
place
that
he
will
be
obliged
to
relieve
Tu
Mu
says
If
the
enemy
is
the
invading
party
we
can
cut
his
line
of
communications
and
occupy
the
roads
by
which
he
will
have
to
return
if
we
are
the
invaders
we
may
direct
our
attack
against
the
sovereign
himself
It
is
clear
that
Sun
Tzŭ
unlike
certain
generals
in
the
late
Boer
war
was
no
believer
in
frontal
attacks
If
we
do
not
wish
to
fight
we
can
prevent
the
enemy
from
engaging
us
even
though
the
lines
of
our
encampment
be
merely
traced
out
on
the
ground
All
we
need
do
is
to
throw
something
odd
and
unaccountable
in
his
way
This
extremely
concise
expression
is
intelligibly
paraphrased
by
Chia
Lin
even
though
we
have
constructed
neither
wall
nor
ditch
Li
Ch’uan
says
we
puzzle
him
by
strange
and
unusual
dispositions
and
Tu
Mu
finally
clinches
the
meaning
by
three
illustrative
anecdotes—one
of
Chu
ko
Liang
who
when
occupying
Yang
p’ing
and
about
to
be
attacked
by
Ssu
ma
I
suddenly
struck
his
colors
stopped
the
beating
of
the
drums
and
flung
open
the
city
gates
showing
only
a
few
men
engaged
in
sweeping
and
sprinkling
the
ground
This
unexpected
proceeding
had
the
intended
effect
for
Ssu
ma
I
suspecting
an
ambush
actually
drew
off
his
army
and
retreated
What
Sun
Tzŭ
is
advocating
here
therefore
is
nothing
more
nor
less
than
the
timely
use
of
bluff
By
discovering
the
enemy’s
dispositions
and
remaining
invisible
ourselves
we
can
keep
our
forces
concentrated
while
the
enemy’s
must
be
divided
The
conclusion
is
perhaps
not
very
obvious
but
Chang
Yu
after
Mei
Yao
ch’en
rightly
explains
it
thus
If
the
enemy’s
dispositions
are
visible
we
can
make
for
him
in
one
body
whereas
our
own
dispositions
being
kept
secret
the
enemy
will
be
obliged
to
divide
his
forces
in
order
to
guard
against
attack
from
every
quarter
We
can
form
a
single
united
body
while
the
enemy
must
split
up
into
fractions
Hence
there
will
be
a
whole
pitted
against
separate
parts
of
a
whole
which
means
that
we
shall
be
many
to
the
enemy’s
few
And
if
we
are
able
thus
to
attack
an
inferior
force
with
a
superior
one
our
opponents
will
be
in
dire
straits
The
spot
where
we
intend
to
fight
must
not
be
made
known
for
then
the
enemy
will
have
to
prepare
against
a
possible
attack
at
several
different
points
Sheridan
once
explained
the
reason
of
General
Grant’s
victories
by
saying
that
while
his
opponents
were
kept
fully
employed
wondering
what
he
was
going
to
do
he
was
thinking
most
of
what
he
was
going
to
do
himself
and
his
forces
being
thus
distributed
in
many
directions
the
numbers
we
shall
have
to
face
at
any
given
point
will
be
proportionately
few
For
should
the
enemy
strengthen
his
van
he
will
weaken
his
rear
should
he
strengthen
his
rear
he
will
weaken
his
van
should
he
strengthen
his
left
he
will
weaken
his
right
should
he
strengthen
his
right
he
will
weaken
his
left
If
he
sends
reinforcements
everywhere
he
will
everywhere
be
weak
In
Frederick
the
Great’s
Instructions
to
his
Generals
we
read
A
defensive
war
is
apt
to
betray
us
into
too
frequent
detachment
Those
generals
who
have
had
but
little
experience
attempt
to
protect
every
point
while
those
who
are
better
acquainted
with
their
profession
having
only
the
capital
object
in
view
guard
against
a
decisive
blow
and
acquiesce
in
small
misfortunes
to
avoid
greater
Numerical
weakness
comes
from
having
to
prepare
against
possible
attacks
numerical
strength
from
compelling
our
adversary
to
make
these
preparations
against
us
The
highest
generalship
in
Col
Henderson’s
words
is
to
compel
the
enemy
to
disperse
his
army
and
then
to
concentrate
superior
force
against
each
fraction
in
turn
Knowing
the
place
and
the
time
of
the
coming
battle
we
may
concentrate
from
the
greatest
distances
in
order
to
fight
What
Sun
Tzŭ
evidently
has
in
mind
is
that
nice
calculation
of
distances
and
that
masterly
employment
of
strategy
which
enable
a
general
to
divide
his
army
for
the
purpose
of
a
long
and
rapid
march
and
afterwards
to
effect
a
junction
at
precisely
the
right
spot
and
the
right
hour
in
order
to
confront
the
enemy
in
overwhelming
strength
Among
many
such
successful
junctions
which
military
history
records
one
of
the
most
dramatic
and
decisive
was
the
appearance
of
Blucher
just
at
the
critical
moment
on
the
field
of
Waterloo
But
if
neither
time
nor
place
be
known
then
the
left
wing
will
be
impotent
to
succour
the
right
the
right
equally
impotent
to
succour
the
left
the
van
unable
to
relieve
the
rear
or
the
rear
to
support
the
van
How
much
more
so
if
the
furthest
portions
of
the
army
are
anything
under
a
hundred
li
apart
and
even
the
nearest
are
separated
by
several
li
The
Chinese
of
this
last
sentence
is
a
little
lacking
in
precision
but
the
mental
picture
we
are
required
to
draw
is
probably
that
of
an
army
advancing
towards
a
given
rendezvous
in
separate
columns
each
of
which
has
orders
to
be
there
on
a
fixed
date
If
the
general
allows
the
various
detachments
to
proceed
at
haphazard
without
precise
instructions
as
to
the
time
and
place
of
meeting
the
enemy
will
be
able
to
annihilate
the
army
in
detail
Chang
Yu’s
note
may
be
worth
quoting
here
If
we
do
not
know
the
place
where
our
opponents
mean
to
concentrate
or
the
day
on
which
they
will
join
battle
our
unity
will
be
forfeited
through
our
preparations
for
defence
and
the
positions
we
hold
will
be
insecure
Suddenly
happening
upon
a
powerful
foe
we
shall
be
brought
to
battle
in
a
flurried
condition
and
no
mutual
support
will
be
possible
between
wings
vanguard
or
rear
especially
if
there
is
any
great
distance
between
the
foremost
and
hindmost
divisions
of
the
army
Though
according
to
my
estimate
the
soldiers
of
Yüeh
exceed
our
own
in
number
that
shall
advantage
them
nothing
in
the
matter
of
victory
I
say
then
that
victory
can
be
achieved
Alas
for
these
brave
words
The
long
feud
between
the
two
states
ended
in
B
C
with
the
total
defeat
of
Wu
by
Kou
Chien
and
its
incorporation
in
Yüeh
This
was
doubtless
long
after
Sun
Tzŭ’s
death
With
his
present
assertion
compare
IV
§
Chang
Yu
is
the
only
one
to
point
out
the
seeming
discrepancy
which
he
thus
goes
on
to
explain
In
the
chapter
on
Tactical
Dispositions
it
is
said
‘One
may
know
how
to
conquer
without
being
able
to
do
it
’
whereas
here
we
have
the
statement
that
‘victory’
can
be
achieved
’
The
explanation
is
that
in
the
former
chapter
where
the
offensive
and
defensive
are
under
discussion
it
is
said
that
if
the
enemy
is
fully
prepared
one
cannot
make
certain
of
beating
him
But
the
present
passage
refers
particularly
to
the
soldiers
of
Yüeh
who
according
to
Sun
Tzŭ’s
calculations
will
be
kept
in
ignorance
of
the
time
and
place
of
the
impending
struggle
That
is
why
he
says
here
that
victory
can
be
achieved
Though
the
enemy
be
stronger
in
numbers
we
may
prevent
him
from
fighting
Scheme
so
as
to
discover
his
plans
and
the
likelihood
of
their
success
An
alternative
reading
offered
by
Chia
Lin
is
Know
beforehand
all
plans
conducive
to
our
success
and
to
the
enemy’s
failure
Rouse
him
and
learn
the
principle
of
his
activity
or
inactivity
Chang
Yu
tells
us
that
by
noting
the
joy
or
anger
shown
by
the
enemy
on
being
thus
disturbed
we
shall
be
able
to
conclude
whether
his
policy
is
to
lie
low
or
the
reverse
He
instances
the
action
of
Cho
ku
Liang
who
sent
the
scornful
present
of
a
woman’s
head
dress
to
Ssu
ma
I
in
order
to
goad
him
out
of
his
Fabian
tactics
Force
him
to
reveal
himself
so
as
to
find
out
his
vulnerable
spots
Carefully
compare
the
opposing
army
with
your
own
so
that
you
may
know
where
strength
is
superabundant
and
where
it
is
deficient
Cf
IV
§
In
making
tactical
dispositions
the
highest
pitch
you
can
attain
is
to
conceal
them
The
piquancy
of
the
paradox
evaporates
in
translation
Concealment
is
perhaps
not
so
much
actual
invisibility
see
supra
§
as
showing
no
sign
of
what
you
mean
to
do
of
the
plans
that
are
formed
in
your
brain
conceal
your
dispositions
and
you
will
be
safe
from
the
prying
of
the
subtlest
spies
from
the
machinations
of
the
wisest
brains
Tu
Mu
explains
Though
the
enemy
may
have
clever
and
capable
officers
they
will
not
be
able
to
lay
any
plans
against
us
How
victory
may
be
produced
for
them
out
of
the
enemy’s
own
tactics—that
is
what
the
multitude
cannot
comprehend
All
men
can
see
the
tactics
whereby
I
conquer
but
what
none
can
see
is
the
strategy
out
of
which
victory
is
evolved
I
e
everybody
can
see
superficially
how
a
battle
is
won
what
they
cannot
see
is
the
long
series
of
plans
and
combinations
which
has
preceded
the
battle
Do
not
repeat
the
tactics
which
have
gained
you
one
victory
but
let
your
methods
be
regulated
by
the
infinite
variety
of
circumstances
As
Wang
Hsi
sagely
remarks
There
is
but
one
root
principle
underlying
victory
but
the
tactics
which
lead
up
to
it
are
infinite
in
number
With
this
compare
Col
Henderson
The
rules
of
strategy
are
few
and
simple
They
may
be
learned
in
a
week
They
may
be
taught
by
familiar
illustrations
or
a
dozen
diagrams
But
such
knowledge
will
no
more
teach
a
man
to
lead
an
army
like
Napoleon
than
a
knowledge
of
grammar
will
teach
him
to
write
like
Gibbon
Military
tactics
are
like
unto
water
for
water
in
its
natural
course
runs
away
from
high
places
and
hastens
downwards
So
in
war
the
way
is
to
avoid
what
is
strong
and
to
strike
at
what
is
weak
Like
water
taking
the
line
of
least
resistance
Water
shapes
its
course
according
to
the
nature
of
the
ground
over
which
it
flows
the
soldier
works
out
his
victory
in
relation
to
the
foe
whom
he
is
facing
Therefore
just
as
water
retains
no
constant
shape
so
in
warfare
there
are
no
constant
conditions
He
who
can
modify
his
tactics
in
relation
to
his
opponent
and
thereby
succeed
in
winning
may
be
called
a
heaven
born
captain
The
five
elements
water
fire
wood
metal
earth
are
not
always
equally
predominant
That
is
as
Wang
Hsi
says
they
predominate
alternately
the
four
seasons
make
way
for
each
other
in
turn
Literally
have
no
invariable
seat
There
are
short
days
and
long
the
moon
has
its
periods
of
waning
and
waxing
Cf
V
§
The
purport
of
the
passage
is
simply
to
illustrate
the
want
of
fixity
in
war
by
the
changes
constantly
taking
place
in
Nature
The
comparison
is
not
very
happy
however
because
the
regularity
of
the
phenomena
which
Sun
Tzŭ
mentions
is
by
no
means
paralleled
in
war
See
Col
Henderson’s
biography
of
Stonewall
Jackson
ed
vol
II
p
Chapter
VII
MANŒUVERING
Sun
Tzŭ
said
In
war
the
general
receives
his
commands
from
the
sovereign
Having
collected
an
army
and
concentrated
his
forces
he
must
blend
and
harmonise
the
different
elements
thereof
before
pitching
his
camp
Chang
Yu
says
the
establishment
of
harmony
and
confidence
between
the
higher
and
lower
ranks
before
venturing
into
the
field
and
he
quotes
a
saying
of
Wu
Tzŭ
chap
ad
init
Without
harmony
in
the
State
no
military
expedition
can
be
undertaken
without
harmony
in
the
army
no
battle
array
can
be
formed
In
an
historical
romance
Sun
Tzŭ
is
represented
as
saying
to
Wu
Yuan
As
a
general
rule
those
who
are
waging
war
should
get
rid
of
all
the
domestic
troubles
before
proceeding
to
attack
the
external
foe
After
that
comes
tactical
manœuvering
than
which
there
is
nothing
more
difficult
I
have
departed
slightly
from
the
traditional
interpretation
of
Ts’ao
Kung
who
says
From
the
time
of
receiving
the
sovereign’s
instructions
until
our
encampment
over
against
the
enemy
the
tactics
to
be
pursued
are
most
difficult
It
seems
to
me
that
the
tactics
or
manœuvers
can
hardly
be
said
to
begin
until
the
army
has
sallied
forth
and
encamped
and
Ch’ien
Hao’s
note
gives
color
to
this
view
For
levying
concentrating
harmonizing
and
entrenching
an
army
there
are
plenty
of
old
rules
which
will
serve
The
real
difficulty
comes
when
we
engage
in
tactical
operations
Tu
Yu
also
observes
that
the
great
difficulty
is
to
be
beforehand
with
the
enemy
in
seizing
favourable
position
The
difficulty
of
tactical
manœuvering
consists
in
turning
the
devious
into
the
direct
and
misfortune
into
gain
This
sentence
contains
one
of
those
highly
condensed
and
somewhat
enigmatical
expressions
of
which
Sun
Tzŭ
is
so
fond
This
is
how
it
is
explained
by
Ts’ao
Kung
Make
it
appear
that
you
are
a
long
way
off
then
cover
the
distance
rapidly
and
arrive
on
the
scene
before
your
opponent
Tu
Mu
says
Hoodwink
the
enemy
so
that
he
may
be
remiss
and
leisurely
while
you
are
dashing
along
with
utmost
speed
Ho
Shih
gives
a
slightly
different
turn
Although
you
may
have
difficult
ground
to
traverse
and
natural
obstacles
to
encounter
this
is
a
drawback
which
can
be
turned
into
actual
advantage
by
celerity
of
movement
Signal
examples
of
this
saying
are
afforded
by
the
two
famous
passages
across
the
Alps—that
of
Hannibal
which
laid
Italy
at
his
mercy
and
that
of
Napoleon
two
thousand
years
later
which
resulted
in
the
great
victory
of
Marengo
Thus
to
take
a
long
and
circuitous
route
after
enticing
the
enemy
out
of
the
way
and
though
starting
after
him
to
contrive
to
reach
the
goal
before
him
shows
knowledge
of
the
artifice
of
deviation
Tu
Mu
cites
the
famous
march
of
Chao
She
in
B
C
to
relieve
the
town
of
O
yu
which
was
closely
invested
by
a
Ch’in
army
The
King
of
Chao
first
consulted
Lien
P’o
on
the
advisability
of
attempting
a
relief
but
the
latter
thought
the
distance
too
great
and
the
intervening
country
too
rugged
and
difficult
His
Majesty
then
turned
to
Chao
She
who
fully
admitted
the
hazardous
nature
of
the
march
but
finally
said
We
shall
be
like
two
rats
fighting
in
a
whole—and
the
pluckier
one
will
win
So
he
left
the
capital
with
his
army
but
had
only
gone
a
distance
of
li
when
he
stopped
and
began
throwing
up
entrenchments
For
days
he
continued
strengthening
his
fortifications
and
took
care
that
spies
should
carry
the
intelligence
to
the
enemy
The
Ch’in
general
was
overjoyed
and
attributed
his
adversary’s
tardiness
to
the
fact
that
the
beleaguered
city
was
in
the
Han
State
and
thus
not
actually
part
of
Chao
territory
But
the
spies
had
no
sooner
departed
than
Chao
She
began
a
forced
march
lasting
for
two
days
and
one
night
and
arrive
on
the
scene
of
action
with
such
astonishing
rapidity
that
he
was
able
to
occupy
a
commanding
position
on
the
North
hill
before
the
enemy
had
got
wind
of
his
movements
A
crushing
defeat
followed
for
the
Ch’in
forces
who
were
obliged
to
raise
the
siege
of
O
yu
in
all
haste
and
retreat
across
the
border
Manœuvering
with
an
army
is
advantageous
with
an
undisciplined
multitude
most
dangerous
I
adopt
the
reading
of
the
T’ung
Tien
Cheng
Yu
hsien
and
the
T’u
Shu
since
they
appear
to
apply
the
exact
nuance
required
in
order
to
make
sense
The
commentators
using
the
standard
text
take
this
line
to
mean
that
manœuvers
may
be
profitable
or
they
may
be
dangerous
it
all
depends
on
the
ability
of
the
general
If
you
set
a
fully
equipped
army
in
march
in
order
to
snatch
an
advantage
the
chances
are
that
you
will
be
too
late
On
the
other
hand
to
detach
a
flying
column
for
the
purpose
involves
the
sacrifice
of
its
baggage
and
stores
Some
of
the
Chinese
text
is
unintelligible
to
the
Chinese
commentators
who
paraphrase
the
sentence
I
submit
my
own
rendering
without
much
enthusiasm
being
convinced
that
there
is
some
deep
seated
corruption
in
the
text
On
the
whole
it
is
clear
that
Sun
Tzŭ
does
not
approve
of
a
lengthy
march
being
undertaken
without
supplies
Cf
infra
§
Thus
if
you
order
your
men
to
roll
up
their
buff
coats
and
make
forced
marches
without
halting
day
or
night
covering
double
the
usual
distance
at
a
stretch
The
ordinary
day’s
march
according
to
Tu
Mu
was
li
but
on
one
occasion
when
pursuing
Liu
Pei
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
is
said
to
have
covered
the
incredible
distance
of
li
within
twenty
four
hours
doing
a
hundred
li
in
order
to
wrest
an
advantage
the
leaders
of
all
your
three
divisions
will
fall
into
the
hands
of
the
enemy
The
stronger
men
will
be
in
front
the
jaded
ones
will
fall
behind
and
on
this
plan
only
one
tenth
of
your
army
will
reach
its
destination
The
moral
is
as
Ts’ao
Kung
and
others
point
out
Don’t
march
a
hundred
li
to
gain
a
tactical
advantage
either
with
or
without
impedimenta
Manœuvers
of
this
description
should
be
confined
to
short
distances
Stonewall
Jackson
said
The
hardships
of
forced
marches
are
often
more
painful
than
the
dangers
of
battle
He
did
not
often
call
upon
his
troops
for
extraordinary
exertions
It
was
only
when
he
intended
a
surprise
or
when
a
rapid
retreat
was
imperative
that
he
sacrificed
everything
for
speed
If
you
march
fifty
li
in
order
to
outmanœuver
the
enemy
you
will
lose
the
leader
of
your
first
division
and
only
half
your
force
will
reach
the
goal
Literally
the
leader
of
the
first
division
will
be
torn
away
If
you
march
thirty
li
with
the
same
object
two
thirds
of
your
army
will
arrive
In
the
T’ung
Tien
is
added
From
this
we
may
know
the
difficulty
of
manœuvering
We
may
take
it
then
that
an
army
without
its
baggage
train
is
lost
without
provisions
it
is
lost
without
bases
of
supply
it
is
lost
I
think
Sun
Tzŭ
meant
stores
accumulated
in
dépôts
But
Tu
Yu
says
fodder
and
the
like
Chang
Yu
says
Goods
in
general
and
Wang
Hsi
says
fuel
salt
foodstuffs
etc
We
cannot
enter
into
alliances
until
we
are
acquainted
with
the
designs
of
our
neighbours
We
are
not
fit
to
lead
an
army
on
the
march
unless
we
are
familiar
with
the
face
of
the
country—its
mountains
and
forests
its
pitfalls
and
precipices
its
marshes
and
swamps
We
shall
be
unable
to
turn
natural
advantages
to
account
unless
we
make
use
of
local
guides
§§
are
repeated
in
chap
XI
§
In
war
practise
dissimulation
and
you
will
succeed
In
the
tactics
of
Turenne
deception
of
the
enemy
especially
as
to
the
numerical
strength
of
his
troops
took
a
very
prominent
position
Move
only
if
there
is
a
real
advantage
to
be
gained
Whether
to
concentrate
or
to
divide
your
troops
must
be
decided
by
circumstances
Let
your
rapidity
be
that
of
the
wind
The
simile
is
doubly
appropriate
because
the
wind
is
not
only
swift
but
as
Mei
Yao
ch’en
points
out
invisible
and
leaves
no
tracks
your
compactness
that
of
the
forest
Meng
Shih
comes
nearer
to
the
mark
in
his
note
When
slowly
marching
order
and
ranks
must
be
preserved
—so
as
to
guard
against
surprise
attacks
But
natural
forest
do
not
grow
in
rows
whereas
they
do
generally
possess
the
quality
of
density
or
compactness
In
raiding
and
plundering
be
like
fire
Cf
Shih
Ching
IV
iv
Fierce
as
a
blazing
fire
which
no
man
can
check
in
immovability
like
a
mountain
That
is
when
holding
a
position
from
which
the
enemy
is
trying
to
dislodge
you
or
perhaps
as
Tu
Yu
says
when
he
is
trying
to
entice
you
into
a
trap
Let
your
plans
be
dark
and
impenetrable
as
night
and
when
you
move
fall
like
a
thunderbolt
Tu
Yu
quotes
a
saying
of
T’ai
Kung
which
has
passed
into
a
proverb
You
cannot
shut
your
ears
to
the
thunder
or
your
eyes
to
the
lighting—so
rapid
are
they
Likewise
an
attack
should
be
made
so
quickly
that
it
cannot
be
parried
When
you
plunder
a
countryside
let
the
spoil
be
divided
amongst
your
men
Sun
Tzŭ
wishes
to
lessen
the
abuses
of
indiscriminate
plundering
by
insisting
that
all
booty
shall
be
thrown
into
a
common
stock
which
may
afterwards
be
fairly
divided
amongst
all
when
you
capture
new
territory
cut
it
up
into
allotments
for
the
benefit
of
the
soldiery
Ch’en
Hao
says
quarter
your
soldiers
on
the
land
and
let
them
sow
and
plant
it
It
is
by
acting
on
this
principle
and
harvesting
the
lands
they
invaded
that
the
Chinese
have
succeeded
in
carrying
out
some
of
their
most
memorable
and
triumphant
expeditions
such
as
that
of
Pan
Ch’ao
who
penetrated
to
the
Caspian
and
in
more
recent
years
those
of
Fu
k’ang
an
and
Tso
Tsung
t’ang
Ponder
and
deliberate
before
you
make
a
move
Chang
Yu
quotes
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
as
saying
that
we
must
not
break
camp
until
we
have
gained
the
resisting
power
of
the
enemy
and
the
cleverness
of
the
opposing
general
Cf
the
seven
comparisons
in
I
§
He
will
conquer
who
has
learnt
the
artifice
of
deviation
See
supra
§§
Such
is
the
art
of
manœuvering
With
these
words
the
chapter
would
naturally
come
to
an
end
But
there
now
follows
a
long
appendix
in
the
shape
of
an
extract
from
an
earlier
book
on
War
now
lost
but
apparently
extant
at
the
time
when
Sun
Tzŭ
wrote
The
style
of
this
fragment
is
not
noticeably
different
from
that
of
Sun
Tzŭ
himself
but
no
commentator
raises
a
doubt
as
to
its
genuineness
The
Book
of
Army
Management
says
It
is
perhaps
significant
that
none
of
the
earlier
commentators
give
us
any
information
about
this
work
Mei
Yao
Ch’en
calls
it
an
ancient
military
classic
and
Wang
Hsi
an
old
book
on
war
Considering
the
enormous
amount
of
fighting
that
had
gone
on
for
centuries
before
Sun
Tzŭ’s
time
between
the
various
kingdoms
and
principalities
of
China
it
is
not
in
itself
improbable
that
a
collection
of
military
maxims
should
have
been
made
and
written
