Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Jump to bottom

Erc20Quest.withdrawRemainingTokens after withdrawFee can revert #585

Closed
code423n4 opened this issue Jan 30, 2023 · 4 comments
Closed

Erc20Quest.withdrawRemainingTokens after withdrawFee can revert #585

code423n4 opened this issue Jan 30, 2023 · 4 comments
Labels
2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working downgraded by judge Judge downgraded the risk level of this issue duplicate-122 satisfactory satisfies C4 submission criteria; eligible for awards

Comments

@code423n4
Copy link
Contributor

Lines of code

https://github.com/rabbitholegg/quest-protocol/tree/8c4c1f71221570b14a0479c216583342bd652d8d/contracts/Erc20Quest.sol#L81-L87
https://github.com/rabbitholegg/quest-protocol/tree/8c4c1f71221570b14a0479c216583342bd652d8d/contracts/Erc20Quest.sol#L102-L104

Vulnerability details

Impact

An attacker can run Erc20Quest.withdrawFee before withdrawRemainingTokens, and as a result, withdrawRemainingTokens can revert.

Proof of Concept

In Erc20Quest.withdrawRemainingTokens, the admin left protocolFee() + unclaimedTokens in the contract. It means that it assumes withdrawFee() will be called after withdrawRemainingTokens().

But in fact, anyone can call withdrawFee after the quest's end time. So if an attacker calls withdrawFee before the admin calls withdrawRemainingTokens, withdrawRemainingTokens will revert.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

withdrawFee should be called only once, and in the implementation of withdrawRemainingTokens, if withdrawFee is called before, no need to leave protocolFee().
@code423n4 code423n4 added 2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working labels Jan 30, 2023
code423n4 added a commit that referenced this issue Jan 30, 2023
@code423n4
hansfriese issue #585
b6a7d57
@c4-judge
Copy link
Contributor

c4-judge commented Feb 6, 2023

kirk-baird marked the issue as duplicate of #61

@c4-judge c4-judge closed this as completed Feb 6, 2023
@c4-judge
Copy link
Contributor

kirk-baird marked the issue as satisfactory

@c4-judge c4-judge added satisfactory satisfies C4 submission criteria; eligible for awards 3 (High Risk) Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly upgraded by judge Original issue severity upgraded from QA/Gas by judge and removed 2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value labels Feb 14, 2023
@c4-judge
Copy link
Contributor

kirk-baird changed the severity to 3 (High Risk)

@c4-judge c4-judge added 2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value downgraded by judge Judge downgraded the risk level of this issue and removed 3 (High Risk) Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly upgraded by judge Original issue severity upgraded from QA/Gas by judge labels Feb 23, 2023
@c4-judge
Copy link
Contributor

kirk-baird changed the severity to 2 (Med Risk)

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Assignees
No one assigned
Labels
2 (Med Risk) Assets not at direct risk, but function/availability of the protocol could be impacted or leak value bug Something isn't working downgraded by judge Judge downgraded the risk level of this issue duplicate-122 satisfactory satisfies C4 submission criteria; eligible for awards
Projects
None yet
Milestone
No milestone
Development

No branches or pull requests
2 participants
@code423n4 @c4-judge