Service Extension Callout (Envoy external processing) #2895
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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| name: Publish Service Extensions Callout images packages | ||
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| on: | ||
| push: | ||
| branches: | ||
| - 'flavien/service-extensions' | ||
| release: | ||
| types: | ||
| - published | ||
| workflow_dispatch: | ||
| inputs: | ||
| tag_name: | ||
| description: 'Docker image tag to use for the package' | ||
| required: true | ||
| default: 'dev' | ||
| commit_sha: | ||
| description: 'Commit SHA to checkout' | ||
| required: true | ||
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| permissions: | ||
| contents: read | ||
| packages: write | ||
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| jobs: | ||
| publish-service-extensions: | ||
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | ||
| steps: | ||
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| - name: Get tag name | ||
| id: get_tag_name | ||
| run: | | ||
| if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "release" ]; then | ||
| echo "::set-output name=tag::${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" | ||
| echo "Here1: tag=${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" | ||
| else | ||
| if [ -z "${{ github.event.inputs.tag_name }}" ]; then | ||
| echo "::set-output name=tag::dev" | ||
| echo "Here2: tag=dev" | ||
| else | ||
| echo "::set-output name=tag::${{ github.event.inputs.tag_name }}" | ||
| echo "Here3: tag=${{ github.event.inputs.tag_name }}" | ||
| fi | ||
| fi | ||
| echo "Finally: ${{ steps.get_tag_name.outputs.tag }}" | ||
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| - name: Checkout | ||
| uses: actions/checkout@v4 | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🟠 Code VulnerabilityWorkflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)Pin third party actions by hash, or at least by tag for trusted sourcesWhen using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path ( No pinned git ref means the action will use the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state. Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks. Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
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| if: github.event_name == 'release' | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ steps.get_tag_name.outputs.tag }} | ||
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| - name: Checkout | ||
| uses: actions/checkout@v4 | ||
| if: github.event_name != 'release' | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.commit_sha || github.sha }} | ||
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| - name: Set up Go 1.22 | ||
| uses: actions/setup-go@v5 | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🟠 Code VulnerabilityWorkflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)Pin third party actions by hash, or at least by tag for trusted sourcesWhen using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path ( No pinned git ref means the action will use the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state. Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks. Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
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| with: | ||
| go-version: 1.22 | ||
| id: go | ||
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| - name: Set up QEMU | ||
| uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🟠 Code VulnerabilityWorkflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)Pin third party actions by hash, or at least by tag for trusted sourcesWhen using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path ( No pinned git ref means the action will use the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state. Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks. Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
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| - name: Set up Docker Buildx | ||
| uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🟠 Code VulnerabilityWorkflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)Pin third party actions by hash, or at least by tag for trusted sourcesWhen using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path ( No pinned git ref means the action will use the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state. Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks. Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
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| - name: Login to Docker | ||
| shell: bash | ||
| run: docker login -u publisher -p ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} ghcr.io | ||
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| - name: Build and push [dev] | ||
| id: build-dev | ||
| if: github.event_name != 'release' | ||
| uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🟠 Code VulnerabilityWorkflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)Pin third party actions by hash, or at least by tag for trusted sourcesWhen using a third party action, one needs to provide its GitHub path ( No pinned git ref means the action will use the latest commit of the default branch each time it runs, eventually running newer versions of the code that were not audited by Datadog. Specifying a git tag is better, but since they are not immutable, using a full length hash is recommended to make sure the action content is actually frozen to some reviewed state. Be careful however, as even pinning an action by hash can be circumvented by attackers still. For instance, if an action relies on a Docker image which is itself not pinned to a digest, it becomes possible to alter its behaviour through the Docker image without actually changing its hash. You can learn more about this kind of attacks in Unpinnable Actions: How Malicious Code Can Sneak into Your GitHub Actions Workflows. Pinning actions by hash is still a good first line of defense against supply chain attacks. Additionally, pinning by hash or tag means the action won’t benefit from newer version updates if any, including eventual security patches. Make sure to regularly check if newer versions for an action you use are available. For actions coming from a very trustworthy source, it can make sense to use a laxer pinning policy to benefit from updates as soon as possible.
