index.xml

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/</link><description>Recent content on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://ooni.github.io/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Launch: Next generation OONI Run for community-driven censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/</guid><description>Image: OONI Run.
Today we are thrilled to announce the launch of OONI Run v2: the next generation version of OONI Run for community-driven censorship testing.
Originally launched in September 2017, OONI Run is a platform for creating mobile deep links that you can share with OONI Probe users to coordinate the testing of websites for censorship. Over the past 7 years, OONI Run has been used extensively by community members in Venezuela, Malaysia, India, and around the world as part of their censorship measurement campaigns aimed at monitoring and rapidly responding to emergent censorship events.</description></item><item><title>Animation: OONI Partner Gathering 2024</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-animation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-animation/</guid><description>Earlier this year, we had the opportunity to host the OONI Partner Gathering 2024: a two-day event in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where we brought our partners from Asia and the Middle East together to exchange skills and knowledge on internet censorship research. Our goal was to strengthen global and regional collaborations on censorship measurement research and advocacy. We previously published a report which shares details about the event and its outcomes.</description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Backend Developer</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-job-opening-ooni-backend-developer/</link><pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-job-opening-ooni-backend-developer/</guid><description>Are you a backend developer interested in defending human rights on the internet? We have a job opening for you!
The OONI team (a non-profit measuring internet censorship globally) is looking for a dedicated Backend Developer to work on our backend components and infrastructure, and to provide OONI data analysis support for our research efforts.
Job description By joining our team, you will work on OONI’s backend components, ensuring the stable and reliable performance of our infrastructure in response to the growing global coverage of measurements.</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Chido Musodza</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-chido-musodza/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-chido-musodza/</guid><description>Today we are excited to publish an interview with Chido Musodza, Program Associate, Community Engagement at Localization Lab. Chido is passionate about supporting minority language communities through the localization of open-source technology. Localization, on the one hand, makes tech products more inclusive and on the other hand, empowers the development of minority languages and their presence in digital space.
Watch Chido’s interview to learn more about the need for localization and community engagement!</description></item><item><title>Russia blocked OONI Explorer, a large open dataset on Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</guid><description>As of 11th September 2024, Russia has blocked one of our platforms: OONI Explorer.
OONI Explorer is one of the largest open datasets on internet censorship around the world. We first launched this web platform back in 2016 with the goal of enabling researchers, journalists, and human rights defenders to investigate internet censorship based on empirical network measurement data that is contributed by OONI Probe users worldwide. Every day, we publish new measurements from around the world in real-time.</description></item><item><title>Kazakhstan: TLS MITM attacks and blocking of news media, human rights, and circumvention tool sites</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</guid><description>In recent years, internet censorship in Kazakhstan has been reported quite extensively. As part of this study, OONI, Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ), and Eurasian Digital Foundation collaborated to investigate internet censorship in Kazakhstan over the past year (between June 2023 to June 2024) through the analysis of empirical network measurement data.
In this report, we share OONI censorship measurement findings and relevant legal context. We found numerous news media, human rights, and circumvention tool websites blocked in Kazakhstan by means of TLS interference.</description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Gathering 2024 in Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/</guid><description>Background: OONI partners and previous events About the OONI Partner Gathering 2024 Objectives Why Malaysia? Sessions Day 1 – 8th May 2024 Day 2 – 9th May 2024 Unconference style sessions Inclusiveness Partner feedback Challenges Needs Outcomes Acknowledgements We are excited to share that on 8th and 9th May 2024, we hosted an in-person OONI Partner Gathering in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. As part of this 2-day event, we brought our partners (primarily from Asia and the Middle East) together to exchange skills and knowledge and strengthen our collaborations on internet censorship research and advocacy.</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Tawanda Mugari</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-tawanda-mugari/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-tawanda-mugari/</guid><description>Today we are excited to publish an interview with Tawanda Mugari, Co-Founder &amp;amp; Geek in Chief of Digital Society of Africa (DSA). Through our partnership with DSA, we have had the opportunity to collaborate on research and training activities across southern Africa. Tawanda is a digital security expert, community leader and trainer who has been part of the OONI community for years. Watch Tawanda’s interview to learn more about his important work!</description></item><item><title>Tanzania: Surge in online LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</guid><description>This report documents the blocking of LGBTIQ websites and other targeted blocks in Tanzania based on the analysis of OONI data.
Key Findings Introduction Methods Acknowledgement of limitations Findings Blocking of LGBTIQ websites LGBTIQ social networks LGBTIQ rights LGBTIQ news and culture LGBTIQ suicide prevention Blocking of websites that support human rights Blocking of online dating websites Blocking of Clubhouse and 4chan Blocking of ProtonVPN Conclusion Acknowledgements Key Findings Our analysis of OONI data collected from Tanzania over the last year (between 1st January 2023 to 31st January 2024) reveals the extensive blocking of LGBTIQ sites, which correlates with the escalating discrimination and crackdown on LGBTIQ communities in Tanzania in recent years.</description></item><item><title>Internet sanctions on Russian media: diverging actions and mixed effects</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-eu-sanctions/</link><pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-eu-sanctions/</guid><description>The original post appeared on the blog of SIDN Labs.
As a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on organisations affiliated with the Russian Federation prohibiting them from broadcasting content in the EU, including online distribution. In a collaborative effort with researchers from the University of Illinois Chicago, Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), the University of Twente and the University of Amsterdam, we carried out a longitudinal traffic analysis to understand how internet service providers (ISPs) in different EU member states implement these sanctions.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2023</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-year-in-review/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-year-in-review/</guid><description>As the end of 2023 approaches, we publish this post to share some OONI highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be working on in 2024!
New OONI non-profit legal entity New OONI Project Manager New OONI measurement tools Launched OONI Probe Web Launched News Media Scan app with Deutsche Welle (DW) Building OONI Run v2 New OONI Explorer features Censorship Findings: 22 reports Domain-centric pages Network-centric pages User feedback reporting mechanism Charts on internet outages Research OONI research reports OONI reports for ISOC Pulse shutdown timeline Community New partnerships New OONI Outreach Kit New OONI screencasts and documentation Localization OONI Explorer OONI Run OONI Probe OONI documentation New OONI Community Interviews OONI workshops and presentations OONI-verse 2024 New OONI non-profit legal entity OONI is now a registered NGO in Italy!</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Ihueze Nwobilor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-ihueze-nwobilor/</link><pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-ihueze-nwobilor/</guid><description>Today we are thrilled to publish an interview with Ihueze Nwobilor: Senior Programs Officer with Paradigm Initiative. Through our partnership with Paradigm Initiative, we have had the opportunity to collaborate on several research reports examining internet censorship in Nigeria. Ihueze’s work is focused on digital inclusion and on making digital technologies accessible to the under-served communities in numerous African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Since the blocking of Twitter in Nigeria in 2021, Ihueze has become an active OONI Probe user and gained a unique experience of using OONI data in his advocacy and government engagement work.</description></item><item><title>Launch: New OONI Censorship Findings platform</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/</link><pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/</guid><description>Image: OONI Censorship Findings platform.
Today we are thrilled to announce the launch of the OONI Censorship Findings platform!
Internet censorship is frequently being reported around the world, but how can we verify such events with empirical evidence?
Our new platform provides short reports on internet censorship around the world based on OONI&amp;rsquo;s open data. With the launch of the platform, we are publishing 20 reports on internet censorship that emerged in 2023.</description></item><item><title>Measure all the Things! IMC Hackathon 2023</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/imc-hackathon-results-2023/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/imc-hackathon-results-2023/</guid><description>On 23rd October 2023, right before the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) 2023, we co-hosted an internet measurement hackathon in collaboration with the Internet Society (ISOC), M-Lab, Censored Planet and IODA.
In this post we would like to share some of the projects that were developed as part of the hackathon. It was great to see how much was accomplished in such a short period of time!
The day started with an introduction to the various datasets from OONI&amp;rsquo;s Arturo, Censored Planet&amp;rsquo;s Armin, IODA&amp;rsquo;s Zach, ISOC&amp;rsquo;s Amreesh and M-Lab&amp;rsquo;s Lai Yi.</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Siti Nurliza</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-siti-nurliza/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-siti-nurliza/</guid><description>Today we are thrilled to publish an interview with Siti Nurliza: a talented data analyst and technologist with Sinar Project, one of our most dedicated and long-term partners who have led OONI censorship measurement efforts in Southeast Asia for more than 6 years!
Sinar Project is a civic tech initiative using open technology, open data and policy analysis to systematically make important information public and more accessible to the Malaysian people.</description></item><item><title>Grindr blocked in Jordan: Shrinking LGBTQ spaces</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/</guid><description>Jordan recently blocked access to Grindr — the world’s largest social networking app for gay, bi, trans, and queer people — adding to the list of social media apps banned in the country, including TikTok and Clubhouse.
OONI network measurement data collected from Jordan suggests that ISPs started blocking access to Grindr on August 8th 2023, and that the block remains ongoing.
This report shares OONI data on the blocking of Grindr in Jordan.</description></item><item><title>Join us at the IMC 2023 Hackathon on Network Interference using Open Data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-imc-hackathon/</link><pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-imc-hackathon/</guid><description>Are you attending the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) 2023?
Join us at the IMC Hackathon on Network Interference using Open Data on Monday, 23rd October 2023, in Montreal, Canada. The hackathon is organized by the Internet Society (ISOC), the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), M-Lab and Censored Planet.
IMC is a yearly academic conference focusing on Internet measurement and analysis. The conference is sponsored by ACM SIGCOMM.
This IMC Hackathon will be about exploring, analyzing, and visualizing open network measurement data with a focus on identifying Internet censorship and Internet shutdown events.</description></item><item><title>Senegal: Social media blocks and network outages amid political unrest</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-senegal-social-media-blocks/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-senegal-social-media-blocks/</guid><description>Violent protests erupted in Senegal on 1st June 2023 over the sentencing of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. On the same day, OONI data collected from Senegal showed that ISPs started blocking access to several instant messaging apps and social media platforms (which were also reported by several news outlets). Those blocks appear to have been in place for a week (until 7th June 2023). Meanwhile, Cloudflare observed three disruptions to traffic from AS37649 (Free/Tigo), and two disruptions at Sudatel Senegal during this period.</description></item><item><title>China is blocking OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/</guid><description>We usually report on how other services are blocked. This time, we’re reporting on how our own services are blocked.
China recently started blocking access to our website (ooni.org) and censorship measurement app (OONI Probe).
This is not too surprising, given the fact that our work and tools center around measuring and exposing internet censorship (in China and around the world), and China has one of the most advanced and pervasive levels of internet censorship in the world.</description></item><item><title>New OONI Explorer features for investigating internet censorship through open data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-new-explorer-features/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-new-explorer-features/</guid><description>We’re excited to share that OONI Explorer includes new features for investigating internet censorship worldwide based on open data.
Specifically, these features include:
New domain-centric pages; New network-centric pages; New “internet outage” charts (integrating IODA, Google traffic, and Cloudflare Radar data), available in each country-specific and network-specific page; New user feedback reporting mechanism, available through the “Verify” button in the banner of each OONI measurement page. In this blog post, we share information about these new features.</description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Project Manager</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-job-opening-ooni-project-manager/</link><pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-job-opening-ooni-project-manager/</guid><description>This job posting is now closed. Any applications received after 2023-06-28 will not be considered
Are you a project manager interested in defending human rights on the internet? We have a job opening for you!
The OONI team (a non-profit measuring internet censorship globally) is looking for a dedicated project manager to help us manage our software development work.
We will be reviewing applications on a rolling basis.
Job description By joining our team, you will help ensure that our software projects are on track, supporting a global community that relies on our tools for measuring and fighting internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>Brazil: OONI data on the blocking of Telegram</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-brazil-telegram/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-brazil-telegram/</guid><description>Encontre a versão em português do relatório localizada pela Coding Rights aqui: https://codingrights.org/library-item/brasil-dados-da-ooni-sobre-o-bloqueio-do-telegram/
Two days ago, on 26th April 2023, Brazil started blocking access to Telegram.
On the same day, a federal judge in Brazil reportedly ordered the temporary suspension of Telegram in response to the messaging service’s alleged failure to share all information on neo-Nazi chat groups requested by the police. This information was reportedly requested as part of a school attacks inquiry, as Brazilian authorities investigate neo-Nazi groups that are believed to have used Telegram to incite school attacks.</description></item><item><title>Throttling of news media amid Kazakhstan’s 2022 presidential election</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-throttling-kz-elections/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-throttling-kz-elections/</guid><description>Snap presidential elections were held in Kazakhstan in November 2022, following a wave of unrest that started in January 2022. Following the victory of incumbent president Tokayev, early legislative elections were held in March 2023.
Through the analysis of OONI data, we observe the throttling of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Kazakhstan&amp;rsquo;s service websites in Kazakh and Russian (www.azattyq.org and rus.azattyq.org) in Kazakhstan, starting from 27th September 2022 and lasting until at least 11th April 2023.</description></item><item><title>Introducing OONI Probe Web</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/</guid><description>Today, we are excited to announce the launch of OONI Probe Web: a new browser-based tool for measuring the blocking of websites.
We built OONI Probe Web in response to long-term community feedback, requesting a censorship measurement tool that can be run from a browser, without requiring the installation of any software. Our goal is to support rapid response efforts to emergent censorship events.
However, please note that OONI Probe Web is experimental, and what can be measured from a browser is very limited in comparison to what can be measured from an app.</description></item><item><title>How we're improving OONI data quality: An analysis of failed measurements</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/</link><pubDate>Mon, 13 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/</guid><description>In this blog post, we manually analyse failed OONI measurements to assess why they were classified as such, whether they are symptomatic of censorship, and whether they still carry helpful information for researchers. We focus on measurements from three countries (India, Pakistan, and Indonesia) and outline steps on how we will improve overall data quality.
Background
Methodology
Results
Pakistan
India
Indonesia
Overall
Limitations
Conclusions and Future Work
Background Web Connectivity is a network test that determines whether a web resource is accessible from the network where the user runs OONI Probe.</description></item><item><title>OONI measurements show ongoing internet censorship in Azerbaijan</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-azerbaijan-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-azerbaijan-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Azerbaijan is known to block access to independent news media websites – we previously reported on this in July 2021. At the time, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021 and found that ISPs in Azerbaijan were blocking access to several independent news media and circumvention tool sites. We also found that amid the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, ISPs in Azerbaijan temporarily blocked access to social media services, and attempted to block access to Tor and Psiphon.</description></item><item><title>How Internet censorship changed in Russia during the 1st year of military conflict in Ukraine</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/</guid><description>As of today, last year, Russia started its military operation in Ukraine. This was followed by increased levels of internet censorship, as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia started blocking access to several news media websites. In early March 2022, OONI published a report documenting these blocks, as well as the blocking of a site (200rf.com) that shares information about captured and killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine. OONI also reported that Russian ISPs started throttling access to Twitter on 26th February 2022, and switched to blocking it by 4th March 2022 – at which point, they also started blocking access to Facebook.</description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Ongoing blocking of social media</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/</guid><description>On 9th February 2023, amid church split tensions and calls for anti-government protests, access to social media platforms (TikTok, Facebook, Telegram) was reportedly blocked in Ethiopia. Access Now also published a statement urging authorities in Ethiopia to stop blocking access to social media.
OONI data collected from Ethiopia provides signals of these blocks. Specifically, OONI data shows the ongoing blocking of Facebook and Telegram (since 9th February 2023) and YouTube (since 10th February 2023).</description></item><item><title>Pakistan: Blocking of Wikipedia and Deutsche Welle (DW)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/</guid><description>Over the past weeks, access to Wikipedia and Deutsche Welle’s (DW) website was reportedly blocked in Pakistan.
As part of this report, we share OONI data from Pakistan that provides signals of these blocks. Specifically, OONI data shows that access to Wikipedia was temporarily restricted between 1st to 6th February 2023, while access to Deutsche Welle (DW) remains blocked since (at least) 16th January 2023.
Blocking of Deutsche Welle
Blocking of Wikipedia</description></item><item><title>Turkey: Throttling and DNS blocking of Twitter following deadly earthquake</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-turkey-throttling-blocking-twitter/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-turkey-throttling-blocking-twitter/</guid><description>On 6th February 2023, a devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake (followed by many strong aftershocks) struck (southern and central) Turkey and (northern and western) Syria, resulting in more than 36,000 deaths.
In the aftermath of the earthquake (on 8th February 2023), access to Twitter was reportedly temporarily restricted. OONI data collected from Turkey provides evidence that the block was implemented through targeted throttling and DNS interference.
The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of Twitter (twitter.</description></item><item><title>iMAP 2022: New Research Reports on Internet Censorship in 8 Asian countries</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-imap-8-research-reports-southeast-asia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-imap-8-research-reports-southeast-asia/</guid><description>On 21st December 2022, our long-term partner, Sinar Project, published 8 new research reports on internet censorship in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in collaboration with their Internet Monitoring and Action Project (iMAP) partners. We are particularly excited about these reports as they make use of OONI data!
Internet Monitoring Action Project (iMAP) aims to establish regional and in-country networks that monitor network interference and restrictions to the freedom of expression online in 8 countries: Myanmar, Cambodia, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Cambodia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-cambodia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-cambodia/</guid><description>បកប្រែជាភាសាខ្មែរ
News and other websites are periodically blocked in Cambodia, particularly those that disseminate information that could be perceived as a threat to the ruling government.1 In July 2018, the government ordered internet service providers (ISPs) to block at least 15 news websites during the country’s election.2 In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has reportedly blocked access to news sites.3 In June 2020, the Ministry of Post telecommunications (MPTC) blocked six online gambling sites.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Hong Kong</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-hong-kong/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-hong-kong/</guid><description>Hong Kong, a place geographically conjunct to the soil of Mainland China, has been previously known as a free society, endured and still enduring multiple historical occasions. Once, there was no nationwide internet censorship until the latest development that local authorities and Beijing forcefully implemented the Hong Kong national security law in late June 2020. Currently, at least four websites are known to be censored, and a few ongoing discussions among pro-Beijing parties and the government to put censorship up on instant messaging and social platforms.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Indonesia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-indonesia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-indonesia/</guid><description>In July 2014, Regulation of the Minister of Communications and Informatics Number 19 of 2014 on the Handling of Negative Internet Sites came into force as part of the regulator&amp;rsquo;s programme for Healthy and Safe Internet (INSAN or Internet Sehat dan Aman). The law mandated ISPs to block any internet content that is deemed to carry &amp;ldquo;negative&amp;rdquo; elements such as pornography, hoaxes, or SARA conflicts.
