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Missing slippage/min-return check in UniswapHandler #256

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code423n4 opened this issue Dec 1, 2021 · 2 comments
Closed

Missing slippage/min-return check in UniswapHandler #256

code423n4 opened this issue Dec 1, 2021 · 2 comments
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2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working duplicate This issue or pull request already exists

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@code423n4
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cmichel

Vulnerability details

The contracts are missing slippage checks which can lead to being vulnerable to sandwich attacks.

A common attack in DeFi is the sandwich attack. Upon observing a trade of asset X for asset Y, an attacker frontruns the victim trade by also buying asset Y, lets the victim execute the trade, and then backruns (executes after) the victim by trading back the amount gained in the first trade. Intuitively, one uses the knowledge that someone’s going to buy an asset, and that this trade will increase its price, to make a profit. The attacker’s plan is to buy this asset cheap, let the victim buy at an increased price, and then sell the received amount again at a higher price afterwards.

See UniswapHandler.buyMalt:

router.swapExactTokensForTokens(
  rewardBalance,
  // @audit allows any out amount, can trade at bad price
  0, // amountOutMin
  path,
  address(this),
  now
);

Impact

Trades can happen at a bad price and lead to receiving fewer Malt tokens than at a fair market price.
The attacker's profit is the protocol's loss.

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Add minimum return amount checks.
Accept a function parameter that can be chosen by the transaction sender, then check that the actually received amount is above this parameter.

Alternatively, check if it's feasible to send these transactions directly to a miner (flashbots) such that they are not visible in the public mempool.

@code423n4 code423n4 added 2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working labels Dec 1, 2021
code423n4 added a commit that referenced this issue Dec 1, 2021
@0xScotch 0xScotch added the duplicate This issue or pull request already exists label Dec 10, 2021
@0xScotch
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#219

@GalloDaSballo
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Duplicate of #219

@GalloDaSballo GalloDaSballo marked this as a duplicate of #219 Jan 9, 2022
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Labels
2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working duplicate This issue or pull request already exists
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