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| with: | ||
| context: . | ||
| file: ./contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions/Dockerfile | ||
| platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64 | ||
| push: true | ||
| tags: | # Use the commit SHA from the manual trigger or default to the SHA from the push event | ||
| ghcr.io/datadog/dd-trace-go/service-extensions-callout:${{ steps.get_tag_name.outputs.tag }} | ||
| ghcr.io/datadog/dd-trace-go/service-extensions-callout:${{ github.event.inputs.commit_sha || github.sha }} | ||
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| - name: Build and push [release] | ||
| id: build-release | ||
| if: github.event_name == 'release' | ||
| uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🟠 Code VulnerabilityWorkflow depends on a GitHub actions pinned by tag (...read more)
|
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| with: | ||
| context: . | ||
| file: ./contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions/Dockerfile | ||
| platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64 | ||
| push: true | ||
| tags: | | ||
| ghcr.io/datadog/dd-trace-go/service-extensions-callout:latest | ||
| ghcr.io/datadog/dd-trace-go/service-extensions-callout:${{ steps.get_tag_name.outputs.tag }} | ||
| ghcr.io/datadog/dd-trace-go/service-extensions-callout:${{ github.sha }} | ||
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1 @@ | ||
| serviceextensions |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ | ||
| # Build stage | ||
| FROM golang:1.22-alpine AS builder | ||
| ENV CGO_ENABLED=1 | ||
| WORKDIR /app | ||
| COPY . . | ||
| RUN apk add --no-cache --update git build-base | ||
| RUN go build -o ./contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions/serviceextensions ./contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions | ||
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| # Runtime stage | ||
| FROM alpine:3.20.3 | ||
| RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates tzdata libc6-compat libgcc libstdc++ | ||
| WORKDIR /app | ||
| COPY --from=builder /app/contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions/serviceextensions /app/serviceextensions | ||
| COPY ./contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions/localhost.crt /app/localhost.crt | ||
| COPY ./contrib/envoyproxy/envoy/cmd/serviceextensions/localhost.key /app/localhost.key | ||
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| EXPOSE 80 | ||
| EXPOSE 443 | ||
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| CMD ["./serviceextensions"] |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ | ||
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | ||
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| OqXIn8E1it+6d5gOZfuHawcNGhRLplE/pfA= | ||
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ | ||
| -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | ||
| MIIEogIBAAKCAQEArQltE47oJyFLvARFSGL3TD/v9hhDUA42YWfHikeQuraAxm4I | ||
| 7A7bfxsSEgIOHIO9HyL8tF6JZxj2aHb3xwzOJSe8hwTnWQ/E10KBOqJEex2bi1Cd | ||
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| h2eAQ0u8GN6tN9C4t8Kp4a3y6FGsxgu+UTxdnL3YQ+yHAVhtCzo= | ||
| -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ | ||
| package main | ||
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| import ( | ||
| "crypto/tls" | ||
| "gopkg.in/DataDog/dd-trace-go.v1/contrib/envoyproxy/envoy" | ||
| "gopkg.in/DataDog/dd-trace-go.v1/internal/log" | ||
| "gopkg.in/DataDog/dd-trace-go.v1/internal/version" | ||
| "net" | ||
| "net/http" | ||
| "os" | ||
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| extproc "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/service/ext_proc/v3" | ||
| "github.com/gorilla/mux" | ||
| "google.golang.org/grpc" | ||
| "google.golang.org/grpc/credentials" | ||
| "google.golang.org/grpc/reflection" | ||
| "gopkg.in/DataDog/dd-trace-go.v1/ddtrace/tracer" | ||
| ) | ||
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| // AppsecCalloutExtensionService defines the struct that follows the ExternalProcessorServer interface. | ||
| type AppsecCalloutExtensionService struct { | ||
| extproc.ExternalProcessorServer | ||
| } | ||
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| type serviceExtensionConfig struct { | ||
| extensionPort string | ||
| extensionHost string | ||
| healthcheckPort string | ||
| } | ||
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| func loadConfig() serviceExtensionConfig { | ||
| extensionPort := os.Getenv("DD_SERVICE_EXTENSION_PORT") | ||
| if extensionPort == "" { | ||
| extensionPort = "443" | ||
| } | ||
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| extensionHost := os.Getenv("DD_SERVICE_EXTENSION_HOST") | ||
| if extensionHost == "" { | ||
| extensionHost = "0.0.0.0" | ||
| } | ||