As of September 2022, the Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication (Kominfo) has blocked over 1,000,000 websites through TrustPositif,1 a filtering application that has been operational since 2010 per Ministerial Regulation No 19 of 2014.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-malaysia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-malaysia/</guid><description>It is a codified guarantee that the internet will not be censored except for illegal, obscene and indecent content, while in reality the extent of censorship and its implementation are wider than projected and remain to be explored.
Diterjemah ke dalam bahasa Melayu
The Ministry of Communications and Multimedia (MCMC) do not publish list of blocked sites, however statements were released from time to time to announce the number of sites blocked.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/</guid><description>မြန်မာဘာသာသို့ ပြန်ဆိုပါသည်။
Blocking of independent New Media. 112 out of 2,130 websites were detected 1,473 confirmed blocking counts through 6 local vantages under DNS level interference and HTTP level interference. There were 11 out of 31 websites’ categories from OONI were found as confirmed blocking. Among 11 categories, News Media was experiential as the highest confirmed blocking measurement, following to pornography to the second largest blocking counts. Interestingly, within 117 government websites, OONI detects 15 websites were blocked from 2 vantage points of 2 ISPs.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Philippines</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-philippines/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-philippines/</guid><description>In recent years, and with the COVID-19 pandemic increasing people’s reliance on digital technologies and with it the role of ICT regulators, agencies such as the NTC have come under fire for the “politicization” of the country’s telecommunications sector.1 This was most apparent under the administration of former president Rodrigo Duterte, whose six-year presidency was marred by the systematic undermining of democratic institutions and countless attacks against critical media and activists.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Thailand</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-thailand/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-thailand/</guid><description>Thailand, a country situated on the mainland of Southeast Asia, was under military junta for five years from 2014 to 2019. Upon the general election in 2019, the country has been nominally a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, although with lèse-majesté laws continuing to be invoked especially with regard to internet censorship. Adding the COVID-19 pandemic into the picture, the Thai government introduced Regulation 29 to curb fake news, which led to reported incidences of internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Vietnam</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-vietnam/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-vietnam/</guid><description>Swedish Ambassador to Vietnam Pereric Högberg affirmed that Vietnam is making good use of opportunities from the internet, being one of the leading countries in Southeast Asia in terms of internet connection and development1. Vietnam is not limited to using the Internet and social networks2. However, there are still websites with controlled access in Vietnam.
Dịch sang tiếng Việt
Under the authoritarian political system, freedom of assembly, association, expression, press and religion, as well as civil society activism, is tightly restricted and controlled by the party despite legislation recognising civil and political rights in the Constitution.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2022</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/</guid><description>As the end of 2022 approaches, we publish this post to share some OONI highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be working on in 2023!
OONI Team
OONI Probe
New OONI Probe experiments
New Test Lists Editor
OONI Run improvements
OONI Probe Web prototype
OONI data
1 billion measurements
New OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)
New Circumvention Tool Reachability Dashboard
Advancing OONI data analysis</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Video</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-video/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-video/</guid><description>We are happy to celebrate OONI&amp;rsquo;s 10th anniversary together with our amazing community, who have been at the heart of our work over the past decade.
Today, we are excited to share a new video with OONI community members, where they discuss how OONI has been useful to their work, while sharing what they would like to see OONI do in the future.
Featured community members and partners Andrés Azpúrua, Venezuela Inteligente Andrés is the co-founder and Director of Venezuela Inteligente, a non-profit organization that aims to facilitate information, communication and collaboration between citizens and civil society organizations to create impact from a non-partisan perspective.</description></item><item><title>Highlights: 10 Years of OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/</link><pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/</guid><description>Today is OONI’s 10th anniversary!
As of today, 10 years ago, the first OONI measurement was published. Today, 10 years later, more than a billion OONI measurements have been published, shedding light on internet censorship worldwide.
In this post, we share some OONI highlights from the past 10 years, as well as some of our future plans.
You can start off by getting a glimpse of “OONI in 10 years” through the following animation, which shares some highlights from the past decade.</description></item><item><title>Technical multi-stakeholder report on Internet shutdowns: The case of Iran amid autumn 2022 protests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/</guid><description>Coordinators: OONI, ISOC Contributors: OONI, IODA, Measurement Lab (M-Lab), Cloudflare, Kentik, Censored Planet, ISOC, Article19 Facilitators: European Commission, United States Download in PDF This report shares empirical technical findings on the recent Internet shutdown events that emerged in Iran following the death of Jhina (Mahsa) Amini in September 2022. The report is intended to be the first among a series of multi-stakeholder reports aimed at shedding light on what is becoming a widespread and increasingly sophisticated practice of certain governments around the world.</description></item><item><title>Join the 10th Ooniversary Events!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/</link><pubDate>Thu, 24 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/</guid><description>Subscribe on YouTube You’re invited to join us for the celebration of OONI’s 10th anniversary!
To share OONI highlights from the last 10 years, as well as how community members have used OONI tools and data as part of their work, we’ll be hosting 2 live-streamed events:
OONI Highlights:
Date and time: 5th December 2022 at 14:00 UTC (1 hour event)
Location: Live-streamed on OONI YouTube channel
OONI Community:</description></item><item><title>Survey: Help shape OONI’s strategic priorities</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-survey-ooni-strategic-priorities/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-survey-ooni-strategic-priorities/</guid><description>OONI will celebrate its 10th anniversary on 5th December 2022!
This is a time for celebration, but also a time for reflection: What worked well? What should we improve? What should we do differently going forward?
The OONI community has been at the heart of our work over the past decade, and so we invite our community to help shape OONI’s strategic priorities for the future.
Please take a few minutes to complete our survey: https://ooni.</description></item><item><title>New online OONI training course launched by Advocacy Assembly</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/</guid><description>We are excited to share that a free, online OONI training course (“Measuring Internet Censorship with OONI tools”) has been launched today on Small Media’s Advocacy Assembly platform!
Through this course, you will learn how to measure internet censorship through the use of OONI tools. You will also learn how to access and interpret real-time OONI data on internet censorship around the world.
Today, the course is available in English, Arabic, Spanish, and Farsi.</description></item><item><title>Iran blocks social media, app stores and encrypted DNS amid Mahsa Amini protests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/</link><pubDate>Sun, 25 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/</guid><description>Protests erupted in Iran over the last week following the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who was reportedly beaten to death by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating strict hijab rules. Amid the ongoing protests, which have reportedly resulted in at least 31 civilian deaths, Iranian authorities cracked down on the internet in an attempt to curb dissent.
Over the past week, Iran experienced severe mobile network outages, in addition to increased levels of internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>Azerbaijan and Armenia block TikTok amid border clashes</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/</guid><description>Earlier this week, on 12th September 2022, fighting erupted between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops along their border. Over the next few days, community members in Azerbaijan reported that the TikTok app was blocked locally.
We analyzed OONI network measurement data to investigate the block. We found that TikTok has been blocked in both Azerbaijan and Armenia over the last few days.
In this report, we share our technical findings. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, we found TLS and DNS level interference of TikTok domains and endpoints during the border clashes.</description></item><item><title>New Test Lists Editor: Contribute websites for censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-test-lists-editor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-test-lists-editor/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is excited to announce the public launch of our new Test Lists Editor!
This platform enables the public to review and contribute to the lists of websites (“test lists”) that are tested for censorship by OONI Probe users around the world.
Help the internet freedom community discover website blocks around the world by contributing through the new Test Lists Editor!</description></item><item><title>Measuring DoT/DoH Blocking Using OONI Probe: A Preliminary Study</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-doh-dot-paper-dnsprivacy21/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-doh-dot-paper-dnsprivacy21/</guid><description>When you enter a URL such as https://example.com/, under the hood, your web browser resolves the example.com domain to one or more IP addresses using the Domain Name System (DNS), a set of federated servers and protocols providing this name-to-IP-address mapping. For example, as of 2022-06-16, example.com resolves to the 93.184.216.34 (IPv4) and 2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946 (IPv6) addresses. Once it knows the IP addresses for the domain, the browser then uses them to fetch the requested webpage.</description></item><item><title>A Quick Look at QUIC Censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-quick-look-quic-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-quick-look-quic-censorship/</guid><description>This blog post was originally published by the Open Technology Fund to disseminate Kathrin Elmenhorst&amp;rsquo;s QUIC-and-HTTP/3 censorship research as part of her ICFP fellowship with OONI.
Last year, the new network protocol QUIC was introduced. QUIC is a general-purpose transport layer network with the goal of reducing latency compared to existing protocols. Since the introduction of QUIC, we have seen rising volumes of QUIC-based web traffic in the form of HTTP/3.</description></item><item><title>OONI’s submission for the OHCHR report on internet shutdowns and human rights</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-submission-ohchr-report-internet-shutdowns/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-submission-ohchr-report-internet-shutdowns/</guid><description>Currently, the 50th session of the UN Human Rights Council is taking place.
In response to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’s call for submissions in support of the OHCHR report on internet shutdowns and human rights to the 50th session of the Human Rights Council in June 2022, the OONI team provided a submission with relevant information on the occurrence of mandated disruptions of access to social media and messaging platforms over the past 5 years based on empirical OONI network measurement data.</description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Community Coordinator</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-job-opening-ooni-community-coordinator/</link><pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-job-opening-ooni-community-coordinator/</guid><description>Are you passionate about defending human rights on the internet? Are you extremely organized and enjoy supporting communities around the world? We have a job opening for you!
The OONI team (a non-profit fighting internet censorship) is looking for a dedicated community coordinator to help grow and support the OONI community around the world.
The application deadline is Sunday, 12th June 2022.
Job description By joining our team, you will support our partners and global community of human rights defenders to measure and fight internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>New Launch: OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is thrilled to announce the public launch of the OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)!
The MAT is a tool that enables you to create your own custom charts based on aggregate views of real-time OONI data collected from around the world.
Use the MAT to track internet censorship worldwide based on real-time OONI data!
About the MAT
What is OONI data?</description></item><item><title>New blocks emerge in Russia amid war in Ukraine: An OONI network measurement analysis</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/</guid><description>Download in PDF Information controls are known to occur during conflicts, and that’s exactly what we’re seeing in Russia following the recent invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022.
In recent days, OONI network measurement data collected from Russia shows that many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have started blocking access to several news media websites, as well as to a website (200rf.com) that shares information about captured and killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine.</description></item><item><title>Measuring HTTP/3 censorship with OONI Probe</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-http3-measurements-paper/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-http3-measurements-paper/</guid><description>Last year, QUIC emerged as a new internet protocol for creating reliable connections and encrypting communications between clients over the new HTTP/3 protocol. Observing the emergence and growing deployment of HTTP/3, we want to enable OONI Probe to measure HTTP/3 censorship and monitor how censors respond and adapt to technical innovation.
We therefore added HTTP/3 support (in early 2021) into OONI Probe (through our urlgetter research tool) to conduct measurements in China, Iran, India and Kazakhstan to investigate the state of HTTP/3 censorship in these countries.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2021</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/</guid><description>In light of the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic, 2021 continued to be a challenging year for everyone.
Yet, several exciting things happened in the censorship measurement world. In this post, we share some OONI highlights from 2021, as well as some upcoming OONI projects for 2022!
OONI Probe
Automated OONI Probe testing
New Debian package for OONI Probe
New OONI Probe Command Line Interface for Linux and macOS
New OONI Probe Experimental card</description></item><item><title>iThena integration of OONI Probe boosts censorship measurement coverage worldwide</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/</guid><description>Over the last months, the iThena project integrated OONI Probe into their platform, resulting in a major spike in OONI censorship measurement coverage around the world.
In this blog post, we’re excited to introduce you to iThena and discuss how they helped support censorship measurement worldwide.
About iThena
OONI Probe integration into iThena
About iThena iThena, developed by the Cyber-Complex Foundation, is a distributed computation and measurement project based on the Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC) platform.</description></item><item><title>Russia started blocking Tor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/</guid><description>On 1st December 2021, some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia started blocking access to the Tor anonymity network.
In this report, we share OONI network measurement data on the blocking of the Tor network and www.torproject.org in Russia.
About Tor
Methods
Findings
Blocking of the Tor network
Blocking of the Tor Project website
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
About Tor If you want real privacy and anonymity on the internet, the answer is simple: use Tor.</description></item><item><title>[Event Report] India, Let's Build the List</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-event-india-test-list/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-event-india-test-list/</guid><description>This is a guest post by The Bachchao Project, originally published here.
The Bachchao Project in partnership with OONI hosted an online event on 9th and 10th October 2021 to update the Citizen Lab test list for India. The event, which was called “India, Lets build the list”, was organised to help strengthen community based monitoring of internet censorship in India. The event allowed experts from different fields to contribute to a curated list of websites that are relevant to India and which are regularly tested for censorship by volunteers in India.</description></item><item><title>Why Collaboration and Transparency is Key to Internet Measurement</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-internet-measurements-collaboration-transparency/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-internet-measurements-collaboration-transparency/</guid><description>This post was originally published on the Internet Society Pulse blog.
With Internet shutdowns, disruptions and censorship events on the increase around the world, tracking where such events are happening and gathering evidence to help in the fight against them is becoming more and more important.
Tracking these events is crucial because of the impact they have on society and the economy. When social media apps are blocked, for example, freedom of speech, access to information, and movement-building is hampered.</description></item><item><title>A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-multiperspective-view-internet-censorship-myanmar/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-multiperspective-view-internet-censorship-myanmar/</guid><description>In the wake of a military coup in February 2021, Myanmar experienced unprecedented levels of internet censorship.
In response, we collaborated with CAIDA’s Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) team and Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO) on publishing a research report which documents a series of nightly internet outages and the blocking of social media, Wikipedia, and circumvention tool sites in Myanmar following the military coup.
In the months that followed, we continued to examine internet censorship in Myanmar quite closely.</description></item><item><title>Investigating Internet shutdowns through Mozilla telemetry</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/</link><pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/</guid><description>More than 200 million users worldwide use the Firefox web browser (developed by Mozilla) every month.
If access to the Internet is shut down in a country, Mozilla should expect to see a dramatic drop in Firefox usage from that country. Given how widespread the use of Firefox is around the world, could Mozilla telemetry be a valuable resource for the Internet freedom community to investigate Internet shutdowns?
To explore this question, the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) teams joined forces to analyze a dataset of potential outage signals gathered through regular Mozilla telemetry, access to which was provided by Mozilla as part of a relevant research project to validate assumptions about the data.</description></item><item><title>How countries attempt to block Signal Private Messenger App around the world</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/</guid><description>Signal Private Messenger, commonly used by human rights defenders worldwide, is widely considered the state-of-the-art app for private and secure communications. But as its popularity surged recently, we have started to observe its blocking in several countries.
In this report, we share our analysis of OONI network measurement data on the blocking of the Signal Private Messenger app in Iran, China, Cuba, and Uzbekistan.
Currently, circumvention is enabled by default for Signal users in Iran, Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.</description></item><item><title>Job Opening: Mobile Developer for OONI Probe</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-job-opening-ooni-mobile-developer/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-job-opening-ooni-mobile-developer/</guid><description>Are you a mobile developer interested in defending human rights on the internet? We have a job opening for you!
The OONI team (a non-profit fighting internet censorship, originally born out of the Tor Project) is looking for a dedicated mobile developer to work on OONI Probe: a free software app designed to measure internet censorship and network performance.
The application deadline is Sunday, 31st October 2021.
Job description If you join our team, you will lead the development of the OONI Probe mobile app, supporting human rights defenders worldwide to investigate and fight internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>Italy blocks Gutenberg book publishing website</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/</guid><description>Cases of internet censorship (that affect public interest) are rarely reported in Europe. Yet, www.gutenberg.org, a book-publishing website run by a non-profit organization, has been blocked in Italy since May 2020.
In this report, we share OONI network measurement data on the ongoing blocking of www.gutenberg.org across networks in Italy.
Background
Methods
Findings
Blocking methods by ISP
Vodafone Italia (AS30722)
Fastweb (AS12874)
Wind (AS1267)
TIM (AS16232)
Telecom Italia (AS3269)</description></item><item><title>No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/</link><pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/</guid><description>Today, in collaboration with OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab, we are excited to share our new research report, “No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries”, which examines the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
READ FULL REPORT
Annotated Bibliography
Below we share some of our key research findings.
Summary of findings We joined forces with OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab to examine the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in six countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).</description></item><item><title>A brief introduction to OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/</guid><description>This is gentle introduction to OONI that does not require readers to have a technical background.
If you are familiar with how the Internet works and how it can be censored you can skip The basics.
For frequently asked questions and answers, please refer to the OONI FAQ.
The basics You might be connecting to the Internet from a local network or using an Internet Service Provider (ISP).
ISPs are usually not connected to each other.</description></item><item><title>Accessing OONI data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/mining-ooni-data/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/mining-ooni-data/</guid><description>This page has moved to: https://docs.ooni.org/data/</description></item><item><title>Zambia: Social media blocked amid 2021 general elections</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/</guid><description>Recently, on 12th August 2021, general elections were held in Zambia, during which access to popular online social media platforms was reportedly blocked.
In this report, we share relevant OONI data on the blocking of WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook amid Zambia’s 2021 general election.
Background
Methods
Findings
Blocking of WhatsApp
Blocking of Twitter and Facebook
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Background While Zambia hasn’t experienced pervasive forms of internet censorship (such as the blocking of popular social media apps) over the last years, various forms of censorship have been reported in the country.</description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Training 2021</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/</link><pubDate>Wed, 07 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-partner-training-2021/</guid><description>Over the last week, we had the pleasure to host two 3-day OONI Partner Training events for our partners in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. As part of these events, our goal was to share OONI-specific knowledge and skills, and to collect feedback to better serve community needs.
In this post, we share information about the training events.
About
Sessions
Session 1: Information Controls Around the World (Day 1)</description></item><item><title>Media censorship in Azerbaijan through the lens of network measurement</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-azerbaijan/</link><pubDate>Fri, 02 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-azerbaijan/</guid><description>Key Findings Introduction Methods OONI network measurement Acknowledgement of limitations Background Network landscape and internet penetration Legal environment Internet censorship and media freedom environment Findings Blocked news media websites Blocking of social media amid 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war Blocking of social media websites Blocking of instant messaging apps WhatsApp Telegram Blocked circumvention tool sites Tor and Psiphon Conclusion Acknowledgements Key Findings As part of our analysis of OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021, we found:</description></item><item><title>Making the OONI Probe Android app more resilient</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/</link><pubDate>Thu, 27 May 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/making-ooni-probe-android-more-resilient/</guid><description>We recently made OONI Probe Android more robust against accidental or deliberate blocking of our backend services. Specifically, we implemented support for specifying a proxy that speaks with OONI’s backend services. We also improved the build process to influence the TLS Client Hello fingerprint, which helps with avoiding accidental blocking.
