The audit makes no statements or warranties about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, investment advice, endorsement of the platform or its products, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bug free status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only. The information presented in this report is confidential and privileged. If you are reading this report, you agree to keep it confidential, not to copy, disclose or disseminate without the agreement of Customer. If you are not the intended recipient(s) of this document, please note that any disclosure, copying or dissemination of its content is strictly forbidden.
A group of auditors are involved in the work on the audit. The security engineers check the provided source code independently of each other in accordance with the methodology described below:
- Project documentation review.
- General code review.
- Reverse research and study of the project architecture on the source code alone.
- Build an independent view of the project's architecture.
- Identifying logical flaws.
- Manual code check for vulnerabilities listed on the Contractor's internal checklist. The Contractor's checklist is constantly updated based on the analysis of hacks, research, and audit of the cients' codes.
- Code check with the use of static analyzers (i.e Slither, Mythril, etc).
Eliminate typical vulnerabilities (e.g. reentrancy, gas limit, flash loan attacks etc.).
- Detailed study of the project documentation.
- Examination of contracts tests.
- Examination of comments in code.
- Comparison of the desired model obtained during the study with the reversed view obtained during the blind audit.
- Exploits PoC development with the use of such programs as Brownie and Hardhat.
Detect inconsistencies with the desired model.
- Cross check: each auditor reviews the reports of the others.
- Discussion of the issues found by the auditors.
- Issuance of an interim audit report.
- Double-check all the found issues to make sure they are relevant and the determined threat level is correct.
- Provide the Customer with an interim report.
- The Customer either fixes the issues or provides comments on the issues found by the auditors. Feedback from the Customer must be received on every issue/bug so that the Contractor can assign them a status (either "fixed" or "acknowledged").
- Upon completion of the bug fixing, the auditors double-check each fix and assign it a specific status, providing a proof link to the fix.
- A re-audited report is issued.
- Verify the fixed code version with all the recommendations and its statuses.
- Provide the Customer with a re-audited report.
- The Customer deploys the re-audited source code on the mainnet.
- The Contractor verifies the deployed code with the re-audited version and checks them for compliance.
- If the versions of the code match, the Contractor issues a public audit report.
- Verify the fixed code version with all the recommendations and its statuses.
- Provide the Customer with a re-audited report.
All vulnerabilities discovered during the audit are classified based on their potential severity and have the following classification:
| Severity | Description |
|---|---|
| Critical | Bugs leading to assets theft, fund access locking, or any other loss funds to be transferred to any party. |
| High | Bugs that can trigger a contract failure. Further recovery is possible only by manual modification of the contract state or replacement. |
| Medium | Bugs that can break the intended contract logic or expose it to DoS attacks, but do not cause direct loss funds. |
| Low | Other non-essential issues and recommendations reported to/ acknowledged by the team. |
Based on the feedback received from the Customer regarding the list of findings discovered by the Contractor, they are assigned the following statuses:
| Status | Description |
|---|---|
| Fixed | Recommended fixes have been made to the project code and no longer affect its security. |
| Acknowledged | The Customer is aware of the finding. Recommendations for the finding are planned to be resolved in the future. |
1Inch is a DeFi aggregator and a decentralized exchange with smart routing. The core protocol connects a large number of decentralized and centralized platforms in order to minimize price slippage and find the optimal trade for the users.
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Client | 1Inch |
| Project name | Aggregation Router V5 |
| Timeline | 18-07-2022 - 27-09-2022 |
| Number of Auditors | 4 |
| Date | Commit Hash | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 18-07-2022 | 8aa5ec4b4871b1d63bb045ddb78aaf7c5dc84dfa | Initial commit |
| 26-07-2022 | 5e682c5227d9428b395041c93db0fb657b741afc | Final commit |
| 22-09-2022 | bc00c75f2c99d62e1a206aa2f81c408caba4b370 | Pre-release commit |
| Date | Commit Hash | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 18-07-2022 | d8437885744543e3f057e84e1b0a05c4c211c553 | Initial commit |
| 26-07-2022 | fdc93648cb665a3bfac469584fd6e1d1d8f07d05 | Final commit |
| 21-09-2022 | 171c5d7bbb280d9f754404828051f2a47fb726df | Pre-release commit |
| Date | Commit Hash | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 18-07-2022 | eec6b523860af5215a8dd196fe3aff3a4d252fc9 | Initial commit |
| 26-07-2022 | 71d6fe457cc420eeba55f612e902e66920faa64c | Final commit |
| 20-09-2022 | c35dc32fd91ee01f961df13ab7c30faf40be8b89 | Pre-release commit |
The audit covered the following files:
| Severity | # of Findings |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 0 |
| HIGH | 0 |
| MEDIUM | 0 |
| LOW | 4 |
During the audit process, 4 low severity issues have been found and fixed by the Client.
| File name | Contract deployed on mainnet |
|---|---|
| AggregationRouterV5 | 0x1111111254EEB25477B68fb85Ed929f73A960582 |
Not found
Not found
Not found
Fixed in https://github.com/1inch/limit-order-protocol/commit/340fff3d6f31780a0f6cb70999df3b6113c99d5d.
The OrderMixin contract inherits the NonceManager contract, and the PredicateHelper contract inherits the NonceManager contract. You can remove the NonceManager contract from the OrderMixin inheritance chain because the OrderMixin contract inherits PredicateHelper and does not use the NonceManager contract code.
We recommend removing the NonceManager contract from inheritance for the OrderMixin contract.
Fixed in https://github.com/1inch/limit-order-protocol/commit/afdd139490049c8da2d08ed6c4ceab4805774b3f, https://github.com/1inch/solidity-utils/commit/2d8931d48372feb02c99cc9cef2bbe32f1c35aec.
Some texts have spelling mistakes:
SYBMOL->SYMBOL(bad input param) https://github.com/1inch/solidity-utils/blob/eec6b523860af5215a8dd196fe3aff3a4d252fc9/contracts/libraries/UniERC20.sol#L62signuture->signaturehttps://github.com/1inch/limit-order-protocol/blob/d8437885744543e3f057e84e1b0a05c4c211c553/contracts/OrderRFQMixin.sol#L98
We recommend correcting them.
Fixed in https://github.com/1inch/1inch-contract/commit/5e682c5227d9428b395041c93db0fb657b741afc.
Some parameters have no null checks: https://github.com/1inch/1inch-contract/blob/8aa5ec4b4871b1d63bb045ddb78aaf7c5dc84dfa/contracts/AggregationRouterV5.sol#L22
We recommend adding a null check for clipperExchange.
Fixed in https://github.com/1inch/solidity-utils/commit/c3b0619418e0341d7a770e81560079af81c5302f.
Reduce gas cost for some functions: https://github.com/1inch/solidity-utils/blob/eec6b523860af5215a8dd196fe3aff3a4d252fc9/contracts/libraries/UniERC20.sol#L99
We recommend adding unchecked block for len++.
The project contains smart contracts that require active monitoring. For these purposes, it is recommended to proceed with developing new monitoring events based on Forta (https://forta.org) with which you can track the following exemplary incidents:
- Anomalies of AggregationRouter's components;
- Call
destroy()and other privileged methods; - Unexpected addresses in routers.
MixBytes is a team of blockchain developers, auditors and analysts keen on decentralized systems. We build opensource solutions, smart contracts and blockchain protocols, perform security audits, work on benchmarking and software testing solutions, do research and tech consultancy.