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@@ -12,6 +12,6 @@ summary: "How much competition should be allowed in the commons? This paper buil
 
 ##### Abstract
 
-Rising competition in the commons poses risks of resource depletion and congestion. This paper develops a dynamic empirical model to identify the drivers of excessive entry and investment, along with low rates of exit and divestment. Using data from the 19th-century American whaling industry, the estimated model reveals that uncoordinated behaviors of whaling firms caused substantial welfare losses. Perfect collusion could have reduced inefficiencies through internalizing externalities, but it would still result in a suboptimal allocation due to higher prices and lower consumer welfare. Derived from the social planner’s first-best allocation, an optimal tax policy would have prevented the tragedy of the commons while minimizing distortions from market power.
+Rising competition in the commons poses risks of resource depletion and congestion. This paper develops an empirical model of common-pool industry dynamics to identify the evolution of competition structure with resource transitions. Using data from the 19th-century American whaling industry, the estimated model reveals that uncoordinated behaviors of whaling firms caused substantial welfare losses over a century. Perfect collusion could have reduced inefficiencies through internalizing externalities, but it would still result in a suboptimal allocation due to higher markups. Derived from the social planner’s problem, a tax policy would have prevented the tragedy of the commons while minimizing distortions from market power.
 
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