Adding support for a proxy
Changing our Android TLS fingerprint
Future improvements
Adding support for a proxy Since late 2020, community members have been reporting specific OONI Probe Android failures.</description></item><item><title>Myanmar: Data on internet blocks and internet outages following military coup</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/</guid><description>On 1st February 2021, the military in Myanmar carried out a coup d’etat, seizing power and detaining the country’s State Counsellor (equivalent to a prime minister) and other democratically elected leaders.
A few days after the coup, ISPs in Myanmar started blocking access to Facebook services. On 5th February 2021, they started blocking access to Twitter and Instagram as well. On 6th February 2021, access to the internet was shut down entirely for nearly 30 hours.</description></item><item><title>Uganda: Data on internet blocks and nationwide internet outage amid 2021 general election</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/</guid><description>Last week, amid its 2021 general election, Uganda was disconnected from the internet entirely. The country experienced a widespread internet blackout that lasted 4 days, starting on the eve of the election (13th January 2021) and ending in the morning of 18th January 2021. In the days leading up to the election, access to major social media platforms and circumvention tools was blocked &amp;ndash; even when the OTT (Over the Top) tax (commonly referred to as the “Social Media Tax”) was paid.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2020</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2020/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Dec 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2020/</guid><description>In light of the global COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 has been a challenging year for everyone.
Yet, several exciting things happened in the censorship measurement world. In this post, we share some OONI highlights from 2020, as well as some upcoming OONI projects for 2021!
OONI Probe
New OONI Probe Desktop App for Windows and macOS
New OONI Probe measurement engine
OONI Run usability study
Measurement methodologies
New circumvention tool tests</description></item><item><title>Investigating Encrypted DNS Blocking in India</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-encrypted-dns-blocking-india/</link><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-encrypted-dns-blocking-india/</guid><description>In October 2020, we collaborated with Divyank Katira and Gurshabad Grover, researchers at the Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society, India, to implement and evaluate a new OONI experiment focused on detecting DNS censorship.
This new OONI experiment, called dnscheck, focuses on detecting the blocking of encrypted DNS transports such as DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS. Its methodology improves upon the measurement methodology OONI previously used to measure DoT blocking in Iran.</description></item><item><title>Tanzania blocks social media (and Tor?) on election day</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/</link><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/</guid><description>Starting from yesterday (27th October 2020) &amp;ndash; on the eve of Tanzania&amp;rsquo;s 2020 general election &amp;ndash; OONI measurements continue to show the ongoing blocking of social media (and of the Tor circumvention tool) in Tanzania.
In this report, we share OONI data collected from Tanzania on these blocks, as well as relevant instructions for further OONI Probe testing.
Methods
Blocking of social media
WhatsApp
Facebook Messenger
Telegram
Social media websites</description></item><item><title>OONI Probe ASN Incident Report</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-ooni-probe-asn-incident-report/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-ooni-probe-asn-incident-report/</guid><description>Last week we noticed that some OONI measurements were available on OONI Explorer under a report ID containing a valid Autonomous System Number (ASN), even though the raw JSON data contained zero as the ASN (i.e. encoded as AS0). We initially thought that this was caused by a bug in our API code, but it actually turned out to be an OONI Probe bug in our probe engine (which powers the OONI Probe apps).</description></item><item><title>Belarus protests: From internet outages to pervasive website censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/</guid><description>Image: Block page served in Belarus.
This report was prepared in collaboration with Human Constanta and the Digital Observers Community Belarus.
More than 70 websites have been blocked in Belarus over the last weeks, following a controversial presidential election and amid ongoing anti-government protests. Many of the blocked sites include news media and are related to the elections, while several other sites expressing political criticism were blocked as well. At the time of writing, many of these sites remain blocked in Belarus.</description></item><item><title>Internet Measurement Village 2020: Slides &amp; Video Recordings</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-imv-slides-recordings/</guid><description>Over the last month, between 10th June 2020 to 3rd July 2020, we organized and hosted the Internet Measurement Village (IMV) 2020, an online community event aimed at sharing skills, knowledge, and resources on internet measurement, in defense of a free and open internet.
As all the IMV sessions were live-streamed and will continue to live on the OONI YouTube channel, we hope that these recordings will serve as a valuable resource on internet measurement for the internet freedom community.</description></item><item><title>Support the OTF: Support a Free and Open Internet</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-support-otf/</link><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-support-otf/</guid><description>Over the last month, the Open Technology Fund (OTF) &amp;ndash; one of the main funders of free censorship circumvention and privacy-enhancing technologies that human rights defenders worldwide rely on &amp;ndash; has been under threat, following the ousting of its leadership.
We previously published a statement in support of the OTF, explaining why we think the OTF is essential for internet freedom and encouraging the public to sign the letter to congress.</description></item><item><title>Measurement observations on network performance during the COVID-19 pandemic in Northern Italy</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-network-performance-covid19-italy/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-network-performance-covid19-italy/</guid><description>We were recently invited to participate in a NetGain Partnership webinar (titled “Surging Demand and The Global Internet Infrastructure”) to discuss the changing landscape for internet infrastructure and technology in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
As part of our preparation for this webinar, we looked at network performance measurements collected from northern Italy over the last months (i.e. when Italy was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic) in an attempt to understand whether and to what extent there was a correlation between increased internet use and reduced network performance.</description></item><item><title>Investigating TLS blocking in India</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-tls-blocking-india/</link><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-tls-blocking-india/</guid><description>This report investigates Transport Layer Security (TLS)-based blocking in India. Previous research by the Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society, India (CIS) has already exposed TLS blocking based on the value of the SNI field. OONI has also implemented and started testing SNI-based TLS blocking measurements.
Recently, the Magma Project documented cases where CIS India and OONI&amp;rsquo;s methodologies could be improved. They specifically found that blocking sometimes appears to depend not only on the value of the SNI field but also on the address of the web server being used.</description></item><item><title>Azərbaycan: OONI Probe Test üçün çağırış</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-azerbaijan-ooni-probe-testing/</link><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-azerbaijan-ooni-probe-testing/</guid><description>This is a guest post by Arzu Geybullayeva (Azerbaijan Internet Watch), originally published here.
Azerbaijan Internet Watch Azərbaycanda internet senzurasını izləyir və bu çərçəvədə aşkar etdiyi pozuntuları öz səhifəsində sənədləşdirir. Bu barədə daha ətraflı məlumatı buradan əldə edə bilərsiniz.
Layihənin bir vacib cəhətlərindən biri də ölkədə bloklanan veb səhifələri izləmək ve bu bloklamaların necə baş verdiyini araşdırmaqdır. Bu barədə isə daha ətraflı buradan və buradan məlumat əldə edə bilərsiniz.</description></item><item><title>DNS over TLS blocked in Iran</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-iran-dot/</link><pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-iran-dot/</guid><description>DNS over TLS (DoT) is a network protocol that allows one to use DNS over TLS (i.e. with encryption and authentication of the remote DNS server).
We investigated whether DoT works in Iran by gathering a list of 31 well-known DoT endpoints and running experiments from four distinct Iranian mobile and fixed-line Internet Service Providers (ISPs): MCI, TCI, Irancell, and Shatel.
We discovered that:
57% of the endpoints are blocked on a least one ISP;</description></item><item><title>Save Internet Freedom: Support the Open Technology Fund</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-06-19-save-internet-freedom-support-the-open-technology-fund/</link><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:48:11 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-06-19-save-internet-freedom-support-the-open-technology-fund/</guid><description>Last Wednesday was dubbed as a “Wednesday night massacre”, following the firing of the directors of four organizations overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM): Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Middle East Broadcasting, and the Open Technology Fund (OTF).
Out of these four organizations, we would like to draw your attention to the OTF, not only because they have been a long-term funder of our project but, more importantly, because they have been essential in creating the internet freedom community as we know it.</description></item><item><title>Those Unspoken Thoughts: A study of censorship and media freedom in Manipur, India</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-those-unspoken-thoughts-otf-fellow-report/</guid><description>This research report was produced by OTF Information Controls Fellow, Chinmayi S K. OONI served as her host organization throughout her fellowship.
Read full report The northeastern Indian state of Manipur has long been an area of conflict and crackdowns. But although human rights violations are well documented in the state, few studies have examined the impact of censorship and internet shutdowns in the region. In 2019, research fellow Chinmayi S K sought to address this critical gap by documenting the blocking of websites in Manipur and assessing how the use of information controls in the state compares to that in the rest of India.</description></item><item><title>OONI Run Usability Study: Findings</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-06-09-ooni-run-usability-study-findings/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2020 09:38:02 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-06-09-ooni-run-usability-study-findings/</guid><description>OONI Run is a platform (launched in September 2017) that you can use to generate mobile deep links and widget code to coordinate OONI Probe testing. To enable community members to more effectively use OONI Run, we researched its limitations and collected structured community feedback through an OONI Run usability study.
This report outlines the objectives, personas, assumptions, and methods of this study.
We also share the outcomes based on the analysis of information collected through our survey and interviews with community members, as well as some of the next steps towards improving OONI Run.</description></item><item><title>Join the online Internet Measurement Village 2020</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/</link><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-internet-measurement-village/</guid><description>Subscribe on YouTube We are excited to bring the first online Internet Measurement Village to you this month.
Interested in learning all about Internet measurement and how to detect Internet censorship? Curious to explore open datasets on Internet censorship and Internet outages? Eager to learn how advocates are pushing back against Internet shutdowns and defending a free and open Internet?
Join us for the online Internet Measurement Village, starting on Wednesday, 10th June 2020 and ending on Friday, 3rd July 2020.</description></item><item><title>Evaluating OONI’s New Measurement Engine in the Context of the Blocking of Women on Web in Spain</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-engine-evaluation-spain/</link><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-engine-evaluation-spain/</guid><description>Reproduction rights site www.womenonweb.org has been blocked in Spain over the last months by several local Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Once Spanish hacktivist communities noticed that www.womenonweb.org was inaccessible, they coordinated on running OONI Probe tests to collect measurement data that could serve as evidence. The findings of this investigation have been published in an excellent report, whose writing was coordinated by our former colleague, Vasilis Ververis.
We were involved in the technical review of the report.</description></item><item><title>Burundi blocks social media amid 2020 general election</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-burundi-blocks-social-media-amid-election/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-burundi-blocks-social-media-amid-election/</guid><description>Yesterday, access to social media was reportedly blocked in Burundi amid its 2020 general election.
The lead-up to the election was marred by violence and unrest, as seven candidates vied to replace Incumbent President Nkurunziza, who has been in power over the last 15 years. Despite widespread deadly protests and a coup attempt, President Nkurunziza won a third term in 2015 following disputed elections. While President Nkurunziza reportedly announced that he would not contest the next elections, he is set to become a “supreme guide to patriotism” as he steps down now in 2020.</description></item><item><title>Myanmar blocks “fake news” websites amid COVID-19 pandemic</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/</guid><description>In March 2020, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Myanmar received a directive from the Ministry of Transport and Communications to block 230 websites, most of which contain adult content. However, 67 of these sites were blocked on the grounds of spreading “fake news”. The list of these 230 websites has not been published.
In an attempt to potentially identify the newly blocked websites, we analyzed OONI network measurements collected from Myanmar over the last months, between 1st January 2020 to 9th April 2020.</description></item><item><title>Measuring SNI based blocking in Iran</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-iran-sni-blocking/</guid><description>In this blog post we start evaluating OONI&amp;rsquo;s new SNI blocking experiment. To this end, we will use measurements performed in Iran, where the blocking technique measured by this experiment is deployed.
OONI&amp;rsquo;s SNI blocking experiment discovers cases where a Client Hello packet carrying a specific SNI triggers blocking. In this context, SNI means Server Name Indication. It is an extension to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that allows a client to specify the domain name that it wants an HTTP server to serve.</description></item><item><title>OONI Run Survey &amp; Interviews: Share your feedback</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-ooni-run-survey-and-interviews/</guid><description>OONI Run is a platform that you can use to generate mobile deep links and widget code to coordinate OONI Probe testing.
Researchers and human rights defenders around the world have used OONI Run to coordinate OONI Probe censorship measurement campaigns, particularly leading up to and during political events (such as elections and protests).
We’re excited to hear more about your experience with OONI Run so that we can improve it.</description></item><item><title>Launched: New OONI Probe Desktop App for Windows and macOS</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-ooni-probe-desktop-app/</link><pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-ooni-probe-desktop-app/</guid><description>Today, OONI is thrilled to announce the public launch of the new OONI Probe desktop app that you can download and install on Windows and macOS to measure internet censorship and network performance.
Install OONI Probe Desktop app By running the tests in the new OONI Probe desktop app, you can measure:
Blocking of websites;
Blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Telegram;
Blocking of Tor and Psiphon;
Presence of systems (“middleboxes”) that could potentially be responsible for censorship and/or surveillance;</description></item><item><title>Building a smart URL list system: Policy for URL prioritization</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-smart-url-list-system/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-smart-url-list-system/</guid><description>To improve the monitoring of website censorship around the world, OONI aims to create a smart URL list system, while ensuring, to the extent possible, the safety of the URL lists themselves by running them through the usual Citizen Lab URL review process. This will help ensure smarter test target selection and by extension, it will enable us &amp;ndash; and the broader internet freedom community &amp;ndash; to more effectively monitor, analyze, and respond to cases of website censorship around the world.</description></item><item><title>Let's measure the accessibility of COVID-19 websites around the world</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/covid-19-ooni-measurement/</link><pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/covid-19-ooni-measurement/</guid><description>Ensuring a free and open internet during an emergency, like the current COVID-19 pandemic, is more important than ever. However, access to information related to the coronavirus pandemic has already been censored by certain governments. China censored information on the coronavirus on Chinese social media platforms, while Venezuela’s state-owned CANTV blocked access to a coronavirus information portal last week.
We therefore invite you to participate in a measurement campaign to check if COVID-19 sites are accessible in your country (and on the network you’re using) and to share relevant measurement data with the world.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2019</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2019/</link><pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2019/</guid><description>As the new decade begins, we publish this post to share some OONI highlights from 2019. We also share some thoughts for 2020.
New Apps
Revamped OONI Probe Mobile App
New OONI Probe Desktop App
Near real-time publication of OONI measurements
Revamped OONI Explorer
OONI PostgreSQL MetaDB
Improved measurements
New OONI Probe tests
New OONI Probe measurement engine
Community
New partnerships
Research publications
OONI workshops and presentations
Community resources
OONI-verse</description></item><item><title>Iran temporarily blocks the Farsi language edition of Wikipedia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-iran-blocks-farsi-wikipedia/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-iran-blocks-farsi-wikipedia/</guid><description>Over the last days, between 2nd to 3rd March 2020, OONI measurements collected from 6 different networks in Iran showed that access to the Farsi edition of Wikipedia (fa.wikipedia.org) was temporarily blocked by means of DNS tampering and SNI filtering.
In this post, we share relevant OONI data.
Blocking of Farsi Wikipedia and Wikinews In the past, Iran mainly blocked the HTTP version of specific Wikipedia articles. But over the last years, this probably wasn’t very noticeable because Wikipedia used HTTPS with HSTS enabled, meaning that Iranian internet users could easily access the censored pages.</description></item><item><title>OONI Highlights: 2017-2019</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-highlights-2017-2019/</link><pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-highlights-2017-2019/</guid><description>This post was originally published on the OTF website.
Back in 2012, the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) was born with OTF support to create the first open methodologies that would enable anyone around the world to measure internet censorship and other forms of network interference.
Today, OONI comprises a global community that runs its censorship measurement software (OONI Probe) in more than 200 countries every month. Millions of measurements have been collected from tens of thousands of networks in 236 countries since 2012, all of which are openly published on OONI Explorer &amp;ndash; arguably the largest publicly available resource on internet censorship to date.</description></item><item><title>Togo: Instant messaging apps blocked amid 2020 presidential election</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-togo-blocks-instant-messaging-apps/</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2020-togo-blocks-instant-messaging-apps/</guid><description>Last Saturday, on 22nd February 2020, presidential elections were held in Togo. These elections follow a wave of protests over the last years against the 53-year rule of Gnassingbe Eyadema and, subsequently, his son, Faure Gnassingbe. A few days before the election, non-partisan election monitoring was restricted as National Democratic Institute (NDI) staff were expelled from the country. According to preliminary results from the electoral commission, incumbent President Faure Gnassingbe won re-election.</description></item><item><title>Call to Action: Let’s measure the blocking of LGBTQI websites around the world!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-measure-blocking-lgbtqi-sites/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-measure-blocking-lgbtqi-sites/</guid><description>LGBTQI websites are blocked in several countries around the world, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. This includes popular dating apps and sites, like grindr, which is blocked in Lebanon and Iran.
How can we track the blocking of LGBTQI sites around the world?
We have teamed up with OutRight Action International &amp;ndash; a leading international LGBTQI human rights organization &amp;ndash; to investigate the blocking of LGBTQI sites worldwide.
We invite you to contribute to this research!</description></item><item><title>Iran’s nation-wide Internet blackout: Measurement data and technical observations</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 Nov 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/</guid><description>Over the last week, Iran experienced a nation-wide Internet blackout.
Most Iranians were barred from connecting to the global Internet and the outside world, but they had access to Iran’s national Intranet: the domestic network that hosts Iranian websites and services—all under the government’s watch.
This major Internet blackout was rolled out on 16th November 2019, right after protests erupted across multiple cities in Iran. The protests (against economic mismanagement and government corruption) were sparked by the government’s abrupt announcement to increase the price of fuel (as much as 300%) and to impose a strict rationing system.</description></item><item><title>On the blocking of abortion rights websites: Women on Waves &amp; Women on Web</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-blocking-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves-web/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-blocking-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves-web/</guid><description>Image: By Clarote (Coding Rights)
Read the Portuguese version by Coding Rights.
View the report&amp;rsquo;s press coverage by The Intercept.
As abortion remains partially or totally criminalized in numerous countries, the fight to promote sexual and reproductive rights, as well as women&amp;rsquo;s health, also relies on access to information. But recently, we were told that the website of the abortion rights non-governmental organization womeonwaves.org, which provides reproductive health services and education to women in countries with restrictive abortion laws, was inaccessible in Brazil.</description></item><item><title>Egypt blocks BBC and Alhurra: Expanding media censorship amid political unrest</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-egypt-blocks-bbc-and-alhurra/</link><pubDate>Thu, 26 Sep 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-egypt-blocks-bbc-and-alhurra/</guid><description>Last weekend, protests erupted in Egypt in response to corruption allegations against President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s government.
