Summary
An unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty.
When loaded on an Windows application, Netty attemps to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash.
Details
When the library netty is loaded in a java windows application, the library tries to identify the system environnement in which it is executed.
At this stage, Netty tries to load both /etc/os-release
and /usr/lib/os-release
even though it is in a Windows environment.
If netty finds this files, it reads them and loads them into memory.
By default :
- The JVM maximum memory size is set to 1 GB,
- A non-privileged user can create a directory at
C:\
and create files within it.
the source code identified :
https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/4.1/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/internal/PlatformDependent.java
Despite the implementation of the function normalizeOs()
the source code not verify the OS before reading C:\etc\os-release
and C:\usr\lib\os-release
.
PoC
Create a file larger than 1 GB of data in C:\etc\os-release
or C:\usr\lib\os-release
on a Windows environnement and start your Netty application.
To observe what the application does with the file, the security analyst used "Process Monitor" from the "Windows SysInternals" suite. (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/)
cd C:\etc
fsutil file createnew os-release 3000000000
The source code used is the Netty website code example : Echo ‐ the very basic client and server.
The vulnerability was tested on the 4.1.112.Final version.
The security analyst tried the same technique for C:\proc\sys\net\core\somaxconn
with a lot of values to impact Netty but the only things that works is the "larger than 1 GB file" technique. https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/c0fdb8e9f8f256990e902fcfffbbe10754d0f3dd/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/NetUtil.java#L186
Impact
By loading the "file larger than 1 GB" into the memory, the Netty library exceeds the JVM memory limit and causes a crash in the java Windows application.
This behaviour occurs 100% of the time in both Server mode and Client mode if the large file exists.
Client mode :
Server mode :
somaxconn :
Severity
- Attack vector : "Local" because the attacker needs to be on the system where the Netty application is running.
- Attack complexity : "Low" because the attacker only need to create a massive file (regardless of its contents).
- Privileges required : "Low" because the attacker requires a user account to exploit the vulnerability.
- User intercation : "None" because the administrator don't need to accidentally click anywhere to trigger the vulnerability. Furthermore, the exploitation works with defaults windows/AD settings.
- Scope : "Unchanged" because only Netty is affected by the vulnerability.
- Confidentiality : "None" because no data is exposed through exploiting the vulnerability.
- Integrity : "None" because the explotation of the vulnerability does not allow editing, deleting or adding data elsewhere.
- Availability : "High" because the exploitation of this vulnerability crashes the entire java application.
References
Summary
An unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty.
When loaded on an Windows application, Netty attemps to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash.
Details
When the library netty is loaded in a java windows application, the library tries to identify the system environnement in which it is executed.
At this stage, Netty tries to load both
/etc/os-release
and/usr/lib/os-release
even though it is in a Windows environment.If netty finds this files, it reads them and loads them into memory.
By default :
C:\
and create files within it.the source code identified :
https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/4.1/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/internal/PlatformDependent.java
Despite the implementation of the function
normalizeOs()
the source code not verify the OS before readingC:\etc\os-release
andC:\usr\lib\os-release
.PoC
Create a file larger than 1 GB of data in
C:\etc\os-release
orC:\usr\lib\os-release
on a Windows environnement and start your Netty application.To observe what the application does with the file, the security analyst used "Process Monitor" from the "Windows SysInternals" suite. (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/)
The source code used is the Netty website code example : Echo ‐ the very basic client and server.
The vulnerability was tested on the 4.1.112.Final version.
The security analyst tried the same technique for
C:\proc\sys\net\core\somaxconn
with a lot of values to impact Netty but the only things that works is the "larger than 1 GB file" technique. https://github.com/netty/netty/blob/c0fdb8e9f8f256990e902fcfffbbe10754d0f3dd/common/src/main/java/io/netty/util/NetUtil.java#L186Impact
By loading the "file larger than 1 GB" into the memory, the Netty library exceeds the JVM memory limit and causes a crash in the java Windows application.
This behaviour occurs 100% of the time in both Server mode and Client mode if the large file exists.
Client mode :
Server mode :
somaxconn :
Severity
References