CHIPSEC ON NON-UEFI PLATFORMS

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CHIPSEC History

- CHIPSEC is a framework for analyzing the security of PC platforms including hardware, system firmware (BIOS/UEFI), and platform components.
- Originally developed by Yuriy Bulygin (@c7zero)
- First version of CHIPSEC was released in March 2014 at CanSecWest
- Currently used by firmware developers, system validation and system integrators

https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec.git

Current CHIPSEC Assumptions

- Runs on an Intel based platform
- Firmware has a threat model that is compatible with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)
- All platforms require the same level of security

Threat Model Assumptions

- Configuration Settings
  - Registers that can be locked should be programmed and locked
  - Non-Volatile data that is updatable from OS should be minimized
- Flash Access
  - Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) flash is runtime updateable
  - System Management Mode (SMM) or Protected Range (PRx) register are used to protect SPI flash
  - Flash programming matches guidance from Intel
- Others…

So What's the Problem?

- Different methods to secure the platform exist
  - Read Only (RO) backup firmware with forced recovery
  - Physical presence for update
  - RO firmware
- Platforms have different security requirements
  - Open Development System
  - High Assurance Critical System
- CHIPSEC modules do not comprehend different platforms requirements

Processing Results

- Know your platform
  - Understand the security assumptions of your platform
- Know your security requirements
  - Physical attack in scope
  - Develop and deploy custom firmware
- Understand why modules may be skipped

CHIPSEC Example

- CHIPSEC run on Chromebook in developer mode
  - Legacy Boot to Linux
  - Skylake Y processor
- Results Summary
  - Failure in bios_wp
  - Warnings in expected locations
  - UEFI tests skipped as expected
  - All others passed

Thanks to John Loucaides from Eclypsium for the log file.

False Positive Example in bios_wp

```
[x][ ========================================================================
[x][ Module: BIOS Region Write Protection
[x][ ========================================================================
[*] BC = 0x0000008D << BIOS Control (b:d.f 00:31.5 + 0xDC)
    [00] BIOSWE           = 1 << BIOS Write Enable
    [01] BLE              = 0 << BIOS Lock Enable
    [02] SRC              = 3 << SPI Read Configuration
    [04] TSS              = 0 << Top Swap Status
    [05] SMM_BWP          = 0 << SMM BIOS Write Protection
    [06] BBS              = 0 << Boot BIOS Strap
    [07] BILD             = 1 << BIOS Interface Lock Down
[-] BIOS region write protection is disabled!
```

- Failure due to different security model being used
  - SMM based protections disabled
  - Configuration locked (good)
- User needs to understand that this is not a real failure

What Can the Community Do?

- Discuss updates to CHIPSEC to support different threat models
  - Open an issue on GitHub for this
  - Looking for the community to provide guidance on implementation
- Create new modules or update existing modules to support multiple threat models
- Submit issues and pull requests on GitHub

https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec

Get Involved Today

Learn to write CHIPSEC modules and utility commands at my next talk.

- **Writing CHIPSEC Modules & Tools**

Participate:

https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec

Contact the Intel CHIPSEC Team:

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

Software