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libbpf: split BTF support #278
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Master branch: 8aaeed8 |
Master branch: f4c3881 |
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=372627 expired. Closing PR. |
Factor out commiting of appended type data. Also extract fetching the very last type in the BTF (to append members to). These two operations are common across many APIs and will be easier to refactor with split BTF, if they are extracted into a single place. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Remove the requirement of a strictly exact string section contents. This used to be true when string deduplication was done through sorting, but with string dedup done through hash table, it's no longer true. So relax test harness to relax strings checks and, consequently, type checks, which now don't have to have exactly the same string offsets. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Revamp BTF dedup's string deduplication to match the approach of writable BTF string management. This allows to transfer deduplicated strings index back to BTF object after deduplication without expensive extra memory copying and hash map re-construction. It also simplifies the code and speeds it up, because hashmap-based string deduplication is faster than sort + unique approach. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Support split BTF operation, in which one BTF (base BTF) provides basic set of types and strings, while another one (split BTF) builds on top of base's types and strings and adds its own new types and strings. From API standpoint, the fact that the split BTF is built on top of the base BTF is transparent. Type numeration is transparent. If the base BTF had last type ID #N, then all types in the split BTF start at type ID N+1. Any type in split BTF can reference base BTF types, but not vice versa. Programmatically construction of a split BTF on top of a base BTF is supported: one can create an empty split BTF with btf__new_empty_split() and pass base BTF as an input, or pass raw binary data to btf__new_split(), or use btf__parse_xxx_split() variants to get initial set of split types/strings from the ELF file with .BTF section. String offsets are similarly transparent and are a logical continuation of base BTF's strings. When building BTF programmatically and adding a new string (explicitly with btf__add_str() or implicitly through appending new types/members), string-to-be-added would first be looked up from the base BTF's string section and re-used if it's there. If not, it will be looked up and/or added to the split BTF string section. Similarly to type IDs, types in split BTF can refer to strings from base BTF absolutely transparently (but not vice versa, of course, because base BTF doesn't "know" about existence of split BTF). Internal type index is slightly adjusted to be zero-indexed, ignoring a fake [0] VOID type. This allows to handle split/base BTF type lookups transparently by using btf->start_id type ID offset, which is always 1 for base/non-split BTF and equals btf__get_nr_types(base_btf) + 1 for the split BTF. BTF deduplication is not yet supported for split BTF and support for it will be added in separate patch. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add selftest validating ability to programmatically generate and then dump split BTF. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
…ests Add re-usable btf_helpers.{c,h} to provide BTF-related testing routines. Start with adding a raw BTF dumping helpers. Raw BTF dump is the most succinct and at the same time a very human-friendly way to validate exact contents of BTF types. Cross-validate raw BTF dump and writable BTF in a single selftest. Raw type dump checks also serve as a good self-documentation. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Make data section layout checks stricter, disallowing overlap of types and strings data. Additionally, allow BTFs with no type data. There is nothing inherently wrong with having BTF with no types (put potentially with some strings). This could be a situation with kernel module BTFs, if module doesn't introduce any new type information. Also fix invalid offset alignment check for btf->hdr->type_off. Fixes: 8a138ae ("bpf: btf: Add BTF support to libbpf") Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add support for deduplication split BTFs. When deduplicating split BTF, base BTF is considered to be immutable and can't be modified or adjusted. 99% of BTF deduplication logic is left intact (module some type numbering adjustments). There are only two differences. First, each type in base BTF gets hashed (expect VAR and DATASEC, of course, those are always considered to be self-canonical instances) and added into a table of canonical table candidates. Hashing is a shallow, fast operation, so mostly eliminates the overhead of having entire base BTF to be a part of BTF dedup. Second difference is very critical and subtle. While deduplicating split BTF types, it is possible to discover that one of immutable base BTF BTF_KIND_FWD types can and should be resolved to a full STRUCT/UNION type from the split BTF part. This is, obviously, can't happen because we can't modify the base BTF types anymore. So because of that, any type in split BTF that directly or indirectly references that newly-to-be-resolved FWD type can't be considered to be equivalent to the corresponding canonical types in base BTF, because that would result in a loss of type resolution information. So in such case, split BTF types will be deduplicated separately and will cause some duplication of type information, which is unavoidable. With those two changes, the rest of the algorithm manages to deduplicate split BTF correctly, pointing all the duplicates to their canonical counter-parts in base BTF, but also is deduplicating whatever unique types are present in split BTF on their own. Also, theoretically, split BTF after deduplication could end up with either empty type section or empty string section. This is handled by libbpf correctly in one of previous patches in the series. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
In some cases compiler seems to generate distinct DWARF types for identical arrays within the same CU. That seems like a bug, but it's already out there and breaks type graph equivalence checks, so accommodate it anyway by checking for identical arrays, regardless of their type ID. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add selftests validating BTF deduplication for split BTF case. Add a helper macro that allows to validate entire BTF with raw BTF dump, not just type-by-type. This saves tons of code and complexity. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Add ability to work with split BTF by providing extra -B flag, which allows to specify the path to the base BTF file. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Master branch: d0b3d2d |
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=377859 irrelevant now. Closing PR. |