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| healthcheckPort := os.Getenv("DD_SERVICE_EXTENSION_HEALTHCHECK_PORT") | ||
| if healthcheckPort == "" { | ||
| healthcheckPort = "80" | ||
| } | ||
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| return serviceExtensionConfig{ | ||
| extensionPort: extensionPort, | ||
| extensionHost: extensionHost, | ||
| healthcheckPort: healthcheckPort, | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| func main() { | ||
| var extensionService AppsecCalloutExtensionService | ||
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| // Force set ASM as enabled only if the environment variable is not set | ||
| // Note: If the environment variable is set to false, it should be disabled | ||
| if os.Getenv("DD_APPSEC_ENABLED") == "" { | ||
| if err := os.Setenv("DD_APPSEC_ENABLED", "1"); err != nil { | ||
| log.Error("service_extension: failed to set DD_APPSEC_ENABLED environment variable: %v\n", err) | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| // TODO: Enable ASM standalone mode when it is developed (should be done for Q4 2024) | ||
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| // Set the DD_VERSION to the current tracer version if not set | ||
| if os.Getenv("DD_VERSION") == "" { | ||
| if err := os.Setenv("DD_VERSION", version.Tag); err != nil { | ||
| log.Error("service_extension: failed to set DD_VERSION environment variable: %v\n", err) | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| config := loadConfig() | ||
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| tracer.Start() | ||
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| go StartGPRCSsl(&extensionService, config) | ||
| log.Info("service_extension: callout gRPC server started on %s:%s\n", config.extensionHost, config.extensionPort) | ||
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| go startHealthCheck(config) | ||
| log.Info("service_extension: health check server started on %s:%s\n", config.extensionHost, config.healthcheckPort) | ||
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| select {} | ||
| } | ||
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| func startHealthCheck(config serviceExtensionConfig) { | ||
| muxServer := mux.NewRouter() | ||
| muxServer.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { | ||
| w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") | ||
| _, err := w.Write([]byte(`{"status": "ok", "library": {"language": "golang", "version": "` + version.Tag + `"}}`)) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) | ||
| return | ||
| } | ||
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| w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) | ||
| }) | ||
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| server := &http.Server{ | ||
| Addr: config.extensionHost + ":" + config.healthcheckPort, | ||
| Handler: muxServer, | ||
| } | ||
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| println(server.ListenAndServe()) | ||
| } | ||
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| func StartGPRCSsl(service extproc.ExternalProcessorServer, config serviceExtensionConfig) { | ||
| cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair("localhost.crt", "localhost.key") | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| log.Error("Failed to load key pair: %v\n", err) | ||
| } | ||
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| lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", config.extensionHost+":"+config.extensionPort) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| log.Error("Failed to listen: %v\n", err) | ||
| } | ||
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| si := envoy.StreamServerInterceptor() | ||
| creds := credentials.NewServerTLSFromCert(&cert) | ||
| grpcServer := grpc.NewServer(grpc.StreamInterceptor(si), grpc.Creds(creds)) | ||
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| extproc.RegisterExternalProcessorServer(grpcServer, service) | ||
| reflection.Register(grpcServer) | ||
| if err := grpcServer.Serve(lis); err != nil { | ||
| log.Error("service_extension: failed to serve gRPC: %v\n", err) | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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🟠 Code Vulnerability
No explicit permissions set for at the workflow level (...read more)
Check the permissions granted to jobs
Datadog’s GitHub organization defines default permissions for the
GITHUB_TOKENto be restricted (contents:read,metadata:readandpackages:read).Your repository may require different setup, but please consider defining permissions for each job following the least privilege principle to restrict the impact of a possible compromission.
You can find the list of all possible permissions in Workflow syntax for GitHub Actions - GitHub Docs. Please note they can be defined at the job or the workflow level.