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Risk #15 - 12/6/2018

Introductions
  • Rich, Steven
Recap [0:58]
  • Quorum requires constant vigilance
  • Apathy and the need to inform MKR holders
  • Discussed vote purchasing and vote implication
  • Gov vote and Exec vote names are a bit confusing. Suggesting governance poll.
  • Executive vote comes from execution or implementation of code rather than the conventional management executive
Risk Teams. What does a good risk team look like? [4:05]
  • Longevity: Need to have a long time horizon
  • Transparency: differing levels of transparency will affect believability
  • Contribute their assessment of collateral for the system
Who can be a risk team? Who should be a risk team? [8:12]
  • Anyone, theoretically. Need to be a stakeholder at least, to provide proposals
  • The transparency and longevity are extensions of being a viable to sustain the participation in the system
Is there an issue of independence? Large CDP holders could be biased to their positions. [9:51]
  • All the biases are different points of view. We’re seeking as many points of view as possible.
  • Very few points of view will be without bias. The aggregate of the points of view will hopefully give a meshed view
  • Reproducible research is the most important factor for scientific governance
Longevity: Does a risk team have to be around for a while to participate or does the waiting increase over time? [13:34]
  • The weighting increases
  • Reputation value increases

#####Transparency: More transparent risk teams will raise their weighting as well? [14:52]

  • The process must be transparent
  • Ideally a tool will provide the code, the data. Let you play with it and try to break it
How is the weighting system applied to specific risk teams or proposals? [15:51]
  • The ecosystem will have supporting entities and submitting entities
  • Teams may perform functions besides submitting proposals, will also need approvals
  • We’ll need to bootstrap the how the weightings are attributed
Are the risk teams going to be independent from the Foundation? [19:05]
  • Ideally, they are completely independent
  • Risk team 0 is meant to be a template for future teams
Are constructs available to the community?
  • Nearly. Determining the best presentation format
How do we incentivize the risk teams? [23:05]
  • In the stability fee is a component that contributes to operating costs and compensating service providers
The ecosystem will grow around Maker through the stakeholders. Distributed risk teams is one component of the overall ecosystem [27:39]
How do we apply the contributions of the risk teams to the system? [29:15]
  • How do we include collateral and build the portfolio
    • Get risk teams in place and incentivize them (pay them)
    • Weighted payments based on contributions to the system
How do we go about paying them? What would terms potentially look like? [33:23]
  • Quantity of proposals and longevity of support would need to be considered
  • Accuracy (quality) would additionally be factored into the weighting
Are we contemplating a skin-in-the-game model? [35:35]
  • You must be a member of the community to put forward a proposal
  • Additionally skin-in-the-game is a plausible construct. Reputation is the biggest thing at stake initially
  • By the nature of flywheeling the process, we’ve elected not to prescribe any initial rules
Are we imagining risk teams as non profit organizations? [39:07]
  • Not likely, service provision is usually not done on an not-for-profit basis
When do you see risk teams outside of the foundation to be implemented? [39:51]
  • Launch MCD, get collateral approved through Risk Team 0, step through the process with dialogs
  • Shortly after an initial example or two there could be two to three entities participating within a few months
So there needs to be a clear Standard Operating Procedure for the risk governance? [41:23]
  • Following a framework to governance and understanding the framing around a worthy collateral-type and getting the dialog around it so the community can de-risk it and get it through a governance poll and eventually to an executive vote
What are the components of the stability fee? [43: 01]
  • Credit Risk, Operating Cost, Inflation component
How will the risk constructs from the independent teams be combined/weighted? [44:28]
  • Weighting is gathered through initial incentivized and reputation model
  • A risk team could be come corrupted, so risk teams could be incentivized to check other risk teams
Are there checks and balances in this function? [46:10]
  • Would inevitably centralize compliance
How will the debate occur through the voting process? [46:54]
  • The framework will help to standardize the tools so they can be consistently and effectively vetted
How will data be sourced to use in the risk assessment? [48:53]
  • Collect data directly
  • CoinMarketCap isn’t ideal, but it’s accessible
How can we prevent bad data? [50:22]
  • We’ll negotiate acceptable data sets and standardizing data usage