-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 10
/
adv_20150311.txt
79 lines (54 loc) · 2.37 KB
/
adv_20150311.txt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
Using `SSH_MSG_KEXINIT` data unbounded
======================================
Project libssh2 Security Advisory, March 11th 2015 -
[Permalink](https://www.libssh2.org/adv_20150311.html)
VULNERABILITY
-------------
When negotiating a new SSH session with a remote server, one of libssh2's
functions for doing the key exchange (`kex_agree_methods()`) was naively
reading data from the incoming packet and using it without doing sufficient
range checks. The `SSH_MSG_KEXINIT` packet arrives to libssh2 with a set of
strings, sent as a series of LENGTH + DATA pairs. libssh2 would go through the
list and read the LENGTH field, read the string following the LENGTH and then
advance the pointer LENGTH bytes in memory and expect to find the next LENGTH
+ DATA pair there. Then move on until seven subsequent strings are taken care
of. It would naively assume that the (unsigned 32 bit) LENGTH fields were
valid.
This packet arrives in the negotiating phase so the remote server has not yet
been deemed to be a known or trusted party.
A malicious attacker could man in the middle a real server and cause libssh2
using clients to crash (denial of service) or otherwise read and use
completely unintended memory areas in this process.
There are no known exploits of this flaw at this time.
INFO
----
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name
CVE-2015-1782 to this issue.
AFFECTED VERSIONS
-----------------
- Affected versions: all versions to and including 1.4.3
- Not affected versions: libssh2 >= 1.5.0
libssh2 is used by many applications, but not always advertised as such!
THE SOLUTION
------------
libssh2 1.5.0 makes sure that the LENGTH fields read from the packet fit
within the received packet size before attempting to read them, or it fails
graciously.
A patch for this problem is available at:
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2015-1782.patch
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------
We suggest you take one of the following actions immediately, in order of
preference:
A - Upgrade to libssh2 1.5.0
B - Apply the patch and rebuild libssh2
TIME LINE
---------
It was first reported to the libssh2 project on January 25 2015. We contacted
distros@openwall on March 6.
libssh2 1.5.0 was released on March 11th 2015, coordinated with the
publication of this advisory.
CREDITS
-------
Reported by Mariusz Ziulek. Patch written by Mariusz Ziulek and Daniel Stenberg,
Thanks a lot!