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Require operator:write to get Connect CA config #9240
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mkeeler
approved these changes
Nov 19, 2020
🍒 If backport labels were added before merging, cherry-picking will start automatically. To retroactively trigger a backport after merging, add backport labels and re-run https://circleci.com/gh/hashicorp/consul/285625. |
🍒✅ Cherry pick of commit fd5928f onto |
hashicorp-ci
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Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
🍒✅ Cherry pick of commit fd5928f onto |
hashicorp-ci
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 19, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
freddygv
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 23, 2020
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh. -- This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
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CVE-2020-28053
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with
operator:read
ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the/v1/connect/ca/configuration
endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the
/connect/ca/configuration
endpoint. They are nowoperator:write
.