Protests have been rare since President Sisi took power in 2014, but amid policies of economic austerity and recent corruption allegations, hundreds of Egyptians took to the streets. It was subsequently reported that BBC News and the US-funded Alhurra news website were amongst blocked services. The head of Egypt’s Supreme Council for Media Regulation reportedly stated that the BBC and other news websites may have been blocked because of their “inaccurate” coverage of the protests.</description></item><item><title>Next Generation OONI Explorer Launched!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is thrilled to announce the public launch of the revamped, next generation OONI Explorer!
OONI Explorer is an open data resource on internet censorship around the world. This new platform offers access to millions of censorship measurements collected from 233 countries since 2012.
About OONI Explorer
Why use OONI Explorer?
Who is OONI Explorer for?
OONI Explorer 2.0
Revamped country pages</description></item><item><title>Resurgence of Internet Censorship in Ethiopia: Blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook, and African Arguments</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/resurgence-internet-censorship-ethiopia-2019/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Aug 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/resurgence-internet-censorship-ethiopia-2019/</guid><description>Last year in June 2018, following years of pervasive internet censorship, Ethiopia unblocked hundreds of websites as part of political reforms under a new government. But merely a year later, we observe a resurgence of internet censorship in the country.
In mid-June 2019, Ethiopia experienced several internet blackouts and once internet access was restored, access to WhatsApp and Telegram was blocked. These events coincided with Ethiopia’s national high school exams and it is believed that internet access was restricted in an attempt to prevent exam leakage as has happened in the past.</description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: From internet blackouts to the blocking of WhatsApp and Telegram</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-whatsapp-telegram/</link><pubDate>Fri, 21 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-whatsapp-telegram/</guid><description>Communication access in Ethiopia has significantly been disrupted over the last week. Internet access and Short Message Services (SMS) were disconnected intermittently across the country.
During the first half of the week, internet connectivity was shut down completely. After access was restored, both WhatsApp and Telegram were blocked. A few days ago, Ethio Telecom (the only telecom in the country) published a notice, acknowledging the internet disruptions, but came short on details about the extent of communication disruptions or why they occurred in the first place.</description></item><item><title>Jordan: Measuring Facebook live-streaming interference during protests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/jordan-measuring-facebook-interference/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/jordan-measuring-facebook-interference/</guid><description>Last December, anti-austerity protests erupted in Jordan against a controversial fiscal reform bill. The protests ensued once a week for several weeks thereafter. Amid the protests, locals reported that they were unable to view live-streaming from Facebook. But they also reported that viewing live-streaming was otherwise possible when protests were not taking place.
Therefore, our first hypothesis was that perhaps people in Jordan couldn’t load videos on Facebook because they were using overloaded networks (rather than Facebook live streaming being interfered with).</description></item><item><title>Nigeria’s 2019 elections through the lens of network measurements</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-nigeria-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-nigeria-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Censorship events are increasingly being reported during political events in Africa (and elsewhere around the world). A few examples include the social media disruptions in Mali amid its 2018 presidential election, the blocking of social media in Uganda during its 2016 general elections, and the complete internet blackout in The Gambia during its 2016 presidential election.
Leading up to and during Nigeria’s 2019 general elections, we collaborated with our local partner, Paradigm Initiative, on measuring networks in the country to monitor potential censorship events.</description></item><item><title>China is now blocking all language editions of Wikipedia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/</link><pubDate>Sat, 04 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/</guid><description>translation: 中国封锁了所有语言版本的维基百科
China recently started blocking all language editions of Wikipedia. Previously, the blocking was limited to the Chinese language edition of Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.org), but has now expanded to include all *.wikipedia.org language editions.
In this post, we share OONI network measurement data on the blocking of Wikipedia in China. We found that all wikipedia.org sub-domains are blocked in China by means of DNS injection and SNI filtering.
DNS injection Through the use of OONI Probe, Wikipedia domains have been tested from multiple local vantage points in China since 2015.</description></item><item><title>Benin: Social media blocking and Internet blackout amid 2019 elections</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/</guid><description>Two days ago, social media was reportedly blocked and access to the Internet was shutdown in Benin during its 2019 parliamentary elections.
In this report, the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) teams share OONI, IODA, and RIPE Atlas network measurement data that corroborate and provide insight into these recent censorship events in Benin.
Background
Social media blocking
OONI measurements
RIPE Atlas measurements</description></item><item><title>Cuba blocks independent media amid 2019 constitutional referendum</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/cuba-referendum/</link><pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/cuba-referendum/</guid><description>On 24th February 2019, Cubans voted on a new constitution for the first time in decades.
But a few hours before the referendum, independent news outlet Tremenda Nota reported that their website got blocked in Cuba.
In this post, we share OONI network measurement data that confirms the blocking of tremendanota.com, as well as the blocking of several other independent media websites during the referendum.
We also found that ETECSA, Cuba’s only telecommunications company, has changed its censorship techniques, now censoring access to sites that support HTTPS by means of IP blocking.</description></item><item><title>OONI Software Development Guidelines</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-software-development-guidelines/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2019 01:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-software-development-guidelines/</guid><description>The goal of this document is to explain and explicit some of the best practices relevant to software development that we follow at the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).
By following these development guidelines we aim to produce higher quality code, which contains less defects and allows us to iterate more quickly delivering greater value to our end users is a shorter amount of time!
Version control Also known as: “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Git!</description></item><item><title>OONI Probe Android 2.0.0 Incident Report</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-probe-android-200-incident/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2019 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-probe-android-200-incident/</guid><description>The first public release of OONI Probe Android 2.0.0 (since 2.0.0-alpha.7) included a very serious bug: we lost measurements and collected measurements that we shouldn’t have. As soon as the problem was identified, we quickly released a fix (OONI Probe Android 2.0.1). All measurements that should not have been uploaded have been deleted and we are working on a new OONI Probe release (OONI Probe Mobile 2.1.0) that will allow you to manually re-upload measurements.</description></item><item><title>From the blocking of Wikipedia to Social Media: Venezuela's Political Crisis</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/venezuela-blocking-wikipedia-and-social-media-2019/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/venezuela-blocking-wikipedia-and-social-media-2019/</guid><description>As political tension escalated in Venezuela over the last few weeks, so did internet censorship.
It started off with edits to Wikipedia pages earlier this month, referencing the opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, as the President of Venezuela. This resulted in the blocking of Wikipedia. Then a group of Venezuelan soldiers circulated videos, announcing an uprising against the government of President Maduro and calling on the public to join them in the streets.</description></item><item><title>Zimbabwe protests: Social media blocking and internet blackouts</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/zimbabwe-protests-social-media-blocking-2019/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/zimbabwe-protests-social-media-blocking-2019/</guid><description>Last week, protests erupted in Zimbabwe in response to the government’s announcement that the price of fuel would more than double. According to Zimbabwe’s government, the price hikes aim to avert fuel shortages and to crackdown on the illegal trading of fuel. The new prices, however, mean that Zimbabwe now has the most expensive fuel in the world.
Zimbabwe’s fuel protests lasted for three days (14th to 17th January 2019), during which 12 people were reportedly killed and many more beaten by security forces.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2018</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2018/</link><pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2018/</guid><description>As the new year begins, we publish this post to share some OONI highlights from 2018. We also share some of the exciting new projects we’ll be launching in 2019!
New partnerships
Research publications
Dev work behind the scenes
Revamped OONI Probe mobile app
Revamped OONI Explorer
New OONI Probe desktop apps
Probe Orchestration
OONI workshops and presentations
Videos
Expanding OONI-verse
New partnerships Our network of partners grew significantly in 2018!</description></item><item><title>Major Revamp: OONI Probe Mobile App 2.0 Launched!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/</link><pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/revamped-ooni-probe-mobile-app/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project is thrilled to announce the release of a major, new OONI Probe mobile app version!
Are websites and social media apps blocked? Is your network unusually slow?
Install OONI Probe now on Android or iOS to find out!
Why run OONI Probe?
OONI Probe 2.0 Highlights
Major UI overhaul
Overview of Test Results
Enhanced Website Testing
Test websites of your choice</description></item><item><title>Internet disruption in Gabon amid coup attempt</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/gabon-internet-disruption/</link><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/gabon-internet-disruption/</guid><description>On 7th January 2019, a military coup was attempted in Gabon in a bid to end more than 50 years of rule by President Ali Bongo’s family. The coup attempt was quickly foiled. Security forces reportedly killed two suspects, arrested seven others, and Gabon’s government retained control.
Meanwhile, a curfew has been imposed and NetBlocks reported that access to the Internet has been shut down.
In this post, we share data that provides signals of network disruptions in Gabon.</description></item><item><title>Uganda's Social Media Tax through the lens of network measurements</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/uganda-social-media-tax/</link><pubDate>Mon, 12 Nov 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/uganda-social-media-tax/</guid><description>Image by @neemascribbles.
Probed ISPs: MTN (AS20294), Africell (AS36991), Airtel (AS37075), Smile Telecom (AS37122), Africa Online Uganda (AS29039), DATANET (AS29032), Sombha Solutions (AS328015), Roke (AS37063), Airtel (AS36977), Uganda Telecom (AS21491)
OONI tests: Web Connectivity, HTTP Invalid Request Line, HTTP Header Field Manipulation, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Telegram, Vanilla Tor. Testing/analysis period: 1st July 2018 to 24th October 2018
Censorship methods: HTTP blocking (resetting connections) and TCP/IP blocking
Key Findings
Introduction</description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Venezuela</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/</guid><description>A study by IPYS Venezuela, Venezuela Inteligente, and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).
Update (2018-10-19): The section on Tor becoming accessible was added.
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Political environment
Legal environment
Reported cases of internet censorship
Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Venezuela
Acknowledgement of limitations Findings
Blocked websites
Media
Political criticism
Zello
Currency exchange
Blocking of Tor
About Tor Testing Tor unblocking Conclusion
Probed ISPs: Most recent measurements collected from Digitel (AS264731), CANTV (AS8048), Movistar (AS6306) and Movilnet (AS27889).</description></item><item><title>South Sudan: Measuring Internet Censorship in the World's Youngest Nation</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/south-sudan-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Aug 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/south-sudan-censorship/</guid><description>Image by Mandavi
Established in July 2011, South Sudan is the youngest country in the world. But the transition to independence from Sudan has been far from smooth, as the country experiences an ongoing civil war. Even though internet penetration levels remain quite low, two media websites and two independent blogs were reportedly blocked last year.
This report is a joint research effort by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and South Sudan’s The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID).</description></item><item><title>Mali: Social media disruptions amid 2018 presidential election?</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/</link><pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/</guid><description>Two days ago, on 29th July 2018, Malians went to the polls to vote in presidential elections and reported that social media was inaccessible.
This is not the first time that social media is reportedly blocked in Mali. Facebook and Twitter were blocked two years ago amidst violent protests against the detention of a popular radio host. Last month, Internet Sans Frontieres reported that social media was disrupted in Mali, following a violent police crackdown on banned opposition protests calling for transparency and accountability in the 2018 presidential elections.</description></item><item><title>Do you use OONI Probe? We want your feedback!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooniprobe-ux-survey-and-interviews/</link><pubDate>Thu, 19 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooniprobe-ux-survey-and-interviews/</guid><description>Survey (self-hosted mirror)
Since last year’s launch of the OONI Probe mobile apps, tens of thousands of people have been measuring internet censorship in around 200 countries every month. But OONI Probe is far from perfect.
We’re excited to hear more about your experience with the apps so that we can improve them.
We invite you to complete our survey and/or participate in an interview to provide feedback.
Survey We’d love to hear your thoughts on the current OONI Probe mobile apps.</description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Egypt</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/egypt-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Mon, 02 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/egypt-internet-censorship/</guid><description>The report uncovers anomalies on Egyptian networks, including censorship and the hijacking of unencrypted HTTP connections for advertising and cryptocurrency mining.
Read full report in English Read full report in Arabic Read the summary of the report in Arabic
Last year, Egypt ordered the blocking of 21 news websites. OONI, a censorship measurement project under the Tor Project, responded by publishing a report on the blocking of (at least) 10 media websites, including Mada Masr and Al Jazeera.</description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Verifying the unblocking of websites</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-unblocking/</link><pubDate>Fri, 29 Jun 2018 19:49:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-unblocking/</guid><description>Pro PM Abiy Ahmed Rally at Meskel Square, June 2018 - Photo by Berhan Taye
On 22nd June 2018, the Ethiopian government reported that it had unblocked 264 websites. This (great) news was also reported by ESAT, a major Ethiopian media website that was blocked over the last years.
Today, OONI and Access Now publish new research based on the testing of sites that were previously found to be blocked, in an attempt to examine whether they have in fact been unblocked in recent days.</description></item><item><title>Nigeria: Measuring Internet Censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/nigeria-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/nigeria-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Last October, Nigeria’s National Communications Commission (NCC) reportedly ordered the blocking of 21 websites. In response, we collaborated with Nigeria’s Paradigm Initiative to test those websites and collect network measurement data that can shed light on whether and how they’re blocked.
Our findings are included in a joint research report that we published today with Paradigm Initiative. The full report, titled “Tightening the Noose on Freedom of Expression: Status of Internet Freedom in Nigeria 2018”, can be downloaded here.</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Julie Owono</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-interviews-julie-owono/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-interviews-julie-owono/</guid><description>If you’ve met Julie Owono, you’ll probably agree that her passion and determination for defending digital rights is one of the things that stands out about her.
In her capacity as the Executive Director of Internet Sans Frontières (Internet Without Borders), Julie has spearheaded advocacy efforts in defense of online freedoms in many West African countries. Notably, Julie led campaigns against internet shutdowns in Cameroon, as well as in Togo and Chad.</description></item><item><title>OONI at RightsCon 2018</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-rightscon-2018/</link><pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-rightscon-2018/</guid><description>We are excited to participate at RightsCon next week: the world’s leading event on human rights in the digital age. Annually hosted by Access Now, this three-day conference will take place in Toronto between 16th-18th May 2018.
Over the last years, RightsCon has provided us the opportunity to participate in critical discussions in the digital rights field, meet many fascinating people and organizations, and to form new coalitions. We therefore look forward to participating at RightsCon and are eager to meet many new faces!</description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Moses Karanja</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-interviews-moses-karanja/</link><pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-interviews-moses-karanja/</guid><description>We first met Moses Karanja several years ago at the Citizen Lab Summer Institute. He’s a Kenyan information controls researcher, having previously worked with Strathmore University Law School research centre, CIPIT. Currently, he’s a PhD student at the University of Toronto.
Over the last years, Moses has championed OONI community engagement across Africa. Thanks to his tireless efforts, communities in many African countries are now running OONI Probe and using OONI data to examine internet censorship and other forms of network interference.</description></item><item><title>ParkNet: Short Documentary on Internet Censorship in Cuba</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/parknet-short-documentary-cuba/</link><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/parknet-short-documentary-cuba/</guid><description>Last year we had the opportunity to travel to Cuba to explore its internet landscape. We spent most of our time hopping from one public WiFi hotspot to another, measuring networks in Havana, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba. You might remember that we published a research report on our findings.
Today we publish a short documentary (“ParkNet”) on our study of internet censorship in Cuba.
“ParkNet” is a term that we coined to refer to parks that serve as public WiFi hotspots in Cuba.</description></item><item><title>OONI's recent participation at events in Africa, India, and Europe</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-africa-india-europe-conferences/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-africa-india-europe-conferences/</guid><description>Over the last months, the OONI team had the opportunity to host workshops, give presentations, and participate in discussions at the following conferences and events:
Seminar at the University of Cape Town (South Africa)
Internet Policy in Africa: Research Methods for Advocacy workshop (Uganda)
Nullcon 2018 (India)
Internet Freedom Festival (IFF) 2018 (Spain)
Tor Meeting (Italy)
These events provided us a great opportunity to meet many fascinating people from various communities, learn about their work, form new collaborations, and collect feedback for the improvement of our tools and methodologies.</description></item><item><title>Sierra Leone: Network disruptions amid 2018 runoff elections</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/sierra-leone-network-disruptions-2018-elections/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/sierra-leone-network-disruptions-2018-elections/</guid><description>Last weekend, two network disruptions occurred in Sierra Leone right before and after the country’s runoff elections.
This post examines these disruptions and shares data that corroborates local reports.
It seems that the network disruptions were caused by an ACE submarine cable cut. Google traffic and BGP data suggest that the second disruption, following the runoff elections, could be an internet blackout.
2018 general elections President Koroma is stepping down, having served ten years in office.</description></item><item><title>Investigating Internet Blackouts from the Edge of the network: OONI's new upcoming methodology</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/investigating-internet-blackouts/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/investigating-internet-blackouts/</guid><description>The OONI team is creating a new methodology aimed at automatically detecting and examining internet blackouts. Learn all about our methodology here.
Imagine a day where the internet is shut down completely. You have to work, check the news, and communicate with your friends and family. All of a sudden, you can’t do any of that, because there simply is no internet. It feels like a strange form of time travel has taken place: you’re thrown several decades into the past, into a world without internet, but in one which has learned to heavily rely on it.</description></item><item><title>Iran Protests: DPI blocking of Instagram (Part 2)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2018-iran-protests-pt2/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2018-iran-protests-pt2/</guid><description>In early January 2018, OONI published a post reporting on the blocking of Telegram and Instagram amidst protests in Iran. We have since been analyzing RIPE data and other network measurements collected from Iran in an attempt to better understand the blockages. Upon further analysis, we found that Instagram was in fact blocked (during the Iran protests) through the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology which targeted the TLS protocol.</description></item><item><title>Iran Protests: OONI data confirms censorship events (Part 1)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2018-iran-protests/</link><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jan 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2018-iran-protests/</guid><description>At this point, you have probably read all about the major anti-government protests that erupted across Iran over the last week. You may have even read about how services like Telegram and Instagram were blocked, reportedly as part of a government attempt to stifle the unrest.
We publish this post to share OONI network measurement data collected from Iran between 28th December 2017 (when the protests started) to 2nd January 2018.</description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2017/</link><pubDate>Sat, 30 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2017/</guid><description>As the end of 2017 approaches, we publish this blog to share some OONI highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be working on in 2018!
OONI Probe mobile apps
Speed and performance tests
OONI Run
OONI API
OONI Partner Gathering
Research reports
OONI in 2018
OONI Probe mobile apps In February 2017, measuring internet censorship with OONI Probe suddenly became easier than ever before!</description></item><item><title>OONI at the 34th Chaos Communication Congress (34C3)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-34c3/</link><pubDate>Sat, 23 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-34c3/</guid><description>Next week the OONI team will be attending the 34th Chaos Communication Congress (34C3): Europe’s largest hacker conference on technology, society, and utopia. Are you going? We hope to see you there!