…CKOPT Add verifier ctx test to call bpf_get_netns_cookie from cgroup/setsockopt. #269/p pass ctx or null check, 1: ctx Did not run the program (not supported) OK #270/p pass ctx or null check, 2: null Did not run the program (not supported) OK #271/p pass ctx or null check, 3: 1 OK #272/p pass ctx or null check, 4: ctx - const OK #273/p pass ctx or null check, 5: null (connect) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #274/p pass ctx or null check, 6: null (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #275/p pass ctx or null check, 7: ctx (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #276/p pass ctx or null check, 8: null (bind) OK #277/p pass ctx or null check, 9: ctx (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #278/p pass ctx or null check, 10: null (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
…CKOPT Add verifier ctx test to call bpf_get_netns_cookie from cgroup/setsockopt. #269/p pass ctx or null check, 1: ctx Did not run the program (not supported) OK #270/p pass ctx or null check, 2: null Did not run the program (not supported) OK #271/p pass ctx or null check, 3: 1 OK #272/p pass ctx or null check, 4: ctx - const OK #273/p pass ctx or null check, 5: null (connect) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #274/p pass ctx or null check, 6: null (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #275/p pass ctx or null check, 7: ctx (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #276/p pass ctx or null check, 8: null (bind) OK #277/p pass ctx or null check, 9: ctx (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #278/p pass ctx or null check, 10: null (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
…CKOPT Add verifier ctx test to call bpf_get_netns_cookie from cgroup/setsockopt. #269/p pass ctx or null check, 1: ctx Did not run the program (not supported) OK #270/p pass ctx or null check, 2: null Did not run the program (not supported) OK #271/p pass ctx or null check, 3: 1 OK #272/p pass ctx or null check, 4: ctx - const OK #273/p pass ctx or null check, 5: null (connect) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #274/p pass ctx or null check, 6: null (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #275/p pass ctx or null check, 7: ctx (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #276/p pass ctx or null check, 8: null (bind) OK #277/p pass ctx or null check, 9: ctx (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #278/p pass ctx or null check, 10: null (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
…CKOPT Add verifier ctx test to call bpf_get_netns_cookie from cgroup/setsockopt. #269/p pass ctx or null check, 1: ctx Did not run the program (not supported) OK #270/p pass ctx or null check, 2: null Did not run the program (not supported) OK #271/p pass ctx or null check, 3: 1 OK #272/p pass ctx or null check, 4: ctx - const OK #273/p pass ctx or null check, 5: null (connect) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #274/p pass ctx or null check, 6: null (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #275/p pass ctx or null check, 7: ctx (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #276/p pass ctx or null check, 8: null (bind) OK #277/p pass ctx or null check, 9: ctx (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #278/p pass ctx or null check, 10: null (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
…CKOPT Add verifier ctx test to call bpf_get_netns_cookie from cgroup/setsockopt. #269/p pass ctx or null check, 1: ctx Did not run the program (not supported) OK #270/p pass ctx or null check, 2: null Did not run the program (not supported) OK #271/p pass ctx or null check, 3: 1 OK #272/p pass ctx or null check, 4: ctx - const OK #273/p pass ctx or null check, 5: null (connect) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #274/p pass ctx or null check, 6: null (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #275/p pass ctx or null check, 7: ctx (bind) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #276/p pass ctx or null check, 8: null (bind) OK #277/p pass ctx or null check, 9: ctx (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK #278/p pass ctx or null check, 10: null (cgroup/setsockopt) Did not run the program (not supported) OK Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ================================================================== Fixes: 6813466 ("bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ================================================================== Fixes: 6813466 ("bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ================================================================== Fixes: 6813466 ("bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ================================================================== Fixes: 6813466 ("bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ================================================================== Fixes: 6813466 ("bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ================================================================== Fixes: 6813466 ("bpf: Add map side support for bpf timers.") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220209070324.1093182-2-memxor@gmail.com
also extend prog_tests with a small retval test: values other than accept or drop (0, 1) will cause issues. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. $ ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
also extend prog_tests with a small retval test: values other than accept or drop (0, 1) will cause issues. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. $ ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
also extend prog_tests with a small retval test: values other than accept or drop (0, 1) will cause issues. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. $ ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
also extend prog_tests with a small retval test: values other than accept or drop (0, 1) will cause issues. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. $ ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode kernel-patches#278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK kernel-patches#278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK kernel-patches#278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK kernel-patches#278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK kernel-patches#278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
also extend prog_tests with a small retval test: values other than accept or drop (0, 1) will cause issues. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. $ ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