down
at
some
earlier
period
On
the
field
of
battle
Implied
though
not
actually
in
the
Chinese
the
spoken
word
does
not
carry
far
enough
hence
the
institution
of
gongs
and
drums
Nor
can
ordinary
objects
be
seen
clearly
enough
hence
the
institution
of
banners
and
flags
Gongs
and
drums
banners
and
flags
are
means
whereby
the
ears
and
eyes
of
the
host
may
be
focussed
on
one
particular
point
Chang
Yu
says
If
sight
and
hearing
converge
simultaneously
on
the
same
object
the
evolutions
of
as
many
as
a
million
soldiers
will
be
like
those
of
a
single
man
The
host
thus
forming
a
single
united
body
is
it
impossible
either
for
the
brave
to
advance
alone
or
for
the
cowardly
to
retreat
alone
Chuang
Yu
quotes
a
saying
Equally
guilty
are
those
who
advance
against
orders
and
those
who
retreat
against
orders
Tu
Mu
tells
a
story
in
this
connection
of
Wu
Ch’i
when
he
was
fighting
against
the
Ch’in
State
Before
the
battle
had
begun
one
of
his
soldiers
a
man
of
matchless
daring
sallied
forth
by
himself
captured
two
heads
from
the
enemy
and
returned
to
camp
Wu
Ch’i
had
the
man
instantly
executed
whereupon
an
officer
ventured
to
remonstrate
saying
This
man
was
a
good
soldier
and
ought
not
to
have
been
beheaded
Wu
Ch’i
replied
I
fully
believe
he
was
a
good
soldier
but
I
had
him
beheaded
because
he
acted
without
orders
This
is
the
art
of
handling
large
masses
of
men
In
night
fighting
then
make
much
use
of
signal
fires
and
drums
and
in
fighting
by
day
of
flags
and
banners
as
a
means
of
influencing
the
ears
and
eyes
of
your
army
Ch’en
Hao
alludes
to
Li
Kuang
pi’s
night
ride
to
Ho
yang
at
the
head
of
mounted
men
they
made
such
an
imposing
display
with
torches
that
though
the
rebel
leader
Shih
Ssu
ming
had
a
large
army
he
did
not
dare
to
dispute
their
passage
A
whole
army
may
be
robbed
of
its
spirit
In
war
says
Chang
Yu
if
a
spirit
of
anger
can
be
made
to
pervade
all
ranks
of
an
army
at
one
and
the
same
time
its
onset
will
be
irresistible
Now
the
spirit
of
the
enemy’s
soldiers
will
be
keenest
when
they
have
newly
arrived
on
the
scene
and
it
is
therefore
our
cue
not
to
fight
at
once
but
to
wait
until
their
ardor
and
enthusiasm
have
worn
off
and
then
strike
It
is
in
this
way
that
they
may
be
robbed
of
their
keen
spirit
Li
Ch’uan
and
others
tell
an
anecdote
to
be
found
in
the
Tso
Chuan
year
§
of
Ts’ao
Kuei
a
protege
of
Duke
Chuang
of
Lu
The
latter
State
was
attacked
by
Ch’i
and
the
duke
was
about
to
join
battle
at
Ch’ang
cho
after
the
first
roll
of
the
enemy’s
drums
when
Ts’ao
said
Not
just
yet
Only
after
their
drums
had
beaten
for
the
third
time
did
he
give
the
word
for
attack
Then
they
fought
and
the
men
of
Ch’i
were
utterly
defeated
Questioned
afterwards
by
the
Duke
as
to
the
meaning
of
his
delay
Ts’ao
Kuei
replied
In
battle
a
courageous
spirit
is
everything
Now
the
first
roll
of
the
drum
tends
to
create
this
spirit
but
with
the
second
it
is
already
on
the
wane
and
after
the
third
it
is
gone
altogether
I
attacked
when
their
spirit
was
gone
and
ours
was
at
its
height
Hence
our
victory
Wu
Tzŭ
chap
puts
spirit
first
among
the
four
important
influences
in
war
and
continues
The
value
of
a
whole
army—a
mighty
host
of
a
million
men—is
dependent
on
one
man
alone
such
is
the
influence
of
spirit
a
commander
in
chief
may
be
robbed
of
his
presence
of
mind
Chang
Yu
says
Presence
of
mind
is
the
general’s
most
important
asset
It
is
the
quality
which
enables
him
to
discipline
disorder
and
to
inspire
courage
into
the
panic
stricken
The
great
general
Li
Ching
A
D
has
a
saying
Attacking
does
not
merely
consist
in
assaulting
walled
cities
or
striking
at
an
army
in
battle
array
it
must
include
the
art
of
assailing
the
enemy’s
mental
equilibrium
Now
a
soldier’s
spirit
is
keenest
in
the
morning
Always
provided
I
suppose
that
he
has
had
breakfast
At
the
battle
of
the
Trebia
the
Romans
were
foolishly
allowed
to
fight
fasting
whereas
Hannibal’s
men
had
breakfasted
at
their
leisure
See
Livy
XXI
liv
lv
and
by
noonday
it
has
begun
to
flag
and
in
the
evening
his
mind
is
bent
only
on
returning
to
camp
A
clever
general
therefore
avoids
an
army
when
its
spirit
is
keen
but
attacks
it
when
it
is
sluggish
and
inclined
to
return
This
is
the
art
of
studying
moods
Disciplined
and
calm
to
await
the
appearance
of
disorder
and
hubbub
amongst
the
enemy
—this
is
the
art
of
retaining
self
possession
To
be
near
the
goal
while
the
enemy
is
still
far
from
it
to
wait
at
ease
while
the
enemy
is
toiling
and
struggling
to
be
well
fed
while
the
enemy
is
famished
—this
is
the
art
of
husbanding
one’s
strength
To
refrain
from
intercepting
an
enemy
whose
banners
are
in
perfect
order
to
refrain
from
attacking
an
army
drawn
up
in
calm
and
confident
array
—this
is
the
art
of
studying
circumstances
It
is
a
military
axiom
not
to
advance
uphill
against
the
enemy
nor
to
oppose
him
when
he
comes
downhill
Do
not
pursue
an
enemy
who
simulates
flight
do
not
attack
soldiers
whose
temper
is
keen
Do
not
swallow
a
bait
offered
by
the
enemy
Li
Ch’uan
and
Tu
Mu
with
extraordinary
inability
to
see
a
metaphor
take
these
words
quite
literally
of
food
and
drink
that
have
been
poisoned
by
the
enemy
Ch’en
Hao
and
Chang
Yu
carefully
point
out
that
the
saying
has
a
wider
application
Do
not
interfere
with
an
army
that
is
returning
home
The
commentators
explain
this
rather
singular
piece
of
advice
by
saying
that
a
man
whose
heart
is
set
on
returning
home
will
fight
to
the
death
against
any
attempt
to
bar
his
way
and
is
therefore
too
dangerous
an
opponent
to
be
tackled
Chang
Yu
quotes
the
words
of
Han
Hsin
Invincible
is
the
soldier
who
hath
his
desire
and
returneth
homewards
A
marvelous
tale
is
told
of
Ts’ao
Ts’ao’s
courage
and
resource
in
ch
of
the
San
Kuo
Chi
In
A
D
he
was
besieging
Chang
Hsiu
in
Jang
when
Liu
Piao
sent
reinforcements
with
a
view
to
cutting
off
Ts’ao’s
retreat
The
latter
was
obliged
to
draw
off
his
troops
only
to
find
himself
hemmed
in
between
two
enemies
who
were
guarding
each
outlet
of
a
narrow
pass
in
which
he
had
engaged
himself
In
this
desperate
plight
Ts’ao
waited
until
nightfall
when
he
bored
a
tunnel
into
the
mountain
side
and
laid
an
ambush
in
it
As
soon
as
the
whole
army
had
passed
by
the
hidden
troops
fell
on
his
rear
while
Ts’ao
himself
turned
and
met
his
pursuers
in
front
so
that
they
were
thrown
into
confusion
and
annihilated
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
said
afterwards
The
brigands
tried
to
check
my
army
in
its
retreat
and
brought
me
to
battle
in
a
desperate
position
hence
I
knew
how
to
overcome
them
When
you
surround
an
army
leave
an
outlet
free
This
does
not
mean
that
the
enemy
is
to
be
allowed
to
escape
The
object
as
Tu
Mu
puts
it
is
to
make
him
believe
that
there
is
a
road
to
safety
and
thus
prevent
his
fighting
with
the
courage
of
despair
Tu
Mu
adds
pleasantly
After
that
you
may
crush
him
Do
not
press
a
desperate
foe
too
hard
Ch’en
Hao
quotes
the
saying
Birds
and
beasts
when
brought
to
bay
will
use
their
claws
and
teeth
Chang
Yu
says
If
your
adversary
has
burned
his
boats
and
destroyed
his
cooking
pots
and
is
ready
to
stake
all
on
the
issue
of
a
battle
he
must
not
be
pushed
to
extremities
Ho
Shih
illustrates
the
meaning
by
a
story
taken
from
the
life
of
Yen
ch’ing
That
general
together
with
his
colleague
Tu
Chung
wei
was
surrounded
by
a
vastly
superior
army
of
Khitans
in
the
year
A
D
The
country
was
bare
and
desert
like
and
the
little
Chinese
force
was
soon
in
dire
straits
for
want
of
water
The
wells
they
bored
ran
dry
and
the
men
were
reduced
to
squeezing
lumps
of
mud
and
sucking
out
the
moisture
Their
ranks
thinned
rapidly
until
at
last
Fu
Yen
ch’ing
exclaimed
We
are
desperate
men
Far
better
to
die
for
our
country
than
to
go
with
fettered
hands
into
captivity
A
strong
gale
happened
to
be
blowing
from
the
northeast
and
darkening
the
air
with
dense
clouds
of
sandy
dust
To
Chung
wei
was
for
waiting
until
this
had
abated
before
deciding
on
a
final
attack
but
luckily
another
officer
Li
Shou
cheng
by
name
was
quicker
to
see
an
opportunity
and
said
They
are
many
and
we
are
few
but
in
the
midst
of
this
sandstorm
our
numbers
will
not
be
discernible
victory
will
go
to
the
strenuous
fighter
and
the
wind
will
be
our
best
ally
Accordingly
Fu
Yen
ch’ing
made
a
sudden
and
wholly
unexpected
onslaught
with
his
cavalry
routed
the
barbarians
and
succeeded
in
breaking
through
to
safety
Such
is
the
art
of
warfare
See
Col
Henderson
op
cit
vol
I
p
For
a
number
of
maxims
on
this
head
see
Marshal
Turenne
Longmans
p
Chapter
VIII
VARIATION
OF
TACTICS
The
heading
means
literally
The
Nine
Variations
but
as
Sun
Tzŭ
does
not
appear
to
enumerate
these
and
as
indeed
he
has
already
told
us
V
§§
that
such
deflections
from
the
ordinary
course
are
practically
innumerable
we
have
little
option
but
to
follow
Wang
Hsi
who
says
that
Nine
stands
for
an
indefinitely
large
number
All
it
means
is
that
in
warfare
we
ought
to
vary
our
tactics
to
the
utmost
degree…
I
do
not
know
what
Ts’ao
Kung
makes
these
Nine
Variations
out
to
be
but
it
has
been
suggested
that
they
are
connected
with
the
Nine
Situations
of
chapt
XI
This
is
the
view
adopted
by
Chang
Yu
The
only
other
alternative
is
to
suppose
that
something
has
been
lost—a
supposition
to
which
the
unusual
shortness
of
the
chapter
lends
some
weight
Sun
Tzŭ
said
In
war
the
general
receives
his
commands
from
the
sovereign
collects
his
army
and
concentrates
his
forces
Repeated
from
VII
§
where
it
is
certainly
more
in
place
It
may
have
been
interpolated
here
merely
in
order
to
supply
a
beginning
to
the
chapter
When
in
difficult
country
do
not
encamp
In
country
where
high
roads
intersect
join
hands
with
your
allies
Do
not
linger
in
dangerously
isolated
positions
The
last
situation
is
not
one
of
the
Nine
Situations
as
given
in
the
beginning
of
chap
XI
but
occurs
later
on
ibid
§
q
v
Chang
Yu
defines
this
situation
as
being
situated
across
the
frontier
in
hostile
territory
Li
Ch’uan
says
it
is
country
in
which
there
are
no
springs
or
wells
flocks
or
herds
vegetables
or
firewood
Chia
Lin
one
of
gorges
chasms
and
precipices
without
a
road
by
which
to
advance
In
hemmed
in
situations
you
must
resort
to
stratagem
In
a
desperate
position
you
must
fight
There
are
roads
which
must
not
be
followed
Especially
those
leading
through
narrow
defiles
says
Li
Ch’uan
where
an
ambush
is
to
be
feared
armies
which
must
be
not
attacked
More
correctly
perhaps
there
are
times
when
an
army
must
not
be
attacked
Ch’en
Hao
says
When
you
see
your
way
to
obtain
a
rival
advantage
but
are
powerless
to
inflict
a
real
defeat
refrain
from
attacking
for
fear
of
overtaxing
your
men’s
strength
towns
which
must
not
be
besieged
Cf
III
§
Ts’ao
Kung
gives
an
interesting
illustration
from
his
own
experience
When
invading
the
territory
of
Hsu
chou
he
ignored
the
city
of
Hua
pi
which
lay
directly
in
his
path
and
pressed
on
into
the
heart
of
the
country
This
excellent
strategy
was
rewarded
by
the
subsequent
capture
of
no
fewer
than
fourteen
important
district
cities
Chang
Yu
says
No
town
should
be
attacked
which
if
taken
cannot
be
held
or
if
left
alone
will
not
cause
any
trouble
Hsun
Ying
when
urged
to
attack
Pi
yang
replied
The
city
is
small
and
well
fortified
even
if
I
succeed
intaking
it
it
will
be
no
great
feat
of
arms
whereas
if
I
fail
I
shall
make
myself
a
laughing
stock
In
the
seventeenth
century
sieges
still
formed
a
large
proportion
of
war
It
was
Turenne
who
directed
attention
to
the
importance
of
marches
countermarches
and
manœuvers
He
said
It
is
a
great
mistake
to
waste
men
in
taking
a
town
when
the
same
expenditure
of
soldiers
will
gain
a
province
positions
which
must
not
be
contested
commands
of
the
sovereign
which
must
not
be
obeyed
This
is
a
hard
saying
for
the
Chinese
with
their
reverence
for
authority
and
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
quoted
by
Tu
Mu
is
moved
to
exclaim
Weapons
are
baleful
instruments
strife
is
antagonistic
to
virtue
a
military
commander
is
the
negation
of
civil
order
The
unpalatable
fact
remains
however
that
even
Imperial
wishes
must
be
subordinated
to
military
necessity
The
general
who
thoroughly
understands
the
advantages
that
accompany
variation
of
tactics
knows
how
to
handle
his
troops
The
general
who
does
not
understand
these
may
be
well
acquainted
with
the
configuration
of
the
country
yet
he
will
not
be
able
to
turn
his
knowledge
to
practical
account
Literally
get
the
advantage
of
the
ground
which
means
not
only
securing
good
positions
but
availing
oneself
of
natural
advantages
in
every
possible
way
Chang
Yu
says
Every
kind
of
ground
is
characterized
by
certain
natural
features
and
also
gives
scope
for
a
certain
variability
of
plan
How
it
is
possible
to
turn
these
natural
features
to
account
unless
topographical
knowledge
is
supplemented
by
versatility
of
mind
So
the
student
of
war
who
is
unversed
in
the
art
of
war
of
varying
his
plans
even
though
he
be
acquainted
with
the
Five
Advantages
will
fail
to
make
the
best
use
of
his
men
Chia
Lin
tells
us
that
these
imply
five
obvious
and
generally
advantageous
lines
of
action
namely
if
a
certain
road
is
short
it
must
be
followed
if
an
army
is
isolated
it
must
be
attacked
if
a
town
is
in
a
parlous
condition
it
must
be
besieged
if
a
position
can
be
stormed
it
must
be
attempted
and
if
consistent
with
military
operations
the
ruler’s
commands
must
be
obeyed
But
there
are
circumstances
which
sometimes
forbid
a
general
to
use
these
advantages
For
instance
a
certain
road
may
be
the
shortest
way
for
him
but
if
he
knows
that
it
abounds
in
natural
obstacles
or
that
the
enemy
has
laid
an
ambush
on
it
he
will
not
follow
that
road
A
hostile
force
may
be
open
to
attack
but
if
he
knows
that
it
is
hard
pressed
and
likely
to
fight
with
desperation
he
will
refrain
from
striking
and
so
on
Hence
in
the
wise
leader’s
plans
considerations
of
advantage
and
of
disadvantage
will
be
blended
together
Whether
in
an
advantageous
position
or
a
disadvantageous
one
says
Ts’ao
Kung
the
opposite
state
should
be
always
present
to
your
mind
If
our
expectation
of
advantage
be
tempered
in
this
way
we
may
succeed
in
accomplishing
the
essential
part
of
our
schemes
Tu
Mu
says
If
we
wish
to
wrest
an
advantage
from
the
enemy
we
must
not
fix
our
minds
on
that
alone
but
allow
for
the
possibility
of
the
enemy
also
doing
some
harm
to
us
and
let
this
enter
as
a
factor
into
our
calculations
If
on
the
other
hand
in
the
midst
of
difficulties
we
are
always
ready
to
seize
an
advantage
we
may
extricate
ourselves
from
misfortune
Tu
Mu
says
If
I
wish
to
extricate
myself
from
a
dangerous
position
I
must
consider
not
only
the
enemy’s
ability
to
injure
me
but
also
my
own
ability
to
gain
an
advantage
over
the
enemy
If
in
my
counsels
these
two
considerations
are
properly
blended
I
shall
succeed
in
liberating
myself…
For
instance
if
I
am
surrounded
by
the
enemy
and
only
think
of
effecting
an
escape
the
nervelessness
of
my
policy
will
incite
my
adversary
to
pursue
and
crush
me
it
would
be
far
better
to
encourage
my
men
to
deliver
a
bold
counter
attack
and
use
the
advantage
thus
gained
to
free
myself
from
the
enemy’s
toils
See
the
story
of
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
VII
§
note
Reduce
the
hostile
chiefs
by
inflicting
damage
on
them
Chia
Lin
enumerates
several
ways
of
inflicting
this
injury
some
of
which
would
only
occur
to
the
Oriental
mind
—
Entice
away
the
enemy’s
best
and
wisest
men
so
that
he
may
be
left
without
counselors
Introduce
traitors
into
his
country
that
the
government
policy
may
be
rendered
futile
Foment
intrigue
and
deceit
and
thus
sow
dissension
between
the
ruler
and
his
ministers
By
means
of
every
artful
contrivance
cause
deterioration
amongst
his
men
and
waste
of
his
treasure
Corrupt
his
morals
by
insidious
gifts
leading
him
into
excess
Disturb
and
unsettle
his
mind
by
presenting
him
with
lovely
women
Chang
Yu
after
Wang
Hsi
makes
a
different
interpretation
of
Sun
Tzŭ
here
Get
the
enemy
into
a
position
where
he
must
suffer
injury
and
he
will
submit
of
his
own
accord
and
make
trouble
for
them
Tu
Mu
in
this
phrase
in
his
interpretation
indicates
that
trouble
should
be
made
for
the
enemy
affecting
their
possessions
or
as
we
might
say
assets
which
he
considers
to
be
a
large
army
a
rich
exchequer
harmony
amongst
the
soldiers
punctual
fulfillment
of
commands
These
give
us
a
whip
hand
over
the
enemy
and
keep
them
constantly
engaged
Literally
make
servants
of
them
Tu
Yu
says
prevent
them
from
having
any
rest
hold
out
specious
allurements
and
make
them
rush
to
any
given
point
Meng
Shih’s
note
contains
an
excellent
example
of
the
idiomatic
use
of
cause
them
to
forget
pien
the
reasons
for
acting
otherwise
than
on
their
first
impulse
and
hasten
in
our
direction
The
art
of
war
teaches
us
to
rely
not
on
the
likelihood
of
the
enemy’s
not
coming
but
on
our
own
readiness
to
receive
him
not
on
the
chance
of
his
not
attacking
but
rather
on
the
fact
that
we
have
made
our
position
unassailable
There
are
five
dangerous
faults
which
may
affect
a
general
Recklessness
which
leads
to
destruction
Bravery
without
forethought
as
Ts’ao
Kung
analyzes
it
which
causes
a
man
to
fight
blindly
and
desperately
like
a
mad
bull
Such
an
opponent
says
Chang
Yu
must
not
be
encountered
with
brute
force
but
may
be
lured
into
an
ambush
and
slain
Cf
Wu
Tzŭ
chap
IV
ad
init
In
estimating
the
character
of
a
general
men
are
wont
to
pay
exclusive
attention
to
his
courage
forgetting
that
courage
is
only
one
out
of
many
qualities
which
a
general
should
possess
The
merely
brave
man
is
prone
to
fight
recklessly
and
he
who
fights
recklessly
without
any
perception
of
what
is
expedient
must
be
condemned
Ssu
ma
Fa
too
makes
the
incisive
remark
Simply
going
to
one’s
death
does
not
bring
about
victory
cowardice
which
leads
to
capture
Ts’ao
Kung
defines
the
Chinese
word
translated
here
as
cowardice
as
being
of
the
man
whom
timidity
prevents
from
advancing
to
seize
an
advantage
and
Wang
Hsi
adds
who
is
quick
to
flee
at
the
sight
of
danger
Meng
Shih
gives
the
closer
paraphrase
he
who
is
bent
on
returning
alive
this
is
the
man
who
will
never
take
a
risk
But
as
Sun
Tzŭ
knew
nothing
is
to
be
achieved
in
war
unless
you
are
willing
to
take
risks
T’ai
Kung
said
He
who
lets
an
advantage
slip
will
subsequently
bring
upon
himself
real
disaster
In
A
D
Liu
Yu
pursued
the
rebel
Huan
Hsuan
up
the
Yangtsze
and
fought
a
naval
battle
with
him
at
the
island
of
Ch’eng
hung
The
loyal
troops
numbered
only
a
few
thousands
while
their
opponents
were
in
great
force
But
Huan
Hsuan
fearing
the
fate
which
was
in
store
for
him
should
be
be
overcome
had
a
light
boat
made
fast
to
the
side
of
his
war
junk
so
that
he
might
escape
if
necessary
at
a
moment’s
notice
The
natural
result
was
that
the
fighting
spirit
of
his
soldiers
was
utterly
quenched
and
when
the
loyalists
made
an
attack
from
windward
with
fireships
all
striving
with
the
utmost
ardor
to
be
first
in
the
fray
Huan
Hsuan’s
forces
were
routed
had
to
burn
all
their
baggage
and
fled
for
two
days
and
nights
without
stopping
Chang
Yu
tells
a
somewhat
similar
story
of
Chao
Ying
ch’i
a
general
of
the
Chin
State
who
during
a
battle
with
the
army
of
Ch’u
in
B
C
had
a
boat
kept
in
readiness
for
him
on
the
river
wishing
in
case
of
defeat
to
be
the
first
to
get
across
a
hasty
temper
which
can
be
provoked
by
insults
Tu
Mu
tells
us
that
Yao
Hsing
when
opposed
in
A
D
by
Huang
Mei
Teng
Ch’iang
and
others
shut
himself
up
behind
his
walls
and
refused
to
fight
Teng
Ch’iang
said
Our
adversary
is
of
a
choleric
temper
and
easily
provoked
let
us
make
constant
sallies
and
break
down
his
walls
then
he
will
grow
angry
and
come
out
Once
we
can
bring
his
force
to
battle
it
is
doomed
to
be
our
prey
This
plan
was
acted
upon
Yao
Hsiang
came
out
to
fight
was
lured
as
far
as
San
yuan
by
the
enemy’s
pretended
flight
and
finally
attacked
and
slain
a
delicacy
of
honour
which
is
sensitive
to
shame
This
need
not
be
taken
to
mean
that
a
sense
of
honour
is
really
a
defect
in
a
general
What
Sun
Tzŭ
condemns
is
rather
an
exaggerated
sensitiveness
to
slanderous
reports
the
thin
skinned
man
who
is
stung
by
opprobrium
however
undeserved
Mei
Yao
ch’en
truly
observes
though
somewhat
paradoxically
The
seeker
after
glory
should
be
careless
of
public
opinion
over
solicitude
for
his
men
which
exposes
him
to
worry
and
trouble
Here
again
Sun
Tzŭ
does
not
mean
that
the
general
is
to
be
careless
of
the
welfare
of
his
troops
All
he
wishes
to
emphasize
is
the
danger
of
sacrificing
any
important
military
advantage
to
the
immediate
comfort
of
his
men
This
is
a
shortsighted
policy
because
in
the
long
run
the
troops
will
suffer
more
from
the
defeat
or
at
best
the
prolongation
of
the
war
which
will
be
the
consequence
A
mistaken
feeling
of
pity
will
often
induce
a
general
to
relieve
a
beleaguered
city
or
to
reinforce
a
hard
pressed
detachment
contrary
to
his
military
instincts
It
is
now
generally