OONI lecture OONI&amp;rsquo;s founder and project lead, Arturo Filastò, will be presenting OONI at 34C3.
Lecture OONI: Lets Fight Internet Censorship Together! Day 29th December 2017 Time 14:30 Room Saal Borg Attend the lecture to learn all about OONI, recent censorship findings from around the world, and how you can join the fight against internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>OONI at LAVITS and Primavera Hacker 2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-lavits-phacker-2017/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-lavits-phacker-2017/</guid><description>Earlier this month we had the opportunity to present OONI at two conferences in Chile: LAVITS and Primavera Hacker.
LAVITS LAVITS is a Latin American network of surveillance technology and society studies that organizes international symposiums since 2009. It features publications, talks and workshops related to surveillance and technology, internet censorship, resistance and counter surveillance, identification, biometrics, protection of personal data and privacy. The fifth series of the LAVITS symposium took place in Santiago, Chile from 29th November to 1st December 2017.</description></item><item><title>How Pakistan blocked news outlets, social media sites, and IM apps amidst protests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/how-pakistan-blocked-social-media/</link><pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/how-pakistan-blocked-social-media/</guid><description>Last weekend, a number of social media sites and news outlets were blocked in Pakistan during Islamist protests. Protesters gathered in Islamabad alleged that Mr. Zahid Hamid, the Federal Law Minister, should be removed from his position because he omitted a reference to the Prophet Muhammad in a parliamentary bill. On Saturday, 25th November 2017, law enforcement agencies initiated an operation to disperse the sit-in at the Faizabad Interchange linking Islamabad and Rawalpindi.</description></item><item><title>Identifying cases of DNS misconfiguration: Not quite censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/not-quite-network-censorship/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/not-quite-network-censorship/</guid><description>Country: Brazil, worldwide
OONI tests: Web Connectivity, HTTP requests
Probed ISPs: AS1916 (Associação Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa), AS262650 (Kyatera Informatica Ltda), AS2715 (Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa/RJ), AS27699 (TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A), AS28573 (CLARO S.A.), AS52873 (SOFTDADOS CONECTIVIDADE), AS7738 (Telemar Norte Leste S.A.), AS8167 (Brasil Telecom S/A - Filial Distrito Federal)
Measurement period: July 2016 — November 2017
Website inaccessibility reasons: IPv6 or DNS misconfiguration
We recently noticed that pernambuco.</description></item><item><title>Writing a modern cross-platform desktop app</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/writing-a-modern-cross-platform-desktop-app/</link><pubDate>Mon, 30 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/writing-a-modern-cross-platform-desktop-app/</guid><description>The goal of this article is to outline some of the architecture &amp;amp; design considerations made while thinking about how we would implement the OONI Probe desktop apps. This is the result of research and experimentation with a variety of different libraries and approaches. For each part of the technical stack we will outline the rationale leading to our choices.
Requirements &amp;amp; design goals Our primary goal with the OONI Probe desktop apps is to enable Windows and macOS desktop users to run OONI Probe network measurement tests without knowledge of the command line.</description></item><item><title>OONI Team Meeting: Montreal 2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/</link><pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-team-meeting-montreal-2017/</guid><description>Last week, right before the Tor meeting, the OONI team gathered in Montreal for a 4-day meeting to reflect, regroup, hack, and plan.
This post shares information from our meeting and future plans with the broader community. All session notes are available on GitHub.
Summary: What OONI is working on
Sessions
Day 1 - 7th October 2017
Day 2 - 8th October 2017
Day 3 - 9th October 2017</description></item><item><title>Internet Censorship in Pakistan: Findings from 2014-2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Islamabad: Political dissent in Pakistan under threat, government censors online content - PC: Haroon Baloch
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Bytes for All Pakistan.
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
Legal environment
Freedom of expression
Press freedom
Access to information
Privacy and digital surveillance
Censorship
Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Pakistan</description></item><item><title>Evidence of Internet Censorship during Catalonia's Independence Referendum</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/internet-censorship-catalonia-independence-referendum/</link><pubDate>Tue, 03 Oct 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/internet-censorship-catalonia-independence-referendum/</guid><description>Image: Catalan Independence Referendum site seized
Two days ago, Catalonia held a referendum seeking independence from Spain. As the world awaits to see what happens next, we publish this post to share evidence of recent censorship events that occurred during and leading up to the referendum.
We confirm the blocking of at least 25 sites related to the Catalan referendum by means of DNS tampering and HTTP blocking, based on OONI Probe network measurements collected from three local networks.</description></item><item><title>Internet Censorship in Iran: Network Measurement Findings from 2014-2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/iran-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/iran-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Image: Blockpage in Iran
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), ASL19, ARTICLE 19, and Small Media.
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape
Internet use
Legal environment
Reported cases of internet censorship
Methodology: Measuring internet censorship in Iran
Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s test list for Iran
OONI network measurement testing
Web Connectivity
HTTP Invalid Request Line
HTTP Header Field Manipulation
Vanilla Tor test</description></item><item><title>OONI Run: Let's fight internet censorship together!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-run/</link><pubDate>Wed, 27 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-run/</guid><description>Today we released OONI Run, a website linked to an exciting new OONI Probe mobile app feature that enables you to:
Engage your friends (and the world) to run censorship measurement tests
Monitor the blocking of your website around the world
OONI Run includes a variety of OONI Probe software testsdesigned to:
Test the blocking of websites
Find middleboxes
Measure the speed and performance of networks
Measure video streaming performance</description></item><item><title>Measuring Internet Censorship in Cuba's ParkNets</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/</link><pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/cuba-internet-censorship-2017/</guid><description>Image by Arturo Filastò (CC-BY-SA-3.0) A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
View the pdf version of the report here.
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
ETECSA
ParkNets
Joven Club
StreetNets
El Paquete
Summary
Measuring Internet Censorship in Cuba
Methodology
Collection and analysis of OONI Probe network measurements
Custom tests
Findings
Blocked websites
News Media
Political Criticism
Human Rights Issues</description></item><item><title>DASH Streaming Test</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/dash/</link><pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/dash/</guid><description>DASH Streaming Test DASH is designed to measure the quality of tested networks by emulating a video streaming. This test is called DASH because it uses the DASH (Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP) streaming technique.
Running this test can be useful to understand the baseline streaming performance of a specific network connection. It measures video-related metrics as well as network metrics that are key to understand the reason of performance issues.</description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Gathering 2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/</link><pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-partner-gathering-2017/</guid><description>Two weeks ago we hosted the first OONI Partner Gathering in Toronto, Canada. This report provides an overview of the event, partner needs and challenges, and future goals to address them.
View the pdf version of the report here.
About
Objectives
Sessions
Day 1 - 10th July 2017
Day 2 - 11th July 2017
Inclusiveness
Challenges and needs
Future goals and priorities
Outcomes
Acknowledgements
About Over the last year, the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project has had the opportunity to collaborate with various digital rights organizations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.</description></item><item><title>#EgyptCensors: Evidence of recent censorship events in Egypt</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/egypt-censors/</link><pubDate>Mon, 19 Jun 2017 15:30:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/egypt-censors/</guid><description>Country: Egypt
OONI tests: Web Connectivity, HTTP Header Field Manipulation, HTTP Invalid Request Line, HTTP Host, Vanilla Tor.
Probed ISPs: Link Egypt (AS24863), Vodafone Egypt (AS36935), Telecom Egypt (AS8452).
Analysis period: 23rd May 2017 to 17th June 2017.
Censorship method: Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) used to RESET connections.
Starting on May 24th, the Egyptian government ordered ISPs to block at least 21 news websites on the grounds of “supporting terrorism and spreading lies”.</description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Indonesia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Image: Block page in Indonesia
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Sinar Project.
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
Legal environment
Freedom of expression
Press freedom
Access to information
Privacy
Censorship and surveillance
Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
Examining internet censorship in Indonesia
Methodology
Collection of OONI Probe network measurements
Web Connectivity
HTTP Invalid Request Line</description></item><item><title>OONI at the CryptoRave 2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-cryptorave-2017/</link><pubDate>Fri, 12 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-cryptorave-2017/</guid><description>CryptoRave is a free, non-commercial and collectively funded 48 hour event featuring talks, workshops and activities related to security, privacy, anonymity, hacking and freedom of expression that attracts more that 2,500 people mainly from South America. The event took place in São Paulo, Brazil on 5th and 6th May 2017.
A number of people attended the OONI presentation and workshop (&amp;ldquo;Listatona&amp;rdquo;) that was co-organized with Coding Rights. During the workshop participants were able to better understand OONI&amp;rsquo;s testing methodology, and how OONI Probe performs network measurements.</description></item><item><title>OONI at the Internet Freedom Festival &amp; RightsCon 2017</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-iff-rightscon/</link><pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-iff-rightscon/</guid><description>Over the last month the OONI team joined the internet freedom community at the following events:
Vietnam Cyber Dialogue (VCD)
Internet Freedom Festival (IFF)
Iran Cyber Dialogue (ICD)
RightsCon 2017
International Journalism Festival (IJF)
These events provided us with the opportunity to engage with community members, create new friendships, learn about new projects, and to share skills and knowledge. We also had the opportunity to facilitate sessions that allowed us to collect feedback for the improvement of our software and research methodologies.</description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/myanmar-report/</link><pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2017 13:31:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/myanmar-report/</guid><description>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), Sinar Project, and the Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO).
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
Legal environment
Freedom of expression
Press freedom
Access to information
Privacy
Censorship and surveillance
Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
Examining internet censorship in Myanmar
Methodology
Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s test list for Myanmar</description></item><item><title>Examining internet blackouts through public data sources</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/examining-internet-blackouts/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2017 16:39:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/examining-internet-blackouts/</guid><description>Pulling the plug on the internet is one of the ways that governments around the world attempt to exert control over the flow of information.
While the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project has developed numerous software tests for examining different forms of internet censorship (such as the blocking of websites, instant messaging apps, and censorship circumvention tools), we currently do not have tests that are designed to examine internet blackouts, when the internet as a whole is rendered inaccessible within a location.</description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Thailand</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/thailand-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/thailand-internet-censorship/</guid><description>Image: Block page in Thailand
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), Sinar Project, and the Thai Netizen Network.
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
Legal environment
Freedom of expression
Press freedom
Access to information
Privacy
Censorship and surveillance
Reported cases of internet censorship and surveillance
Examining internet censorship in Thailand
Methodology
Review of the Citizen Lab&amp;rsquo;s Thai test list</description></item><item><title>New OONI Probe Mobile App: Measure Internet Censorship &amp; Performance</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-mobile-app/</link><pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-mobile-app/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project is thrilled to announce the release of a new mobile app (“OONI Probe - Measure Internet Censorship &amp;amp; Performance”) that can now be installed on Android and iOS for testing Internet censorship and network performance.
By running the tests included in OONI’s mobile app, you can monitor:
Blocking of websites; Presence of systems that could be responsible for censorship or surveillance; Speed and performance of your network.</description></item><item><title>Kenya: Censorship-free internet?</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/kenya-study/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/kenya-study/</guid><description>Over the last five months we ran OONI tests in Kenya almost every day to examine whether internet censorship events were occurring in the country. Hundreds of thousands of network measurements were collected and analyzed. 1,357 URLs were tested for censorship, including both international websites and sites that are more relevant to Kenya (e.g. local news outlets). Yet, after five months of intensive testing from four local vantage points in Kenya, we found almost no signs of internet censorship in the country.</description></item><item><title>The State of Internet Censorship in Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/malaysia-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/malaysia-report/</guid><description>Block page in Malaysia
A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Sinar Project.
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
Legal environment
Freedom of expression
Press freedom
Access to information
Privacy
Censorship and surveillance
Previous cases of internet censorship and surveillance
Examining internet censorship in Malaysia
Methodology
Creation of a Malaysian test list
OONI network measurements
Web connectivity
HTTP invalid request line</description></item><item><title>New OONI tests examine the blocking of WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/whatsapp-and-facebook-tests/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/whatsapp-and-facebook-tests/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project is excited to announce the release of two new software tests which are designed to examine the blocking of WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. You can now run these tests to monitor the accessibility of these apps across time, and to collect data that can serve as evidence when/if they are blocked.
WhatsApp test Many of our users have asked us to develop a test to examine the accessibility of WhatsApp, especially in light of it being blocked by various governments around the world during elections, protests, and other political events.</description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Evidence of social media blocking and internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-report/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-report/</guid><description>Youth in Addis trying to get Wi-Fi Connection. Credit Addis Fortune Newspaper
Recently we published a post about what appeared to be a possible internet shutdown in Ethiopia during a wave of ongoing protests by ethnic groups. Today, in collaboration with Amnesty International we are releasing a report that includes evidence of recent censorship events during Ethiopia’s political upheaval.
See the Amharic translation of the report. Translated by Wolete Mariam.</description></item><item><title>OONI releases new Web UI: Run censorship tests from your web browser!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/web-ui-post/</link><pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/web-ui-post/</guid><description>Today we are excited to announce the beta release of our new web-based user interface (WUI) that enables OONI Probe users to run censorship tests from a web browser!
Whether you’re running OONI Probe from your desktop or a Raspberry Pi, you can now easily choose which tests you want to run through OONI’s web UI and run them with the click of a button. These tests are designed to examine the following:</description></item><item><title>The Gambia: Internet Shutdown during 2016 Presidential Election</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/gambia-internet-shutdown/</guid><description>Last week we attempted to perform OONI network measurement tests in the Gambia to examine whether websites were blocked during its 2016 presidential election. But merely a few hours after we connected our probe to perform tests, it stopped working completely.
We suspected that this was due to an internet shutdown. To confirm this, we referred to third-party data to examine whether a country-wide internet blackout was taking place.
In this report, we summarize some of our key findings pertaining to the internet shutdown that appears to have occurred in the Gambia on the eve of its 2016 presidential election.</description></item><item><title>urandom.pcap: Belarus (finally) bans Tor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/belarus-fries-onion/</link><pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/belarus-fries-onion/</guid><description>Country: Belarus
Probed ISPs: Beltelecom (AS 6697)
Censorship method: TCP injections
We have recently heard of network anomalies in Belarus. Tor has been finally blocked in December 2016, although it had been explicitly declared that Tor should be blocked since February 2015.
An anonymous cypherpunk has helped to gather some evidence regarding Tor being blocked in Belarus. It&amp;rsquo;s neither a complete study nor an in-depth research and it&amp;rsquo;s unclear if any other further evidence will be gathered, so we decided to share current knowledge as-is:</description></item><item><title>OONI releases Lepidopter Raspberry Pi distribution</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/lepidopter/</link><pubDate>Wed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/lepidopter/</guid><description>The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is happy to announce the beta release of OONI Probe&amp;rsquo;s distribution for Raspberry Pis, caĺled Lepidopter.
What is Lepidopter Lepidopter is a Raspberry Pi distribution image with all the required dependencies and software packages in place, configured to run network measurement tests via the OONI Probe software. It is developed and designed to require no physical attendance upon first bootstrap but also allows experienced users to further configure it as they wish.</description></item><item><title>OONI-dev meeting and hackathon 2016</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-dev-and-hackathon-2016/</link><pubDate>Tue, 22 Nov 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-dev-and-hackathon-2016/</guid><description>Oonitarians are spread out across the globe, and OONI’s core team is no exception. We recently met in Berlin to hack on OONI’s software, work on our roadmap, and to have all those discussions that are more fruitful to have in person than on IRC. We also held a hackathon to engage new individuals with our project!
Below we document some of the things that we worked on as part of our OONI-dev meeting and hackathon.</description></item><item><title>Egypt: Media censorship, Tor interference, HTTPS throttling and ads injections?</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/egypt-network-interference/</link><pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/egypt-network-interference/</guid><description>Country: Egypt
Probed ISPs: Noor (AS 20928), TE Data (AS 8452), Vodafone (AS 24835)
Censorship method: DPI, network throttling, TCP injections
OONI tests: HTTP Requests, Web Connectivity, Vanilla Tor
Measurement period: 2016-08-27 - 2016-10-26
We recently noticed network anomalies in Egypt and performed a study in an attempt to understand the situation.
Our findings indicate that the Tor anonymity network appeared to be interfered with in Egypt, while HTTPS connections to DigitalOcean&amp;rsquo;s Frankfurt data centre were throttled.</description></item><item><title>OONI Hackathon: Join us to explore internet censorship!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/berlin-hackathon-2016/</guid><description>Interested in exploring (and exposing) internet censorship? Join the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) hackathon in Berlin!
When? Friday, 11th November &amp;amp; Saturday, 12th November 2016
Where? The OnionSpace (Gottschedstraße 4, 13357 Berlin, Germany)
What time? 10am onwards
Who? Software developers, data analysts, academics, journalists, bloggers, lawyers, activists, and all those who don’t go by any particular label, but are curious enough to join! We only have one rule: Be excellent to each other.</description></item><item><title>Zambia: Internet censorship during the 2016 general elections?</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/zambia-election-monitoring/</link><pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2016 10:52:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/zambia-election-monitoring/</guid><description>A research study by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Strathmore University’s Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT).
Table of contents
Key Findings
Introduction
Background
Network landscape and internet penetration
Legal environment
Freedom of expression
Press freedom
Access to information
Privacy
Censorship and surveillance
Previous cases of internet censorship and surveillance
Zambia’s 2016 general elections and constitutional referendum
Examining internet censorship during Zambia’s 2016 general elections</description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Internet Shutdown Amidst Recent Protests?</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ethiopia-internet-shutdown-amidst-recent-protests/</guid><description>Nearly 100 deaths and thousands of arrests have been reported in Ethiopia over the last days, as part of protests against the marginalization and persecution of the Oromos and Amharas, Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups. But the attacks and arrests may not have been the only forms of retribution carried out by the Ethiopian government in its crackdown against protesters.
Last weekend, the internet was reportedly shut down in the country.</description></item><item><title>Internet Access Disruption in Turkey - July 2016</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/turkey-internet-access-disruption/</link><pubDate>Tue, 19 Jul 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/turkey-internet-access-disruption/</guid><description>With the attempted coup in Turkey, reports went out about social media being throttled and/or blocked. We analysed data about this that we collected with RIPE Atlas and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).
