🌱 Implement privileged namespace security policy update for tilt-prepare

[maxrantil]

What this PR does / why we need it:
This PR creates a updateNamespacePodSecurityStandard function to ensure that the pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce label is set to "privileged" for Namespace objects. This change is essential for compatibility with CAPIs tilt-prepare and Tiltfile when using CAPM3 (and other providers?), where accessing securityContext is required. Without this update, the existing pod-security policy restricts the usage of securityContext, hindering necessary operations. This aligns the behavior with CAPD, where the privileged policy is already set for Namespace objects.

/area provider/infrastructure-in-memory

[k8s-ci-robot]

@maxrantil: The label(s) area/ cannot be applied, because the repository doesn't have them.

In response to this:

What this PR does / why we need it:
This PR creates a updateNamespaceSecurityPolicy function to ensure that the pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce label is set to "privileged" for Namespace objects. This change is essential for compatibility with CAPIs tilt-prepare and Tiltfile when using CAPM3 (and other providers?), where accessing securityContext is required. Without this update, the existing pod-security policy restricts the usage of securityContext, hindering necessary operations. This aligns the behavior with CAPD, where the privileged policy is already set for Namespace objects.

/area provider/infrastructure-in-memory

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[k8s-ci-robot]

Hi @maxrantil. Thanks for your PR.

I'm waiting for a kubernetes-sigs member to verify that this patch is reasonable to test. If it is, they should reply with /ok-to-test on its own line. Until that is done, I will not automatically test new commits in this PR, but the usual testing commands by org members will still work. Regular contributors should join the org to skip this step.

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[chrischdi]

/ok-to-test

[chrischdi]

/remove-area provider/infrastructure-in-memory

[chrischdi]

/area devtools

[lentzi90]

This change is essential for compatibility with CAPIs tilt-prepare and Tiltfile when using CAPM3 (and other providers?), where accessing securityContext is required. Without this update, the existing pod-security policy restricts the usage of securityContext, hindering necessary operations. This aligns the behavior with CAPD, where the privileged policy is already set for Namespace objects.

I just wanted to clarify this a bit. Tilt-prepare already removes the security context from the deployments, but this is not enough if the namespace has enforced pod security standards. The issue is not visible for CAPI/CAPD since CAPD anyway uses the privileged policy in order to mount the docker socket. Other providers will likely be able to run with a restricted policy for the namespace, except when using Tilt. This is why we want to make tilt-prepare change the label on the namespace.

[chrischdi]

This change is essential for compatibility with CAPIs tilt-prepare and Tiltfile when using CAPM3 (and other providers?), where accessing securityContext is required. Without this update, the existing pod-security policy restricts the usage of securityContext, hindering necessary operations. This aligns the behavior with CAPD, where the privileged policy is already set for Namespace objects.

I just wanted to clarify this a bit. Tilt-prepare already removes the security context from the deployments, but this is not enough if the namespace has enforced pod security standards. The issue is not visible for CAPI/CAPD since CAPD anyway uses the privileged policy in order to mount the docker socket. Other providers will likely be able to run with a restricted policy for the namespace, except when using Tilt. This is why we want to make tilt-prepare change the label on the namespace.

100% agree, this gets helpful when PSA is enforced in a clusters and we want to run a provider or the core CAPI providers using tilt.
Core CAPI controllers should be affected to, only CAPD not because it requires privileged anyway.

Edit: it comes down to that the reason for wanting this in tilt-prepare is this line in tilt-prepare:

cluster-api/hack/tools/internal/tilt-prepare/main.go

Line 800 in 09f3520

container.SecurityContext = nil

[lentzi90]

Good point! So the reason it is currently working for CAPI is that there are no restrictions on the namespace. Probably the same for many other providers.

[tuminoid]

/lgtm

[k8s-ci-robot]

LGTM label has been added.

Git tree hash: 7cd7cabbf76b59c96494ba7f5bad36da33982cb3

[chrischdi]

One last nit, let's add a comment on why we have to do this to provide future context.

[chrischdi]

/lgtm

[k8s-ci-robot]

LGTM label has been added.

Git tree hash: 92cf5b3fa87d43dd1aec4c273f8892485401cc79

[maxrantil]

/cc @killianmuldoon @JoelSpeed would any of you please be willing to do a review?

[tuminoid]

Readding LGTM after all comments so far have been resolved.

/lgtm

[k8s-ci-robot]

LGTM label has been added.

Git tree hash: dc11a973b8c001a38361c1b5656ab20d9dbd884b

[killianmuldoon]

/lgtm
/approve

Thanks for this!

[k8s-ci-robot]

[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is APPROVED

This pull-request has been approved by: killianmuldoon

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