admitted
that
our
repeated
efforts
to
relieve
Ladysmith
in
the
South
African
War
were
so
many
strategical
blunders
which
defeated
their
own
purpose
And
in
the
end
relief
came
through
the
very
man
who
started
out
with
the
distinct
resolve
no
longer
to
subordinate
the
interests
of
the
whole
to
sentiment
in
favour
of
a
part
An
old
soldier
of
one
of
our
generals
who
failed
most
conspicuously
in
this
war
tried
once
I
remember
to
defend
him
to
me
on
the
ground
that
he
was
always
so
good
to
his
men
By
this
plea
had
he
but
known
it
he
was
only
condemning
him
out
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
mouth
These
are
the
five
besetting
sins
of
a
general
ruinous
to
the
conduct
of
war
When
an
army
is
overthrown
and
its
leader
slain
the
cause
will
surely
be
found
among
these
five
dangerous
faults
Let
them
be
a
subject
of
meditation
Marshal
Turenne
p
Chapter
IX
THE
ARMY
ON
THE
MARCH
The
contents
of
this
interesting
chapter
are
better
indicated
in
§
than
by
this
heading
Sun
Tzŭ
said
We
come
now
to
the
question
of
encamping
the
army
and
observing
signs
of
the
enemy
Pass
quickly
over
mountains
and
keep
in
the
neighbourhood
of
valleys
The
idea
is
not
to
linger
among
barren
uplands
but
to
keep
close
to
supplies
of
water
and
grass
Cf
Wu
Tzŭ
ch
Abide
not
in
natural
ovens
i
e
the
openings
of
valleys
Chang
Yu
tells
the
following
anecdote
Wu
tu
Ch’iang
was
a
robber
captain
in
the
time
of
the
Later
Han
and
Ma
Yuan
was
sent
to
exterminate
his
gang
Ch’iang
having
found
a
refuge
in
the
hills
Ma
Yuan
made
no
attempt
to
force
a
battle
but
seized
all
the
favourable
positions
commanding
supplies
of
water
and
forage
Ch’iang
was
soon
in
such
a
desperate
plight
for
want
of
provisions
that
he
was
forced
to
make
a
total
surrender
He
did
not
know
the
advantage
of
keeping
in
the
neighbourhood
of
valleys
Camp
in
high
places
Not
on
high
hills
but
on
knolls
or
hillocks
elevated
above
the
surrounding
country
facing
the
sun
Tu
Mu
takes
this
to
mean
facing
south
and
Ch’en
Hao
facing
east
Cf
infra
§§
Do
not
climb
heights
in
order
to
fight
So
much
for
mountain
warfare
After
crossing
a
river
you
should
get
far
away
from
it
In
order
to
tempt
the
enemy
to
cross
after
you
according
to
Ts’ao
Kung
and
also
says
Chang
Yu
in
order
not
to
be
impeded
in
your
evolutions
The
T’ung
Tien
reads
If
the
enemy
crosses
a
river
etc
But
in
view
of
the
next
sentence
this
is
almost
certainly
an
interpolation
When
an
invading
force
crosses
a
river
in
its
onward
march
do
not
advance
to
meet
it
in
mid
stream
It
will
be
best
to
let
half
the
army
get
across
and
then
deliver
your
attack
Li
Ch’uan
alludes
to
the
great
victory
won
by
Han
Hsin
over
Lung
Chu
at
the
Wei
River
Turning
to
the
Ch’ien
Han
Shu
ch
fol
verso
we
find
the
battle
described
as
follows
The
two
armies
were
drawn
up
on
opposite
sides
of
the
river
In
the
night
Han
Hsin
ordered
his
men
to
take
some
ten
thousand
sacks
filled
with
sand
and
construct
a
dam
higher
up
Then
leading
half
his
army
across
he
attacked
Lung
Chu
but
after
a
time
pretending
to
have
failed
in
his
attempt
he
hastily
withdrew
to
the
other
bank
Lung
Chu
was
much
elated
by
this
unlooked
for
success
and
exclaiming
I
felt
sure
that
Han
Hsin
was
really
a
coward
he
pursued
him
and
began
crossing
the
river
in
his
turn
Han
Hsin
now
sent
a
party
to
cut
open
the
sandbags
thus
releasing
a
great
volume
of
water
which
swept
down
and
prevented
the
greater
portion
of
Lung
Chu’s
army
from
getting
across
He
then
turned
upon
the
force
which
had
been
cut
off
and
annihilated
it
Lung
Chu
himself
being
amongst
the
slain
The
rest
of
the
army
on
the
further
bank
also
scattered
and
fled
in
all
directions
If
you
are
anxious
to
fight
you
should
not
go
to
meet
the
invader
near
a
river
which
he
has
to
cross
For
fear
of
preventing
his
crossing
Moor
your
craft
higher
up
than
the
enemy
and
facing
the
sun
See
supra
§
The
repetition
of
these
words
in
connection
with
water
is
very
awkward
Chang
Yu
has
the
note
Said
either
of
troops
marshalled
on
the
river
bank
or
of
boats
anchored
in
the
stream
itself
in
either
case
it
is
essential
to
be
higher
than
the
enemy
and
facing
the
sun
The
other
commentators
are
not
at
all
explicit
Do
not
move
up
stream
to
meet
the
enemy
Tu
Mu
says
As
water
flows
downwards
we
must
not
pitch
our
camp
on
the
lower
reaches
of
a
river
for
fear
the
enemy
should
open
the
sluices
and
sweep
us
away
in
a
flood
Chu
ko
Wu
hou
has
remarked
that
‘in
river
warfare
we
must
not
advance
against
the
stream
’
which
is
as
much
as
to
say
that
our
fleet
must
not
be
anchored
below
that
of
the
enemy
for
then
they
would
be
able
to
take
advantage
of
the
current
and
make
short
work
of
us
There
is
also
the
danger
noted
by
other
commentators
that
the
enemy
may
throw
poison
on
the
water
to
be
carried
down
to
us
So
much
for
river
warfare
In
crossing
salt
marshes
your
sole
concern
should
be
to
get
over
them
quickly
without
any
delay
Because
of
the
lack
of
fresh
water
the
poor
quality
of
the
herbage
and
last
but
not
least
because
they
are
low
flat
and
exposed
to
attack
If
forced
to
fight
in
a
salt
marsh
you
should
have
water
and
grass
near
you
and
get
your
back
to
a
clump
of
trees
Li
Ch’uan
remarks
that
the
ground
is
less
likely
to
be
treacherous
where
there
are
trees
while
Tu
Mu
says
that
they
will
serve
to
protect
the
rear
So
much
for
operations
in
salt
marshes
In
dry
level
country
take
up
an
easily
accessible
position
with
rising
ground
to
your
right
and
on
your
rear
Tu
Mu
quotes
T’ai
Kung
as
saying
An
army
should
have
a
stream
or
a
marsh
on
its
left
and
a
hill
or
tumulus
on
its
right
so
that
the
danger
may
be
in
front
and
safety
lie
behind
So
much
for
campaigning
in
flat
country
These
are
the
four
useful
branches
of
military
knowledge
Those
namely
concerned
with
mountains
rivers
marshes
and
plains
Compare
Napoleon’s
Military
Maxims
no
which
enabled
the
Yellow
Emperor
to
vanquish
four
several
sovereigns
Regarding
the
Yellow
Emperor
Mei
Yao
ch’en
asks
with
some
plausibility
whether
there
is
an
error
in
the
text
as
nothing
is
known
of
Huang
Ti
having
conquered
four
other
Emperors
The
Shih
Chi
ch
ad
init
speaks
only
of
his
victories
over
Yen
Ti
and
Ch’ih
Yu
In
the
Liu
T’ao
it
is
mentioned
that
he
fought
seventy
battles
and
pacified
the
Empire
Ts’ao
Kung’s
explanation
is
that
the
Yellow
Emperor
was
the
first
to
institute
the
feudal
system
of
vassals
princes
each
of
whom
to
the
number
of
four
originally
bore
the
title
of
Emperor
Li
Ch’uan
tells
us
that
the
art
of
war
originated
under
Huang
Ti
who
received
it
from
his
Minister
Feng
Hou
All
armies
prefer
high
ground
to
low
High
Ground
says
Mei
Yao
ch’en
is
not
only
more
agreeable
and
salubrious
but
more
convenient
from
a
military
point
of
view
low
ground
is
not
only
damp
and
unhealthy
but
also
disadvantageous
for
fighting
and
sunny
places
to
dark
If
you
are
careful
of
your
men
Ts’ao
Kung
says
Make
for
fresh
water
and
pasture
where
you
can
turn
out
your
animals
to
graze
and
camp
on
hard
ground
the
army
will
be
free
from
disease
of
every
kind
Chang
Yu
says
The
dryness
of
the
climate
will
prevent
the
outbreak
of
illness
and
this
will
spell
victory
When
you
come
to
a
hill
or
a
bank
occupy
the
sunny
side
with
the
slope
on
your
right
rear
Thus
you
will
at
once
act
for
the
benefit
of
your
soldiers
and
utilise
the
natural
advantages
of
the
ground
When
in
consequence
of
heavy
rains
up
country
a
river
which
you
wish
to
ford
is
swollen
and
flecked
with
foam
you
must
wait
until
it
subsides
Country
in
which
there
are
precipitous
cliffs
with
torrents
running
between
deep
natural
hollows
The
latter
defined
as
places
enclosed
on
every
side
by
steep
banks
with
pools
of
water
at
the
bottom
confined
places
Defined
as
natural
pens
or
prisons
or
places
surrounded
by
precipices
on
three
sides—easy
to
get
into
but
hard
to
get
out
of
tangled
thickets
Defined
as
places
covered
with
such
dense
undergrowth
that
spears
cannot
be
used
quagmires
Defined
as
low
lying
places
so
heavy
with
mud
as
to
be
impassable
for
chariots
and
horsemen
and
crevasses
Defined
by
Mei
Yao
ch’en
as
a
narrow
difficult
way
between
beetling
cliffs
Tu
Mu’s
note
is
ground
covered
with
trees
and
rocks
and
intersected
by
numerous
ravines
and
pitfalls
This
is
very
vague
but
Chia
Lin
explains
it
clearly
enough
as
a
defile
or
narrow
pass
and
Chang
Yu
takes
much
the
same
view
On
the
whole
the
weight
of
the
commentators
certainly
inclines
to
the
rendering
defile
But
the
ordinary
meaning
of
the
Chinese
in
one
place
is
a
crack
or
fissure
and
the
fact
that
the
meaning
of
the
Chinese
elsewhere
in
the
sentence
indicates
something
in
the
nature
of
a
defile
make
me
think
that
Sun
Tzŭ
is
here
speaking
of
crevasses
should
be
left
with
all
possible
speed
and
not
approached
While
we
keep
away
from
such
places
we
should
get
the
enemy
to
approach
them
while
we
face
them
we
should
let
the
enemy
have
them
on
his
rear
If
in
the
neighbourhood
of
your
camp
there
should
be
any
hilly
country
ponds
surrounded
by
aquatic
grass
hollow
basins
filled
with
reeds
or
woods
with
thick
undergrowth
they
must
be
carefully
routed
out
and
searched
for
these
are
places
where
men
in
ambush
or
insidious
spies
are
likely
to
be
lurking
Chang
Yu
has
the
note
We
must
also
be
on
our
guard
against
traitors
who
may
lie
in
close
covert
secretly
spying
out
our
weaknesses
and
overhearing
our
instructions
When
the
enemy
is
close
at
hand
and
remains
quiet
he
is
relying
on
the
natural
strength
of
his
position
Here
begin
Sun
Tzŭ’s
remarks
on
the
reading
of
signs
much
of
which
is
so
good
that
it
could
almost
be
included
in
a
modern
manual
like
Gen
Baden
Powell’s
Aids
to
Scouting
When
he
keeps
aloof
and
tries
to
provoke
a
battle
he
is
anxious
for
the
other
side
to
advance
Probably
because
we
are
in
a
strong
position
from
which
he
wishes
to
dislodge
us
If
he
came
close
up
to
us
says
Tu
Mu
and
tried
to
force
a
battle
he
would
seem
to
despise
us
and
there
would
be
less
probability
of
our
responding
to
the
challenge
If
his
place
of
encampment
is
easy
of
access
he
is
tendering
a
bait
Movement
amongst
the
trees
of
a
forest
shows
that
the
enemy
is
advancing
Ts’ao
Kung
explains
this
as
felling
trees
to
clear
a
passage
and
Chang
Yu
says
Every
man
sends
out
scouts
to
climb
high
places
and
observe
the
enemy
If
a
scout
sees
that
the
trees
of
a
forest
are
moving
and
shaking
he
may
know
that
they
are
being
cut
down
to
clear
a
passage
for
the
enemy’s
march
The
appearance
of
a
number
of
screens
in
the
midst
of
thick
grass
means
that
the
enemy
wants
to
make
us
suspicious
Tu
Yu’s
explanation
borrowed
from
Ts’ao
Kung’s
is
as
follows
The
presence
of
a
number
of
screens
or
sheds
in
the
midst
of
thick
vegetation
is
a
sure
sign
that
the
enemy
has
fled
and
fearing
pursuit
has
constructed
these
hiding
places
in
order
to
make
us
suspect
an
ambush
It
appears
that
these
screens
were
hastily
knotted
together
out
of
any
long
grass
which
the
retreating
enemy
happened
to
come
across
The
rising
of
birds
in
their
flight
is
the
sign
of
an
ambuscade
Chang
Yu’s
explanation
is
doubtless
right
When
birds
that
are
flying
along
in
a
straight
line
suddenly
shoot
upwards
it
means
that
soldiers
are
in
ambush
at
the
spot
beneath
Startled
beasts
indicate
that
a
sudden
attack
is
coming
When
there
is
dust
rising
in
a
high
column
it
is
the
sign
of
chariots
advancing
when
the
dust
is
low
but
spread
over
a
wide
area
it
betokens
the
approach
of
infantry
High
and
sharp
or
rising
to
a
peak
is
of
course
somewhat
exaggerated
as
applied
to
dust
The
commentators
explain
the
phenomenon
by
saying
that
horses
and
chariots
being
heavier
than
men
raise
more
dust
and
also
follow
one
another
in
the
same
wheel
track
whereas
foot
soldiers
would
be
marching
in
ranks
many
abreast
According
to
Chang
Yu
every
army
on
the
march
must
have
scouts
some
way
in
advance
who
on
sighting
dust
raised
by
the
enemy
will
gallop
back
and
report
it
to
the
commander
in
chief
Cf
Gen
Baden
Powell
As
you
move
along
say
in
a
hostile
country
your
eyes
should
be
looking
afar
for
the
enemy
or
any
signs
of
him
figures
dust
rising
birds
getting
up
glitter
of
arms
etc
When
it
branches
out
in
different
directions
it
shows
that
parties
have
been
sent
to
collect
firewood
A
few
clouds
of
dust
moving
to
and
fro
signify
that
the
army
is
encamping
Chang
Yu
says
In
apportioning
the
defences
for
a
cantonment
light
horse
will
be
sent
out
to
survey
the
position
and
ascertain
the
weak
and
strong
points
all
along
its
circumference
Hence
the
small
quantity
of
dust
and
its
motion
Humble
words
and
increased
preparations
are
signs
that
the
enemy
is
about
to
advance
As
though
they
stood
in
great
fear
of
us
says
Tu
Mu
Their
object
is
to
make
us
contemptuous
and
careless
after
which
they
will
attack
us
Chang
Yu
alludes
to
the
story
of
T’ien
Tan
of
the
Ch’i
mo
against
the
Yen
forces
led
by
Ch’i
Chieh
In
ch
of
the
Shih
Chi
we
read
T’ien
Tan
openly
said
‘My
only
fear
is
that
the
Yen
army
may
cut
off
the
noses
of
their
Ch’i
prisoners
and
place
them
in
the
front
rank
to
fight
against
us
that
would
be
the
undoing
of
our
city
’
The
other
side
being
informed
of
this
speech
at
once
acted
on
the
suggestion
but
those
within
the
city
were
enraged
at
seeing
their
fellow
countrymen
thus
mutilated
and
fearing
only
lest
they
should
fall
into
the
enemy’s
hands
were
nerved
to
defend
themselves
more
obstinately
than
ever
Once
again
T’ien
Tan
sent
back
converted
spies
who
reported
these
words
to
the
enemy
What
I
dread
most
is
that
the
men
of
Yen
may
dig
up
the
ancestral
tombs
outside
the
town
and
by
inflicting
this
indignity
on
our
forefathers
cause
us
to
become
faint
hearted
’
Forthwith
the
besiegers
dug
up
all
the
graves
and
burned
the
corpses
lying
in
them
And
the
inhabitants
of
Chi
mo
witnessing
the
outrage
from
the
city
walls
wept
passionately
and
were
all
impatient
to
go
out
and
fight
their
fury
being
increased
tenfold
T’ien
Tan
knew
then
that
his
soldiers
were
ready
for
any
enterprise
But
instead
of
a
sword
he
himself
took
a
mattock
in
his
hands
and
ordered
others
to
be
distributed
amongst
his
best
warriors
while
the
ranks
were
filled
up
with
their
wives
and
concubines
He
then
served
out
all
the
remaining
rations
and
bade
his
men
eat
their
fill
The
regular
soldiers
were
told
to
keep
out
of
sight
and
the
walls
were
manned
with
the
old
and
weaker
men
and
with
women
This
done
envoys
were
dispatched
to
the
enemy’s
camp
to
arrange
terms
of
surrender
whereupon
the
Yen
army
began
shouting
for
joy
T’ien
Tan
also
collected
ounces
of
silver
from
the
people
and
got
the
wealthy
citizens
of
Chi
mo
to
send
it
to
the
Yen
general
with
the
prayer
that
when
the
town
capitulated
he
would
not
allow
their
homes
to
be
plundered
or
their
women
to
be
maltreated
Ch’i
Chieh
in
high
good
humor
granted
their
prayer
but
his
army
now
became
increasingly
slack
and
careless
Meanwhile
T’ien
Tan
got
together
a
thousand
oxen
decked
them
with
pieces
of
red
silk
painted
their
bodies
dragon
like
with
colored
stripes
and
fastened
sharp
blades
on
their
horns
and
well
greased
rushes
on
their
tails
When
night
came
on
he
lighted
the
ends
of
the
rushes
and
drove
the
oxen
through
a
number
of
holes
which
he
had
pierced
in
the
walls
backing
them
up
with
a
force
of
picked
warriors
The
animals
maddened
with
pain
dashed
furiously
into
the
enemy’s
camp
where
they
caused
the
utmost
confusion
and
dismay
for
their
tails
acted
as
torches
showing
up
the
hideous
pattern
on
their
bodies
and
the
weapons
on
their
horns
killed
or
wounded
any
with
whom
they
came
into
contact
In
the
meantime
the
band
of
had
crept
up
with
gags
in
their
mouths
and
now
threw
themselves
on
the
enemy
At
the
same
moment
a
frightful
din
arose
in
the
city
itself
all
those
that
remained
behind
making
as
much
noise
as
possible
by
banging
drums
and
hammering
on
bronze
vessels
until
heaven
and
earth
were
convulsed
by
the
uproar
Terror
stricken
the
Yen
army
fled
in
disorder
hotly
pursued
by
the
men
of
Ch’i
who
succeeded
in
slaying
their
general
Ch’i
Chien…
The
result
of
the
battle
was
the
ultimate
recovery
of
some
seventy
cities
which
had
belonged
to
the
Ch’i
State
Violent
language
and
driving
forward
as
if
to
the
attack
are
signs
that
he
will
retreat
When
the
light
chariots
come
out
first
and
take
up
a
position
on
the
wings
it
is
a
sign
that
the
enemy
is
forming
for
battle
Peace
proposals
unaccompanied
by
a
sworn
covenant
indicate
a
plot
The
reading
here
is
uncertain
Li
Ch’uan
indicates
a
treaty
confirmed
by
oaths
and
hostages
Wang
Hsi
and
Chang
Yu
on
the
other
hand
simply
say
without
reason
on
a
frivolous
pretext
When
there
is
much
running
about
Every
man
hastening
to
his
proper
place
under
his
own
regimental
banner
and
the
soldiers
fall
into
rank
it
means
that
the
critical
moment
has
come
When
some
are
seen
advancing
and
some
retreating
it
is
a
lure
When
the
soldiers
stand
leaning
on
their
spears
they
are
faint
from
want
of
food
If
those
who
are
sent
to
draw
water
begin
by
drinking
themselves
the
army
is
suffering
from
thirst
As
Tu
Mu
remarks
One
may
know
the
condition
of
a
whole
army
from
the
behavior
of
a
single
man
If
the
enemy
sees
an
advantage
to
be
gained
and
makes
no
effort
to
secure
it
the
soldiers
are
exhausted
If
birds
gather
on
any
spot
it
is
unoccupied
A
useful
fact
to
bear
in
mind
when
for
instance
as
Ch’en
Hao
says
the
enemy
has
secretly
abandoned
his
camp
Clamour
by
night
betokens
nervousness
If
there
is
disturbance
in
the
camp
the
general’s
authority
is
weak
If
the
banners
and
flags
are
shifted
about
sedition
is
afoot
If
the
officers
are
angry
it
means
that
the
men
are
weary
Tu
Mu
understands
the
sentence
differently
If
all
the
officers
of
an
army
are
angry
with
their
general
it
means
that
they
are
broken
with
fatigue
owing
to
the
exertions
which
he
has
demanded
from
them
When
an
army
feeds
its
horses
with
grain
and
kills
its
cattle
for
food
In
the
ordinary
course
of
things
the
men
would
be
fed
on
grain
and
the
horses
chiefly
on
grass
and
when
the
men
do
not
hang
their
cooking
pots
over
the
camp
fires
showing
that
they
will
not
return
to
their
tents
you
may
know
that
they
are
determined
to
fight
to
the
death
I
may
quote
here
the
illustrative
passage
from
the
Hou
Han
Shu
ch
given
in
abbreviated
form
by
the
P’ei
Wen
Yun
Fu
The
rebel
Wang
Kuo
of
Liang
was
besieging
the
town
of
Ch’en
ts’ang
and
Huang
fu
Sung
who
was
in
supreme
command
and
Tung
Cho
were
sent
out
against
him
The
latter
pressed
for
hasty
measures
but
Sung
turned
a
deaf
ear
to
his
counsel
At
last
the
rebels
were
utterly
worn
out
and
began
to
throw
down
their
weapons
of
their
own
accord
Sung
was
not
advancing
to
the
attack
but
Cho
said
‘It
is
a
principle
of
war
not
to
pursue
desperate
men
and
not
to
press
a
retreating
host
’
Sung
answered
‘That
does
not
apply
here
What
I
am
about
to
attack
is
a
jaded
army
not
a
retreating
host
with
disciplined
troops
I
am
falling
on
a
disorganized
multitude
not
a
band
of
desperate
men
’
Thereupon
he
advances
to
the
attack
unsupported
by
his
colleague
and
routed
the
enemy
Wang
Kuo
being
slain
The
sight
of
men
whispering
together
in
small
knots
or
speaking
in
subdued
tones
points
to
disaffection
amongst
the
rank
and
file
Too
frequent
rewards
signify
that
the
enemy
is
at
the
end
of
his
resources
Because
when
an
army
is
hard
pressed
as
Tu
Mu
says
there
is
always
a
fear
of
mutiny
and
lavish
rewards
are
given
to
keep
the
men
in
good
temper
too
many
punishments
betray
a
condition
of
dire
distress
Because
in
such
case
discipline
becomes
relaxed
and
unwonted
severity
is
necessary
to
keep
the
men
to
their
duty
To
begin
by
bluster
but
afterwards
to
take
fright
at
the
enemy’s
numbers
shows
a
supreme
lack
of
intelligence
I
follow
the
interpretation
of
Ts’ao
Kung
also
adopted
by
Li
Ch’uan
Tu
Mu
and
Chang
Yu
Another
possible
meaning
set
forth
by
Tu
Yu
Chia
Lin
Mei
Tao
ch’en
and
Wang
Hsi
is
The
general
who
is
first
tyrannical
towards
his
men
and
then
in
terror
lest
they
should
mutiny
etc
This
would
connect
the
sentence
with
what
went
before
about
rewards
and
punishments
When
envoys
are
sent
with
compliments
in
their
mouths
it
is
a
sign
that
the
enemy
wishes
for
a
truce
Tu
Mu
says
If
the
enemy
open
friendly
relations
be
sending
hostages
it
is
a
sign
that
they
are
anxious
for
an
armistice
either
because
their
strength
is
exhausted
or
for
some
other
reason
But
it
hardly
needs
a
Sun
Tzŭ
to
draw
such
an
obvious
inference
If
the
enemy’s
troops
march
up
angrily
and
remain
facing
ours
for
a
long
time
without
either
joining
battle
or
taking
themselves
off
again
the
situation
is
one
that
demands
great
vigilance
and
circumspection
Ts’ao
Kung
says
a
manœuver
of
this
sort
may
be
only
a
ruse
to
gain
time
for
an
unexpected
flank
attack
or
the
laying
of
an
ambush
If
our
troops
are
no
more
in
number
than
the
enemy
that
is
amply
sufficient
it
only
means
that
no
direct
attack
can
be
made
Literally
no
martial
advance
That
is
to
say
cheng
tactics
and
frontal
attacks
