Fix: GitHub workflow script injection #1169
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Signed-off-by: Joyce Brum <joycebrum@google.com>
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Hi! Joyce from Google's Open Source Security Team (GOSST) here. This PR prevents script injection in your GitHub workflows by parsing github.event.pull_request.head.ref into an environment variable before use.
More info on this threat: Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input.
Any questions, let me know!
Thanks!