Impact

A Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability was identified in the history page of triggered Canarytokens.

This permits an attacker who recognised an HTTP-based Canarytoken (a URL) to execute Javascript in the Canarytoken's history page (domain: canarytokens.org) when the history page is later visited by the Canarytoken's creator.

This vulnerability could be used to disable or delete the affected Canarytoken, or view its activation history. It might also be used as a stepping stone towards revealing more information about the Canarytoken's creator to the attacker. For example, an attacker could recover the email address tied to the Canarytoken, or place Javascript on the history page that redirect the creator towards an attacker-controlled Canarytoken to show the creator's network location.

Scope of impact

An attacker could only act on the discovered Canarytoken. This issue did not expose other Canarytokens or other Canarytoken creators.

Patches

The issue is patched on Canarytokens.org. We scanned the current Canarytokens.org database for signs of malicious exploitation and did not find any.

Users of self-hosted Canarytokens installations can update by pulling the latest Docker image (or any Docker image after sha-dc37895):

$ docker pull thinkst/canarytokens:latest