must
be
eschewed
and
stratagem
resorted
to
instead
What
we
can
do
is
simply
to
concentrate
all
our
available
strength
keep
a
close
watch
on
the
enemy
and
obtain
reinforcements
This
is
an
obscure
sentence
and
none
of
the
commentators
succeed
in
squeezing
very
good
sense
out
of
it
I
follow
Li
Ch’uan
who
appears
to
offer
the
simplest
explanation
Only
the
side
that
gets
more
men
will
win
Fortunately
we
have
Chang
Yu
to
expound
its
meaning
to
us
in
language
which
is
lucidity
itself
When
the
numbers
are
even
and
no
favourable
opening
presents
itself
although
we
may
not
be
strong
enough
to
deliver
a
sustained
attack
we
can
find
additional
recruits
amongst
our
sutlers
and
camp
followers
and
then
concentrating
our
forces
and
keeping
a
close
watch
on
the
enemy
contrive
to
snatch
the
victory
But
we
must
avoid
borrowing
foreign
soldiers
to
help
us
He
then
quotes
from
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
ch
The
nominal
strength
of
mercenary
troops
may
be
but
their
real
value
will
be
not
more
than
half
that
figure
He
who
exercises
no
forethought
but
makes
light
of
his
opponents
is
sure
to
be
captured
by
them
Ch’en
Hao
quoting
from
the
Tso
Chuan
says
If
bees
and
scorpions
carry
poison
how
much
more
will
a
hostile
state
Even
a
puny
opponent
then
should
not
be
treated
with
contempt
If
soldiers
are
punished
before
they
have
grown
attached
to
you
they
will
not
prove
submissive
and
unless
submissive
then
will
be
practically
useless
If
when
the
soldiers
have
become
attached
to
you
punishments
are
not
enforced
they
will
still
be
useless
Therefore
soldiers
must
be
treated
in
the
first
instance
with
humanity
but
kept
under
control
by
means
of
iron
discipline
Yen
Tzŭ
B
C
said
of
Ssu
ma
Jang
chu
His
civil
virtues
endeared
him
to
the
people
his
martial
prowess
kept
his
enemies
in
awe
Cf
Wu
Tzŭ
ch
init
The
ideal
commander
unites
culture
with
a
warlike
temper
the
profession
of
arms
requires
a
combination
of
hardness
and
tenderness
This
is
a
certain
road
to
victory
If
in
training
soldiers
commands
are
habitually
enforced
the
army
will
be
well
disciplined
if
not
its
discipline
will
be
bad
If
a
general
shows
confidence
in
his
men
but
always
insists
on
his
orders
being
obeyed
Tu
Mu
says
A
general
ought
in
time
of
peace
to
show
kindly
confidence
in
his
men
and
also
make
his
authority
respected
so
that
when
they
come
to
face
the
enemy
orders
may
be
executed
and
discipline
maintained
because
they
all
trust
and
look
up
to
him
What
Sun
Tzŭ
has
said
in
§
however
would
lead
one
rather
to
expect
something
like
this
If
a
general
is
always
confident
that
his
orders
will
be
carried
out
etc
the
gain
will
be
mutual
Chang
Yu
says
The
general
has
confidence
in
the
men
under
his
command
and
the
men
are
docile
having
confidence
in
him
Thus
the
gain
is
mutual
He
quotes
a
pregnant
sentence
from
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
ch
The
art
of
giving
orders
is
not
to
try
to
rectify
minor
blunders
and
not
to
be
swayed
by
petty
doubts
Vacillation
and
fussiness
are
the
surest
means
of
sapping
the
confidence
of
an
army
Aids
to
Scouting
p
Chapter
X
TERRAIN
Only
about
a
third
of
the
chapter
comprising
§§
deals
with
terrain
the
subject
being
more
fully
treated
in
ch
XI
The
six
calamities
are
discussed
in
§§
and
the
rest
of
the
chapter
is
again
a
mere
string
of
desultory
remarks
though
not
less
interesting
perhaps
on
that
account
Sun
Tzŭ
said
We
may
distinguish
six
kinds
of
terrain
to
wit
Accessible
ground
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
plentifully
provided
with
roads
and
means
of
communications
entangling
ground
The
same
commentator
says
Net
like
country
venturing
into
which
you
become
entangled
temporising
ground
Ground
which
allows
you
to
stave
off
or
delay
narrow
passes
precipitous
heights
positions
at
a
great
distance
from
the
enemy
It
is
hardly
necessary
to
point
out
the
faultiness
of
this
classification
A
strange
lack
of
logical
perception
is
shown
in
the
Chinaman’s
unquestioning
acceptance
of
glaring
cross
divisions
such
as
the
above
Ground
which
can
be
freely
traversed
by
both
sides
is
called
accessible
With
regard
to
ground
of
this
nature
be
before
the
enemy
in
occupying
the
raised
and
sunny
spots
and
carefully
guard
your
line
of
supplies
The
general
meaning
of
the
last
phrase
is
doubtlessly
as
Tu
Yu
says
not
to
allow
the
enemy
to
cut
your
communications
In
view
of
Napoleon’s
dictum
the
secret
of
war
lies
in
the
communications
we
could
wish
that
Sun
Tzŭ
had
done
more
than
skirt
the
edge
of
this
important
subject
here
and
in
I
§
VII
§
Col
Henderson
says
The
line
of
supply
may
be
said
to
be
as
vital
to
the
existence
of
an
army
as
the
heart
to
the
life
of
a
human
being
Just
as
the
duelist
who
finds
his
adversary’s
point
menacing
him
with
certain
death
and
his
own
guard
astray
is
compelled
to
conform
to
his
adversary’s
movements
and
to
content
himself
with
warding
off
his
thrusts
so
the
commander
whose
communications
are
suddenly
threatened
finds
himself
in
a
false
position
and
he
will
be
fortunate
if
he
has
not
to
change
all
his
plans
to
split
up
his
force
into
more
or
less
isolated
detachments
and
to
fight
with
inferior
numbers
on
ground
which
he
has
not
had
time
to
prepare
and
where
defeat
will
not
be
an
ordinary
failure
but
will
entail
the
ruin
or
surrender
of
his
whole
army
Then
you
will
be
able
to
fight
with
advantage
Ground
which
can
be
abandoned
but
is
hard
to
re
occupy
is
called
entangling
From
a
position
of
this
sort
if
the
enemy
is
unprepared
you
may
sally
forth
and
defeat
him
But
if
the
enemy
is
prepared
for
your
coming
and
you
fail
to
defeat
him
then
return
being
impossible
disaster
will
ensue
When
the
position
is
such
that
neither
side
will
gain
by
making
the
first
move
it
is
called
temporising
ground
Tu
Mu
says
Each
side
finds
it
inconvenient
to
move
and
the
situation
remains
at
a
deadlock
In
a
position
of
this
sort
even
though
the
enemy
should
offer
us
an
attractive
bait
Tu
Yu
says
turning
their
backs
on
us
and
pretending
to
flee
But
this
is
only
one
of
the
lures
which
might
induce
us
to
quit
our
position
it
will
be
advisable
not
to
stir
forth
but
rather
to
retreat
thus
enticing
the
enemy
in
his
turn
then
when
part
of
his
army
has
come
out
we
may
deliver
our
attack
with
advantage
With
regard
to
narrow
passes
if
you
can
occupy
them
first
let
them
be
strongly
garrisoned
and
await
the
advent
of
the
enemy
Because
then
as
Tu
Yu
observes
the
initiative
will
lie
with
us
and
by
making
sudden
and
unexpected
attacks
we
shall
have
the
enemy
at
our
mercy
Should
the
enemy
forestall
you
in
occupying
a
pass
do
not
go
after
him
if
the
pass
is
fully
garrisoned
but
only
if
it
is
weakly
garrisoned
With
regard
to
precipitous
heights
if
you
are
beforehand
with
your
adversary
you
should
occupy
the
raised
and
sunny
spots
and
there
wait
for
him
to
come
up
Ts’ao
Kung
says
The
particular
advantage
of
securing
heights
and
defiles
is
that
your
actions
cannot
then
be
dictated
by
the
enemy
For
the
enunciation
of
the
grand
principle
alluded
to
see
VI
§
Chang
Yu
tells
the
following
anecdote
of
P’ei
Hsing
chien
A
D
who
was
sent
on
a
punitive
expedition
against
the
Turkic
tribes
At
night
he
pitched
his
camp
as
usual
and
it
had
already
been
completely
fortified
by
wall
and
ditch
when
suddenly
he
gave
orders
that
the
army
should
shift
its
quarters
to
a
hill
near
by
This
was
highly
displeasing
to
his
officers
who
protested
loudly
against
the
extra
fatigue
which
it
would
entail
on
the
men
P’ei
Hsing
chien
however
paid
no
heed
to
their
remonstrances
and
had
the
camp
moved
as
quickly
as
possible
The
same
night
a
terrific
storm
came
on
which
flooded
their
former
place
of
encampment
to
the
depth
of
over
twelve
feet
The
recalcitrant
officers
were
amazed
at
the
sight
and
owned
that
they
had
been
in
the
wrong
‘How
did
you
know
what
was
going
to
happen
’
they
asked
P’ei
Hsing
chien
replied
‘From
this
time
forward
be
content
to
obey
orders
without
asking
unnecessary
questions
’
From
this
it
may
be
seen
Chang
Yu
continues
that
high
and
sunny
places
are
advantageous
not
only
for
fighting
but
also
because
they
are
immune
from
disastrous
floods
If
the
enemy
has
occupied
them
before
you
do
not
follow
him
but
retreat
and
try
to
entice
him
away
The
turning
point
of
Li
Shih
min’s
campaign
in
A
D
against
the
two
rebels
Tou
Chien
te
King
of
Hsia
and
Wang
Shih
ch’ung
Prince
of
Cheng
was
his
seizure
of
the
heights
of
Wu
lao
in
spite
of
which
Tou
Chien
te
persisted
in
his
attempt
to
relieve
his
ally
in
Lo
yang
was
defeated
and
taken
prisoner
See
Chiu
T’ang
Shu
ch
fol
verso
and
also
ch
If
you
are
situated
at
a
great
distance
from
the
enemy
and
the
strength
of
the
two
armies
is
equal
it
is
not
easy
to
provoke
a
battle
The
point
is
that
we
must
not
think
of
undertaking
a
long
and
wearisome
march
at
the
end
of
which
as
Tu
Yu
says
we
should
be
exhausted
and
our
adversary
fresh
and
keen
and
fighting
will
be
to
your
disadvantage
These
six
are
the
principles
connected
with
Earth
Or
perhaps
the
principles
relating
to
ground
See
however
I
§
The
general
who
has
attained
a
responsible
post
must
be
careful
to
study
them
Now
an
army
is
exposed
to
six
several
calamities
not
arising
from
natural
causes
but
from
faults
for
which
the
general
is
responsible
These
are
Flight
insubordination
collapse
ruin
disorganisation
rout
Other
conditions
being
equal
if
one
force
is
hurled
against
another
ten
times
its
size
the
result
will
be
the
flight
of
the
former
When
the
common
soldiers
are
too
strong
and
their
officers
too
weak
the
result
is
insubordination
Tu
Mu
cites
the
unhappy
case
of
T’ien
Pu
Hsin
T’ang
Shu
ch
who
was
sent
to
Wei
in
A
D
with
orders
to
lead
an
army
against
Wang
T’ing
ts’ou
But
the
whole
time
he
was
in
command
his
soldiers
treated
him
with
the
utmost
contempt
and
openly
flouted
his
authority
by
riding
about
the
camp
on
donkeys
several
thousands
at
a
time
T’ien
Pu
was
powerless
to
put
a
stop
to
this
conduct
and
when
after
some
months
had
passed
he
made
an
attempt
to
engage
the
enemy
his
troops
turned
tail
and
dispersed
in
every
direction
After
that
the
unfortunate
man
committed
suicide
by
cutting
his
throat
When
the
officers
are
too
strong
and
the
common
soldiers
too
weak
the
result
is
collapse
Ts’ao
Kung
says
The
officers
are
energetic
and
want
to
press
on
the
common
soldiers
are
feeble
and
suddenly
collapse
When
the
higher
officers
are
angry
and
insubordinate
and
on
meeting
the
enemy
give
battle
on
their
own
account
from
a
feeling
of
resentment
before
the
commander
in
chief
can
tell
whether
or
no
he
is
in
a
position
to
fight
the
result
is
ruin
Wang
Hsi’s
note
is
This
means
the
general
is
angry
without
cause
and
at
the
same
time
does
not
appreciate
the
ability
of
his
subordinate
officers
thus
he
arouses
fierce
resentment
and
brings
an
avalanche
of
ruin
upon
his
head
When
the
general
is
weak
and
without
authority
when
his
orders
are
not
clear
and
distinct
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
ch
says
If
the
commander
gives
his
orders
with
decision
the
soldiers
will
not
wait
to
hear
them
twice
if
his
moves
are
made
without
vacillation
the
soldiers
will
not
be
in
two
minds
about
doing
their
duty
General
Baden
Powell
says
italicizing
the
words
The
secret
of
getting
successful
work
out
of
your
trained
men
lies
in
one
nutshell—in
the
clearness
of
the
instructions
they
receive
Cf
also
Wu
Tzŭ
ch
the
most
fatal
defect
in
a
military
leader
is
difference
the
worst
calamities
that
befall
an
army
arise
from
hesitation
when
there
are
no
fixed
duties
assigned
to
officers
and
men
Tu
Mu
says
Neither
officers
nor
men
have
any
regular
routine
and
the
ranks
are
formed
in
a
slovenly
haphazard
manner
the
result
is
utter
disorganisation
When
a
general
unable
to
estimate
the
enemy’s
strength
allows
an
inferior
force
to
engage
a
larger
one
or
hurls
a
weak
detachment
against
a
powerful
one
and
neglects
to
place
picked
soldiers
in
the
front
rank
the
result
must
be
a
rout
Chang
Yu
paraphrases
the
latter
part
of
the
sentence
and
continues
Whenever
there
is
fighting
to
be
done
the
keenest
spirits
should
be
appointed
to
serve
in
the
front
ranks
both
in
order
to
strengthen
the
resolution
of
our
own
men
and
to
demoralize
the
enemy
Cf
the
primi
ordines
of
Caesar
De
Bello
Gallico
V
et
al
These
are
six
ways
of
courting
defeat
which
must
be
carefully
noted
by
the
general
who
has
attained
a
responsible
post
See
supra
§
The
natural
formation
of
the
country
is
the
soldier’s
best
ally
Ch’en
Hao
says
The
advantages
of
weather
and
season
are
not
equal
to
those
connected
with
ground
but
a
power
of
estimating
the
adversary
of
controlling
the
forces
of
victory
and
of
shrewdly
calculating
difficulties
dangers
and
distances
constitutes
the
test
of
a
great
general
He
who
knows
these
things
and
in
fighting
puts
his
knowledge
into
practice
will
win
his
battles
He
who
knows
them
not
nor
practises
them
will
surely
be
defeated
If
fighting
is
sure
to
result
in
victory
then
you
must
fight
even
though
the
ruler
forbid
it
if
fighting
will
not
result
in
victory
then
you
must
not
fight
even
at
the
ruler’s
bidding
Cf
VIII
§
fin
Huang
Shih
kung
of
the
Ch’in
dynasty
who
is
said
to
have
been
the
patron
of
Chang
Liang
and
to
have
written
the
San
Lueh
has
these
words
attributed
to
him
The
responsibility
of
setting
an
army
in
motion
must
devolve
on
the
general
alone
if
advance
and
retreat
are
controlled
from
the
Palace
brilliant
results
will
hardly
be
achieved
Hence
the
god
like
ruler
and
the
enlightened
monarch
are
content
to
play
a
humble
part
in
furthering
their
country’s
cause
lit
kneel
down
to
push
the
chariot
wheel
This
means
that
in
matters
lying
outside
the
zenana
the
decision
of
the
military
commander
must
be
absolute
Chang
Yu
also
quote
the
saying
Decrees
from
the
Son
of
Heaven
do
not
penetrate
the
walls
of
a
camp
The
general
who
advances
without
coveting
fame
and
retreats
without
fearing
disgrace
It
was
Wellington
I
think
who
said
that
the
hardest
thing
of
all
for
a
soldier
is
to
retreat
whose
only
thought
is
to
protect
his
country
and
do
good
service
for
his
sovereign
is
the
jewel
of
the
kingdom
A
noble
presentiment
in
few
words
of
the
Chinese
happy
warrior
Such
a
man
says
Ho
Shih
even
if
he
had
to
suffer
punishment
would
not
regret
his
conduct
Regard
your
soldiers
as
your
children
and
they
will
follow
you
into
the
deepest
valleys
look
on
them
as
your
own
beloved
sons
and
they
will
stand
by
you
even
unto
death
Cf
I
§
In
this
connection
Tu
Mu
draws
for
us
an
engaging
picture
of
the
famous
general
Wu
Ch’i
from
whose
treatise
on
war
I
have
frequently
had
occasion
to
quote
He
wore
the
same
clothes
and
ate
the
same
food
as
the
meanest
of
his
soldiers
refused
to
have
either
a
horse
to
ride
or
a
mat
to
sleep
on
carried
his
own
surplus
rations
wrapped
in
a
parcel
and
shared
every
hardship
with
his
men
One
of
his
soldiers
was
suffering
from
an
abscess
and
Wu
Ch’i
himself
sucked
out
the
virus
The
soldier’s
mother
hearing
this
began
wailing
and
lamenting
Somebody
asked
her
saying
‘Why
do
you
cry
Your
son
is
only
a
common
soldier
and
yet
the
commander
in
chief
himself
has
sucked
the
poison
from
his
sore
’
The
woman
replied
‘Many
years
ago
Lord
Wu
performed
a
similar
service
for
my
husband
who
never
left
him
afterwards
and
finally
met
his
death
at
the
hands
of
the
enemy
And
now
that
he
has
done
the
same
for
my
son
he
too
will
fall
fighting
I
know
not
where
’
Li
Ch’uan
mentions
the
Viscount
of
Ch’u
who
invaded
the
small
state
of
Hsiao
during
the
winter
The
Duke
of
Shen
said
to
him
Many
of
the
soldiers
are
suffering
severely
from
the
cold
So
he
made
a
round
of
the
whole
army
comforting
and
encouraging
the
men
and
straightway
they
felt
as
if
they
were
clothed
in
garments
lined
with
floss
silk
If
however
you
are
indulgent
but
unable
to
make
your
authority
felt
kind
hearted
but
unable
to
enforce
your
commands
and
incapable
moreover
of
quelling
disorder
then
your
soldiers
must
be
likened
to
spoilt
children
they
are
useless
for
any
practical
purpose
Li
Ching
once
said
that
if
you
could
make
your
soldiers
afraid
of
you
they
would
not
be
afraid
of
the
enemy
Tu
Mu
recalls
an
instance
of
stern
military
discipline
which
occurred
in
A
D
when
Lu
Meng
was
occupying
the
town
of
Chiang
ling
He
had
given
stringent
orders
to
his
army
not
to
molest
the
inhabitants
nor
take
anything
from
them
by
force
Nevertheless
a
certain
officer
serving
under
his
banner
who
happened
to
be
a
fellow
townsman
ventured
to
appropriate
a
bamboo
hat
belonging
to
one
of
the
people
in
order
to
wear
it
over
his
regulation
helmet
as
a
protection
against
the
rain
Lu
Meng
considered
that
the
fact
of
his
being
also
a
native
of
Ju
nan
should
not
be
allowed
to
palliate
a
clear
breach
of
discipline
and
accordingly
he
ordered
his
summary
execution
the
tears
rolling
down
his
face
however
as
he
did
so
This
act
of
severity
filled
the
army
with
wholesome
awe
and
from
that
time
forth
even
articles
dropped
in
the
highway
were
not
picked
up
If
we
know
that
our
own
men
are
in
a
condition
to
attack
but
are
unaware
that
the
enemy
is
not
open
to
attack
we
have
gone
only
halfway
towards
victory
That
is
Ts’ao
Kung
says
the
issue
in
this
case
is
uncertain
If
we
know
that
the
enemy
is
open
to
attack
but
are
unaware
that
our
own
men
are
not
in
a
condition
to
attack
we
have
gone
only
halfway
towards
victory
Cf
III
§
If
we
know
that
the
enemy
is
open
to
attack
and
also
know
that
our
men
are
in
a
condition
to
attack
but
are
unaware
that
the
nature
of
the
ground
makes
fighting
impracticable
we
have
still
gone
only
halfway
towards
victory
Hence
the
experienced
soldier
once
in
motion
is
never
bewildered
once
he
has
broken
camp
he
is
never
at
a
loss
The
reason
being
according
to
Tu
Mu
that
he
has
taken
his
measures
so
thoroughly
as
to
ensure
victory
beforehand
He
does
not
move
recklessly
says
Chang
Yu
so
that
when
he
does
move
he
makes
no
mistakes
Hence
the
saying
If
you
know
the
enemy
and
know
yourself
your
victory
will
not
stand
in
doubt
if
you
know
Heaven
and
know
Earth
you
may
make
your
victory
complete
Li
Ch’uan
sums
up
as
follows
Given
a
knowledge
of
three
things—the
affairs
of
men
the
seasons
of
heaven
and
the
natural
advantages
of
earth—
victory
will
invariably
crown
your
battles
See
Pensees
de
Napoleon
no
The
Science
of
War
chap
Aids
to
Scouting
p
xii
Chapter
XI
THE
NINE
SITUATIONS
Sun
Tzŭ
said
The
art
of
war
recognises
nine
varieties
of
ground
Dispersive
ground
facile
ground
contentious
ground
open
ground
ground
of
intersecting
highways
serious
ground
difficult
ground
hemmed
in
ground
desperate
ground
When
a
chieftain
is
fighting
in
his
own
territory
it
is
dispersive
ground
So
called
because
the
soldiers
being
near
to
their
homes
and
anxious
to
see
their
wives
and
children
are
likely
to
seize
the
opportunity
afforded
by
a
battle
and
scatter
in
every
direction
In
their
advance
observes
Tu
Mu
they
will
lack
the
valor
of
desperation
and
when
they
retreat
they
will
find
harbors
of
refuge
When
he
has
penetrated
into
hostile
territory
but
to
no
great
distance
it
is
facile
ground
Li
Ch’uan
and
Ho
Shih
say
because
of
the
facility
for
retreating
and
the
other
commentators
give
similar
explanations
Tu
Mu
remarks
When
your
army
has
crossed
the
border
you
should
burn
your
boats
and
bridges
in
order
to
make
it
clear
to
everybody
that
you
have
no
hankering
after
home
Ground
the
possession
of
which
imports
great
advantage
to
either
side
is
contentious
ground
Tu
Mu
defines
the
ground
as
ground
to
be
contended
for
Ts’ao
Kung
says
ground
on
which
the
few
and
the
weak
can
defeat
the
many
and
the
strong
such
as
the
neck
of
a
pass
instanced
by
Li
Ch’uan
Thus
Thermopylae
was
of
this
classification
because
the
possession
of
it
even
for
a
few
days
only
meant
holding
the
entire
invading
army
in
check
and
thus
gaining
invaluable
time
Cf
Wu
Tzŭ
ch
V
ad
init
For
those
who
have
to
fight
in
the
ratio
of
one
to
ten
there
is
nothing
better
than
a
narrow
pass
When
Lu
Kuang
was
returning
from
his
triumphant
expedition
to
Turkestan
in
A
D
and
had
got
as
far
as
I
ho
laden
with
spoils
Liang
Hsi
administrator
of
Liang
chou
taking
advantage
of
the
death
of
Fu
Chien
King
of
Ch’in
plotted
against
him
and
was
for
barring
his
way
into
the
province
Yang
Han
governor
of
Kao
ch’ang
counseled
him
saying
Lu
Kuang
is
fresh
from
his
victories
in
the
west
and
his
soldiers
are
vigorous
and
mettlesome
If
we
oppose
him
in
the
shifting
sands
of
the
desert
we
shall
be
no
match
for
him
and
we
must
therefore
try
a
different
plan
Let
us
hasten
to
occupy
the
defile
at
the
mouth
of
the
Kao
wu
pass
thus
cutting
him
off
from
supplies
of
water
and
when
his
troops
are
prostrated
with
thirst
we
can
dictate
our
own
terms
without
moving
Or
if
you
think
that
the
pass
I
mention
is
too
far
off
we
could
make
a
stand
against
him
at
the
I
wu
pass
which
is
nearer
The
cunning
and
resource
of
Tzŭ
fang
himself
would
be
