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Pick a licence for the specs #2
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My vote is for the WTFPL 🙌🏾. |
rustyrussell
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Nov 15, 2016
rustyrussell
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Nov 15, 2016
rustyrussell
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rustyrussell
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And remove a duplicate sentence. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I quite like CC-BY but I have no idea of the implications :-) |
Joseph Poon notifications@github.com writes:
CC-BY would be my default guess, but I'll ask People Who Know This Stuff Cheers, |
rustyrussell
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Nov 18, 2016
(Rebased by Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>)
rustyrussell
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(Rebased by Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>)
rustyrussell
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rustyrussell
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Nov 21, 2016
It's already in the next paragraph. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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Nov 22, 2016
rustyrussell
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Nov 22, 2016
Closes: #2 Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Merged
rustyrussell
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Jan 3, 2017
…A wrong. Suggested-by: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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Jan 5, 2017
…A wrong. Suggested-by: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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…A wrong. Suggested-by: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
andrewshvv
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in andrewshvv/lightning-rfc
Jul 2, 2017
My apology if I have missed the context of the conversation, but it seems for me that in order to update the sphinx onion packet version in the future we have to have onion packet size decoupled from the `update_add_htlc` message, so that we could make smooth transitions, by simultaneously maintaining several types of the onion packet.
Roasbeef
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Jul 24, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents. Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for Bitcoin within the glossary. This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
Roasbeef
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Jul 24, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents. Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for Bitcoin within the glossary. This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
rustyrussell
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Aug 8, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents. Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for Bitcoin within the glossary. This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
rustyrussell
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Aug 8, 2017
This commit modifies the glossary to add a new entry which defines the usage of `chain_hash` throughout the remainder of the documents. Additionally, we now also specify which chain hash we expect for Bitcoin within the glossary. This commit also modifies BOLT #2 and #7 to omit the definition of the expected `chain_hash` value for Bitcoin.
rustyrussell
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Oct 2, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of a channel to control the CTLV delta. But it's the receipient which is vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it. This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages. There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts" section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but that's not ready yet. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc
Oct 3, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of a channel to control the CTLV delta. But it's the receipient which is vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it. This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages. There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts" section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but that's not ready yet. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc
Oct 3, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of a channel to control the CTLV delta. But it's the receipient which is vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it. This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages. There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts" section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but that's not ready yet. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc
Oct 3, 2017
There's a mistake in the spec, where we were using the outgoing side of a channel to control the CTLV delta. But it's the receipient which is vulnerable if it's too low, so the recipient should set it. This exchanges values at channel open, and relies on the counterparty to advertize it correctly in its `channel_update` messages. There's another patch which changes the "Risks With HTLC Timeouts" section to cover the setting of cltv_expiry_delta in detail, but that's not ready yet. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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Jan 30, 2018
I got an unexpected update_fee message after `shutdown` exchange, which is currently legal: A: shutdown (no htlcs) B: receive shutdown B: reply with shutdown & closing_signed A: send update_fee & commitment_signed A: receive shutdown Simplest to ban any updates (currently, just update_fee) from adding a new commitment tx while we're at the end of shutdown. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc
Feb 5, 2018
I got an unexpected update_fee message after `shutdown` exchange, which is currently legal: A: shutdown (no htlcs) B: receive shutdown B: reply with shutdown & closing_signed A: send update_fee & commitment_signed A: receive shutdown Simplest to ban any updates (currently, just update_fee) from adding a new commitment tx while we're at the end of shutdown. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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I got an unexpected update_fee message after `shutdown` exchange, which is currently legal: A: shutdown (no htlcs) B: receive shutdown B: reply with shutdown & closing_signed A: send update_fee & commitment_signed A: receive shutdown Simplest to ban any updates (currently, just update_fee) from adding a new commitment tx while we're at the end of shutdown. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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in rustyrussell/lightning-rfc
Oct 21, 2018
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really matters. I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up! Closes: lightning#448 Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
fjahr
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Dec 20, 2018
fjahr
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Dec 20, 2018
fjahr
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Dec 20, 2018
fjahr
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Dec 20, 2018
fjahr
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Jan 1, 2019
fjahr
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Jan 5, 2019
cdecker
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Jan 22, 2019
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really matters. I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up! Closes: lightning#448 Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
cdecker
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Jan 22, 2019
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really matters. I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up! Closes: #448 Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Crypt-iQ
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Sep 20, 2022
This is especially useful for protocols such as splicing; for simplified commitment transactions, there is already an implied initiator at each point, so having the negotiation at splicing time would be redundant. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
ProofOfKeags
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Apr 10, 2024
This is especially useful for protocols such as splicing; for simplified commitment transactions, there is already an implied initiator at each point, so having the negotiation at splicing time would be redundant. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
rustyrussell
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Jun 17, 2024
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Header from folded patch 'bolt_2__set_an_initiator_in_quiescence.patch': BOLT #2: Set an initiator in quiescence. This is especially useful for protocols such as splicing; for simplified commitment transactions, there is already an implied initiator at each point, so having the negotiation at splicing time would be redundant. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Header from folded patch 'option_quiesce__feature_to_support_stfu_method.patch': option_quiesce: feature to support stfu method. In practice, sftu is useless unless you have something (e.g. channel_upgrade) which uses it, but adding a feature is best practice IMHO. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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CC-BY?
GNU FDL?
WTFPL?
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