On 15 July, a coup was attempted in Turkey. We heard about social media being throttled and/or blocked, but much was unclear about what was actually going on. Here we present measurement data from various platforms that shared their data publicly.</description></item><item><title>OONI releases new Web Connectivity test for detecting online censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/web-connectivity/</link><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/web-connectivity/</guid><description>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) is excited to be releasing a brand new test, called Web Connectivity, which is designed to detect three different types of censorship: DNS tampering, TCP/IP blocking and HTTP blocking.
Advantages of running Web Connectivity This test allows us to see which websites are blocked and how, more accurately than ever before!
Previously we relied on running separate (http_request, dns_consistency and tcp_connect) tests with the aim of identifying various forms of censorship.</description></item><item><title>How Uganda blocked social media, again</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/</link><pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/uganda-social-media-blocked/</guid><description>Country: Uganda
Probed ISPs: Orange (AS36991), SMILE (AS37122)
Censorship method: IP blocking
OONI tests: HTTP Requests
Measurement period: 2016-05-12
Last Wednesday, the Ugandan Communications Commission (UCC) ordered ISPs to block access to social media leading up to the (fifth) inauguration of President Yoweri Museveni, who has governed the country since 1986. Authorities argued that the blocking was ordered for “security purposes”, but the move directly harms political opposition, which has relied on social media to organize a “defiance campaign” of protests.</description></item><item><title>OONI Data Reveals How WhatsApp Was Blocked (Again) in Brazil</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/</link><pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/brazil-whatsapp-block/</guid><description>Country: Brazil
Probed ISPs: Tim mobile (AS 26615), Oi landline (AS 7738)
Censorship method: DNS Hijacking
OONI tests: HTTP Requests, DNS Consistency
Measurement period: 2016-05-02 - 2016-05-03
19:10 UTC Saturday, 7 May 2016 Update: Add OONI Explorer measurements links
Ever since WhatsApp implemented end-to-end encryption to protect the privacy and security of its 1 billion users worldwide, several cases of censorship have been ordered by governments who are frustrated with the fact that they can no longer access users&amp;rsquo; private communications.</description></item><item><title>EEEP and Greek Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/eeep-greek-censorship/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/eeep-greek-censorship/</guid><description>Technical analysis of Hellenic gaming commission blacklist in Greece</description></item><item><title>Zambia, a country under Deep Packet Inspection</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/zambia/</link><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jul 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/zambia/</guid><description>&amp;quot;I do not have the details of the blocking of Zambianwatchdog.com, but I would celebrate.&amp;quot; Guy Scott Zambian Vicepresident, Friday 28th June 2013 The following article is a guest blog post by Mr T. an independent researcher and provider of hosting to various grass roots organizations.
This article summarizes how we discovered that the grass roots online newspaper Zambianwatchdog.com was being blocked inside Zambia. This report provides technical evidence of the unlawful presence of Deep Packet Inspection in the country to monitor the Internet communications and stop users from browsing the website.</description></item><item><title>Tab-Tab, Come in! Bypassing Internet blocking to categorize DPI devices</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/tab-tab-come-in/</link><pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/tab-tab-come-in/</guid><description>Analysis of censorship in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan</description></item><item><title>Hadara Palestine</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/hadara-palestine/</link><pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/hadara-palestine/</guid><description>This is the technical report on the politically motivated censorship going on in Bethlehem, West Bank</description></item><item><title>T-Mobile USA Web Guard</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/t-mobile-usa-web-guard/</link><pubDate>Wed, 21 Mar 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/t-mobile-usa-web-guard/</guid><description>Measuring censorship on T-Mobile USA</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/about/inform-users-long/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/about/inform-users-long/</guid><description>GOAL OONI is a project aimed at mapping network anomalies by performing measurements from the vantage point of a users. You may find details on what exactly it is that we measure by reading through our test specifications. The data we collect is then made available to the public for further analysis.
The goal of this study is to have a better understanding on how the internet works around the world and what is stopping it from working as it should.</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/about/inform-users-short/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/about/inform-users-short/</guid><description>WARNING: Running OONI may be against the terms of service of your ISP or legally questionable in your country. By running OONI you will connect to web services which may be banned, and use web censorship circumvention methods such as Tor. The OONI project will publish data submitted by probes, possibly including your IP address or other identifying information. In addition, your use of OONI will be clear to anybody who has access to your computer, and to anybody who can monitor your internet connection (such as your employer, ISP or government).</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/about/risks/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/about/risks/</guid><description>Risks: Things you should know before running OONI Probe Translations:
Español, Riesgos: Lo que debes saber antes de ejecutar OONI Probe العربية, Risks: Things you should know before running OONI Probe فارسی, Risks: Things you should know before running OONI Probe Kiswahili, Hatari: Vitu unavyotakiwa kuvijua kabla ya kutumia OONI Probe Русский, Риски: что вы должны знать до запуска OONI Probe Français, Risques: Ce que vous devez savoir avant d&amp;rsquo;exécuter OONI Probe မြန်မာ, အန္တရာယ်များ OONI Probe ကို အသုံးမပြုမီ ဤအရာများကို သိထားသင့်သည်။ To our knowledge, no OONI Probe user has ever faced consequences as a result of using our software.</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/data/content/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/data/content/</guid><description>This URL is old Raw OONI Probe measurements now live at: https://api.ooni.io.
You can also explore the collected measurements via the OONI Explorer.
You should update your bookmarks and links accordingly.</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/net-neutrality-us/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/net-neutrality-us/</guid><description>Can you join our group of US-based volunteers?
When we need certain tests run to track net neutrality violations in the US, we’ll email you instructions on how to participate.
We promise we will not spam you.</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/monthly-reports/2019-07-monthly-report/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/monthly-reports/2019-07-monthly-report/</guid><description>OONI Monthly Report: July 2019 In July 2019, the OONI team made progress on many fronts: fast-path pipeline, RSS feed generator, OONI Probe mobile and desktop apps, new OONI Explorer, OONI Probe Orchestration System, ndt7, and on making OONI Probe testing more resilient to network outages. We also held a team meeting to roadmap for the next 12 months, and we attended the Tor Meeting and the Citizen Lab Summer Institute (CLSI).</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2017-08-23-angola-elections/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2017-08-23-angola-elections/</guid><description>Angolan Legislative Election 2017 Election day is an important day, but so are the days following an election.
You can actively examine whether and to what extent online information is accessible in Angola. By running OONI Probe, you can examine:
Whether websites are blocked; Whether systems that could be responsible for censorship or surveillance are present in your network; Net neutrality violations. Increasing transparency of information controls during political events is important!</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2017-09-06-togo/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2017-09-06-togo/</guid><description>Facebook and WhatsApp blocked in Togo? Today, 6th September 2017, we heard that Facebook and WhatsApp are inaccessible in Togo.
Run OONI Probe to collect data showing whether and how they (and other sites) are blocked!</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2018-01-belarus-test-blocking-of-charter97-org/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2018-01-belarus-test-blocking-of-charter97-org/</guid><description>Belarus: Test blocking of charter97.org Reporters Without Borders reported the blocking of news outlet charter97.org in Belarus: https://rsf.org/en/news/blocking-leading-belarusian-news-website-seen-test-eu
You can test this site with OONI Probe to examine whether and how it is being blocked. In addition to network measurement data, you will also receive relevant circumvention advice.
Simply click on this link (&amp;amp; open it with your OONI Probe mobile app) to test charter97.org with OONI Probe.
To view the results:</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2018-07-19-ux-survey/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2018-07-19-ux-survey/</guid><description>Help us improve OONI Probe Thanks for using OONI Probe! We&amp;rsquo;re excited to hear more about your experience with OONI Probe so that we can improve it.
Please take a few minutes to complete our survey: https://ooniuxteam.typeform.com/to/a1P0cn
Alternatively, you can fill out the survey using Tor&amp;rsquo;s self-hosted version of it: https://storm.torproject.org/shared/VpAFK13fdAozTGTolFd2EsT1CkLY8-YlBLbRERy5EwI
Thank you!</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2020-01-16-wikipedia-turkey/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/msg/2020-01-16-wikipedia-turkey/</guid><description>Document the unblocking of Wikipedia Wikipedia is reportedly unblocked in Turkey, after having been blocked for more than 2 years.
Document this important development by testing Wikipedia domains with OONI Probe:
1 - Open your browser and type https://ooni.org/get-involved/run 2 - Tap on the Wikipedia button and open with the OONI Probe app 3 - Tap Run The results will automatically get published here: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2020-01-17&amp;amp;domain=www.wikipedia.org&amp;amp;probe_cc=TR</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/retired/labs/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/retired/labs/</guid><description>OONI labs has been retired The OONI Labs host has been retired for the time being as we plan to integrate work from it in OONI Explorer.
You can still find all the code for it here: https://github.com/ooni/labs
If you have any questions you can reach the OONI team on our slack or #ooni at irc.oftc.net.</description></item><item><title/><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-run/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-run/</guid><description>User Guide: OONI Run Last updated: 24th October 2024
OONI Run is a web platform that you can use to generate mobile deep links to coordinate OONI Probe website testing. Specifically, you can use OONI Run to create links for:
Testing websites (of your choice) for censorship; Coordinating website censorship testing with other OONI Probe users. OONI Run links only work with the OONI Probe mobile app. To learn how to use OONI Probe, please refer to our OONI Probe mobile app user guide.</description></item><item><title>Access Now</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/access-now/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/access-now/</guid><description>Access Now defends and extends the digital rights of users at risk around the world through policy and advocacy efforts. Every year, they host RightsCon, the world&amp;rsquo;s leading summit on human rights in the digital age.
Since 2016, Access Now&amp;rsquo;s #KeepItOn coalition — more than 300 organizations from 105 countries around the world — has been fighting internet shutdowns with all kinds of creative approaches, including grassroots advocacy, direct policy-maker engagement, technical support, corporate accountability, and legal intervention.</description></item><item><title>Annir Initiative</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/annir/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/annir/</guid><description>Annir Initiative is an independent, neutral, and non-political Libyan initiative focused on digital space matters in Libya. Annir focuses on spreading digital awareness and knowledge, advocating for digital rights and safety, and fighting misinformation.</description></item><item><title>Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/adc/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/adc/</guid><description>Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) is a civil society organization based in Argentina that, since its foundation in 1995, works to defend and promote civil and human rights in Argentina and Latin America.</description></item><item><title>Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/afte/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/afte/</guid><description>The Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) is a nongovernmental organization, registered in accordance with Egyptian law as a law firm since 2007. The association works to promote and protect freedom of expression and freedom of information. It uses research, legal support, monitoring of violations, and advocacy through its team of researchers and lawyers.
AFTE is concerned with a number of issues, such as: media freedom, digital rights, freedom of information, freedom of creativity, academic freedom, student rights and freedoms, the right to privacy.</description></item><item><title>Azerbaijan Internet Watch</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/azerbaijan-internet-watch/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/azerbaijan-internet-watch/</guid><description>Azerbaijan Internet Watch (AIW) is an online resource platform tracking and mapping internet censorship and surveillance in real-time in Azerbaijan.</description></item><item><title>Campaign for Human Rights &amp; Development International (CHRDI)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/chrdi/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/chrdi/</guid><description>The Campaign for Human Rights and Development International (CHRDI) is a development and human rights organisation (based in Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom) that utilizes rights based and voice and accountability approaches to bridge the justice and social equity gaps. They envision a world in which all people enjoy their human rights and live with dignity, equality, and justice.
CHRDI is in Special Consultative Status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOS) and accredited to many UN Agencies.</description></item><item><title>Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT), Strathmore University</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/cipit/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/cipit/</guid><description>The Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT) is an evidence-based research and training Centre based at Strathmore University, Nairobi, Kenya.
Their Mission is to study, create, and share knowledge on the development of intellectual property and information technology, especially as they contribute to African Law and Human Rights.
Their team is multidisciplinary, drawn from law, political science, computer science and development while using diverse methodological approaches to inform debates on ICT applications and regulation.</description></item><item><title>Coding Rights</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/coding-rights/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/coding-rights/</guid><description>Coding Rights are an organisation bringing an intersectional feminist approach to defend human rights in the development, regulation and use of technologies. They act collectively and in networks, use creativity and hacker knowledge to question the present and reimagine a future based on transfeminist and decolonial values.
Their mission is to expose and challenge technologies which reinforce power asymmetries, with focus on gender inequalities and its intersectionalities.
Openness, transparency, diversity, equality, privacy and freedom in the access and usages of technologies and in the interaction with governance processes are at the core of the development of a people-centered network and a democratic society.</description></item><item><title>Community Participation In Sustainable Development (COMPSUDEV) Cameroon</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/compsudev/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/compsudev/</guid><description>Community Participation in Sustainable Development (COMPSUDEV) is a non-profit association in Cameroon that sets out to empower youths and communities through sustainable livelihood programs in the domain of ICT and Open Access to the internet.
COMPSUDEV Cameroon is one of the pioneer members of the Cameroon Digital Rights Coalition working on digital security and censorship.
COMPSUDEV Cameroon is concerned with issues such as; right to privacy, information freedom, digital security, open internet, internet circumvention, digital rights and responsibilities and open data.</description></item><item><title>Computech Institute</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/computech/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/computech/</guid><description>Based in Dakar since 2015, Computech Institute is a research and training organization. Their activities focus on cybersecurity, disinformation and misinformation, internet shutdowns, promotion of digital rights and democracy through ICTs. The activities are run through technical training, awareness raising, research and advocacy.</description></item><item><title>Coordinating OONI censorship measurement campaigns</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-censorship-measurement-campaigns/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-censorship-measurement-campaigns/</guid><description>Last updated: 21st March 2023
Internet censorship around the world often emerges during political events, such as elections or protests. The abrupt emergence of new blocks requires rapid response in terms of measurement, particularly if the blocks are short-lived. Such measurement can help with the collection of data that can potentially serve as evidence of internet censorship, supporting the efforts of journalists, researchers, and human rights defenders challenging the blocks.</description></item><item><title>DefendDefenders</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/defenddefenders/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/defenddefenders/</guid><description>DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project) seeks to strengthen the work of human rights defenders (HRDs) throughout the East and Horn of Africa sub-region by reducing their vulnerability to the risk of persecution and by enhancing their capacity to effectively defend human rights. They work in Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia/Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
DefendDefenders serves as the secretariat of the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Network, which represents hundreds of members consisting of individual HRDs, human rights organisations, and national HRD coalitions.</description></item><item><title>Derechos Digitales</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/derechos-digitales/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/derechos-digitales/</guid><description>Derechos Digitales is an independent, non-profit organization of Latin American scope, founded in 2005 and whose main objective is the development, defense and promotion of human rights in the digital environment.
The organization&amp;rsquo;s work is concentrated on three fundamental axes:
Freedom of expression. Privacy and personal data. Copyright and access to knowledge. The mission of Derechos Digitales is the defense, promotion and development of human rights in the digital environment in Latin America, through the study and dissemination of information on public policies and private practices, to promote social change around the respect and dignity of people.</description></item><item><title>Digital Rights Foundation</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-rights-foundation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-rights-foundation/</guid><description>Digital Rights Foundation (DRF) is a feminist, not-for-profit organisation based in Pakistan working on digital rights freedoms since 2013. DRF envisions a place where all people, especially women and gender minorities, can exercise the right of expression without being threatened. DRF believes that a free internet with access to information and impeccable privacy policies can create safe online spaces for not only women but the world at large.
At DRF, we aim to strengthen the protections for human rights defenders (HRDs), with a focus on women’s rights in digital spaces through policy advocacy and digital security awareness-raising.</description></item><item><title>Digital Rights Lab</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/drlab/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/drlab/</guid><description>Digital Rights Lab is an independent and non-political non-profit Sudanese organization that focuses on enhancing online space in Sudan.
To this end, Digital Rights Lab works to:
Perform network measurements and analyze the network measurement data Advocate for Internet freedom Empower local communities in Sudan with the necessary information and tools to access the internet safely and privately to know about digital threats and how to combat them Provide digital security training to activists, human rights defenders, and journalists - including minority and marginalized groups Evaluate information online and fact-check it, in order to curb the spread of fake news and mis/mal/disinformation, especially during critical times, e.</description></item><item><title>Digital Rights Nepal</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-rights-nepal/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-rights-nepal/</guid><description>Digital Rights Nepal (DRN) is a non-profit organization dedicated to safeguarding and advancing digital rights in Nepal. Since its establishment in 2020, DRN has been at the forefront of advocating for online freedom of expression, privacy, data protection, and equitable access to information. The organization achieves this through rigorous research, impactful policy advocacy, and comprehensive capacity-building programs.
DRN tackles pressing issues such as disinformation, hate speech, and cybersecurity, while playing a key role in shaping inclusive internet governance and progressive cyber laws.</description></item><item><title>Digital Security Lab Ukraine</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-security-lab-ukraine/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-security-lab-ukraine/</guid><description>Digital Security Lab Ukraine managed efforts to establish a nationwide Internet censorship measurement system in Ukraine. In doing so, they engaged volunteers across different regions of Ukraine with the use of OONI Probe for censorship measurement, and they performed analysis of OONI data to uncover censorship events. They published several reports documenting their findings, showing how internet censorship varies across regions and networks within Ukraine.</description></item><item><title>Digital Society of Africa</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-society-of-africa/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digital-society-of-africa/</guid><description>Digital Society of Africa (DSA) works to strengthen the resilience and ability of frontline activists; human rights defenders and other at-risk groups in the region to independently recognize and respond to digital threats and attacks. They seek to achieve this using the holistic security approach; through a range of activities including: organisational security audits; risk assessment; trainings, sustainable security accompaniment; security policy formulation and tech support.</description></item><item><title>Digitally Right</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digitally-right/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/digitally-right/</guid><description>Digitally Right is a Bangladesh based company dedicated to promoting a free and open digital space through the use of research, analysis, and capacity building. They support civil society, media, and businesses with critical knowledge and solutions to help them navigate the ever-changing information ecosystem.</description></item><item><title>DNS consistency</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/dns-consistency/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/dns-consistency/</guid><description>This test compares the DNS query results from a DNS resolver which is considered to be reliable with one that is tested for tampering.
The domain name system (DNS) is what is responsible for transforming a host name (e.g. torproject.org) into an IP address (e.g. 38.229.72.16). ISPs, amongst others, run DNS resolvers which map IP addresses to host names. In certain circumstances though, ISPs map the wrong IP addresses to the wrong host names.</description></item><item><title>Download OONI Probe Desktop</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/install/desktop/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/install/desktop/</guid><description>Download OONI Probe for Windows Download OONI Probe for macOS Other Platforms &amp;raquo;
User Guide &amp;raquo;</description></item><item><title>Facebook Messenger test</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/facebook-messenger/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/facebook-messenger/</guid><description>This test is designed to examine the reachability of Facebook Messenger within a tested network.
