allow longer line

foundry.toml

@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ optimizer_runs = 999999
 
 [fmt]
 sort_imports = true
-wrap_comments = true
+wrap_comments = true
+line_length = 140

src/WebAuthn.sol

@@ -64,52 +64,35 @@ library WebAuthn {
     ///
     ///      Specifically, we do verify the following:
     ///         - Verify that authenticatorData (which comes from the authenticator, such as iCloud Keychain) indicates
-    ///           a well-formed assertion with the user present bit set. If `requireUV` is set, checks that the
-    /// authenticator
-    ///           enforced user verification. User verification should be required if, and only if,
-    /// options.userVerification
+    ///           a well-formed assertion with the user present bit set. If `requireUV` is set, checks that the authenticator
+    ///           enforced user verification. User verification should be required if, and only if, options.userVerification
     ///           is set to required in the request.
-    ///         - Verifies that the client JSON is of type "webauthn.get", i.e. the client was responding to a request
-    /// to
+    ///         - Verifies that the client JSON is of type "webauthn.get", i.e. the client was responding to a request to
     ///           assert authentication.
     ///         - Verifies that the client JSON contains the requested challenge.
-    ///         - Verifies that (r, s) constitute a valid signature over both the authenicatorData and client JSON, for
-    /// public
+    ///         - Verifies that (r, s) constitute a valid signature over both the authenicatorData and client JSON, for public
     ///            key (x, y).
     ///
     ///      We make some assumptions about the particular use case of this verifier, so we do NOT verify the following:
-    ///         - Does NOT verify that the origin in the `clientDataJSON` matches the Relying Party's origin: tt is
-    /// considered
+    ///         - Does NOT verify that the origin in the `clientDataJSON` matches the Relying Party's origin: tt is considered
     ///           the authenticator's responsibility to ensure that the user is interacting with the correct RP. This is
-    ///           enforced by most high quality authenticators properly, particularly the iCloud Keychain and Google
-    /// Password
+    ///           enforced by most high quality authenticators properly, particularly the iCloud Keychain and Google Password
     ///           Manager were tested.
-    ///         - Does NOT verify That `topOrigin` in `clientDataJSON` is well-formed: We assume it would never be
-    /// present, i.e.
-    ///           the credentials are never used in a cross-origin/iframe context. The website/app set up should
-    /// disallow
-    ///           cross-origin usage of the credentials. This is the default behaviour for created credentials in common
-    /// settings.
-    ///         - Does NOT verify that the `rpIdHash` in `authenticatorData` is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected
-    /// by the Relying
-    ///           Party: this means that we rely on the authenticator to properly enforce credentials to be used only by
-    /// the correct RP.
-    ///           This is generally enforced with features like Apple App Site Association and Google Asset Links. To
-    /// protect from
-    ///           edge cases in which a previously-linked RP ID is removed from the authorised RP IDs, we recommend that
-    /// messages
+    ///         - Does NOT verify That `topOrigin` in `clientDataJSON` is well-formed: We assume it would never be present, i.e.
+    ///           the credentials are never used in a cross-origin/iframe context. The website/app set up should disallow
+    ///           cross-origin usage of the credentials. This is the default behaviour for created credentials in common settings.
+    ///         - Does NOT verify that the `rpIdHash` in `authenticatorData` is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying
+    ///           Party: this means that we rely on the authenticator to properly enforce credentials to be used only by the correct RP.
+    ///           This is generally enforced with features like Apple App Site Association and Google Asset Links. To protect from
+    ///           edge cases in which a previously-linked RP ID is removed from the authorised RP IDs, we recommend that messages
     ///           signed by the authenticator include some expiry mechanism.
-    ///         - Does NOT verify the credential backup state: this assumes the credential backup state is NOT used as
-    /// part of Relying
+    ///         - Does NOT verify the credential backup state: this assumes the credential backup state is NOT used as part of Relying
     ///           Party business logic or policy.
-    ///         - Does NOT verify the values of the client extension outputs: this assumes that the Relying Party does
-    /// not use client
+    ///         - Does NOT verify the values of the client extension outputs: this assumes that the Relying Party does not use client
     ///           extension outputs.
-    ///         - Does NOT verify the signature counter: signature counters are intended to enable risk scoring for the
-    /// Relying Party.
+    ///         - Does NOT verify the signature counter: signature counters are intended to enable risk scoring for the Relying Party.
     ///           This assumes risk scoring is not used as part of Relying Party business logic or policy.
-    ///         - Does NOT verify the attestation object: this assumes that response.attestationObject is NOT present in
-    /// the response,
+    ///         - Does NOT verify the attestation object: this assumes that response.attestationObject is NOT present in the response,
     ///           i.e. the RP does not intend to verify an attestation.
     ///
     /// @param challenge    The challenge that was provided by the relying party.
@@ -138,9 +121,8 @@ library WebAuthn {
 
         // 12. Verify that the value of C.challenge equals the base64url encoding of options.challenge.
         bytes memory expectedChallenge = bytes(string.concat('"challenge":"', Base64.encodeURL(challenge), '"'));
-        string memory actualChallenge = webAuthnAuth.clientDataJSON.slice(
-            webAuthnAuth.challengeIndex, webAuthnAuth.challengeIndex + expectedChallenge.length
-        );
+        string memory actualChallenge =
+            webAuthnAuth.clientDataJSON.slice(webAuthnAuth.challengeIndex, webAuthnAuth.challengeIndex + expectedChallenge.length);
         if (keccak256(bytes(actualChallenge)) != keccak256(expectedChallenge)) {
             return false;
         }

test/Utils.sol

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ library Utils {
         string memory challengeb64url = Base64Url.encode(abi.encode(challenge));
         string memory clientDataJSON = string(
             abi.encodePacked(
-                '{"type":"webauthn.get","challenge":"',
-                challengeb64url,
-                '","origin":"https://sign.coinbase.com","crossOrigin":false}'
+                '{"type":"webauthn.get","challenge":"', challengeb64url, '","origin":"https://sign.coinbase.com","crossOrigin":false}'
             )
         );
 

test/WebAuthn.t.sol

@@ -30,9 +30,7 @@ contract WebAuthnTest is Test {
         WebAuthn.WebAuthnAuth memory auth = WebAuthn.WebAuthnAuth({
             authenticatorData: hex"49960de5880e8c687434170f6476605b8fe4aeb9a28632c7995cf3ba831d9763050000010a",
             clientDataJSON: string.concat(
-                '{"type":"webauthn.get","challenge":"',
-                Base64Url.encode(challenge),
-                '","origin":"http://localhost:3005","crossOrigin":false}'
+                '{"type":"webauthn.get","challenge":"', Base64Url.encode(challenge), '","origin":"http://localhost:3005","crossOrigin":false}'
             ),
             challengeIndex: 23,
             typeIndex: 1,

test/Webauthn.fuzz.t.sol

@@ -175,9 +175,7 @@ contract WebAuthnFuzzTest is Test {
         webAuthnAuth = WebAuthn.WebAuthnAuth({
             authenticatorData: abi.decode(json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".authenticator_data")), (bytes)),
             clientDataJSON: abi.decode(json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".client_data_json.json")), (string)),
-            challengeIndex: abi.decode(
-                json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".client_data_json.challenge_index")), (uint256)
-            ),
+            challengeIndex: abi.decode(json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".client_data_json.challenge_index")), (uint256)),
             typeIndex: abi.decode(json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".client_data_json.type_index")), (uint256)),
             r: abi.decode(json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".r")), (uint256)),
             s: abi.decode(json.parseRaw(string.concat(jsonCaseSelector, ".s")), (uint256))