expended
in
vain
against
the
enormous
strength
of
these
two
positions
Liang
Hsi
refusing
to
act
on
this
advice
was
overwhelmed
and
swept
away
by
the
invader
Ground
on
which
each
side
has
liberty
of
movement
is
open
ground
There
are
various
interpretations
of
the
Chinese
adjective
for
this
type
of
ground
Ts’ao
Kung
says
it
means
ground
covered
with
a
network
of
roads
like
a
chessboard
Ho
Shih
suggested
ground
on
which
intercommunication
is
easy
Ground
which
forms
the
key
to
three
contiguous
states
Ts’au
Kung
defines
this
as
Our
country
adjoining
the
enemy’s
and
a
third
country
conterminous
with
both
Meng
Shih
instances
the
small
principality
of
Cheng
which
was
bounded
on
the
north
east
by
Ch’i
on
the
west
by
Chin
and
on
the
south
by
Ch’u
so
that
he
who
occupies
it
first
has
most
of
the
Empire
at
his
command
The
belligerent
who
holds
this
dominating
position
can
constrain
most
of
them
to
become
his
allies
is
ground
of
intersecting
highways
When
an
army
has
penetrated
into
the
heart
of
a
hostile
country
leaving
a
number
of
fortified
cities
in
its
rear
it
is
serious
ground
Wang
Hsi
explains
the
name
by
saying
that
when
an
army
has
reached
such
a
point
its
situation
is
serious
Mountain
forests
Or
simply
forests
rugged
steeps
marshes
and
fens—all
country
that
is
hard
to
traverse
this
is
difficult
ground
Ground
which
is
reached
through
narrow
gorges
and
from
which
we
can
only
retire
by
tortuous
paths
so
that
a
small
number
of
the
enemy
would
suffice
to
crush
a
large
body
of
our
men
this
is
hemmed
in
ground
Ground
on
which
we
can
only
be
saved
from
destruction
by
fighting
without
delay
is
desperate
ground
The
situation
as
pictured
by
Ts’ao
Kung
is
very
similar
to
the
hemmed
in
ground
except
that
here
escape
is
no
longer
possible
A
lofty
mountain
in
front
a
large
river
behind
advance
impossible
retreat
blocked
Ch’en
Hao
says
to
be
on
‘desperate
ground’
is
like
sitting
in
a
leaking
boat
or
crouching
in
a
burning
house
Tu
Mu
quotes
from
Li
Ching
a
vivid
description
of
the
plight
of
an
army
thus
entrapped
Suppose
an
army
invading
hostile
territory
without
the
aid
of
local
guides
—it
falls
into
a
fatal
snare
and
is
at
the
enemy’s
mercy
A
ravine
on
the
left
a
mountain
on
the
right
a
pathway
so
perilous
that
the
horses
have
to
be
roped
together
and
the
chariots
carried
in
slings
no
passage
open
in
front
retreat
cut
off
behind
no
choice
but
to
proceed
in
single
file
Then
before
there
is
time
to
range
our
soldiers
in
order
of
battle
the
enemy
is
overwhelming
strength
suddenly
appears
on
the
scene
Advancing
we
can
nowhere
take
a
breathing
space
retreating
we
have
no
haven
of
refuge
We
seek
a
pitched
battle
but
in
vain
yet
standing
on
the
defensive
none
of
us
has
a
moment’s
respite
If
we
simply
maintain
our
ground
whole
days
and
months
will
crawl
by
the
moment
we
make
a
move
we
have
to
sustain
the
enemy’s
attacks
on
front
and
rear
The
country
is
wild
destitute
of
water
and
plants
the
army
is
lacking
in
the
necessaries
of
life
the
horses
are
jaded
and
the
men
worn
out
all
the
resources
of
strength
and
skill
unavailing
the
pass
so
narrow
that
a
single
man
defending
it
can
check
the
onset
of
ten
thousand
all
means
of
offense
in
the
hands
of
the
enemy
all
points
of
vantage
already
forfeited
by
ourselves
—in
this
terrible
plight
even
though
we
had
the
most
valiant
soldiers
and
the
keenest
of
weapons
how
could
they
be
employed
with
the
slightest
effect
Students
of
Greek
history
may
be
reminded
of
the
awful
close
to
the
Sicilian
expedition
and
the
agony
of
the
Athenians
under
Nicias
and
Demonsthenes
See
Thucydides
VII
sqq
On
dispersive
ground
therefore
fight
not
On
facile
ground
halt
not
On
contentious
ground
attack
not
But
rather
let
all
your
energies
be
bent
on
occupying
the
advantageous
position
first
So
Ts’ao
Kung
Li
Ch’uan
and
others
however
suppose
the
meaning
to
be
that
the
enemy
has
already
forestalled
us
sot
that
it
would
be
sheer
madness
to
attack
In
the
Sun
Tzŭ
Hsu
Lu
when
the
King
of
Wu
inquires
what
should
be
done
in
this
case
Sun
Tzŭ
replies
The
rule
with
regard
to
contentious
ground
is
that
those
in
possession
have
the
advantage
over
the
other
side
If
a
position
of
this
kind
is
secured
first
by
the
enemy
beware
of
attacking
him
Lure
him
away
by
pretending
to
flee—show
your
banners
and
sound
your
drums—make
a
dash
for
other
places
that
he
cannot
afford
to
lose—trail
brushwood
and
raise
a
dust—confound
his
ears
and
eyes—detach
a
body
of
your
best
troops
and
place
it
secretly
in
ambuscade
Then
your
opponent
will
sally
forth
to
the
rescue
On
open
ground
do
not
try
to
block
the
enemy’s
way
Because
the
attempt
would
be
futile
and
would
expose
the
blocking
force
itself
to
serious
risks
There
are
two
interpretations
available
here
I
follow
that
of
Chang
Yu
The
other
is
indicated
in
Ts’ao
Kung’s
brief
note
Draw
closer
together
—i
e
see
that
a
portion
of
your
own
army
is
not
cut
off
On
ground
of
intersecting
highways
join
hands
with
your
allies
Or
perhaps
form
alliances
with
neighbouring
states
On
serious
ground
gather
in
plunder
On
this
Li
Ch’uan
has
the
following
delicious
note
When
an
army
penetrates
far
into
the
enemy’s
country
care
must
be
taken
not
to
alienate
the
people
by
unjust
treatment
Follow
the
example
of
the
Han
Emperor
Kao
Tsu
whose
march
into
Ch’in
territory
was
marked
by
no
violation
of
women
or
looting
of
valuables
Nota
bene
this
was
in
B
C
and
may
well
cause
us
to
blush
for
the
Christian
armies
that
entered
Peking
in
A
D
Thus
he
won
the
hearts
of
all
In
the
present
passage
then
I
think
that
the
true
reading
must
be
not
‘plunder
’
but
‘do
not
plunder
’
Alas
I
fear
that
in
this
instance
the
worthy
commentator’s
feelings
outran
his
judgment
Tu
Mu
at
least
has
no
such
illusions
He
says
When
encamped
on
‘serious
ground
’
there
being
no
inducement
as
yet
to
advance
further
and
no
possibility
of
retreat
one
ought
to
take
measures
for
a
protracted
resistance
by
bringing
in
provisions
from
all
sides
and
keep
a
close
watch
on
the
enemy
In
difficult
ground
keep
steadily
on
the
march
Or
in
the
words
of
VIII
§
do
not
encamp
On
hemmed
in
ground
resort
to
stratagem
Ts’au
Kung
says
Try
the
effect
of
some
unusual
artifice
and
Tu
Yu
amplifies
this
by
saying
In
such
a
position
some
scheme
must
be
devised
which
will
suit
the
circumstances
and
if
we
can
succeed
in
deluding
the
enemy
the
peril
may
be
escaped
This
is
exactly
what
happened
on
the
famous
occasion
when
Hannibal
was
hemmed
in
among
the
mountains
on
the
road
to
Casilinum
and
to
all
appearances
entrapped
by
the
dictator
Fabius
The
stratagem
which
Hannibal
devised
to
baffle
his
foes
was
remarkably
like
that
which
T’ien
Tan
had
also
employed
with
success
exactly
years
before
See
IX
§
note
When
night
came
on
bundles
of
twigs
were
fastened
to
the
horns
of
some
oxen
and
set
on
fire
the
terrified
animals
being
then
quickly
driven
along
the
mountain
side
towards
the
passes
which
were
beset
by
the
enemy
The
strange
spectacle
of
these
rapidly
moving
lights
so
alarmed
and
discomfited
the
Romans
that
they
withdrew
from
their
position
and
Hannibal’s
army
passed
safely
through
the
defile
See
Polybius
III
Livy
XXII
On
desperate
ground
fight
For
as
Chia
Lin
remarks
if
you
fight
with
all
your
might
there
is
a
chance
of
life
where
as
death
is
certain
if
you
cling
to
your
corner
Those
who
were
called
skilful
leaders
of
old
knew
how
to
drive
a
wedge
between
the
enemy’s
front
and
rear
More
literally
cause
the
front
and
rear
to
lose
touch
with
each
other
to
prevent
co
operation
between
his
large
and
small
divisions
to
hinder
the
good
troops
from
rescuing
the
bad
the
officers
from
rallying
their
men
When
the
enemy’s
men
were
scattered
they
prevented
them
from
concentrating
even
when
their
forces
were
united
they
managed
to
keep
them
in
disorder
When
it
was
to
their
advantage
they
made
a
forward
move
when
otherwise
they
stopped
still
Mei
Yao
ch’en
connects
this
with
the
foregoing
Having
succeeded
in
thus
dislocating
the
enemy
they
would
push
forward
in
order
to
secure
any
advantage
to
be
gained
if
there
was
no
advantage
to
be
gained
they
would
remain
where
they
were
If
asked
how
to
cope
with
a
great
host
of
the
enemy
in
orderly
array
and
on
the
point
of
marching
to
the
attack
I
should
say
Begin
by
seizing
something
which
your
opponent
holds
dear
then
he
will
be
amenable
to
your
will
Opinions
differ
as
to
what
Sun
Tzŭ
had
in
mind
Ts’ao
Kung
thinks
it
is
some
strategical
advantage
on
which
the
enemy
is
depending
Tu
Mu
says
The
three
things
which
an
enemy
is
anxious
to
do
and
on
the
accomplishment
of
which
his
success
depends
are
to
capture
our
favourable
positions
to
ravage
our
cultivated
land
to
guard
his
own
communications
Our
object
then
must
be
to
thwart
his
plans
in
these
three
directions
and
thus
render
him
helpless
Cf
III
§
By
boldly
seizing
the
initiative
in
this
way
you
at
once
throw
the
other
side
on
the
defensive
Rapidity
is
the
essence
of
war
According
to
Tu
Mu
this
is
a
summary
of
leading
principles
in
warfare
and
he
adds
These
are
the
profoundest
truths
of
military
science
and
the
chief
business
of
the
general
The
following
anecdotes
told
by
Ho
Shih
shows
the
importance
attached
to
speed
by
two
of
China’s
greatest
generals
In
A
D
Meng
Ta
governor
of
Hsin
ch’eng
under
the
Wei
Emperor
Wen
Ti
was
meditating
defection
to
the
House
of
Shu
and
had
entered
into
correspondence
with
Chu
ko
Liang
Prime
Minister
of
that
State
The
Wei
general
Ssu
ma
I
was
then
military
governor
of
Wan
and
getting
wind
of
Meng
Ta’s
treachery
he
at
once
set
off
with
an
army
to
anticipate
his
revolt
having
previously
cajoled
him
by
a
specious
message
of
friendly
import
Ssu
ma’s
officers
came
to
him
and
said
If
Meng
Ta
has
leagued
himself
with
Wu
and
Shu
the
matter
should
be
thoroughly
investigated
before
we
make
a
move
Ssu
ma
I
replied
Meng
Ta
is
an
unprincipled
man
and
we
ought
to
go
and
punish
him
at
once
while
he
is
still
wavering
and
before
he
has
thrown
off
the
mask
Then
by
a
series
of
forced
marches
be
brought
his
army
under
the
walls
of
Hsin
ch’eng
with
in
a
space
of
eight
days
Now
Meng
Ta
had
previously
said
in
a
letter
to
Chu
ko
Liang
Wan
is
li
from
here
When
the
news
of
my
revolt
reaches
Ssu
ma
I
he
will
at
once
inform
his
imperial
master
but
it
will
be
a
whole
month
before
any
steps
can
be
taken
and
by
that
time
my
city
will
be
well
fortified
Besides
Ssu
ma
I
is
sure
not
to
come
himself
and
the
generals
that
will
be
sent
against
us
are
not
worth
troubling
about
The
next
letter
however
was
filled
with
consternation
Though
only
eight
days
have
passed
since
I
threw
off
my
allegiance
an
army
is
already
at
the
city
gates
What
miraculous
rapidity
is
this
A
fortnight
later
Hsin
ch’eng
had
fallen
and
Meng
Ta
had
lost
his
head
See
Chin
Shu
ch
f
In
A
D
Li
Ching
was
sent
from
K’uei
chou
in
Ssu
ch’uan
to
reduce
the
successful
rebel
Hsiao
Hsien
who
had
set
up
as
Emperor
at
the
modern
Ching
chou
Fu
in
Hupeh
It
was
autumn
and
the
Yangtsze
being
then
in
flood
Hsiao
Hsien
never
dreamt
that
his
adversary
would
venture
to
come
down
through
the
gorges
and
consequently
made
no
preparations
But
Li
Ching
embarked
his
army
without
loss
of
time
and
was
just
about
to
start
when
the
other
generals
implored
him
to
postpone
his
departure
until
the
river
was
in
a
less
dangerous
state
for
navigation
Li
Ching
replied
To
the
soldier
overwhelming
speed
is
of
paramount
importance
and
he
must
never
miss
opportunities
Now
is
the
time
to
strike
before
Hsiao
Hsien
even
knows
that
we
have
got
an
army
together
If
we
seize
the
present
moment
when
the
river
is
in
flood
we
shall
appear
before
his
capital
with
startling
suddenness
like
the
thunder
which
is
heard
before
you
have
time
to
stop
your
ears
against
it
See
VII
§
note
This
is
the
great
principle
in
war
Even
if
he
gets
to
know
of
our
approach
he
will
have
to
levy
his
soldiers
in
such
a
hurry
that
they
will
not
be
fit
to
oppose
us
Thus
the
full
fruits
of
victory
will
be
ours
All
came
about
as
he
predicted
and
Hsiao
Hsien
was
obliged
to
surrender
nobly
stipulating
that
his
people
should
be
spared
and
he
alone
suffer
the
penalty
of
death
take
advantage
of
the
enemy’s
unreadiness
make
your
way
by
unexpected
routes
and
attack
unguarded
spots
The
following
are
the
principles
to
be
observed
by
an
invading
force
The
further
you
penetrate
into
a
country
the
greater
will
be
the
solidarity
of
your
troops
and
thus
the
defenders
will
not
prevail
against
you
Make
forays
in
fertile
country
in
order
to
supply
your
army
with
food
Cf
supra
§
Li
Ch’uan
does
not
venture
on
a
note
here
Carefully
study
the
well
being
of
your
men
For
well
being
Wang
Hsi
means
Pet
them
humor
them
give
them
plenty
of
food
and
drink
and
look
after
them
generally
and
do
not
overtax
them
Concentrate
your
energy
and
hoard
your
strength
Ch’en
recalls
the
line
of
action
adopted
in
B
C
by
the
famous
general
Wang
Chien
whose
military
genius
largely
contributed
to
the
success
of
the
First
Emperor
He
had
invaded
the
Ch’u
State
where
a
universal
levy
was
made
to
oppose
him
But
being
doubtful
of
the
temper
of
his
troops
he
declined
all
invitations
to
fight
and
remained
strictly
on
the
defensive
In
vain
did
the
Ch’u
general
try
to
force
a
battle
day
after
day
Wang
Chien
kept
inside
his
walls
and
would
not
come
out
but
devoted
his
whole
time
and
energy
to
winning
the
affection
and
confidence
of
his
men
He
took
care
that
they
should
be
well
fed
sharing
his
own
meals
with
them
provided
facilities
for
bathing
and
employed
every
method
of
judicious
indulgence
to
weld
them
into
a
loyal
and
homogenous
body
After
some
time
had
elapsed
he
told
off
certain
persons
to
find
out
how
the
men
were
amusing
themselves
The
answer
was
that
they
were
contending
with
one
another
in
putting
the
weight
and
long
jumping
When
Wang
Chien
heard
that
they
were
engaged
in
these
athletic
pursuits
he
knew
that
their
spirits
had
been
strung
up
to
the
required
pitch
and
that
they
were
now
ready
for
fighting
By
this
time
the
Ch’u
army
after
repeating
their
challenge
again
and
again
had
marched
away
eastwards
in
disgust
The
Ch’in
general
immediately
broke
up
his
camp
and
followed
them
and
in
the
battle
that
ensued
they
were
routed
with
great
slaughter
Shortly
afterwards
the
whole
of
Ch’u
was
conquered
by
Ch’in
and
the
king
Fu
ch’u
led
into
captivity
Keep
your
army
continually
on
the
move
In
order
that
the
enemy
may
never
know
exactly
where
you
are
It
has
struck
me
however
that
the
true
reading
might
be
link
your
army
together
and
devise
unfathomable
plans
Throw
your
soldiers
into
positions
whence
there
is
no
escape
and
they
will
prefer
death
to
flight
If
they
will
face
death
there
is
nothing
they
may
not
achieve
Chang
Yu
quotes
his
favourite
Wei
Liao
Tzŭ
ch
If
one
man
were
to
run
amok
with
a
sword
in
the
market
place
and
everybody
else
tried
to
get
our
of
his
way
I
should
not
allow
that
this
man
alone
had
courage
and
that
all
the
rest
were
contemptible
cowards
The
truth
is
that
a
desperado
and
a
man
who
sets
some
value
on
his
life
do
not
meet
on
even
terms
Officers
and
men
alike
will
put
forth
their
uttermost
strength
Chang
Yu
says
If
they
are
in
an
awkward
place
together
they
will
surely
exert
their
united
strength
to
get
out
of
it
Soldiers
when
in
desperate
straits
lose
the
sense
of
fear
If
there
is
no
place
of
refuge
they
will
stand
firm
If
they
are
in
the
heart
of
a
hostile
country
they
will
show
a
stubborn
front
If
there
is
no
help
for
it
they
will
fight
hard
Thus
without
waiting
to
be
marshalled
the
soldiers
will
be
constantly
on
the
qui
vive
without
waiting
to
be
asked
they
will
do
your
will
Literally
without
asking
you
will
get
without
restrictions
they
will
be
faithful
without
giving
orders
they
can
be
trusted
Prohibit
the
taking
of
omens
and
do
away
with
superstitious
doubts
Then
until
death
itself
comes
no
calamity
need
be
feared
The
superstitious
bound
in
to
saucy
doubts
and
fears
degenerate
into
cowards
and
die
many
times
before
their
deaths
Tu
Mu
quotes
Huang
Shih
kung
‘Spells
and
incantations
should
be
strictly
forbidden
and
no
officer
allowed
to
inquire
by
divination
into
the
fortunes
of
an
army
for
fear
the
soldiers’
minds
should
be
seriously
perturbed
’
The
meaning
is
he
continues
that
if
all
doubts
and
scruples
are
discarded
your
men
will
never
falter
in
their
resolution
until
they
die
If
our
soldiers
are
not
overburdened
with
money
it
is
not
because
they
have
a
distaste
for
riches
if
their
lives
are
not
unduly
long
it
is
not
because
they
are
disinclined
to
longevity
Chang
Yu
has
the
best
note
on
this
passage
Wealth
and
long
life
are
things
for
which
all
men
have
a
natural
inclination
Hence
if
they
burn
or
fling
away
valuables
and
sacrifice
their
own
lives
it
is
not
that
they
dislike
them
but
simply
that
they
have
no
choice
Sun
Tzŭ
is
slyly
insinuating
that
as
soldiers
are
but
human
it
is
for
the
general
to
see
that
temptations
to
shirk
fighting
and
grow
rich
are
not
thrown
in
their
way
On
the
day
they
are
ordered
out
to
battle
your
soldiers
may
weep
The
word
in
the
Chinese
is
snivel
This
is
taken
to
indicate
more
genuine
grief
than
tears
alone
those
sitting
up
bedewing
their
garments
and
those
lying
down
letting
the
tears
run
down
their
cheeks
Not
because
they
are
afraid
but
because
as
Ts’ao
Kung
says
all
have
embraced
the
firm
resolution
to
do
or
die
We
may
remember
that
the
heroes
of
the
Iliad
were
equally
childlike
in
showing
their
emotion
Chang
Yu
alludes
to
the
mournful
parting
at
the
I
River
between
Ching
K’o
and
his
friends
when
the
former
was
sent
to
attempt
the
life
of
the
King
of
Ch’in
afterwards
First
Emperor
in
B
C
The
tears
of
all
flowed
down
like
rain
as
he
bade
them
farewell
and
uttered
the
following
lines
The
shrill
blast
is
blowing
Chilly
the
burn
Your
champion
is
going—Not
to
return
But
let
them
once
be
brought
to
bay
and
they
will
display
the
courage
of
a
Chu
or
a
Kuei
Chu
was
the
personal
name
of
Chuan
Chu
a
native
of
the
Wu
State
and
contemporary
with
Sun
Tzŭ
himself
who
was
employed
by
Kung
tzu
Kuang
better
known
as
Ho
Lu
Wang
to
assassinate
his
sovereign
Wang
Liao
with
a
dagger
which
he
secreted
in
the
belly
of
a
fish
served
up
at
a
banquet
He
succeeded
in
his
attempt
but
was
immediately
hacked
to
pieces
by
the
king’s
bodyguard
This
was
in
B
C
The
other
hero
referred
to
Ts’ao
Kuei
or
Ts’ao
Mo
performed
the
exploit
which
has
made
his
name
famous
years
earlier
in
B
C
Lu
had
been
thrice
defeated
by
Ch’i
and
was
just
about
to
conclude
a
treaty
surrendering
a
large
slice
of
territory
when
Ts’ao
Kuei
suddenly
seized
Huan
Kung
the
Duke
of
Ch’i
as
he
stood
on
the
altar
steps
and
held
a
dagger
against
his
chest
None
of
the
duke’s
retainers
dared
to
move
a
muscle
and
Ts’ao
Kuei
proceeded
to
demand
full
restitution
declaring
the
Lu
was
being
unjustly
treated
because
she
was
a
smaller
and
a
weaker
state
Huan
Kung
in
peril
of
his
life
was
obliged
to
consent
whereupon
Ts’ao
Kuei
flung
away
his
dagger
and
quietly
resumed
his
place
amid
the
terrified
assemblage
without
having
so
much
as
changed
color
As
was
to
be
expected
the
Duke
wanted
afterwards
to
repudiate
the
bargain
but
his
wise
old
counselor
Kuan
Chung
pointed
out
to
him
the
impolicy
of
breaking
his
word
and
the
upshot
was
that
this
bold
stroke
regained
for
Lu
the
whole
of
what
she
had
lost
in
three
pitched
battles
The
skilful
tactician
may
be
likened
to
the
shuai
jan
Now
the
shuai
jan
is
a
snake
that
is
found
in
the
Ch‘ang
mountains
Shuai
jan
means
suddenly
or
rapidly
and
the
snake
in
question
was
doubtless
so
called
owing
to
the
rapidity
of
its
movements
Through
this
passage
the
term
in
the
Chinese
has
now
come
to
be
used
in
the
sense
of
military
manœuvers
Strike
at
its
head
and
you
will
be
attacked
by
its
tail
strike
at
its
tail
and
you
will
be
attacked
by
its
head
strike
at
its
middle
and
you
will
be
attacked
by
head
and
tail
both
Asked
if
an
army
can
be
made
to
imitate
the
shuai
jan
That
is
as
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
Is
it
possible
to
make
the
front
and
rear
of
an
army
each
swiftly
responsive
to
attack
on
the
other
just
as
though
they
were
part
of
a
single
living
body
I
should
answer
Yes
For
the
men
of
Wu
and
the
men
of
Yüeh
are
enemies
Cf
VI
§
yet
if
they
are
crossing
a
river
in
the
same
boat
and
are
caught
by
a
storm
they
will
come
to
each
other’s
assistance
just
as
the
left
hand
helps
the
right
The
meaning
is
If
two
enemies
will
help
each
other
in
a
time
of
common
peril
how
much
more
should
two
parts
of
the
same
army
bound
together
as
they
are
by
every
tie
of
interest
and
fellow
feeling
Yet
it
is
notorious
that
many
a
campaign
has
been
ruined
through
lack
of
cooperation
especially
in
the
case
of
allied
armies
Hence
it
is
not
enough
to
put
one’s
trust
in
the
tethering
of
horses
and
the
burying
of
chariot
wheels
in
the
ground
These
quaint
devices
to
prevent
one’s
army
from
running
away
recall
the
Athenian
hero
Sophanes
who
carried
the