OONI&amp;rsquo;s Facebook Messenger test attempts to perform a TCP connection and DNS lookup to Facebook&amp;rsquo;s endpoints over the vantage point of the user.
Based on this methodology, Facebook Messenger is likely blocked if one or both of the following apply:
TCP connections to Facebook&amp;rsquo;s endpoints fail
DNS lookups to domains associated to Facebook do not resolve to IP addresses allocated to Facebook</description></item><item><title>Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/faq/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/faq/</guid><description>This Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section aims to address the questions that we are frequently asked by the community.
Translations:
Español, Preguntas frecuentes (FAQ) العربية, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) فارسی, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Kiswahili, Maswali Yanayoulizwa Mara kwa Mara (MYM) Русский, Часто задаваемые вопросы Khmer, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) by DigitalHub101 Tiếng Việt, Trang Những Câu Hỏi Thường Gặp မြန်မာ, မကြာခဏ မေးမြန်းခံရလေ့ရှိသော မေးခွန်းများ Are there other questions you would like us to address?</description></item><item><title>Fundación Internet Bolivia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/fundacion-internet-bolivia.org/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/fundacion-internet-bolivia.org/</guid><description>Fundación Internet Bolivia aims to defend digital rights in Bolivia through the generation of knowledge and the promotion of good practices. Their vision is to achieve free, open and secure Internet access for the Bolivian population.</description></item><item><title>Fundación Karisma</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/karisma-foundation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/karisma-foundation/</guid><description>Fundación Karisma is a Colombian civil society organization that seeks to respond to the threats and opportunities that “technology for development” poses to the exercise of human rights.
In 2019, Fundación Karisma won the Index Censorship Freedom of Expression Award.</description></item><item><title>GitHub: Updating the Citizen Lab test lists</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/github-test-lists/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/github-test-lists/</guid><description>This guide is meant for GitHub users and provides information related to updating the Citizen Lab test lists for website censorship testing. If you are not a GitHub user, please refer to our Test Lists Editor.
By contributing to the Citizen Lab test lists, you can support website censorship testing by OONI Probe users around the world.
Before getting started, please refer to our documentation to learn all about test lists.</description></item><item><title>GLITCH</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/glitch/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/glitch/</guid><description>The Global Information Technology Controls Hub (GLITCH) is based at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. GLITCH brings together academics, organisations and other stakeholders researching digital rights, information controls, internet shutdowns, and censorship.
They take a highly interdisciplinary perspective on the study of information controls, bringing together quantitative and qualitative tools in the social sciences, statistics, and computer science to identify the root causes of censorship and shutdowns, and their wider effects on individuals and societies.</description></item><item><title>HTTP Header Field Manipulation</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-header-field-manipulation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-header-field-manipulation/</guid><description>This test tries to detect the presence of network components (“middle box”) which could be responsible for censorship and/or traffic manipulation.
HTTP is a protocol which transfers or exchanges data across the internet. It does so by handling a client&amp;rsquo;s request to connect to a server, and a server&amp;rsquo;s response to a client&amp;rsquo;s request. Every time you connect to a server, you (the client) send a request through the HTTP protocol to that server.</description></item><item><title>HTTP Host</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-host/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-host/</guid><description>This test attempts to:
examine whether the domain names of websites are blocked
detect the presence of “middle boxes” (software which could be used for censorship and/or traffic manipulation) in tested networks
assess which censorship circumvention techniques are capable of bypassing the censorship implemented by the “middle box”
HTTP is a protocol which transfers or exchanges data across the internet. It does so by handling a client&amp;rsquo;s request to connect to a server, and a server&amp;rsquo;s response to a client&amp;rsquo;s request.</description></item><item><title>HTTP Invalid Request Line</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-invalid-request-line/</guid><description>This test tries to detect the presence of network components (“middle box”) which could be responsible for censorship and/or traffic manipulation.
Instead of sending a normal HTTP request, this test sends an invalid HTTP request line - containing an invalid HTTP version number, an invalid field count and a huge request method – to an echo service listening on the standard HTTP port. An echo service is a very useful debugging and measurement tool, which simply sends back to the originating source any data it receives.</description></item><item><title>HTTP Requests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-requests/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/http-requests/</guid><description>This test tries to detect online censorship based on a comparison of HTTP requests over Tor and over the network of the user.
HTTP is a protocol which allows communication between a client and a server. It does so by handling a client&amp;rsquo;s request to connect to a server, and a server&amp;rsquo;s response to a client&amp;rsquo;s request. Every time you connect to a website, your browser (the client) sends a request through the HTTP protocol to the server which is hosting that website.</description></item><item><title>ICT Users Association (ASUTIC)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/asutic/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/asutic/</guid><description>ASUTIC a non-profit organization in Senegal that protects digital rights, promotes digital economy and digital ecology, and works to strengthen democracy through ICT.
They strive for getting people access to knowledge and information, key drivers for sustainable development to the benefit of everyone.
ASUTIC are mobilized for a strong and dynamic democracy through transparency, accountability of policy makers and citizen participation, based on gender equality. They work to relocate power from politicians to citizens.</description></item><item><title>Install OONI Probe CLI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/install/cli/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/install/cli/</guid><description>To install OONI Probe on the command line, follow the installation instructions for the platforms below:
Debian/Ubuntu
macOS
Upon installation, OONI Probe will run tests automatically every day!
For in depth usage instructions, check out the OONI Probe CLI user guide.</description></item><item><title>Install OONI Probe CLI on Debian/Ubuntu Linux</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/install/cli/ubuntu-debian/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/install/cli/ubuntu-debian/</guid><description>Install the GPG key: sudo gpg --no-default-keyring --keyserver hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com --keyring /etc/apt/keyrings/ooni-apt-keyring.gpg --recv-keys &amp;#39;B5A08F01796E7F521861B449372D1FF271F2DD50&amp;#39; You can choose how to fetch OONI Probe:
2.A) Using HTTP. This is the recommended option.
echo &amp;#34;deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/ooni-apt-keyring.gpg] https://deb.ooni.org/ unstable main&amp;#34; | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ooniprobe.list 2.B) Using Tor. This is an alternative option in case the HTTP repository is not reachable. This requires running the tor daemon on your system.
sudo apt-get install tor apt-transport-tor echo &amp;#34;deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/ooni-apt-keyring.</description></item><item><title>Install OONI Probe CLI on macOS</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/install/cli/macos/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/install/cli/macos/</guid><description> Install homebrew
Install ooniprobe
brew install ooniprobe Start automatic daily run ooniprobe autorun start</description></item><item><title>Install OONI Probe Mobile</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/install/mobile/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/install/mobile/</guid><description>Other Platforms &amp;raquo;
User Guide &amp;raquo;</description></item><item><title>Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/ifkz/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/ifkz/</guid><description>Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ) aims to ensure that the Internet of Kazakhstan is free from any unlawful censorship or restrictions and to create a user-friendly digital environment with the possibility to exercise all human rights and freedoms.
IFKZ focuses on:
Enhancing transparency of governmental authorities in the ICT industry Introducing selectable access to unlawfully restricted resources Analyzing the legal grounds for restricting access to websites Advocating for digital human rights and freedoms</description></item><item><title>Internet Outage Detection &amp; Analysis (IODA)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/ioda/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/ioda/</guid><description>The Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) project is run by the Internet Intelligence Research Lab, which is based at the Georgia Institute of Technology&amp;rsquo;s School of Computer Science in the College of Computing.
IODA monitors the Internet in near-realtime to identify macroscopic Internet outages affecting the edge of the network, i.e., significantly impacting a network operator (AS) or a large fraction of a country.
IODA combines information from three data sources, establishes the relevance of an event and generates alerts.</description></item><item><title>Internet Sans Frontières</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/internet-sans-frontieres/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/internet-sans-frontieres/</guid><description>Internet Sans Frontières is a non-profit organizations whose objective is to promote the free flow of information and knowledge, defend digital rights and freedoms and fight against all forms of censorship on connected networks.
Internet Sans Frontières has led advocacy efforts against internet shutdowns in West Africa.</description></item><item><title>Internet Society</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/internet-society/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/internet-society/</guid><description>The Internet Society is a global nonprofit empowering people to keep the Internet a force for good: open, globally connected, secure, and trustworthy. They believe that the Internet is for everyone. Their work centers on increasing the Internet’s reach, reliability and resilience, as well as ensuring that the Internet remains open, globally connected, secure, and trustworthy. To assess whether these efforts are working, they&amp;rsquo;re building Internet Society Pulse - a curated set of insights to help everyone gain deeper, data-driven insight into the health, availability and evolution of the global Internet.</description></item><item><title>Interpreting OONI data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/interpreting-ooni-data/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/interpreting-ooni-data/</guid><description>This documentation explains how you can interpret OONI data. It’s primarily intended for researchers interested in investigating internet censorship around the world. Knowledge of some internet basics (i.e how the internet works) is required, though you can also refer to the OONI Glossary for the explanation of relevant terms.
We also recommend referring to the OONI Explorer user guide for accessing OONI data.
OONI data What is OONI data? Types of OONI Probe tests How to access OONI data?</description></item><item><title>IPYS Venezuela</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/ipys-venezuela/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/ipys-venezuela/</guid><description>IPYS Venezuela works for a Venezuela where there is full enjoyment of freedom of expression and the right to information, and demands that the necessary guarantees to exercise free and plural journalism, allowing the scrutiny of power, be met.
For the advancement of this vision, and as an organization formed by professionals and defenders of communication, IPYS Venezuela promotes the development of journalists and communicators, as well as the establishment of conditions that guarantee an independent and vigilant investigative journalism.</description></item><item><title>Jordan Open Source Association (JOSA)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/josa/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/josa/</guid><description>The Jordan Open Source Association (JOSA) is a non-profit organization that works for the promotion and implementation of the Open Source principles in Jordan. JOSA organizes activities and leads initiatives in different fields, including Open Source software and hardware, Open Content and Free Culture, and digital rights.
JOSA’s main objectives are building a more open, collaborative Jordan, pushing technical skillset for the tech community in Jordan to a global caliber, ensure readiness of ICT graduates and defending Jordanians’ rights online.</description></item><item><title>Lantern</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/lantern/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/lantern/</guid><description>This test provides an automated way of examining whether Lantern works in a tested network.
Lantern is a centralized and peer-to-peer proxy, which is used as a circumvention tool. It detects whether websites are blocked and, if so, it allows you to access them via Lantern servers or via the network of Lantern users.
This test runs Lantern and checks to see if it is working. If it&amp;rsquo;s able to connect to a Lantern server and reach a control website over it, then we consider that Lantern can be used for censorship circumvention within the tested network.</description></item><item><title>Localization Lab</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/localization-lab/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/localization-lab/</guid><description>Localization Lab believes that language shouldn&amp;rsquo;t be a barrier when it comes to security and access to the Internet. Since 2012, they have helped expand the reach of Internet freedom tools by unlocking access to communities all over the world.
To this end, Localization Lab works to:
Expand the reach of Internet freedom technology and supporting materials.
Facilitate relationships between developers and end-users to increase the adoption of new technologies and ensure that community needs are being met.</description></item><item><title>Masaar - Technology and Law Community</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/masaar/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/masaar/</guid><description>Masaar are a group of lawyers and technologists interested in enhancing and promoting digital rights and associated freedoms in Egypt. They focus on merging law and technology and deepening their understanding of their impact on human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Masaar&amp;rsquo;s activities focus on digital freedoms in the context of the Egyptian law, but that will not isolate Masaar from the human rights situation in other countries in the region and the world.</description></item><item><title>Measure internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/install/all/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/install/all/</guid><description>Download OONI Probe Desktop Windows 64-bit macOS Install OONI Probe Mobile Install OONI Probe CLI Install instructions</description></item><item><title>Meek Fronted Requests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/meek-fronted-requests/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/meek-fronted-requests/</guid><description>This test examines whether the domains used by Meek (a type of Tor bridge) work in tested networks.
Meek is a pluggable transport which uses non-blocked domains, such as google.com, awsstatic.com (Amazon cloud infrastructure) and ajax.aspnetcdn.com (Microsoft azure cloud infrastructure), to proxy its users over Tor to blocked websites, while hiding both the fact that they are connecting to such websites and how they are connecting to them. As such, Meek is useful for not only connecting to websites that are blocked, but for also hiding which websites you are connecting to.</description></item><item><title>Miaan Group</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/miaan/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/miaan/</guid><description>Miaan Group is a nonprofit organization founded in 2019 to promote human rights, good governance, and social justice in Iran and the broader Middle East and North Africa region.
To achieve their goals, Miaan Group focus on three main areas:
Internet freedom and digital rights: Miaan Group works to counter threats posed by online censorship, surveillance, network disruption, and government harassment by empowering citizens, activists, and technologists. Capacity building and mentoring: Miaan Group provides local networks inside Iran and diaspora-based human rights defenders with legal and technical expertise, research, and advocacy support to strengthen civil society and human rights organizations.</description></item><item><title>Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/mido/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/mido/</guid><description>Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO) aims to promote the spread of ICT technology in rural areas of Myanmar and to improve people&amp;rsquo;s lives and knowledge.</description></item><item><title>NDT Speed Test</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/ndt/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/ndt/</guid><description>NDT (Network Diagnostic Test) is designed to measure the speed and performance of tested networks.
This network performance test was originally developed by The Internet2 Project and is currently maintained by Measurement Lab (M-Lab). NDT is designed to measure the speed and performance of networks by connecting to M-Lab servers close to the user, and by subsequently uploading and downloading random data. In doing so, NDT collects TCP/IP low level information that is useful to examining and characterizing the quality of the network path between the user and the mLab server.</description></item><item><title>Netalitica</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/netalitica/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/netalitica/</guid><description>Netalitica aims to improve the Citizen Lab’s test lists that network measurement tools (i.e. OONI Probe, Centinel) use to uncover blocking of websites. If network probes have evolved over the years, test lists for some countries and regions have seen little updates, which negatively affects the quality of collected measurements and wastes resources of testers on the ground.
Netalitica&amp;rsquo;s test list project aims to address these issues by updating the lists for select censorship hot spots around the world and advance recommendations for streamlining the process of updating lists.</description></item><item><title>OONI Code of Conduct</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/code-of-conduct/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/code-of-conduct/</guid><description>Last modified: October 18, 2022
Version: 1.2
OONI Code of Conduct OONI Code of Conduct Statement of Intent Unacceptable behaviors Inappropriate content and derogatory language Privacy of community members Unwelcome attention, including physical contact and sexual attention Personal attacks Disruptive behavior Unacceptable behavior has consequences Where to go for help License and attribution Statement of Intent A primary goal of the OONI community is to be inclusive of many different contributors and to build a welcoming and enjoyable environment.</description></item><item><title>OONI Data Policy</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/about/data-policy/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/about/data-policy/</guid><description>Last modified: October 15, 2024
Version: 1.6.0
This Data Policy discloses and explains what data the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) project (&amp;ldquo;we&amp;rdquo;, &amp;ldquo;us&amp;rdquo;, or &amp;ldquo;our&amp;rdquo;) collects, processes, stores and publishes relating to the users of its OONI Probe software (&amp;ldquo;you&amp;rdquo; or &amp;ldquo;your&amp;rdquo;). This Data Policy also outlines the data principles that govern OONI&amp;rsquo;s data practices.
Data Principles
1. Purpose Limitation
2. User Safety
3. User Control
4. Open By Default</description></item><item><title>OONI Glossary</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/glossary/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/glossary/</guid><description>Last updated: 3rd July 2023
This glossary contains brief explanations for terms used in OONI apps, methodologies, and research reports.
Translations:
Español, OONI Glosario العربية, OONI Glossary فارسی, OONI Glossary Kiswahili, OONI Faharasa Русский, OONI Глоссарий If you would like to see additional terms in this glossary, please open a pull request or send us an email.
API
AS
ASN
BGP
Blocklist
Block page
Caching
Circumvention tools
Client
Data processing pipeline</description></item><item><title>OONI Outreach Kit</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-outreach-kit/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-outreach-kit/</guid><description>Community engagement is at the heart of OONI’s work, as OONI data on internet censorship depends on people running OONI Probe around the world.
Interested in engaging your communities with OONI censorship measurement?
The OONI Outreach Kit includes materials that you are encouraged to use as part of your OONI community engagement efforts.
The OONI Outreach Kit is translated into Russian, French, Spanish, Swahili, Arabic, Farsi.
OONI Brochures OONI Probe Flyers and Leaflets OONI Explorer Flyers Internet Censorship Flyers OONI Screencasts OONI Workshop Slides OONI Resources OONI Brochures We provide 2 OONI brochures that include information about using OONI tools and data for investigating internet censorship around the world.</description></item><item><title>OONI Partnership Program</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/partnership-program/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/partnership-program/</guid><description>What is the OONI Partnership Program?
What is the aim of the OONI Partnership Program?
What does the OONI Partnership Program entail?
Collecting OONI Probe network measurements
Reviewing community resources for censorship measurement research
Communicating internet censorship findings to the public
Who can join the OONI Partnership Program?
How can OONI support its partners?
What is the OONI Partnership Program? The OONI Partnership Program is a collaboration between the OONI team and groups or organizations around the world on the study of internet censorship.</description></item><item><title>OONI Team</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/about/team/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/about/team/</guid><description> Arturo Filastò Executive Director &amp;amp; CTO
Twitter Email PGP Key Maria Xynou Director of Strategic Engagement
Twitter Email PGP Key Roberta Giassetti Director of Finance &amp;amp; Administration
Email Jessie Bonisteel Senior Project Manager
Email Norbel Ambanumben Mobile Developer
Email PGP Key Mehul Gulati Backend Developer
Email Maja Komel Frontend Engineer
Email PGP Key Elizaveta Yachmeneva Community Coordinator
Twitter Email PGP Key</description></item><item><title>Open Culture Foundation (OCF)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/open-culture-foundation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/open-culture-foundation/</guid><description>The Open Culture Foundation (OCF) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, founded in 2014 by several members of Taiwan’s open source community. Their main goal is to support local communities advocate the use of open technologies in broader sectors, including open source software, open hardware, and open data. They help government, enterprises, and NGOs better understand the benefits of adopting open source,and promote the importance of open data to the public sphere.</description></item><item><title>Open Net Korea</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/open-net-korea/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/open-net-korea/</guid><description>Founded in January 2013, Open Net Korea is a non-profit organization that aims to provide a forum for discussion and collaboration to explore effective policies and solutions in the following areas: Freedom of Expression, Freedom from Surveillance, Reforming Innovation-blocking Regulations, Net Governance and Neutrality, Open Data Policy, and Reforming the Intellectual Property Regime.
