feat: use 128 bits of randomness for blinding factors #155
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There were several exchanges about the perf implications vs security tradeoffs of 64 vs 128 bits of randomness for the blinding factor of
verifyMultipleAggregateSignatures
andaggregateWithRandomness
. You can find parts of that discussion on these two ethresearch posts.This is the original post by Vitalik that set the 64-bit value:
https://ethresear.ch/t/fast-verification-of-multiple-bls-signatures/5407/6
Here is the thread were it was discussed:
https://ethresear.ch/t/security-of-bls-batch-verification/10748/7
There were more discussions on the private Lodestar <> Research telegram as well. Those pertinent messages are below:
Performance Testing Results