diff --git a/02-peer-protocol.md b/02-peer-protocol.md
index 28a32ff45..70f232022 100644
--- a/02-peer-protocol.md
+++ b/02-peer-protocol.md
@@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ A node:
     `your_last_per_commitment_secret` is correct for that
     `next_revocation_number` minus 1:
       - MUST NOT broadcast its commitment transaction.
-      - SHOULD fail the channel.
+      - SHOULD send an `error` to request the peer to fail the channel.
     - otherwise:
       - if `your_last_per_commitment_secret` does not match the expected values:
         - SHOULD fail the channel.
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ A node:
     `your_last_per_commitment_secret` is correct for that
     `next_revocation_number` minus 1:
       - MUST NOT broadcast its commitment transaction.
-      - SHOULD fail the channel.
+      - SHOULD send an `error` to request the peer to fail the channel.
       - SHOULD store `my_current_per_commitment_point` to retrieve funds
         should the sending node broadcast its commitment transaction on-chain.
     - otherwise (`your_last_per_commitment_secret` or `my_current_per_commitment_point`
@@ -1466,18 +1466,19 @@ Similarly, for the fundee's `funding_signed` message: it's better to
 remember a channel that never opens (and times out) than to let the
 funder open it while the fundee has forgotten it.
 
-`option_data_loss_protect` was added to allow a node, which has somehow fallen behind
-(e.g. has been restored from old backup), to detect that it's fallen-behind. A fallen-behind
-node must know it cannot broadcast its current commitment transaction — which would lead to
-total loss of funds — as the remote node can prove it knows the
-revocation preimage. The error returned by the fallen-behind node
-(or simply the invalid numbers in the `channel_reestablish` it has
-sent) should make the other node drop its current commitment
-transaction to the chain. This will, at least, allow the fallen-behind node to recover
-non-HTLC funds, if the `my_current_per_commitment_point`
-is valid. However, this also means the fallen-behind node has revealed this
-fact (though not provably: it could be lying), and the other node could use this to
-broadcast a previous state.
+`option_data_loss_protect` was added to allow a node, which has somehow fallen
+behind (e.g. has been restored from old backup), to detect that it has fallen
+behind. A fallen-behind node must know it cannot broadcast its current
+commitment transaction — which would lead to total loss of funds — as the
+remote node can prove it knows the revocation preimage. The `error` returned by
+the fallen-behind node should make the other node drop its current commitment
+transaction to the chain. The other node should wait for that `error` to give
+the fallen-behind node an opportunity to fix its state first (e.g by restarting
+with a different backup). If the fallen-behind node doesn't have the latest
+backup, this will, at least, allow it to recover non-HTLC funds, if the
+`my_current_per_commitment_point` is valid. However, this also means the
+fallen-behind node has revealed this fact (though not provably: it could be lying),
+and the other node could use this to broadcast a previous state.
 
 `option_static_remotekey` removes the changing `to_remote` key,
 so the `my_current_per_commitment_point` is unnecessary and thus
diff --git a/05-onchain.md b/05-onchain.md
index d4e136078..c2396d009 100644
--- a/05-onchain.md
+++ b/05-onchain.md
@@ -143,15 +143,14 @@ A node:
       sufficient fee:
         - SHOULD use this fee to perform a *mutual close*.
       - otherwise:
-      	- if the node knows or assumes its channel state is outdated it
-      	  -  MUST NOT broadcast its *last commitment transaction*. 
-      	  -  SHOULD send an `error`.
+      	- if the node knows or assumes its channel state is outdated:
+      	  - MUST NOT broadcast its *last commitment transaction*.
         - otherwise:
           - MUST broadcast the *last commitment transaction*, for which it has a
-        signature, to perform a *unilateral close*.
-          - MUST spend any `to_local_anchor` output, providing sufficient fees as incentive to include the commitment transaction in a block
-        Special care must be taken when spending to a third-party, because this re-introduces the vulnerability that was
-        addressed by adding the CSV delay to the non-anchor outputs.
+          signature, to perform a *unilateral close*.
+          - MUST spend any `to_local_anchor` output, providing sufficient fees as incentive to include the commitment transaction in a block.
+          Special care must be taken when spending to a third-party, because this re-introduces the vulnerability that was
+          addressed by adding the CSV delay to the non-anchor outputs.
           - SHOULD use [replace-by-fee](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0125.mediawiki) or other mechanism on the spending transaction if it proves insufficient for timely inclusion in a block.
 
 ## Rationale