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Added sgx feature for rand with no-std #764

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Added sgx feature for rand with no-std #764

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6669766
Added rust-sgx feature for rand
elichai Jan 17, 2019
9bd37dd
Remove unstable features
elichai Jan 17, 2019
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5 changes: 5 additions & 0 deletions Cargo.toml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -303,6 +303,10 @@ libc = { version = "0.2.45" }
[target.'cfg(any(target_os = "redox", all(unix, not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")))))'.dependencies]
lazy_static = "1.2"


[target.'cfg(not(target_env = "sgx"))'.dependencies]
sgx_trts = { version = "1.0.4", optional = true }

# Keep this in sync with `[dependencies]` in pregenerate_asm/Cargo.toml.
[build-dependencies]
cc = "1.0.26"
Expand All @@ -315,6 +319,7 @@ internal_benches = []
slow_tests = []
test_logging = []
use_heap = []
sgx = ["sgx_trts"]

# XXX: debug = false because of https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/34122

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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions src/aead.rs
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Expand Up @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
//! [AEAD]: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/oem.html
//! [`crypto.cipher.AEAD`]: https://golang.org/pkg/crypto/cipher/#AEAD



use self::block::{Block, BLOCK_LEN};
use crate::{
constant_time, cpu, error,
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1 change: 0 additions & 1 deletion src/cpu.rs
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Expand Up @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.

#[inline(always)]
pub fn cache_detected_features() {
#[cfg(not(target_os = "ios"))]
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4 changes: 3 additions & 1 deletion src/lib.rs
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Expand Up @@ -67,14 +67,16 @@
not(feature = "use_heap"),
unix,
not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios")),
any(not(target_os = "linux"), feature = "dev_urandom_fallback")
any(not(target_os = "linux"), feature = "dev_urandom_fallback", feature = "sgx")
)
),
no_std
)]

#![cfg_attr(feature = "internal_benches", allow(unstable_features))]
#![cfg_attr(feature = "internal_benches", feature(test))]


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#[macro_use]
mod debug;

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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions src/polyfill.rs
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Expand Up @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
//! Polyfills for functionality that will (hopefully) be added to Rust's
//! standard library soon.


use core;

#[macro_use]
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28 changes: 25 additions & 3 deletions src/rand.rs
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Expand Up @@ -100,19 +100,27 @@ impl sealed::Sealed for SystemRandom {}
use self::urandom::fill as fill_impl;

#[cfg(any(
all(target_os = "linux", not(feature = "dev_urandom_fallback")),
all(target_os = "linux", not(any(feature = "dev_urandom_fallback", feature = "sgx"))),
windows
))]
use self::sysrand::fill as fill_impl;

#[cfg(all(target_os = "linux", feature = "dev_urandom_fallback"))]
use self::sysrand_or_urandom::fill as fill_impl;


#[cfg(all(
target_os = "linux",
feature = "sgx",
not(any(feature = "dev_urandom_fallback", feature = "use_heap"))))]
use self::sgxrand::fill as fill_impl;


#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
use self::darwin::fill as fill_impl;
use crate::sealed;

#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[cfg(all(target_os = "linux", not(feature = "sgx")))]
mod sysrand_chunk {
use crate::{c, error};
use libc;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -168,7 +176,7 @@ mod sysrand_chunk {
}
}

#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", windows))]
#[cfg(all(any(target_os = "linux", windows), not(feature = "sgx")))]
mod sysrand {
use super::sysrand_chunk::chunk;
use crate::error;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -248,6 +256,20 @@ mod sysrand_or_urandom {
}
}

#[cfg(all(
target_os = "linux",
feature = "sgx",
not(any(feature = "dev_urandom_fallback", feature = "use_heap"))))]
mod sgxrand {
use sgx_trts::trts;
use crate::error;

pub fn fill(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
trts::rsgx_read_rand(dest).map_err(|_| error::Unspecified)
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Is this really a good idea? I looked at the source code for sgx_raed_rand in the Intel SGX SDK. It does feature detection using CPUID to try to detect whether RDRAND is available, and falls back to rand() if feature detection says RDRAND isn't available. But, feature detection like that isn't secure in SGX because the CPUID has to be executed outside the enclave.

In #738, @akash-fortanix and @jethrogb suggested to just hard-code the use of RDRAND, i.e. require RDRAND be available within SGX, since in practice it seems like all SGX-capable CPUs include RDRAND, despite Intel's warnings. That seems more secure to me. What do you think?

Importantly, I'd rather avoid having two different implementations for this for the two different SGX targets.

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It sounds like you're saying that Intel's secure randomness isn't really secure.
Assembly is out of my yard.
@dingelish What do you think?

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Hi Brian, as far as I know, RDRAND is always enabled in CPU supporting SGX. The feature detection is only enabled in simulation mode and the fallback only works on sim+oldcpu (no rdrand) combinations.

#ifndef SE_SIM
    /* We expect the CPU has RDRAND support for HW mode. Otherwise, an exception will be thrown
    * do_rdrand() will try to call RDRAND for 10 times
    */
    if(0 == do_rdrand(rand_num))
        return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
#else

I don't know if you are considering to support the simulation mode of SGX. I would like to recommend to just hard code it for simplification. I would like to say that users needs to add additional stuffs to claim that this is a simulation mode (currently it is defined by env SGX_MODE=SW).

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BoringSSL already has the assembly language code that ring can import, so don't worry about writing assembly language code for this.

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@dingelish dingelish Jan 17, 2019 •
edited
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It sounds like you're saying that Intel's secure randomness isn't really secure.
Assembly is out of my yard.
@dingelish What do you think?

I've not dug into the randomness of RDRAND much. What I know is that people choose to trust it or not.

Technically the randomness of RDRAND seems good enough.

Update: a proof of RDRAND 'bug' caused by bad impl of urandom.
https://cr.yp.to/talks/2014.01.09/slides-dan+tanja-20140109-4x3.pdf

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@briansmith briansmith Jan 17, 2019 •
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@dingelish Whether or not RDRAND is secure, both of these approaches ultimately use RDRAND, right? That is, the sgx_read_rand function uses RDRAND under the hood, right? The main questoin is whether it is better to use the sgx_read_rand wrapper or whether it's better to just directly use RDRAND, right?

I have to say, I don't understand the Intel SDK source code at all. My concern was already raised as a bug at intel/linux-sgx#111. It is confusing to have two different implementations of the function (if I understand correctly): the one you pointed me to and the one at https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx/blob/master/common/src/sgx_read_rand.cpp.

This makes me lean in favor of just using RDRAND directly for all SGX targets. WDYT?

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Yes everything will ultimately use RDRAND. I believe in foreseeable future this is the only randomness source in SGX.

You can forget about sgx_read_rand, a function exported by Intel SGX SDK, because ring does not need to depends on Intel SGX SDK. Simply wrap RDRAND or just use intrinsic functions and that'll be 100% fine for SGX enclave.

Yes. There are two implementations of sgx_read_rand. One is for the untrusted side, and another is for the trusted side (SGX Enclave). The code snipped he referred to is used in the untrusted side.

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@dingelish Thanks for the explanation. I agree that we should just more directly use RDRAND and avoid sgx_read_rand.

}

}

#[cfg(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios"))]
mod darwin {
use crate::{c, error};
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