anchor
with
him
at
the
battle
of
Plataea
by
means
of
which
he
fastened
himself
firmly
to
one
spot
See
Herodotus
IX
It
is
not
enough
says
Sun
Tzŭ
to
render
flight
impossible
by
such
mechanical
means
You
will
not
succeed
unless
your
men
have
tenacity
and
unity
of
purpose
and
above
all
a
spirit
of
sympathetic
cooperation
This
is
the
lesson
which
can
be
learned
from
the
shuai
jan
The
principle
on
which
to
manage
an
army
is
to
set
up
one
standard
of
courage
which
all
must
reach
Literally
level
the
courage
of
all
as
though
it
were
that
of
one
If
the
ideal
army
is
to
form
a
single
organic
whole
then
it
follows
that
the
resolution
and
spirit
of
its
component
parts
must
be
of
the
same
quality
or
at
any
rate
must
not
fall
below
a
certain
standard
Wellington’s
seemingly
ungrateful
description
of
his
army
at
Waterloo
as
the
worst
he
had
ever
commanded
meant
no
more
than
that
it
was
deficient
in
this
important
particular—unity
of
spirit
and
courage
Had
he
not
foreseen
the
Belgian
defections
and
carefully
kept
those
troops
in
the
background
he
would
almost
certainly
have
lost
the
day
How
to
make
the
best
of
both
strong
and
weak—that
is
a
question
involving
the
proper
use
of
ground
Mei
Yao
ch’en’s
paraphrase
is
The
way
to
eliminate
the
differences
of
strong
and
weak
and
to
make
both
serviceable
is
to
utilize
accidental
features
of
the
ground
Less
reliable
troops
if
posted
in
strong
positions
will
hold
out
as
long
as
better
troops
on
more
exposed
terrain
The
advantage
of
position
neutralizes
the
inferiority
in
stamina
and
courage
Col
Henderson
says
With
all
respect
to
the
text
books
and
to
the
ordinary
tactical
teaching
I
am
inclined
to
think
that
the
study
of
ground
is
often
overlooked
and
that
by
no
means
sufficient
importance
is
attached
to
the
selection
of
positions…
and
to
the
immense
advantages
that
are
to
be
derived
whether
you
are
defending
or
attacking
from
the
proper
utilization
of
natural
features
Thus
the
skilful
general
conducts
his
army
just
as
though
he
were
leading
a
single
man
willy
nilly
by
the
hand
Tu
Mu
says
The
simile
has
reference
to
the
ease
with
which
he
does
it
It
is
the
business
of
a
general
to
be
quiet
and
thus
ensure
secrecy
upright
and
just
and
thus
maintain
order
He
must
be
able
to
mystify
his
officers
and
men
by
false
reports
and
appearances
Literally
to
deceive
their
eyes
and
ears
and
thus
keep
them
in
total
ignorance
Ts’ao
Kung
gives
us
one
of
his
excellent
apophthegms
The
troops
must
not
be
allowed
to
share
your
schemes
in
the
beginning
they
may
only
rejoice
with
you
over
their
happy
outcome
To
mystify
mislead
and
surprise
the
enemy
is
one
of
the
first
principles
in
war
as
had
been
frequently
pointed
out
But
how
about
the
other
process—the
mystification
of
one’s
own
men
Those
who
may
think
that
Sun
Tzŭ
is
over
emphatic
on
this
point
would
do
well
to
read
Col
Henderson’s
remarks
on
Stonewall
Jackson’s
Valley
campaign
The
infinite
pains
he
says
with
which
Jackson
sought
to
conceal
even
from
his
most
trusted
staff
officers
his
movements
his
intentions
and
his
thoughts
a
commander
less
thorough
would
have
pronounced
useless
—etc
etc
In
the
year
A
D
as
we
read
in
ch
of
the
Hou
Han
Shu
Pan
Ch’ao
took
the
field
with
men
from
Khotan
and
other
Central
Asian
states
with
the
object
of
crushing
Yarkand
The
King
of
Kutcha
replied
by
dispatching
his
chief
commander
to
succour
the
place
with
an
army
drawn
from
the
kingdoms
of
Wen
su
Ku
mo
and
Wei
t’ou
totaling
men
Pan
Ch’ao
summoned
his
officers
and
also
the
King
of
Khotan
to
a
council
of
war
and
said
‘Our
forces
are
now
outnumbered
and
unable
to
make
head
against
the
enemy
The
best
plan
then
is
for
us
to
separate
and
disperse
each
in
a
different
direction
The
King
of
Khotan
will
march
away
by
the
easterly
route
and
I
will
then
return
myself
towards
the
west
Let
us
wait
until
the
evening
drum
has
sounded
and
then
start
’
Pan
Ch’ao
now
secretly
released
the
prisoners
whom
he
had
taken
alive
and
the
King
of
Kutcha
was
thus
informed
of
his
plans
Much
elated
by
the
news
the
latter
set
off
at
once
at
the
head
of
horsemen
to
bar
Pan
Ch’ao’s
retreat
in
the
west
while
the
King
of
Wen
su
rode
eastward
with
horse
in
order
to
intercept
the
King
of
Khotan
As
soon
as
Pan
Ch’ao
knew
that
the
two
chieftains
had
gone
he
called
his
divisions
together
got
them
well
in
hand
and
at
cock
crow
hurled
them
against
the
army
of
Yarkand
as
it
lay
encamped
The
barbarians
panic
stricken
fled
in
confusion
and
were
closely
pursued
by
Pan
Ch’ao
Over
heads
were
brought
back
as
trophies
besides
immense
spoils
in
the
shape
of
horses
and
cattle
and
valuables
of
every
description
Yarkand
then
capitulating
Kutcha
and
the
other
kingdoms
drew
off
their
respective
forces
From
that
time
forward
Pan
Ch’ao’s
prestige
completely
overawed
the
countries
of
the
west
In
this
case
we
see
that
the
Chinese
general
not
only
kept
his
own
officers
in
ignorance
of
his
real
plans
but
actually
took
the
bold
step
of
dividing
his
army
in
order
to
deceive
the
enemy
By
altering
his
arrangements
and
changing
his
plans
Wang
Hsi
thinks
that
this
means
not
using
the
same
stratagem
twice
he
keeps
the
enemy
without
definite
knowledge
Chang
Yu
in
a
quotation
from
another
work
says
The
axiom
that
war
is
based
on
deception
does
not
apply
only
to
deception
of
the
enemy
You
must
deceive
even
your
own
soldiers
Make
them
follow
you
but
without
letting
them
know
why
By
shifting
his
camp
and
taking
circuitous
routes
he
prevents
the
enemy
from
anticipating
his
purpose
At
the
critical
moment
the
leader
of
an
army
acts
like
one
who
has
climbed
up
a
height
and
then
kicks
away
the
ladder
behind
him
He
carries
his
men
deep
into
hostile
territory
before
he
shows
his
hand
Literally
releases
the
spring
see
V
§
that
is
takes
some
decisive
step
which
makes
it
impossible
for
the
army
to
return—like
Hsiang
Yu
who
sunk
his
ships
after
crossing
a
river
Ch’en
Hao
followed
by
Chia
Lin
understands
the
words
less
well
as
puts
forth
every
artifice
at
his
command
He
burns
his
boats
and
breaks
his
cooking
pots
like
a
shepherd
driving
a
flock
of
sheep
he
drives
his
men
this
way
and
that
and
none
knows
whither
he
is
going
Tu
Mu
says
The
army
is
only
cognizant
of
orders
to
advance
or
retreat
it
is
ignorant
of
the
ulterior
ends
of
attacking
and
conquering
To
muster
his
host
and
bring
it
into
danger
—this
may
be
termed
the
business
of
the
general
Sun
Tzŭ
means
that
after
mobilization
there
should
be
no
delay
in
aiming
a
blow
at
the
enemy’s
heart
Note
how
he
returns
again
and
again
to
this
point
Among
the
warring
states
of
ancient
China
desertion
was
no
doubt
a
much
more
present
fear
and
serious
evil
than
it
is
in
the
armies
of
today
The
different
measures
suited
to
the
nine
varieties
of
ground
Chang
Yu
says
One
must
not
be
hide
bound
in
interpreting
the
rules
for
the
nine
varieties
of
ground
the
expediency
of
aggressive
or
defensive
tactics
and
the
fundamental
laws
of
human
nature
these
are
things
that
must
most
certainly
be
studied
When
invading
hostile
territory
the
general
principle
is
that
penetrating
deeply
brings
cohesion
penetrating
but
a
short
way
means
dispersion
Cf
supra
§
When
you
leave
your
own
country
behind
and
take
your
army
across
neighbourhood
territory
you
find
yourself
on
critical
ground
This
ground
is
curiously
mentioned
in
VIII
§
but
it
does
not
figure
among
the
Nine
Situations
or
the
Six
Calamities
in
chap
X
One’s
first
impulse
would
be
to
translate
it
distant
ground
but
this
if
we
can
trust
the
commentators
is
precisely
what
is
not
meant
here
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
it
is
a
position
not
far
enough
advanced
to
be
called
‘facile
’
and
not
near
enough
to
home
to
be
‘dispersive
’
but
something
between
the
two
Wang
Hsi
says
It
is
ground
separated
from
home
by
an
interjacent
state
whose
territory
we
have
had
to
cross
in
order
to
reach
it
Hence
it
is
incumbent
on
us
to
settle
our
business
there
quickly
He
adds
that
this
position
is
of
rare
occurrence
which
is
the
reason
why
it
is
not
included
among
the
Nine
Situations
When
there
are
means
of
communication
on
all
four
sides
the
ground
is
one
of
intersecting
highways
When
you
penetrate
deeply
into
a
country
it
is
serious
ground
When
you
penetrate
but
a
little
way
it
is
facile
ground
When
you
have
the
enemy’s
strongholds
on
your
rear
and
narrow
passes
in
front
it
is
hemmed
in
ground
When
there
is
no
place
of
refuge
at
all
it
is
desperate
ground
Therefore
on
dispersive
ground
I
would
inspire
my
men
with
unity
of
purpose
This
end
according
to
Tu
Mu
is
best
attained
by
remaining
on
the
defensive
and
avoiding
battle
Cf
supra
§
On
facile
ground
I
would
see
that
there
is
close
connection
between
all
parts
of
my
army
As
Tu
Mu
says
the
object
is
to
guard
against
two
possible
contingencies
the
desertion
of
our
own
troops
a
sudden
attack
on
the
part
of
the
enemy
Cf
VII
§
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
On
the
march
the
regiments
should
be
in
close
touch
in
an
encampment
there
should
be
continuity
between
the
fortifications
On
contentious
ground
I
would
hurry
up
my
rear
This
is
Ts’ao
Kung’s
interpretation
Chang
Yu
adopts
it
saying
We
must
quickly
bring
up
our
rear
so
that
head
and
tail
may
both
reach
the
goal
That
is
they
must
not
be
allowed
to
straggle
up
a
long
way
apart
Mei
Yao
ch’en
offers
another
equally
plausible
explanation
Supposing
the
enemy
has
not
yet
reached
the
coveted
position
and
we
are
behind
him
we
should
advance
with
all
speed
in
order
to
dispute
its
possession
Ch’en
Hao
on
the
other
hand
assuming
that
the
enemy
has
had
time
to
select
his
own
ground
quotes
VI
§
where
Sun
Tzŭ
warns
us
against
coming
exhausted
to
the
attack
His
own
idea
of
the
situation
is
rather
vaguely
expressed
If
there
is
a
favourable
position
lying
in
front
of
you
detach
a
picked
body
of
troops
to
occupy
it
then
if
the
enemy
relying
on
their
numbers
come
up
to
make
a
fight
for
it
you
may
fall
quickly
on
their
rear
with
your
main
body
and
victory
will
be
assured
It
was
thus
he
adds
that
Chao
She
beat
the
army
of
Ch’in
See
p
On
open
ground
I
would
keep
a
vigilant
eye
on
my
defences
On
ground
of
intersecting
highways
I
would
consolidate
my
alliances
On
serious
ground
I
would
try
to
ensure
a
continuous
stream
of
supplies
The
commentators
take
this
as
referring
to
forage
and
plunder
not
as
one
might
expect
to
an
unbroken
communication
with
a
home
base
On
difficult
ground
I
would
keep
pushing
on
along
the
road
On
hemmed
in
ground
I
would
block
any
way
of
retreat
Meng
Shih
says
To
make
it
seem
that
I
meant
to
defend
the
position
whereas
my
real
intention
is
to
burst
suddenly
through
the
enemy’s
lines
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
in
order
to
make
my
soldiers
fight
with
desperation
Wang
Hsi
says
fearing
lest
my
men
be
tempted
to
run
away
Tu
Mu
points
out
that
this
is
the
converse
of
VII
§
where
it
is
the
enemy
who
is
surrounded
In
A
D
Kao
Huan
afterwards
Emperor
and
canonized
as
Shen
wu
was
surrounded
by
a
great
army
under
Erh
chu
Chao
and
others
His
own
force
was
comparatively
small
consisting
only
of
horse
and
something
under
foot
The
lines
of
investment
had
not
been
drawn
very
closely
together
gaps
being
left
at
certain
points
But
Kao
Huan
instead
of
trying
to
escape
actually
made
a
shift
to
block
all
the
remaining
outlets
himself
by
driving
into
them
a
number
of
oxen
and
donkeys
roped
together
As
soon
as
his
officers
and
men
saw
that
there
was
nothing
for
it
but
to
conquer
or
die
their
spirits
rose
to
an
extraordinary
pitch
of
exaltation
and
they
charged
with
such
desperate
ferocity
that
the
opposing
ranks
broke
and
crumbled
under
their
onslaught
On
desperate
ground
I
would
proclaim
to
my
soldiers
the
hopelessness
of
saving
their
lives
Tu
Yu
says
Burn
your
baggage
and
impedimenta
throw
away
your
stores
and
provisions
choke
up
the
wells
destroy
your
cooking
stoves
and
make
it
plain
to
your
men
that
they
cannot
survive
but
must
fight
to
the
death
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
The
only
chance
of
life
lies
in
giving
up
all
hope
of
it
This
concludes
what
Sun
Tzŭ
has
to
say
about
grounds
and
the
variations
corresponding
to
them
Reviewing
the
passages
which
bear
on
this
important
subject
we
cannot
fail
to
be
struck
by
the
desultory
and
unmethodical
fashion
in
which
it
is
treated
Sun
Tzŭ
begins
abruptly
in
VIII
§
to
enumerate
variations
before
touching
on
grounds
at
all
but
only
mentions
five
namely
nos
and
of
the
subsequent
list
and
one
that
is
not
included
in
it
A
few
varieties
of
ground
are
dealt
with
in
the
earlier
portion
of
chap
IX
and
then
chap
X
sets
forth
six
new
grounds
with
six
variations
of
plan
to
match
None
of
these
is
mentioned
again
though
the
first
is
hardly
to
be
distinguished
from
ground
no
in
the
next
chapter
At
last
in
chap
XI
we
come
to
the
Nine
Grounds
par
excellence
immediately
followed
by
the
variations
This
takes
us
down
to
§
In
§§
fresh
definitions
are
provided
for
nos
and
in
the
order
given
as
well
as
for
the
tenth
ground
noticed
in
chap
VIII
and
finally
the
nine
variations
are
enumerated
once
more
from
beginning
to
end
all
with
the
exception
of
and
being
different
from
those
previously
given
Though
it
is
impossible
to
account
for
the
present
state
of
Sun
Tzŭ’s
text
a
few
suggestive
facts
maybe
brought
into
prominence
Chap
VIII
according
to
the
title
should
deal
with
nine
variations
whereas
only
five
appear
It
is
an
abnormally
short
chapter
Chap
XI
is
entitled
The
Nine
Grounds
Several
of
these
are
defined
twice
over
besides
which
there
are
two
distinct
lists
of
the
corresponding
variations
The
length
of
the
chapter
is
disproportionate
being
double
that
of
any
other
except
IX
I
do
not
propose
to
draw
any
inferences
from
these
facts
beyond
the
general
conclusion
that
Sun
Tzŭ’s
work
cannot
have
come
down
to
us
in
the
shape
in
which
it
left
his
hands
chap
VIII
is
obviously
defective
and
probably
out
of
place
while
XI
seems
to
contain
matter
that
has
either
been
added
by
a
later
hand
or
ought
to
appear
elsewhere
For
it
is
the
soldier’s
disposition
to
offer
an
obstinate
resistance
when
surrounded
to
fight
hard
when
he
cannot
help
himself
and
to
obey
promptly
when
he
has
fallen
into
danger
Chang
Yu
alludes
to
the
conduct
of
Pan
Ch’ao’s
devoted
followers
in
A
D
The
story
runs
thus
in
the
Hou
Han
Shu
ch
When
Pan
Ch’ao
arrived
at
Shan
shan
Kuang
the
King
of
the
country
received
him
at
first
with
great
politeness
and
respect
but
shortly
afterwards
his
behavior
underwent
a
sudden
change
and
he
became
remiss
and
negligent
Pan
Ch’ao
spoke
about
this
to
the
officers
of
his
suite
‘Have
you
noticed
’
he
said
‘that
Kuang’s
polite
intentions
are
on
the
wane
This
must
signify
that
envoys
have
come
from
the
Northern
barbarians
and
that
consequently
he
is
in
a
state
of
indecision
not
knowing
with
which
side
to
throw
in
his
lot
That
surely
is
the
reason
The
truly
wise
man
we
are
told
can
perceive
things
before
they
have
come
to
pass
how
much
more
then
those
that
are
already
manifest
’
Thereupon
he
called
one
of
the
natives
who
had
been
assigned
to
his
service
and
set
a
trap
for
him
saying
‘Where
are
those
envoys
from
the
Hsiung
nu
who
arrived
some
day
ago
’
The
man
was
so
taken
aback
that
between
surprise
and
fear
he
presently
blurted
out
the
whole
truth
Pan
Ch’ao
keeping
his
informant
carefully
under
lock
and
key
then
summoned
a
general
gathering
of
his
officers
thirty
six
in
all
and
began
drinking
with
them
When
the
wine
had
mounted
into
their
heads
a
little
he
tried
to
rouse
their
spirit
still
further
by
addressing
them
thus
‘Gentlemen
here
we
are
in
the
heart
of
an
isolated
region
anxious
to
achieve
riches
and
honour
by
some
great
exploit
Now
it
happens
that
an
ambassador
from
the
Hsiung
no
arrived
in
this
kingdom
only
a
few
days
ago
and
the
result
is
that
the
respectful
courtesy
extended
towards
us
by
our
royal
host
has
disappeared
Should
this
envoy
prevail
upon
him
to
seize
our
party
and
hand
us
over
to
the
Hsiung
no
our
bones
will
become
food
for
the
wolves
of
the
desert
What
are
we
to
do
’
With
one
accord
the
officers
replied
‘Standing
as
we
do
in
peril
of
our
lives
we
will
follow
our
commander
through
life
and
death
’
For
the
sequel
of
this
adventure
see
chap
XII
§
note
We
cannot
enter
into
alliance
with
neighbouring
princes
until
we
are
acquainted
with
their
designs
We
are
not
fit
to
lead
an
army
on
the
march
unless
we
are
familiar
with
the
face
of
the
country—its
mountains
and
forests
its
pitfalls
and
precipices
its
marshes
and
swamps
We
shall
be
unable
to
turn
natural
advantages
to
account
unless
we
make
use
of
local
guides
These
three
sentences
are
repeated
from
VII
§§
order
to
emphasize
their
importance
the
commentators
seem
to
think
I
prefer
to
regard
them
as
interpolated
here
in
order
to
form
an
antecedent
to
the
following
words
With
regard
to
local
guides
Sun
Tzŭ
might
have
added
that
there
is
always
the
risk
of
going
wrong
either
through
their
treachery
or
some
misunderstanding
such
as
Livy
records
XXII
Hannibal
we
are
told
ordered
a
guide
to
lead
him
into
the
neighbourhood
of
Casinum
where
there
was
an
important
pass
to
be
occupied
but
his
Carthaginian
accent
unsuited
to
the
pronunciation
of
Latin
names
caused
the
guide
to
understand
Casilinum
instead
of
Casinum
and
turning
from
his
proper
route
he
took
the
army
in
that
direction
the
mistake
not
being
discovered
until
they
had
almost
arrived
To
be
ignorant
of
any
one
of
the
following
four
or
five
principles
does
not
befit
a
warlike
prince
When
a
warlike
prince
attacks
a
powerful
state
his
generalship
shows
itself
in
preventing
the
concentration
of
the
enemy’s
forces
He
overawes
his
opponents
and
their
allies
are
prevented
from
joining
against
him
Mei
Tao
ch’en
constructs
one
of
the
chains
of
reasoning
that
are
so
much
affected
by
the
Chinese
In
attacking
a
powerful
state
if
you
can
divide
her
forces
you
will
have
a
superiority
in
strength
if
you
have
a
superiority
in
strength
you
will
overawe
the
enemy
if
you
overawe
the
enemy
the
neighbouring
states
will
be
frightened
and
if
the
neighbouring
states
are
frightened
the
enemy’s
allies
will
be
prevented
from
joining
her
The
following
gives
a
stronger
meaning
If
the
great
state
has
once
been
defeated
before
she
has
had
time
to
summon
her
allies
then
the
lesser
states
will
hold
aloof
and
refrain
from
massing
their
forces
Ch’en
Hao
and
Chang
Yu
take
the
sentence
in
quite
another
way
The
former
says
Powerful
though
a
prince
may
be
if
he
attacks
a
large
state
he
will
be
unable
to
raise
enough
troops
and
must
rely
to
some
extent
on
external
aid
if
he
dispenses
with
this
and
with
overweening
confidence
in
his
own
strength
simply
tries
to
intimidate
the
enemy
he
will
surely
be
defeated
Chang
Yu
puts
his
view
thus
If
we
recklessly
attack
a
large
state
our
own
people
will
be
discontented
and
hang
back
But
if
as
will
then
be
the
case
our
display
of
military
force
is
inferior
by
half
to
that
of
the
enemy
the
other
chieftains
will
take
fright
and
refuse
to
join
us
Hence
he
does
not
strive
to
ally
himself
with
all
and
sundry
nor
does
he
foster
the
power
of
other
states
He
carries
out
his
own
secret
designs
keeping
his
antagonists
in
awe
The
train
of
thought
as
said
by
Li
Ch’uan
appears
to
be
this
Secure
against
a
combination
of
his
enemies
he
can
afford
to
reject
entangling
alliances
and
simply
pursue
his
own
secret
designs
his
prestige
enable
him
to
dispense
with
external
friendships
Thus
he
is
able
to
capture
their
cities
and
overthrow
their
kingdoms
This
paragraph
though
written
many
years
before
the
Ch’in
State
became
a
serious
menace
is
not
a
bad
summary
of
the
policy
by
which
the
famous
Six
Chancellors
gradually
paved
the
way
for
her
final
triumph
under
Shih
Huang
Ti
Chang
Yu
following
up
his
previous
note
thinks
that
Sun
Tzŭ
is
condemning
this
attitude
of
cold
blooded
selfishness
and
haughty
isolation
Bestow
rewards
without
regard
to
rule
Wu
Tzŭ
ch
less
wisely
says
Let
advance
be
richly
rewarded
and
retreat
be
heavily
punished
issue
orders
Literally
hang
or
post
up
without
regard
to
previous
arrangements
In
order
to
prevent
treachery
says
Wang
Hsi
The
general
meaning
is
made
clear
by
Ts’ao
Kung’s
quotation
from
the
Ssu
ma
Fa
Give
instructions
only
on
sighting
the
enemy
give
rewards
when
you
see
deserving
deeds
Ts’ao
Kung’s
paraphrase
The
final
instructions
you
give
to
your
army
should
not
correspond
with
those
that
have
been
previously
posted
up
Chang
Yu
simplifies
this
into
your
arrangements
should
not
be
divulged
beforehand
And
Chia
Lin
says
there
should
be
no
fixity
in
your
rules
and
arrangements
Not
only
is
there
danger
in
letting
your
plans
be
known
but
war
often
necessitates
the
entire
reversal
of
them
at
the
last
moment
and
you
will
be
able
to
handle
a
whole
army
as
though
you
had
to
do
with
but
a
single
man
Cf
supra
§
Confront
your
soldiers
with
the
deed
itself
never
let
them
know
your