Open Net Korea is aspiring to become not only a legal and legislative advocacy organization that fights the regulations, but also a think tank that inquires into the reasons for these regulations and “thinks aloud” with the Korean public and the world on what has caused and what will prevent the Internet from becoming a “closed” circuit for some group of people, instead of “open network”.</description></item><item><title>Other ways to donate to OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/donate/other/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/donate/other/</guid><description>Thank you for your interest in supporting the OONI-verse!
Bank Transfer / SEPA You can donate to OONI by doing a wire transfer to the following bank information:
Beneficiary Name: Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) Beneficiary Address: Via Ostiense 131L, 00154, Rome, Italy Bank Name: Banca di Credito Cooperativo di roma (BCC Rome) Bank Street: Piazza Nicosia, 31 Rome 00186 Italy IBAN: IT85B0832703221000000005814 SWIFT Code: ICRAITRRROM If you require a donation receipt, please send us an email to giving@ooni.</description></item><item><title>OutRight Action International</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/outright-action-international/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/outright-action-international/</guid><description>OutRight Action International works at a global, regional and national level to eradicate the persecution, inequality and violence lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer (LGBTIQ) people face around the world. From its offices in 7 countries and headquarters in New York, OutRight builds capacity of LGBTIQ movements, documents human rights violations, advocates for inclusion and equality, and holds leaders accountable for protecting the rights of LGBTIQ people everywhere. OutRight has recognized consultative status at the United Nations.</description></item><item><title>Paradigm Initiative</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/paradigm-initiative/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/paradigm-initiative/</guid><description>Paradigm Initiative is a social enterprise that builds an ICT-enabled support system and advocates digital rights in order to improve livelihoods for under-served youth. Their programs include digital inclusion programs – such as the Life Skills, ICT, Financial Readiness, Entrepreneurship (LIFE) training program and Tertiary program – and a digital rights program, Magoyi. Across their offices in Nigeria (Aba, Abuja, Ajegunle, Kano, Yaba), Cameroon (Yaoundé), Kenya (Nairobi), and beyond,they work to connect under-served youth with improved livelihoods through their digital inclusion and digital rights programs.</description></item><item><title>Psiphon</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/psiphon/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/psiphon/</guid><description>About Psiphon Psiphon is a free and open source tool that utilizes VPN, SSH, and HTTP proxy technology for censorship circumvention. The Psiphon VPN essentially serves as a tunnel that enables you to circumvent censorship because you access resources on the internet through the non-censored tunnel that Psiphon provides.
In an attempt to limit censorship circumvention, some governments have blocked access to Psiphon. OONI has therefore developed an OONI Probe test that anyone can run to measure the reachability of the Psiphon app.</description></item><item><title>Psiphon</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/psiphon/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/psiphon/</guid><description>Since 2006, Psiphon has provided open access to the internet for millions of citizens around the world.
Psiphon is a free and open source tool that utilizes VPN, SSH, and HTTP proxy technology for censorship circumvention. The Psiphon VPN essentially serves as a tunnel that enables you to circumvent censorship because you access resources on the internet through the non-censored tunnel that Psiphon provides.
OONI collaborated with Psiphon on developing an OONI Probe test that measures whether the Psiphon app works in a tested network.</description></item><item><title>Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/r3d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/r3d/</guid><description>Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales (R3D) is a Mexican non-profit organization dedicated to the defense of human rights in the digital environment. They use various legal and communication tools to conduct policy research, strategic litigation, public advocacy and campaigns with the aim of promoting digital rights in Mexico. In particular, freedom of expression, privacy, access to knowledge and free culture.</description></item><item><title>RiseupVPN</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/riseupvpn/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/riseupvpn/</guid><description>About RiseupVPN RiseupVPN is a non-commercial, donation-based VPN service. It offers simple-to-use clients to secure your internet traffic against surveillance and to circumvent internet censorship. RiseupVPN doesn&amp;rsquo;t log any user data and doesn&amp;rsquo;t require registration. The software is based on LEAP VPN, an open source VPN solution, and is run by the Riseup collective which has been offering privacy-preserving online services for activists for more than 20 years.
RiseupVPN test The RiseupVPN test, contributed by the LEAP collective, provides an automated way of examining whether RiseupVPN works in a tested network.</description></item><item><title>Roskomsvoboda</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/roskomsvoboda/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/roskomsvoboda/</guid><description>Roskomsvoboda is a Russian public organization that operates in the sphere of digital rights protection and digital empowerment.
It stands for the ideas of privacy and anonymity, freedom of information and prohibition of censorship, self-regulation of the IT industry and digital entrepreneurship, openness of the state and public control over the digital activities of government agencies.
Roskomsvoboda provides and implements different tools (technical, legal, events) that help censorship circumvention and allow users access independent information.</description></item><item><title>SAFEnet</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/safenet/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/safenet/</guid><description>Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) is an Indonesian-based civil society organization working to defend digital rights in Southeast Asia. Since 2013, SAFEnet has been intensively monitoring digital rights violations, particularly in Indonesia, and supporting victims of the violation, as well as building capacity for CSOs about the issue and advocationg digital-related policy in the country.
Every year, SAFEnet publishes the Digital Rights Situation Report of Indonesia in Bahasa Indonesia and English, in addition of quarterly reports.</description></item><item><title>Signal test</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/signal/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/signal/</guid><description>About Signal Signal is a free and open source messaging app for encrypted voice calls and instant messages.
Signal provides security by encrypting communications in transit (end-to-end encryption) and by ensuring that past communications are secure even if encryption keys are stolen (forward secrecy). Several applications, such as WhatsApp, use the Signal protocol for encryption.
Signal test The OONI Probe Signal test is designed to measure the reachability of the Signal messaging app within a tested network.</description></item><item><title>Sinar Project</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/sinar-project/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/sinar-project/</guid><description>Sinar Project is a civic tech initiative using open technology, open data and policy analysis to systematically make important information public and more accessible to the Malaysian people. It aims to improve governance and encourage greater citizen involvement in the public affairs of the nation by making Parliament and Malaysian Government more open, transparent and accountable.
Sinar Project has worked across Southeast Asia to engage local communities with censorship measurement research.</description></item><item><title>Software Freedom Law Centre, India</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/sflc/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/sflc/</guid><description>Software Freedom Law Centre, India (SFLC.IN) is a donor supported legal services organisation that brings together lawyers, policy analysts, technologists, and students to protect freedom in the digital world. SFLC.IN promotes innovation and open access to knowledge by helping developers make great Free and Open Source Software, protect privacy and civil liberties for citizens in the digital world by educating and providing free legal advice and help policy makers make informed and just decisions with the use and adoption of technology.</description></item><item><title>Supporters &amp; Funders</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/about/supporters/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/about/supporters/</guid><description>Supporters are organisations or individuals who believe in OONI&amp;rsquo;s mission and have made significant in-kind donations to OONI in the last year. If you would like to become an OONI supporter, please reach out to us at giving@ooni.org.
Below we share a list of current and past OONI funders.
Octopus supporters Dolphin Supporters Seahorse Supporters Starfish Supporters This could be you! Donate now to support internet freedom By donating to OONI, you support: Free and open source software for detecting internet censorship Real-time analysis of internet censorship around the world Open data on internet censorship -- supporting global research and advocacy efforts Research on censorship events worldwide Donate Supporter tiers Octopus Octopuses have three hearts: two pump blood to the gills, while the third pumps it to the rest of the body.</description></item><item><title>TEDIC</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tedic/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tedic/</guid><description>The Association of Technology, Education, Development, Research, Communication (TEDIC) is an NGO that develops open civic technology and defends digital rights for a free culture on the Internet.
TEDIC promotes the use and development of free software and hardware, open design and open data. They seek for full compliance of civil rights on the Internet. They research, advocate and train in privacy, freedom of expression, network neutrality, copyright, among others.</description></item><item><title>Telegram test</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/telegram/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/telegram/</guid><description>This test is designed to examine the reachability of Telegram&amp;rsquo;s app and web version within a tested network.
More specifically, this test attempts to perform an HTTP POST request, and establish a TCP connection to Telegram’s access points (DCs), as well as an HTTPS GET request to Telegram&amp;rsquo;s web version (web.telegram.org) over the vantage point of the user. The test is triggered as blocking when connections to all access points defined in the test fail.</description></item><item><title>Test Lists: Contribute websites for censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/contribute-test-lists/</guid><description>Censorship findings are only as interesting as the sites and services that you test.
You can contribute websites for censorship testing through the following platforms:
Test Lists Editor (guide) GitHub (guide) Before contributing, please read the documentation below to learn all about test lists. We also recommend reading Netalitica&amp;rsquo;s Guidelines for Test List Researchers.
About test lists
What are test lists?
What aren&amp;rsquo;t test lists?
Types of test lists
Contributing to test lists</description></item><item><title>Thai Netizen Network</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/thai-netizen-network/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/thai-netizen-network/</guid><description>Thai Netizen Network is a leading non-profit organisation in Thailand that advocates for digital rights and civil liberties. Founded in December 2008, it grew out of a group of netizens who had concerns about limited internet freedom during post-coup governments.
Its activities are based on five themes: 1) access to information, 2) freedom of opinion and expression, 3) privacy, 4) participatory internet governance, and 5) rights over information resources. The Network is run by a small working group, with consultation from its members and an advisory board drawn from civil society, industry and academia.</description></item><item><title>Thanks for donating to OONI!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/donate/thanks/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/donate/thanks/</guid><description>Your donation means a lot to us, and it will help us support a global community fighting internet censorship.
To stay informed about OONI&amp;rsquo;s work, you can subscribe to the ooni-talk mailing list, follow us on Twitter, and join us on the OONI Slack channel.</description></item><item><title>The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tahurid/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tahurid/</guid><description>The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID) is an NGO in South Sudan working to promote and protect human rights and democracy through advocacy, capacity building, and legal representation in courts.
TAHURID aims to improve and safeguard the human dignity of every person by promoting and supporting the principles of democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance and public accountability in South Sudan.</description></item><item><title>The Centre for Internet &amp; Society (CIS)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/cis-india/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/cis-india/</guid><description>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives.
CIS has been actively involved in research and measurement of web censorship in India. CIS&amp;rsquo; past work includes critical analysis of the Indian government&amp;rsquo;s power to block online content, the different techniques used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to censor websites and the consistency of website blocklists across different ISPs in India.</description></item><item><title>The Citizen Lab</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/citizen-lab/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/citizen-lab/</guid><description>The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs &amp;amp; Public Policy, University of Toronto, focusing on research, development, and high-level strategic policy and legal engagement at the intersection of information and communication technologies, human rights, and global security.
They use a “mixed methods” approach to research combining practices from political science, law, computer science, and area studies. Their research includes: investigating digital espionage against civil society, documenting Internet filtering and other technologies and practices that impact freedom of expression online, analyzing privacy, security, and information controls of popular applications, and examining transparency and accountability mechanisms relevant to the relationship between corporations and state agencies regarding personal data and other surveillance activities.</description></item><item><title>The Tor Project</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tor-project/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tor-project/</guid><description>The Tor Project, Inc, became a 501(c)3 nonprofit in 2006, but the idea of &amp;ldquo;onion routing&amp;rdquo; began in the mid 1990s.
Just like Tor users, the developers, researchers, and founders who&amp;rsquo;ve made Tor possible are a diverse group of people. But all of the people who have been involved in Tor are united by a common belief: internet users should have private access to an uncensored web.
The Tor network, which is free and open source, provides its users with online anonymity, privacy, and censorship circumvention.</description></item><item><title>Thematic OONI Probe testing</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/run/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/get-involved/run/</guid><description>Social media, news websites, and VPNs often get blocked during political events (such as elections or protests) around the world.
To support rapid response to emergent censorship events, we share the following OONI Run buttons to enable the testing of specific types of websites.
Install the OONI Probe mobile app: Android, iOS, F-Droid
Tap the buttons below &amp;amp; open them with your OONI Probe mobile app (not with a browser)</description></item><item><title>Tor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/tor/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/tor/</guid><description>About Tor The Tor network, which is free and open source, provides its users with online anonymity, privacy, and censorship circumvention. Tor software is designed to bounce communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers around the world, thereby hiding its users’ IP addresses and enabling them to circumvent online tracking and internet censorship.
In an attempt to limit online anonymity and circumvention, some governments have blocked access to Tor.</description></item><item><title>Tor Bridge Reachability</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/tor-bridge-reachability/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/tor-bridge-reachability/</guid><description>This test examines whether Tor bridges work in tested networks.
Tor is free and open source software which enables online anonymity and censorship circumvention. It was designed to bounce communications around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers around the world, thus hiding users&amp;rsquo; IP address and circumventing online tracking and censorship. However, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in various countries around the world are often ordered by their governments to block users&amp;rsquo; access to Tor.</description></item><item><title>Tor Snowflake</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/tor-snowflake/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/tor-snowflake/</guid><description>About Tor Snowflake The Tor network, which is free and open source, provides its users with online anonymity, privacy, and censorship circumvention.
In an attempt to limit online anonymity and circumvention, some governments have blocked access to Tor. The Tor Project therefore created pluggable transports to help users (who can&amp;rsquo;t access the Tor network) circumvent Tor blocking.
Snowflake is a pluggable transport that proxies traffic through temporary proxies using WebRTC, a peer-to-peer protocol with built-in NAT punching.</description></item><item><title>Tuwindi</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tuwindi/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/tuwindi/</guid><description>Tuwindi is a non-partisan, non-profit Malian law organization. Their goal is to use information and communication technologies to support social and economic development. Their mission is to propell economic and social development through the innovative use of ICT communication and information technologies.</description></item><item><title>User Guide: OONI Explorer</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-explorer/</guid><description>Last updated: 15th March 2023
OONI Explorer is an open data resource on internet censorship around the world.
This user guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to use OONI Explorer to investigate internet censorship worldwide.
What you will get from this guide:
Learn how to use OONI Explorer to:
Discover blocked websites and apps around the world
Access measurement data that can serve as evidence of internet censorship
Generate charts based on aggregate views of OONI data</description></item><item><title>User Guide: OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-probe-cli/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-probe-cli/</guid><description>Last updated: 29th August 2022
OONI Probe CLI version: 3.9.2
OONI Probe is free and open source software that you can run to measure internet censorship and other forms of network interference.
This user guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to install and use the OONI Probe Command Line Interface (CLI).
You can run OONI Probe CLI on macOS, Debian/Ubuntu Linux, and on Raspberry Pis.
What you will get from this guide:</description></item><item><title>User Guide: OONI Probe Desktop App</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-probe-desktop/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-probe-desktop/</guid><description>Last updated: 25th October 2022
OONI Probe Desktop version: 3.7.0
Access the OONI Probe Desktop user guide in other languages: فارسی, Русский, Deutsch, Türkçe, Tiếng Việt, Português
OONI Probe is a free and open source app that you can use to measure internet censorship and other forms of network interference. This user guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to install, run, and customize your use of the OONI Probe desktop app.</description></item><item><title>User Guide: OONI Probe Mobile App</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-probe-mobile/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/ooni-probe-mobile/</guid><description>Last updated: 19th October 2022
OONI Probe Mobile version: 3.7.1
Access the user guide in other languages: فارسی, Русский, Deutsch, Türkçe, Tiếng Việt, မြန်မာ
OONI Probe is a free and open source app that you can use to measure internet censorship and other forms of network interference. This user guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to install, run, and customize your use of the OONI Probe mobile app.
What you will get from this guide:</description></item><item><title>User Guide: OONI Test Lists Editor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/support/test-lists-editor/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/support/test-lists-editor/</guid><description>Last updated: 7th September 2022
The OONI Test Lists Editor enables the public to review and contribute to the lists of websites (“test lists”) that are tested for censorship by OONI Probe users around the world.
This user guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to use the Test Lists Editor to review and contribute websites for censorship testing.
Upon reading this guide, we hope you will feel empowered to contribute to test lists!</description></item><item><title>Vanilla Tor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/vanilla-tor/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/vanilla-tor/</guid><description>This test measures the reachability of the Tor network (which is designed for online anonymity and censorship circumvention).
The Vanilla Tor test attempts to start a connection to the Tor network. If the test successfully bootstraps a connection within a predefined amount of seconds (300 by default), then Tor is considered to be reachable from the vantage point of the user. But if the test does not manage to establish a connection, then the Tor network is likely blocked within the tested network.</description></item><item><title>Venezuela Inteligente</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/venezuela-inteligente/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/venezuela-inteligente/</guid><description>Venezuela Inteligente is a non-profit organization that aims to facilitate information, communication and collaboration between citizens and civil society organizations to create impact from a non-partisan perspective. They promote, facilitate and develop digital tools, improving access to information, collaboration and responsiveness, empowering organizations, activists and citizens. They fight for the rights of Venezuelans online and offline.
Through their VEsinFiltro project, Venezuela Inteligente investigate and document internet censorship in Venezuela, using (along with custom scripts and tools) OONI Probe and OONI data.</description></item><item><title>WhatsApp test</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/whatsapp/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/whatsapp/</guid><description>This test is designed to examine the reachability of both WhatsApp&amp;rsquo;s app and the WhatsApp web version within a tested network.
OONI&amp;rsquo;s WhatsApp test attempts to perform an HTTP GET request, TCP connection and DNS lookup to WhatsApp’s endpoints, registration service and web version over the vantage point of the user. Based on this methodology, WhatsApp’s app is likely blocked if any of the following apply:
TCP connections to WhatsApp&amp;rsquo;s endpoints fail;</description></item><item><title>Zaina Foundation</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/partners/zaina-foundation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/partners/zaina-foundation/</guid><description>Founded in 2017, Zaina Foundation is a non-governmental, non-profit organization registered under NGO’s Act of 2002 with the aim of promoting digital rights in Tanzania.
Zaina Foundation’s vision is to empower women in technology through digital security and privacy capacity building, workshops and training. This is done by providing capacity building of digital security training to women and human rights defenders in Tanzania, localization and translation of open source tools in Swahili language in order to allow Swahili users to access secure tools for their communication.</description></item><item><title>Web Connectivity</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/web-connectivity/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 0000 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/nettest/web-connectivity/</guid><description>This test examines whether websites (included in the Citizen Lab test lists) are reachable and if they are not, it attempts to determine whether access to them is blocked by means of DNS tampering, TCP/IP blocking or by a transparent HTTP proxy.
Specifically, this test is designed to perform the following:
Resolver identification
DNS lookup
TCP connect
HTTP GET request
By default, this test performs the above (excluding the first step, which is performed only over the network of the user) both over a control server and over the network of the user.</description></item></channel></rss>