core: add limits to unauthorized connections

[schmichael]

Fixes #7002

Introduce limits to prevent unauthorized users from exhausting all
ephemeral ports on agents:

• {https,rpc}_handshake_timeout
• {http,rpc}_max_conns_per_client

The handshake timeout closes connections that have not completed the TLS
handshake by the deadline (5s by default). For RPC connections this
timeout also separately applies to first byte being read so RPC
connections with TLS enabled have rpc_handshake_time * 2 as their
deadline.

The connection limit per client prevents a single remote TCP peer from
exhausting all ephemeral ports. The default is 100, but can be lowered
to a minimum of 26. Since streaming RPC connections create a new TCP
connection (until MultiplexV2 is used), 20 connections are reserved for
Raft and non-streaming RPCs to prevent connection exhaustion due to
streaming RPCs.

All limits are configurable and may be disabled by setting them to 0.

This also includes a fix that closes connections that attempt to create
TLS RPC connections recursively. While only users with valid mTLS
certificates could perform such an operation, it was added as a
safeguard to prevent programming errors before they could cause resource
exhaustion.

[schmichael]

Will address flaky test in followup.

[github-actions]

I'm going to lock this pull request because it has been closed for 120 days ⏳. This helps our maintainers find and focus on the active contributions.
If you have found a problem that seems related to this change, please open a new issue and complete the issue template so we can capture all the details necessary to investigate further.