design
Literally
do
not
tell
them
words
i
e
do
not
give
your
reasons
for
any
order
Lord
Mansfield
once
told
a
junior
colleague
to
give
no
reasons
for
his
decisions
and
the
maxim
is
even
more
applicable
to
a
general
than
to
a
judge
When
the
outlook
is
bright
bring
it
before
their
eyes
but
tell
them
nothing
when
the
situation
is
gloomy
Place
your
army
in
deadly
peril
and
it
will
survive
plunge
it
into
desperate
straits
and
it
will
come
off
in
safety
These
words
of
Sun
Tzŭ
were
once
quoted
by
Han
Hsin
in
explanation
of
the
tactics
he
employed
in
one
of
his
most
brilliant
battles
already
alluded
to
on
p
In
B
C
he
was
sent
against
the
army
of
Chao
and
halted
ten
miles
from
the
mouth
of
the
Ching
hsing
pass
where
the
enemy
had
mustered
in
full
force
Here
at
midnight
he
detached
a
body
of
light
cavalry
every
man
of
which
was
furnished
with
a
red
flag
Their
instructions
were
to
make
their
way
through
narrow
defiles
and
keep
a
secret
watch
on
the
enemy
When
the
men
of
Chao
see
me
in
full
flight
Han
Hsin
said
they
will
abandon
their
fortifications
and
give
chase
This
must
be
the
sign
for
you
to
rush
in
pluck
down
the
Chao
standards
and
set
up
the
red
banners
of
Han
in
their
stead
Turning
then
to
his
other
officers
he
remarked
Our
adversary
holds
a
strong
position
and
is
not
likely
to
come
out
and
attack
us
until
he
sees
the
standard
and
drums
of
the
commander
in
chief
for
fear
I
should
turn
back
and
escape
through
the
mountains
So
saying
he
first
of
all
sent
out
a
division
consisting
of
men
and
ordered
them
to
form
in
line
of
battle
with
their
backs
to
the
River
Ti
Seeing
this
manœuver
the
whole
army
of
Chao
broke
into
loud
laughter
By
this
time
it
was
broad
daylight
and
Han
Hsin
displaying
the
generalissimo’s
flag
marched
out
of
the
pass
with
drums
beating
and
was
immediately
engaged
by
the
enemy
A
great
battle
followed
lasting
for
some
time
until
at
length
Han
Hsin
and
his
colleague
Chang
Ni
leaving
drums
and
banner
on
the
field
fled
to
the
division
on
the
river
bank
where
another
fierce
battle
was
raging
The
enemy
rushed
out
to
pursue
them
and
to
secure
the
trophies
thus
denuding
their
ramparts
of
men
but
the
two
generals
succeeded
in
joining
the
other
army
which
was
fighting
with
the
utmost
desperation
The
time
had
now
come
for
the
horsemen
to
play
their
part
As
soon
as
they
saw
the
men
of
Chao
following
up
their
advantage
they
galloped
behind
the
deserted
walls
tore
up
the
enemy’s
flags
and
replaced
them
by
those
of
Han
When
the
Chao
army
looked
back
from
the
pursuit
the
sight
of
these
red
flags
struck
them
with
terror
Convinced
that
the
Hans
had
got
in
and
overpowered
their
king
they
broke
up
in
wild
disorder
every
effort
of
their
leader
to
stay
the
panic
being
in
vain
Then
the
Han
army
fell
on
them
from
both
sides
and
completed
the
rout
killing
a
number
and
capturing
the
rest
amongst
whom
was
King
Ya
himself…
After
the
battle
some
of
Han
Hsin’s
officers
came
to
him
and
said
In
the
Art
of
War
we
are
told
to
have
a
hill
or
tumulus
on
the
right
rear
and
a
river
or
marsh
on
the
left
front
This
appears
to
be
a
blend
of
Sun
Tzŭ
and
T’ai
Kung
See
IX
§
and
note
You
on
the
contrary
ordered
us
to
draw
up
our
troops
with
the
river
at
our
back
Under
these
conditions
how
did
you
manage
to
gain
the
victory
The
general
replied
I
fear
you
gentlemen
have
not
studied
the
Art
of
War
with
sufficient
care
Is
it
not
written
there
‘Plunge
your
army
into
desperate
straits
and
it
will
come
off
in
safety
place
it
in
deadly
peril
and
it
will
survive’
Had
I
taken
the
usual
course
I
should
never
have
been
able
to
bring
my
colleague
round
What
says
the
Military
Classic—‘Swoop
down
on
the
market
place
and
drive
the
men
off
to
fight
’
This
passage
does
not
occur
in
the
present
text
of
Sun
Tzŭ
If
I
had
not
placed
my
troops
in
a
position
where
they
were
obliged
to
fight
for
their
lives
but
had
allowed
each
man
to
follow
his
own
discretion
there
would
have
been
a
general
débandade
and
it
would
have
been
impossible
to
do
anything
with
them
The
officers
admitted
the
force
of
his
argument
and
said
These
are
higher
tactics
than
we
should
have
been
capable
of
See
Ch’ien
Han
Shu
ch
ff
For
it
is
precisely
when
a
force
has
fallen
into
harm’s
way
that
is
capable
of
striking
a
blow
for
victory
Danger
has
a
bracing
effect
Success
in
warfare
is
gained
by
carefully
accommodating
ourselves
to
the
enemy’s
purpose
Ts’ao
Kung
says
Feign
stupidity
—by
an
appearance
of
yielding
and
falling
in
with
the
enemy’s
wishes
Chang
Yu’s
note
makes
the
meaning
clear
If
the
enemy
shows
an
inclination
to
advance
lure
him
on
to
do
so
if
he
is
anxious
to
retreat
delay
on
purpose
that
he
may
carry
out
his
intention
The
object
is
to
make
him
remiss
and
contemptuous
before
we
deliver
our
attack
By
persistently
hanging
on
the
enemy’s
flank
I
understand
the
first
four
words
to
mean
accompanying
the
enemy
in
one
direction
Ts’ao
Kung
says
unite
the
soldiers
and
make
for
the
enemy
But
such
a
violent
displacement
of
characters
is
quite
indefensible
we
shall
succeed
in
the
long
run
Literally
after
a
thousand
li
in
killing
the
commander
in
chief
Always
a
great
point
with
the
Chinese
This
is
called
ability
to
accomplish
a
thing
by
sheer
cunning
On
the
day
that
you
take
up
your
command
block
the
frontier
passes
destroy
the
official
tallies
These
were
tablets
of
bamboo
or
wood
one
half
of
which
was
issued
as
a
permit
or
passport
by
the
official
in
charge
of
a
gate
Cf
the
border
warden
of
Lun
Yu
III
who
may
have
had
similar
duties
When
this
half
was
returned
to
him
within
a
fixed
period
he
was
authorized
to
open
the
gate
and
let
the
traveler
through
and
stop
the
passage
of
all
emissaries
Either
to
or
from
the
enemy’s
country
Be
stern
in
the
council
chamber
Show
no
weakness
and
insist
on
your
plans
being
ratified
by
the
sovereign
so
that
you
may
control
the
situation
Mei
Yao
ch’en
understands
the
whole
sentence
to
mean
Take
the
strictest
precautions
to
ensure
secrecy
in
your
deliberations
If
the
enemy
leaves
a
door
open
you
must
rush
in
Forestall
your
opponent
by
seizing
what
he
holds
dear
Cf
supra
§
and
subtly
contrive
to
time
his
arrival
on
the
ground
Ch’en
Hao’s
explanation
If
I
manage
to
seize
a
favourable
position
but
the
enemy
does
not
appear
on
the
scene
the
advantage
thus
obtained
cannot
be
turned
to
any
practical
account
He
who
intends
therefore
to
occupy
a
position
of
importance
to
the
enemy
must
begin
by
making
an
artful
appointment
so
to
speak
with
his
antagonist
and
cajole
him
into
going
there
as
well
Mei
Yao
ch’en
explains
that
this
artful
appointment
is
to
be
made
through
the
medium
of
the
enemy’s
own
spies
who
will
carry
back
just
the
amount
of
information
that
we
choose
to
give
them
Then
having
cunningly
disclosed
our
intentions
we
must
manage
though
starting
after
the
enemy
to
arrive
before
him
VII
§
We
must
start
after
him
in
order
to
ensure
his
marching
thither
we
must
arrive
before
him
in
order
to
capture
the
place
without
trouble
Taken
thus
the
present
passage
lends
some
support
to
Mei
Yao
ch’en’s
interpretation
of
§
Walk
in
the
path
defined
by
rule
Chia
Lin
says
Victory
is
the
only
thing
that
matters
and
this
cannot
be
achieved
by
adhering
to
conventional
canons
It
is
unfortunate
that
this
variant
rests
on
very
slight
authority
for
the
sense
yielded
is
certainly
much
more
satisfactory
Napoleon
as
we
know
according
to
the
veterans
of
the
old
school
whom
he
defeated
won
his
battles
by
violating
every
accepted
canon
of
warfare
and
accommodate
yourself
to
the
enemy
until
you
can
fight
a
decisive
battle
Tu
Mu
says
Conform
to
the
enemy’s
tactics
until
a
favourable
opportunity
offers
then
come
forth
and
engage
in
a
battle
that
shall
prove
decisive
At
first
then
exhibit
the
coyness
of
a
maiden
until
the
enemy
gives
you
an
opening
afterwards
emulate
the
rapidity
of
a
running
hare
and
it
will
be
too
late
for
the
enemy
to
oppose
you
As
the
hare
is
noted
for
its
extreme
timidity
the
comparison
hardly
appears
felicitous
But
of
course
Sun
Tzŭ
was
thinking
only
of
its
speed
The
words
have
been
taken
to
mean
You
must
flee
from
the
enemy
as
quickly
as
an
escaping
hare
but
this
is
rightly
rejected
by
Tu
Mu
Giles’
Biographical
Dictionary
no
The
Science
of
War
p
Stonewall
Jackson
vol
I
p
Chapter
XII
THE
ATTACK
BY
FIRE
Rather
more
than
half
the
chapter
§§
is
devoted
to
the
subject
of
fire
after
which
the
author
branches
off
into
other
topics
Sun
Tzŭ
said
There
are
five
ways
of
attacking
with
fire
The
first
is
to
burn
soldiers
in
their
camp
So
Tu
Mu
Li
Ch’uan
says
Set
fire
to
the
camp
and
kill
the
soldiers
when
they
try
to
escape
from
the
flames
Pan
Ch’ao
sent
on
a
diplomatic
mission
to
the
King
of
Shan
shan
see
XI
§
note
found
himself
placed
in
extreme
peril
by
the
unexpected
arrival
of
an
envoy
from
the
Hsiung
nu
the
mortal
enemies
of
the
Chinese
In
consultation
with
his
officers
he
exclaimed
Never
venture
never
win
The
only
course
open
to
us
now
is
to
make
an
assault
by
fire
on
the
barbarians
under
cover
of
night
when
they
will
not
be
able
to
discern
our
numbers
Profiting
by
their
panic
we
shall
exterminate
them
completely
this
will
cool
the
King’s
courage
and
cover
us
with
glory
besides
ensuring
the
success
of
our
mission
’
The
officers
all
replied
that
it
would
be
necessary
to
discuss
the
matter
first
with
the
Intendant
Pan
Ch’ao
then
fell
into
a
passion
‘It
is
today
’
he
cried
‘that
our
fortunes
must
be
decided
The
Intendant
is
only
a
humdrum
civilian
who
on
hearing
of
our
project
will
certainly
be
afraid
and
everything
will
be
brought
to
light
An
inglorious
death
is
no
worthy
fate
for
valiant
warriors
’
All
then
agreed
to
do
as
he
wished
Accordingly
as
soon
as
night
came
on
he
and
his
little
band
quickly
made
their
way
to
the
barbarian
camp
A
strong
gale
was
blowing
at
the
time
Pan
Ch’ao
ordered
ten
of
the
party
to
take
drums
and
hide
behind
the
enemy’s
barracks
it
being
arranged
that
when
they
saw
flames
shoot
up
they
should
begin
drumming
and
yelling
with
all
their
might
The
rest
of
his
men
armed
with
bows
and
crossbows
he
posted
in
ambuscade
at
the
gate
of
the
camp
He
then
set
fire
to
the
place
from
the
windward
side
whereupon
a
deafening
noise
of
drums
and
shouting
arose
on
the
front
and
rear
of
the
Hsiung
nu
who
rushed
out
pell
mell
in
frantic
disorder
Pan
Ch’ao
slew
three
of
them
with
his
own
hand
while
his
companions
cut
off
the
heads
of
the
envoy
and
thirty
of
his
suite
The
remainder
more
than
a
hundred
in
all
perished
in
the
flames
On
the
following
day
Pan
Ch’ao
divining
his
thoughts
said
with
uplifted
hand
‘Although
you
did
not
go
with
us
last
night
I
should
not
think
Sir
of
taking
sole
credit
for
our
exploit
’
This
satisfied
Kuo
Hsun
and
Pan
Ch’ao
having
sent
for
Kuang
King
of
Shan
shan
showed
him
the
head
of
the
barbarian
envoy
The
whole
kingdom
was
seized
with
fear
and
trembling
which
Pan
Ch’ao
took
steps
to
allay
by
issuing
a
public
proclamation
Then
taking
the
king’s
sons
as
hostage
he
returned
to
make
his
report
to
Tou
Ku
Hou
Han
Shu
ch
ff
the
second
is
to
burn
stores
Tu
Mu
says
Provisions
fuel
and
fodder
In
order
to
subdue
the
rebellious
population
of
Kiangnan
Kao
Keng
recommended
Wen
Ti
of
the
Sui
dynasty
to
make
periodical
raids
and
burn
their
stores
of
grain
a
policy
which
in
the
long
run
proved
entirely
successful
the
third
is
to
burn
baggage
trains
An
example
given
is
the
destruction
of
Yuan
Shao’s
wagons
and
impedimenta
by
Ts’ao
Ts’ao
in
A
D
the
fourth
is
to
burn
arsenals
and
magazines
Tu
Mu
says
that
the
things
contained
in
arsenals
and
magazines
are
the
same
He
specifies
weapons
and
other
implements
bullion
and
clothing
Cf
VII
§
the
fifth
is
to
hurl
dropping
fire
amongst
the
enemy
Tu
Yu
says
in
the
T’ung
Tien
To
drop
fire
into
the
enemy’s
camp
The
method
by
which
this
may
be
done
is
to
set
the
tips
of
arrows
alight
by
dipping
them
into
a
brazier
and
then
shoot
them
from
powerful
crossbows
into
the
enemy’s
lines
In
order
to
carry
out
an
attack
we
must
have
means
available
T’sao
Kung
thinks
that
traitors
in
the
enemy’s
camp
are
referred
to
But
Ch’en
Hao
is
more
likely
to
be
right
in
saying
We
must
have
favourable
circumstances
in
general
not
merely
traitors
to
help
us
Chia
Lin
says
We
must
avail
ourselves
of
wind
and
dry
weather
the
material
for
raising
fire
should
always
be
kept
in
readiness
Tu
Mu
suggests
as
material
for
making
fire
dry
vegetable
matter
reeds
brushwood
straw
grease
oil
etc
Here
we
have
the
material
cause
Chang
Yu
says
vessels
for
hoarding
fire
stuff
for
lighting
fires
There
is
a
proper
season
for
making
attacks
with
fire
and
special
days
for
starting
a
conflagration
The
proper
season
is
when
the
weather
is
very
dry
the
special
days
are
those
when
the
moon
is
in
the
constellations
of
the
Sieve
the
Wall
the
Wing
or
the
Cross
bar
These
are
respectively
the
and
of
the
Twenty
eight
Stellar
Mansions
corresponding
roughly
to
Sagittarius
Pegasus
Crater
and
Corvus
for
these
four
are
all
days
of
rising
wind
In
attacking
with
fire
one
should
be
prepared
to
meet
five
possible
developments
When
fire
breaks
out
inside
the
enemy’s
camp
respond
at
once
with
an
attack
from
without
If
there
is
an
outbreak
of
fire
but
the
enemy’s
soldiers
remain
quiet
bide
your
time
and
do
not
attack
The
prime
object
of
attacking
with
fire
is
to
throw
the
enemy
into
confusion
If
this
effect
is
not
produced
it
means
that
the
enemy
is
ready
to
receive
us
Hence
the
necessity
for
caution
When
the
force
of
the
flames
has
reached
its
height
follow
it
up
with
an
attack
if
that
is
practicable
if
not
stay
where
you
are
Ts’ao
Kung
says
If
you
see
a
possible
way
advance
but
if
you
find
the
difficulties
too
great
retire
If
it
is
possible
to
make
an
assault
with
fire
from
without
do
not
wait
for
it
to
break
out
within
but
deliver
your
attack
at
a
favourable
moment
Tu
Mu
says
that
the
previous
paragraphs
had
reference
to
the
fire
breaking
out
either
accidentally
we
may
suppose
or
by
the
agency
of
incendiaries
inside
the
enemy’s
camp
But
he
continues
if
the
enemy
is
settled
in
a
waste
place
littered
with
quantities
of
grass
or
if
he
has
pitched
his
camp
in
a
position
which
can
be
burnt
out
we
must
carry
our
fire
against
him
at
any
seasonable
opportunity
and
not
await
on
in
hopes
of
an
outbreak
occurring
within
for
fear
our
opponents
should
themselves
burn
up
the
surrounding
vegetation
and
thus
render
our
own
attempts
fruitless
The
famous
Li
Ling
once
baffled
the
leader
of
the
Hsiung
nu
in
this
way
The
latter
taking
advantage
of
a
favourable
wind
tried
to
set
fire
to
the
Chinese
general’s
camp
but
found
that
every
scrap
of
combustible
vegetation
in
the
neighbourhood
had
already
been
burnt
down
On
the
other
hand
Po
ts’ai
a
general
of
the
Yellow
Turban
rebels
was
badly
defeated
in
A
D
through
his
neglect
of
this
simple
precaution
At
the
head
of
a
large
army
he
was
besieging
Ch’ang
she
which
was
held
by
Huang
fu
Sung
The
garrison
was
very
small
and
a
general
feeling
of
nervousness
pervaded
the
ranks
so
Huang
fu
Sung
called
his
officers
together
and
said
In
war
there
are
various
indirect
methods
of
attack
and
numbers
do
not
count
for
everything
The
commentator
here
quotes
Sun
Tzŭ
V
§§
and
Now
the
rebels
have
pitched
their
camp
in
the
midst
of
thick
grass
which
will
easily
burn
when
the
wind
blows
If
we
set
fire
to
it
at
night
they
will
be
thrown
into
a
panic
and
we
can
make
a
sortie
and
attack
them
on
all
sides
at
once
thus
emulating
the
achievement
of
T’ien
Tan
’
See
p
That
same
evening
a
strong
breeze
sprang
up
so
Huang
fu
Sung
instructed
his
soldiers
to
bind
reeds
together
into
torches
and
mount
guard
on
the
city
walls
after
which
he
sent
out
a
band
of
daring
men
who
stealthily
made
their
way
through
the
lines
and
started
the
fire
with
loud
shouts
and
yells
Simultaneously
a
glare
of
light
shot
up
from
the
city
walls
and
Huang
fu
Sung
sounding
his
drums
led
a
rapid
charge
which
threw
the
rebels
into
confusion
and
put
them
to
headlong
flight
Hou
Han
Shu
ch
When
you
start
a
fire
be
to
windward
of
it
Do
not
attack
from
the
leeward
Chang
Yu
following
Tu
Yu
says
When
you
make
a
fire
the
enemy
will
retreat
away
from
it
if
you
oppose
his
retreat
and
attack
him
then
he
will
fight
desperately
which
will
not
conduce
to
your
success
A
rather
more
obvious
explanation
is
given
by
Tu
Mu
If
the
wind
is
in
the
east
begin
burning
to
the
east
of
the
enemy
and
follow
up
the
attack
yourself
from
that
side
If
you
start
the
fire
on
the
east
side
and
then
attack
from
the
west
you
will
suffer
in
the
same
way
as
your
enemy
A
wind
that
rises
in
the
daytime
lasts
long
but
a
night
breeze
soon
falls
Cf
Lao
Tzŭ’s
saying
A
violent
wind
does
not
last
the
space
of
a
morning
Tao
Te
Ching
chap
Mei
Yao
ch’en
and
Wang
Hsi
say
A
day
breeze
dies
down
at
nightfall
and
a
night
breeze
at
daybreak
This
is
what
happens
as
a
general
rule
The
phenomenon
observed
may
be
correct
enough
but
how
this
sense
is
to
be
obtained
is
not
apparent
In
every
army
the
five
developments
connected
with
fire
must
be
known
the
movements
of
the
stars
calculated
and
a
watch
kept
for
the
proper
days
Tu
Mu
says
We
must
make
calculations
as
to
the
paths
of
the
stars
and
watch
for
the
days
on
which
wind
will
rise
before
making
our
attack
with
fire
Chang
Yu
seems
to
interpret
the
text
differently
We
must
not
only
know
how
to
assail
our
opponents
with
fire
but
also
be
on
our
guard
against
similar
attacks
from
them
Hence
those
who
use
fire
as
an
aid
to
the
attack
show
intelligence
those
who
use
water
as
an
aid
to
the
attack
gain
an
accession
of
strength
By
means
of
water
an
enemy
may
be
intercepted
but
not
robbed
of
all
his
belongings
Ts’ao
Kung’s
note
is
We
can
merely
obstruct
the
enemy’s
road
or
divide
his
army
but
not
sweep
away
all
his
accumulated
stores
Water
can
do
useful
service
but
it
lacks
the
terrible
destructive
power
of
fire
This
is
the
reason
Chang
Yu
concludes
why
the
former
is
dismissed
in
a
couple
of
sentences
whereas
the
attack
by
fire
is
discussed
in
detail
Wu
Tzŭ
ch
speaks
thus
of
the
two
elements
If
an
army
is
encamped
on
low
lying
marshy
ground
from
which
the
water
cannot
run
off
and
where
the
rainfall
is
heavy
it
may
be
submerged
by
a
flood
If
an
army
is
encamped
in
wild
marsh
lands
thickly
overgrown
with
weeds
and
brambles
and
visited
by
frequent
gales
it
may
be
exterminated
by
fire
Unhappy
is
the
fate
of
one
who
tries
to
win
his
battles
and
succeed
in
his
attacks
without
cultivating
the
spirit
of
enterprise
for
the
result
is
waste
of
time
and
general
stagnation
This
is
one
of
the
most
perplexing
passages
in
Sun
Tzŭ
Ts’ao
Kung
says
Rewards
for
good
service
should
not
be
deferred
a
single
day
And
Tu
Mu
If
you
do
not
take
opportunity
to
advance
and
reward
the
deserving
your
subordinates
will
not
carry
out
your
commands
and
disaster
will
ensue
For
several
reasons
however
and
in
spite
of
the
formidable
array
of
scholars
on
the
other
side
I
prefer
the
interpretation
suggested
by
Mei
Yao
ch’en
alone
whose
words
I
will
quote
Those
who
want
to
make
sure
of
succeeding
in
their
battles
and
assaults
must
seize
the
favourable
moments
when
they
come
and
not
shrink
on
occasion
from
heroic
measures
that
is
to
say
they
must
resort
to
such
means
of
attack
of
fire
water
and
the
like
What
they
must
not
do
and
what
will
prove
fatal
is
to
sit
still
and
simply
hold
to
the
advantages
they
have
got
Hence
the
saying
The
enlightened
ruler
lays
his
plans
well
ahead
the
good
general
cultivates
his
resources
Tu
Mu
quotes
the
following
from
the
San
Lueh
ch
The
warlike
prince
controls
his
soldiers
by
his
authority
kits
them
together
by
good
faith
and
by
rewards
makes
them
serviceable
If
faith
decays
there
will
be
disruption
if
rewards
are
deficient
commands
will
not
be
respected
Move
not
unless
you
see
an
advantage
use
not
your
troops
unless
there
is
something
to
be
gained
fight
not
unless
the
position
is
critical
Sun
Tzŭ
may
at
times
appear
to
be
over
cautious
but
he
never
goes
so
far
in
that
direction
as
the
remarkable
passage
in
the
Tao
Te
Ching
ch
I
dare
not
take
the
initiative
but
prefer
to
act
on
the
defensive
I
dare
not
advance
an
inch
but
prefer
to
retreat
a
foot
No
ruler
should
put
troops
into
the
field
merely
to
gratify
his
own
spleen
no
general
should
fight
a
battle
simply
out
of
pique
If
it
is
to
your
advantage
make
a
forward
move
if
not
stay
where
you
are
This
is
repeated
from
XI
§
Here
I
feel
convinced
that
it
is
an
interpolation
for
it
is
evident
that
§
ought
to
follow
immediately
on
§
Anger
may
in
time
change
to
gladness
vexation
may
be
succeeded
by
content
But
a
kingdom
that
has
once
been
destroyed
can
never
come
again
into
being
The
Wu
State
was
destined
to
be
a
melancholy
example
of
this
saying
nor
can
the
dead
ever
be
brought
back
to
life
Hence
the
enlightened
ruler
is
heedful
and
the
good
general
full
of
caution
This
is
the
way
to
keep
a
country
at
peace
and
an
army
intact
Unless
you
enter
the
tiger’s
lair
you
cannot
get
hold
of
the
