Add anti nonce-sidechannel protocol to schnorrsigs #572
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jonasnick
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rebased on #558 |
instagibbs
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Dec 11, 2018
…ning, verification and batch verification. [0] https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.mediawiki
…eaks of public keys. The functionality is not exposed.
…chnorr do sign-to-contract commitments if an s2c context is provided as nonce data
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The sign-to-contract functionality is not split off into new PR #588. |
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Closing in favor of #590 |
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Based on #588.
Adding anti nonce-sidechannel functionality was a request in the schnorrsig module PR. The use case is to prevent a signing device from exfiltrating the secret signing keys through biased signature nonces, for example after a bad firmware update. It uses sign-to-contract commitments to host supplied randomness which forces the signer to randomize the nonce.
In order to add more sign-to-contract commitments the host can create a merkle tree of data to be committed and randomness and send that to the signing device as "host randomness".
See https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/572/files#diff-b19c5ee427283d4d82bc5beb4e2f4777R59 for the workflow.