also extend prog_tests with a small retval test: values other than accept or drop (0, 1) will cause issues. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. $ ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Extend prog_tests with two test cases: # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK This checks that only accept and drop (0,1) are permitted. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. v4: test case for bpf_nf_ctx access checks, requested by Alexei Starovoitov. # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_ctx #280/1 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #280/2 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #280/3 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, past end of ctx:OK #280/4 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context, write:OK #280/5 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context access:OK #280/6 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context access @unpriv:OK #280 verifier_netfilter_ctx:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED This checks: 1/2: partial reads of ctx->{skb,state} are rejected 3. read access past sizeof(ctx) is rejected 4. write to ctx content, e.g. 'ctx->skb = NULL;' is rejected 5. ctx->skb and ctx->state can be read (valid case), but ... 6. ... same program fails for unpriv (CAP_NET_ADMIN needed). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230419021152.sjq4gttphzzy6b5f@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Extend prog_tests with two test cases: # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK This checks that only accept and drop (0,1) are permitted. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. v4: test case for bpf_nf_ctx access checks, requested by Alexei Starovoitov. # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_ctx #280/1 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #280/2 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #280/3 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, past end of ctx:OK #280/4 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context, write:OK #280/5 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context access:OK #280/6 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context access @unpriv:OK #280 verifier_netfilter_ctx:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED This checks: 1/2: partial reads of ctx->{skb,state} are rejected 3. read access past sizeof(ctx) is rejected 4. write to ctx content, e.g. 'ctx->skb = NULL;' is rejected 5. ctx->skb and ctx->state can be read (valid case), but ... 6. ... same program fails for unpriv (CAP_NET_ADMIN needed). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230419021152.sjq4gttphzzy6b5f@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Extend prog_tests with two test cases: # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK This checks that only accept and drop (0,1) are permitted. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. v4: test case for bpf_nf_ctx access checks, requested by Alexei Starovoitov. # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_ctx #280/1 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #280/2 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #280/3 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, past end of ctx:OK #280/4 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context, write:OK #280/5 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context access:OK #280/6 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context access @unpriv:OK #280 verifier_netfilter_ctx:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED This checks: 1/2: partial reads of ctx->{skb,state} are rejected 3. read access past sizeof(ctx) is rejected 4. write to ctx content, e.g. 'ctx->skb = NULL;' is rejected 5. ctx->skb and ctx->state can be read (valid case), but ... 6. ... same program fails for unpriv (CAP_NET_ADMIN needed). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230419021152.sjq4gttphzzy6b5f@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Extend prog_tests with two test cases: # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK This checks that only accept and drop (0,1) are permitted. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. v4: test case for bpf_nf_ctx access checks, requested by Alexei Starovoitov. v5: also check ctx->{state,skb} can be dereferenced (Alexei). # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_ctx #281/1 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #281/2 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #281/3 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, past end of ctx:OK #281/4 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context, write:OK #281/5 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context read and invalid write:OK #281/6 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter test prog with skb and state read access:OK #281/7 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter test prog with skb and state read access @unpriv:OK #281 verifier_netfilter_ctx:OK Summary: 1/7 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED This checks: 1/2: partial reads of ctx->{skb,state} are rejected 3. read access past sizeof(ctx) is rejected 4. write to ctx content, e.g. 'ctx->skb = NULL;' is rejected 5. ctx->state content cannot be altered 6. ctx->state and ctx->skb can be dereferenced 7. ... same program fails for unpriv (CAP_NET_ADMIN needed). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230419021152.sjq4gttphzzy6b5f@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230420201655.77kkgi3dh7fesoll@MacBook-Pro-6.local/ Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Extend prog_tests with two test cases: # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_retcode #278/1 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test1:OK #278/2 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test2:OK #278/3 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with valid return code. test3:OK #278/4 verifier_netfilter_retcode/bpf_exit with invalid return code. test4:OK #278 verifier_netfilter_retcode:OK This checks that only accept and drop (0,1) are permitted. NF_QUEUE could be implemented later if we can guarantee that attachment of such programs can be rejected if they get attached to a pf/hook that doesn't support async reinjection. NF_STOLEN could be implemented via trusted helpers that can guarantee that the skb will eventually be free'd. v4: test case for bpf_nf_ctx access checks, requested by Alexei Starovoitov. v5: also check ctx->{state,skb} can be dereferenced (Alexei). # ./test_progs --allow=verifier_netfilter_ctx #281/1 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #281/2 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, size too short:OK #281/3 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context access, past end of ctx:OK #281/4 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter invalid context, write:OK #281/5 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter valid context read and invalid write:OK #281/6 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter test prog with skb and state read access:OK #281/7 verifier_netfilter_ctx/netfilter test prog with skb and state read access @unpriv:OK #281 verifier_netfilter_ctx:OK Summary: 1/7 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED This checks: 1/2: partial reads of ctx->{skb,state} are rejected 3. read access past sizeof(ctx) is rejected 4. write to ctx content, e.g. 'ctx->skb = NULL;' is rejected 5. ctx->state content cannot be altered 6. ctx->state and ctx->skb can be dereferenced 7. ... same program fails for unpriv (CAP_NET_ADMIN needed). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230419021152.sjq4gttphzzy6b5f@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230420201655.77kkgi3dh7fesoll@MacBook-Pro-6.local/ Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421170300.24115-8-fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Pull request for series with
subject: libbpf: split BTF support
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=372627