tiger’s
cubs
Chapter
XIII
THE
USE
OF
SPIES
Sun
Tzŭ
said
Raising
a
host
of
a
hundred
thousand
men
and
marching
them
great
distances
entails
heavy
loss
on
the
people
and
a
drain
on
the
resources
of
the
State
The
daily
expenditure
will
amount
to
a
thousand
ounces
of
silver
Cf
II
§§
There
will
be
commotion
at
home
and
abroad
and
men
will
drop
down
exhausted
on
the
highways
Cf
Tao
Te
Ching
ch
Where
troops
have
been
quartered
brambles
and
thorns
spring
up
Chang
Yu
has
the
note
We
may
be
reminded
of
the
saying
‘On
serious
ground
gather
in
plunder
’
Why
then
should
carriage
and
transportation
cause
exhaustion
on
the
highways
—The
answer
is
that
not
victuals
alone
but
all
sorts
of
munitions
of
war
have
to
be
conveyed
to
the
army
Besides
the
injunction
to
‘forage
on
the
enemy’
only
means
that
when
an
army
is
deeply
engaged
in
hostile
territory
scarcity
of
food
must
be
provided
against
Hence
without
being
solely
dependent
on
the
enemy
for
corn
we
must
forage
in
order
that
there
may
be
an
uninterrupted
flow
of
supplies
Then
again
there
are
places
like
salt
deserts
where
provisions
being
unobtainable
supplies
from
home
cannot
be
dispensed
with
As
many
as
seven
hundred
thousand
families
will
be
impeded
in
their
labor
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
Men
will
be
lacking
at
the
plough
tail
The
allusion
is
to
the
system
of
dividing
land
into
nine
parts
each
consisting
of
about
acres
the
plot
in
the
center
being
cultivated
on
behalf
of
the
State
by
the
tenants
of
the
other
eight
It
was
here
also
so
Tu
Mu
tells
us
that
their
cottages
were
built
and
a
well
sunk
to
be
used
by
all
in
common
See
II
§
note
In
time
of
war
one
of
the
families
had
to
serve
in
the
army
while
the
other
seven
contributed
to
its
support
Thus
by
a
levy
of
men
reckoning
one
able
bodied
soldier
to
each
family
the
husbandry
of
families
would
be
affected
Hostile
armies
may
face
each
other
for
years
striving
for
the
victory
which
is
decided
in
a
single
day
This
being
so
to
remain
in
ignorance
of
the
enemy’s
condition
simply
because
one
grudges
the
outlay
of
a
hundred
ounces
of
silver
in
honours
and
emoluments
For
spies
is
of
course
the
meaning
though
it
would
spoil
the
effect
of
this
curiously
elaborate
exordium
if
spies
were
actually
mentioned
at
this
point
is
the
height
of
inhumanity
Sun
Tzŭ’s
agreement
is
certainly
ingenious
He
begins
by
adverting
to
the
frightful
misery
and
vast
expenditure
of
blood
and
treasure
which
war
always
brings
in
its
train
Now
unless
you
are
kept
informed
of
the
enemy’s
condition
and
are
ready
to
strike
at
the
right
moment
a
war
may
drag
on
for
years
The
only
way
to
get
this
information
is
to
employ
spies
and
it
is
impossible
to
obtain
trustworthy
spies
unless
they
are
properly
paid
for
their
services
But
it
is
surely
false
economy
to
grudge
a
comparatively
trifling
amount
for
this
purpose
when
every
day
that
the
war
lasts
eats
up
an
incalculably
greater
sum
This
grievous
burden
falls
on
the
shoulders
of
the
poor
and
hence
Sun
Tzŭ
concludes
that
to
neglect
the
use
of
spies
is
nothing
less
than
a
crime
against
humanity
One
who
acts
thus
is
no
leader
of
men
no
present
help
to
his
sovereign
no
master
of
victory
This
idea
that
the
true
object
of
war
is
peace
has
its
root
in
the
national
temperament
of
the
Chinese
Even
so
far
back
as
B
C
these
memorable
words
were
uttered
by
Prince
Chuang
of
the
Ch’u
State
The
Chinese
character
for
‘prowess’
is
made
up
of
the
characters
for
‘to
stay’
and
‘a
spear’
cessation
of
hostilities
Military
prowess
is
seen
in
the
repression
of
cruelty
the
calling
in
of
weapons
the
preservation
of
the
appointment
of
Heaven
the
firm
establishment
of
merit
the
bestowal
of
happiness
on
the
people
putting
harmony
between
the
princes
the
diffusion
of
wealth
Thus
what
enables
the
wise
sovereign
and
the
good
general
to
strike
and
conquer
and
achieve
things
beyond
the
reach
of
ordinary
men
is
foreknowledge
That
is
knowledge
of
the
enemy’s
dispositions
and
what
he
means
to
do
Now
this
foreknowledge
cannot
be
elicited
from
spirits
it
cannot
be
obtained
inductively
from
experience
Tu
Mu’s
note
is
knowledge
of
the
enemy
cannot
be
gained
by
reasoning
from
other
analogous
cases
nor
by
any
deductive
calculation
Li
Ch’uan
says
Quantities
like
length
breadth
distance
and
magnitude
are
susceptible
of
exact
mathematical
determination
human
actions
cannot
be
so
calculated
Knowledge
of
the
enemy’s
dispositions
can
only
be
obtained
from
other
men
Mei
Yao
ch’en
has
rather
an
interesting
note
Knowledge
of
the
spirit
world
is
to
be
obtained
by
divination
information
in
natural
science
may
be
sought
by
inductive
reasoning
the
laws
of
the
universe
can
be
verified
by
mathematical
calculation
but
the
dispositions
of
an
enemy
are
ascertainable
through
spies
and
spies
alone
Hence
the
use
of
spies
of
whom
there
are
five
classes
Local
spies
inward
spies
converted
spies
doomed
spies
surviving
spies
When
these
five
kinds
of
spy
are
all
at
work
none
can
discover
the
secret
system
This
is
called
divine
manipulation
of
the
threads
It
is
the
sovereign’s
most
precious
faculty
Cromwell
one
of
the
greatest
and
most
practical
of
all
cavalry
leaders
had
officers
styled
‘scout
masters
’
whose
business
it
was
to
collect
all
possible
information
regarding
the
enemy
through
scouts
and
spies
etc
and
much
of
his
success
in
war
was
traceable
to
the
previous
knowledge
of
the
enemy’s
moves
thus
gained
Having
local
spies
means
employing
the
services
of
the
inhabitants
of
a
district
Tu
Mu
says
In
the
enemy’s
country
win
people
over
by
kind
treatment
and
use
them
as
spies
Having
inward
spies
making
use
of
officials
of
the
enemy
Tu
Mu
enumerates
the
following
classes
as
likely
to
do
good
service
in
this
respect
Worthy
men
who
have
been
degraded
from
office
criminals
who
have
undergone
punishment
also
favourite
concubines
who
are
greedy
for
gold
men
who
are
aggrieved
at
being
in
subordinate
positions
or
who
have
been
passed
over
in
the
distribution
of
posts
others
who
are
anxious
that
their
side
should
be
defeated
in
order
that
they
may
have
a
chance
of
displaying
their
ability
and
talents
fickle
turncoats
who
always
want
to
have
a
foot
in
each
boat
Officials
of
these
several
kinds
he
continues
should
be
secretly
approached
and
bound
to
one’s
interests
by
means
of
rich
presents
In
this
way
you
will
be
able
to
find
out
the
state
of
affairs
in
the
enemy’s
country
ascertain
the
plans
that
are
being
formed
against
you
and
moreover
disturb
the
harmony
and
create
a
breach
between
the
sovereign
and
his
ministers
The
necessity
for
extreme
caution
however
in
dealing
with
inward
spies
appears
from
an
historical
incident
related
by
Ho
Shih
Lo
Shang
Governor
of
I
Chou
sent
his
general
Wei
Po
to
attack
the
rebel
Li
Hsiung
of
Shu
in
his
stronghold
at
P’i
After
each
side
had
experienced
a
number
of
victories
and
defeats
Li
Hsiung
had
recourse
to
the
services
of
a
certain
P’o
t’ai
a
native
of
Wu
tu
He
began
to
have
him
whipped
until
the
blood
came
and
then
sent
him
off
to
Lo
Shang
whom
he
was
to
delude
by
offering
to
cooperate
with
him
from
inside
the
city
and
to
give
a
fire
signal
at
the
right
moment
for
making
a
general
assault
Lo
Shang
confiding
in
these
promises
march
out
all
his
best
troops
and
placed
Wei
Po
and
others
at
their
head
with
orders
to
attack
at
P’o
t’ai’s
bidding
Meanwhile
Li
Hsiung’s
general
Li
Hsiang
had
prepared
an
ambuscade
on
their
line
of
march
and
P’o
t’ai
having
reared
long
scaling
ladders
against
the
city
walls
now
lighted
the
beacon
fire
Wei
Po’s
men
raced
up
on
seeing
the
signal
and
began
climbing
the
ladders
as
fast
as
they
could
while
others
were
drawn
up
by
ropes
lowered
from
above
More
than
a
hundred
of
Lo
Shang’s
soldiers
entered
the
city
in
this
way
every
one
of
whom
was
forthwith
beheaded
Li
Hsiung
then
charged
with
all
his
forces
both
inside
and
outside
the
city
and
routed
the
enemy
completely
This
happened
in
A
D
I
do
not
know
where
Ho
Shih
got
the
story
from
It
is
not
given
in
the
biography
of
Li
Hsiung
or
that
of
his
father
Li
T’e
Chin
Shu
ch
Having
converted
spies
getting
hold
of
the
enemy’s
spies
and
using
them
for
our
own
purposes
By
means
of
heavy
bribes
and
liberal
promises
detaching
them
from
the
enemy’s
service
and
inducing
them
to
carry
back
false
information
as
well
as
to
spy
in
turn
on
their
own
countrymen
On
the
other
hand
Hsiao
Shih
hsien
says
that
we
pretend
not
to
have
detected
him
but
contrive
to
let
him
carry
away
a
false
impression
of
what
is
going
on
Several
of
the
commentators
accept
this
as
an
alternative
definition
but
that
it
is
not
what
Sun
Tzŭ
meant
is
conclusively
proved
by
his
subsequent
remarks
about
treating
the
converted
spy
generously
§
sqq
Ho
Shih
notes
three
occasions
on
which
converted
spies
were
used
with
conspicuous
success
by
T’ien
Tan
in
his
defence
of
Chi
mo
see
supra
p
by
Chao
She
on
his
march
to
O
yu
see
p
and
by
the
wily
Fan
Chu
in
B
C
when
Lien
P’o
was
conducting
a
defensive
campaign
against
Ch’in
The
King
of
Chao
strongly
disapproved
of
Lien
P’o’s
cautious
and
dilatory
methods
which
had
been
unable
to
avert
a
series
of
minor
disasters
and
therefore
lent
a
ready
ear
to
the
reports
of
his
spies
who
had
secretly
gone
over
to
the
enemy
and
were
already
in
Fan
Chu’s
pay
They
said
The
only
thing
which
causes
Ch’in
anxiety
is
lest
Chao
Kua
should
be
made
general
Lien
P’o
they
consider
an
easy
opponent
who
is
sure
to
be
vanquished
in
the
long
run
Now
this
Chao
Kua
was
a
son
of
the
famous
Chao
She
From
his
boyhood
he
had
been
wholly
engrossed
in
the
study
of
war
and
military
matters
until
at
last
he
came
to
believe
that
there
was
no
commander
in
the
whole
Empire
who
could
stand
against
him
His
father
was
much
disquieted
by
this
overweening
conceit
and
the
flippancy
with
which
he
spoke
of
such
a
serious
thing
as
war
and
solemnly
declared
that
if
ever
Kua
was
appointed
general
he
would
bring
ruin
on
the
armies
of
Chao
This
was
the
man
who
in
spite
of
earnest
protests
from
his
own
mother
and
the
veteran
statesman
Lin
Hsiang
ju
was
now
sent
to
succeed
Lien
P’o
Needless
to
say
he
proved
no
match
for
the
redoubtable
Po
Ch’i
and
the
great
military
power
of
Ch’in
He
fell
into
a
trap
by
which
his
army
was
divided
into
two
and
his
communications
cut
and
after
a
desperate
resistance
lasting
days
during
which
the
famished
soldiers
devoured
one
another
he
was
himself
killed
by
an
arrow
and
his
whole
force
amounting
it
is
said
to
men
ruthlessly
put
to
the
sword
Having
doomed
spies
doing
certain
things
openly
for
purposes
of
deception
and
allowing
our
own
spies
to
know
of
them
and
report
them
to
the
enemy
Tu
Yu
gives
the
best
exposition
of
the
meaning
We
ostentatiously
do
things
calculated
to
deceive
our
own
spies
who
must
be
led
to
believe
that
they
have
been
unwittingly
disclosed
Then
when
these
spies
are
captured
in
the
enemy’s
lines
they
will
make
an
entirely
false
report
and
the
enemy
will
take
measures
accordingly
only
to
find
that
we
do
something
quite
different
The
spies
will
thereupon
be
put
to
death
As
an
example
of
doomed
spies
Ho
Shih
mentions
the
prisoners
released
by
Pan
Ch’ao
in
his
campaign
against
Yarkand
See
p
He
also
refers
to
T’ang
Chien
who
in
A
D
was
sent
by
T’ai
Tsung
to
lull
the
Turkish
Kahn
Chieh
li
into
fancied
security
until
Li
Ching
was
able
to
deliver
a
crushing
blow
against
him
Chang
Yu
says
that
the
Turks
revenged
themselves
by
killing
T’ang
Chien
but
this
is
a
mistake
for
we
read
in
both
the
old
and
the
New
T’ang
History
ch
fol
and
ch
fol
respectively
that
he
escaped
and
lived
on
until
Li
I
chi
played
a
somewhat
similar
part
in
B
C
when
sent
by
the
King
of
Han
to
open
peaceful
negotiations
with
Ch’i
He
has
certainly
more
claim
to
be
described
a
doomed
spy
for
the
king
of
Ch’i
being
subsequently
attacked
without
warning
by
Han
Hsin
and
infuriated
by
what
he
considered
the
treachery
of
Li
I
chi
ordered
the
unfortunate
envoy
to
be
boiled
alive
Surviving
spies
finally
are
those
who
bring
back
news
from
the
enemy’s
camp
This
is
the
ordinary
class
of
spies
properly
so
called
forming
a
regular
part
of
the
army
Tu
Mu
says
Your
surviving
spy
must
be
a
man
of
keen
intellect
though
in
outward
appearance
a
fool
of
shabby
exterior
but
with
a
will
of
iron
He
must
be
active
robust
endowed
with
physical
strength
and
courage
thoroughly
accustomed
to
all
sorts
of
dirty
work
able
to
endure
hunger
and
cold
and
to
put
up
with
shame
and
ignominy
Ho
Shih
tells
the
following
story
of
Ta’hsi
Wu
of
the
Sui
dynasty
When
he
was
governor
of
Eastern
Ch’in
Shen
wu
of
Ch’i
made
a
hostile
movement
upon
Sha
yuan
The
Emperor
T’ai
Tsu
Kao
Tsu
sent
Ta
hsi
Wu
to
spy
upon
the
enemy
He
was
accompanied
by
two
other
men
All
three
were
on
horseback
and
wore
the
enemy’s
uniform
When
it
was
dark
they
dismounted
a
few
hundred
feet
away
from
the
enemy’s
camp
and
stealthily
crept
up
to
listen
until
they
succeeded
in
catching
the
passwords
used
in
the
army
Then
they
got
on
their
horses
again
and
boldly
passed
through
the
camp
under
the
guise
of
night
watchmen
and
more
than
once
happening
to
come
across
a
soldier
who
was
committing
some
breach
of
discipline
they
actually
stopped
to
give
the
culprit
a
sound
cudgeling
Thus
they
managed
to
return
with
the
fullest
possible
information
about
the
enemy’s
dispositions
and
received
warm
commendation
from
the
Emperor
who
in
consequence
of
their
report
was
able
to
inflict
a
severe
defeat
on
his
adversary
Hence
it
is
that
with
none
in
the
whole
army
are
more
intimate
relations
to
be
maintained
than
with
spies
Tu
Mu
and
Mei
Yao
ch’en
point
out
that
the
spy
is
privileged
to
enter
even
the
general’s
private
sleeping
tent
None
should
be
more
liberally
rewarded
In
no
other
business
should
greater
secrecy
be
preserved
Tu
Mu
gives
a
graphic
touch
all
communication
with
spies
should
be
carried
mouth
to
ear
The
following
remarks
on
spies
may
be
quoted
from
Turenne
who
made
perhaps
larger
use
of
them
than
any
previous
commander
Spies
are
attached
to
those
who
give
them
most
he
who
pays
them
ill
is
never
served
They
should
never
be
known
to
anybody
nor
should
they
know
one
another
When
they
propose
anything
very
material
secure
their
persons
or
have
in
your
possession
their
wives
and
children
as
hostages
for
their
fidelity
Never
communicate
anything
to
them
but
what
is
absolutely
necessary
that
they
should
know
Spies
cannot
be
usefully
employed
without
a
certain
intuitive
sagacity
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
In
order
to
use
them
one
must
know
fact
from
falsehood
and
be
able
to
discriminate
between
honesty
and
double
dealing
Wang
Hsi
in
a
different
interpretation
thinks
more
along
the
lines
of
intuitive
perception
and
practical
intelligence
Tu
Mu
strangely
refers
these
attributes
to
the
spies
themselves
Before
using
spies
we
must
assure
ourselves
as
to
their
integrity
of
character
and
the
extent
of
their
experience
and
skill
But
he
continues
A
brazen
face
and
a
crafty
disposition
are
more
dangerous
than
mountains
or
rivers
it
takes
a
man
of
genius
to
penetrate
such
So
that
we
are
left
in
some
doubt
as
to
his
real
opinion
on
the
passage
They
cannot
be
properly
managed
without
benevolence
and
straightforwardness
Chang
Yu
says
When
you
have
attracted
them
by
substantial
offers
you
must
treat
them
with
absolute
sincerity
then
they
will
work
for
you
with
all
their
might
Without
subtle
ingenuity
of
mind
one
cannot
make
certain
of
the
truth
of
their
reports
Mei
Yao
ch’en
says
Be
on
your
guard
against
the
possibility
of
spies
going
over
to
the
service
of
the
enemy
Be
subtle
be
subtle
and
use
your
spies
for
every
kind
of
business
Cf
VI
§
If
a
secret
piece
of
news
is
divulged
by
a
spy
before
the
time
is
ripe
he
must
be
put
to
death
together
with
the
man
to
whom
the
secret
was
told
Word
for
word
the
translation
here
is
If
spy
matters
are
heard
before
our
plans
are
carried
out
etc
Sun
Tzŭ’s
main
point
in
this
passage
is
Whereas
you
kill
the
spy
himself
as
a
punishment
for
letting
out
the
secret
the
object
of
killing
the
other
man
is
only
as
Ch’en
Hao
puts
it
to
stop
his
mouth
and
prevent
news
leaking
any
further
If
it
had
already
been
repeated
to
others
this
object
would
not
be
gained
Either
way
Sun
Tzŭ
lays
himself
open
to
the
charge
of
inhumanity
though
Tu
Mu
tries
to
defend
him
by
saying
that
the
man
deserves
to
be
put
to
death
for
the
spy
would
certainly
not
have
told
the
secret
unless
the
other
had
been
at
pains
to
worm
it
out
of
him
Whether
the
object
be
to
crush
an
army
to
storm
a
city
or
to
assassinate
an
individual
it
is
always
necessary
to
begin
by
finding
out
the
names
of
the
attendants
the
aides
de
camp
Literally
visitors
is
equivalent
as
Tu
Yu
says
to
those
whose
duty
it
is
to
keep
the
general
supplied
with
information
which
naturally
necessitates
frequent
interviews
with
him
the
door
keepers
and
sentries
of
the
general
in
command
Our
spies
must
be
commissioned
to
ascertain
these
As
the
first
step
no
doubt
towards
finding
out
if
any
of
these
important
functionaries
can
be
won
over
by
bribery
The
enemy’s
spies
who
have
come
to
spy
on
us
must
be
sought
out
tempted
with
bribes
led
away
and
comfortably
housed
Thus
they
will
become
converted
spies
and
available
for
our
service
It
is
through
the
information
brought
by
the
converted
spy
that
we
are
able
to
acquire
and
employ
local
and
inward
spies
Tu
Yu
says
through
conversion
of
the
enemy’s
spies
we
learn
the
enemy’s
condition
And
Chang
Yu
says
We
must
tempt
the
converted
spy
into
our
service
because
it
is
he
that
knows
which
of
the
local
inhabitants
are
greedy
of
gain
and
which
of
the
officials
are
open
to
corruption
It
is
owing
to
his
information
again
that
we
can
cause
the
doomed
spy
to
carry
false
tidings
to
the
enemy
Chang
Yu
says
because
the
converted
spy
knows
how
the
enemy
can
best
be
deceived
Lastly
it
is
by
his
information
that
the
surviving
spy
can
be
used
on
appointed
occasions
The
end
and
aim
of
spying
in
all
its
five
varieties
is
knowledge
of
the
enemy
and
this
knowledge
can
only
be
derived
in
the
first
instance
from
the
converted
spy
As
explained
in
§§
He
not
only
brings
information
himself
but
makes
it
possible
to
use
the
other
kinds
of
spy
to
advantage
Hence
it
is
essential
that
the
converted
spy
be
treated
with
the
utmost
liberality
Of
old
the
rise
of
the
Yin
dynasty
Sun
Tzŭ
means
the
Shang
dynasty
founded
in
B
C
Its
name
was
changed
to
Yin
by
P’an
Keng
in
was
due
to
I
Chih
Better
known
as
I
Yin
the
famous
general
and
statesman
who
took
part
in
Ch’eng
T’ang’s
campaign
against
Chieh
Kuei
who
had
served
under
the
Hsia
Likewise
the
rise
of
the
Chou
dynasty
was
due
to
Lü
Ya
Lu
Shang
rose
to
high
office
under
the
tyrant
Chou
Hsin
whom
he
afterwards
helped
to
overthrow
Popularly
known
as
T’ai
Kung
a
title
bestowed
on
him
by
Wen
Wang
he
is
said
to
have
composed
a
treatise
on
war
erroneously
identified
with
the
Liu
T’ao
who
had
served
under
the
Yin
There
is
less
precision
in
the
Chinese
than
I
have
thought
it
well
to
introduce
into
my
translation
and
the
commentaries
on
the
passage
are
by
no
means
explicit
But
having
regard
to
the
context
we
can
hardly
doubt
that
Sun
Tzŭ
is
holding
up
I
Chih
and
Lu
Ya
as
illustrious
examples
of
the
converted
spy
or
something
closely
analogous
His
suggestion
is
that
the
Hsia
and
Yin
dynasties
were
upset
owing
to
the
intimate
knowledge
of
their
weaknesses
and
shortcoming
which
these
former
ministers
were
able
to
impart
to
the
other
side
Mei
Yao
ch’en
appears
to
resent
any
such
aspersion
on
these
historic
names
I
Yin
and
Lu
Ya
he
says
were
not
rebels
against
the
Government
Hsia
could
not
employ
the
former
hence
Yin
employed
him
Yin
could
not
employ
the
latter
hence
Hou
employed
him
Their
great
achievements
were
all
for
the
good
of
the
people
Ho
Shih
is
also
indignant
How
should
two
divinely
inspired
men
such
as
I
and
Lu
have
acted
as
common
spies
Sun
Tzŭ’s
mention
of
them
simply
means
that
the
proper
use
of
the
five
classes
of
spies
is
a
matter
which
requires
men
of
the
highest
mental
caliber
like
I
and
Lu
whose
wisdom
and
capacity
qualified
them
for
the
task
The
above
words
only
emphasize
this
point
Ho
Shih
believes
then
that
the
two
heroes
are
mentioned
on
account
of
their
supposed
skill
in
the
use
of
spies
But
this
is
very
weak
Hence
it
is
only
the
enlightened
ruler
and
the
wise
general
who
will
use
the
highest
intelligence
of
the
army
for
purposes
of
spying
and
thereby
they
achieve
great
results
Tu
Mu
closes
with
a
note
of
warning
Just
as
water
which
carries
a
boat
from
bank
to
bank
may
also
be
the
means
of
sinking
it
so
reliance
on
spies
while
production
of
great
results
is
oft
times
the
cause
of
utter
destruction
Spies
are
a
most
important
element
in
war
because
on
them
depends
an
army’s
ability
to
move
Chia
Lin
says
that
an
army
without
spies
is
like
a
man
with
ears
or
eyes
Aids
to
Scouting
p
Marshal
Turenne
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