Kryptonite is a turn-key ready transformation (SMT) for Apache Kafka® to do field-level encryption/decryption of records with or without schema in data integration scenarios based on Kafka Connect. It uses authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) and in particular applies AES in GCM mode.
This repository is forked from hpgrahsl/kryptonite-for-kafka, thanks for @hpgrahsl
The following fictional data record value without schema - represented in JSON-encoded format - is used to illustrate a simple encrypt/decrypt scenario:
{
"id": "1234567890",
"myString": "some foo bla text",
"myInt": 42,
"myBoolean": true,
"mySubDoc1": {"myString":"hello json"},
"myArray1": ["str_1","str_2","...","str_N"],
"mySubDoc2": {"k1":9,"k2":8,"k3":7}
}
Let's assume the fields "myString"
,"myArray1"
and "mySubDoc2"
of the above data record should get encrypted,
the CipherField SMT can be configured as follows:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "ENCRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_keys": "[{\"name\":\"my-demo-secret-key\",\"version\":\"123\",\"material\":\"YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWE=\"}]", // key materials of utmost secrecy!
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "my-demo-secret-key",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "123",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\"},{\"name\":\"myArray1\"},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\"}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
The result after applying this SMT is a record in which all the fields specified in the field_config
parameter are
encrypted using the secret key specified with the cipher_data_key_name
and cipher_data_key_version
parameters.
If you specify cipher_data_keys
, then apparently, the configured key materials have to be treated with utmost secrecy, for leaking any of the secret keys renders encryption useless.
The recommended way of doing this for now is to indirectly reference secret key materials by externalizing them into a separate properties file.
Read a few details about this here.
It is also possible to use the GCP Cloud KMS and Secret Manager. Please see here for details.
Since the configuration parameter field_mode
is set to 'OBJECT', complex field types are processed as a whole instead of element-wise.
Below is an exemplary JSON-encoded record after the encryption:
{
"id": "1234567890",
"myString": "123#OtWbJ+VR6P6i1x9DE4FKOmsV43HOHttUjdufCjrt6SIixILy+6Bk9zBdWC4KCgeN9I2z",
"myInt": 42,
"myBoolean": true,
"mySubDoc1": {"myString":"hello json"},
"myArray1": "123#uWz9MODqJ0hyzXYaraEZ08S1e78ZOC0G4zeL8eZmISUpMiNsfBLDviBlWrCL2cQRbt3qNGlpKUys7/Lio9OIc0A=",
"mySubDoc2": "123#O0AHEZ8pOccnmBHT/5kJj2QQeke3ltf8i/kJzEo/alB2sOqUooFGThBKDZA0HjdC2zz9thvB8zfjw7+fbfts6/4="
}
NOTE: Encrypted fields are always represented as Base64-encoded strings, with the ciphertext of the field's original values and the version number of the secret key appended to the beginning, separated by #.
Provided that the secret key material used to encrypt the original data record is made available to a specific sink connector, the CipherField SMT can be configured to decrypt the data like so:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "DECRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_keys": "[{\"name\":\"my-demo-secret-key\",\"version\":\"123\",\"material\":\"YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWE=\"}]", // key materials of utmost secrecy!
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "my-demo-secret-key",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "123",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\"},{\"name\":\"myArray1\"},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\"}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
The result after applying this SMT is a record in which all the fields specified in the field_config
parameter are decrypted
using the secret key version that is specified and was used to encrypt the original data.
Below is an exemplary JSON-encoded record after the decryption, which is equal to the original record:
{
"id": "1234567890",
"myString": "some foo bla text",
"myInt": 42,
"myBoolean": true,
"mySubDoc1": {"myString":"hello json"},
"myArray1": ["str_1","str_2","...","str_N"],
"mySubDoc2": {"k1":9,"k2":8,"k3":7}
}
The following example is based on an Avro value record and used to illustrate a simple encrypt/decrypt scenario for data records with schema. The schema could be defined as:
{
"type": "record", "fields": [
{ "name": "id", "type": "string" },
{ "name": "myString", "type": "string" },
{ "name": "myInt", "type": "int" },
{ "name": "myBoolean", "type": "boolean" },
{ "name": "mySubDoc1", "type": "record",
"fields": [
{ "name": "myString", "type": "string" }
]
},
{ "name": "myArray1", "type": { "type": "array", "items": "string"}},
{ "name": "mySubDoc2", "type": { "type": "map", "values": "int"}}
]
}
The data of one such fictional record - represented by its Struct.toString()
output - might look as:
Struct{
id=1234567890,
myString=some foo bla text,
myInt=42,
myBoolean=true,
mySubDoc1=Struct{myString=hello json},
myArray1=[str_1, str_2, ..., str_N],
mySubDoc2={k1=9, k2=8, k3=7}
}
Let's assume the fields "myString"
,"myArray1"
and "mySubDoc2"
of the above data record should get encrypted,
the CipherField SMT can be configured as follows:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "ENCRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_keys": "[{\"name\":\"my-demo-secret-key\",\"version\":\"123\",\"material\":\"YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWE=\"}]", // key materials of utmost secrecy!
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "my-demo-secret-key",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "123",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\"},{\"name\":\"myArray1\"},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\"}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
The result after applying this SMT is a record in which all the fields specified in the field_config
parameter are
encrypted using the secret key specified by its id with the cipher_data_key_name
and cipher_data_version
parameters.
If you specify cipher_data_keys
, then apparently, the configured key materials have to be treated with utmost secrecy, for leaking any of the secret keys renders encryption useless.
The recommended way of doing this for now is to indirectly reference secret key materials by externalizing them into a separate properties file.
Read a few details about this here.
It is also possible to use the GCP Cloud KMS and Secret Manager. Please see here for details.
Since the configuration parameter field_mode
is set to 'OBJECT', complex field types are processed as a whole instead of element-wise.
Below is an exemplary Struct.toString()
output of the record after the encryption:
Struct{
id=1234567890,
myString=123#OtWbJ+VR6P6i1x9DE4FKOmsV43HOHttUjdufCjrt6SIixILy+6Bk9zBdWC4KCgeN9I2z,
myInt=42,
myBoolean=true,
mySubDoc1=Struct{myString=hello json},
myArray1=123#uWz9MODqJ0hyzXYaraEZ08S1e78ZOC0G4zeL8eZmISUpMiNsfBLDviBlWrCL2cQRbt3qNGlpKUys7/Lio9OIc0A=,
mySubDoc2=123#O0AHEZ8pOccnmBHT/5kJj2QQeke3ltf8i/kJzEo/alB2sOqUooFGThBKDZA0HjdC2zz9thvB8zfjw7+fbfts6/4=
}
NOTE 1: Encrypted fields are always represented as Base64-encoded strings, with the ciphertext of the field's original values and the version number of the secret key appended to the beginning, separated by #.
NOTE 2: Obviously, in order to support this the original schema of the data record is automatically redacted such that any encrypted fields can be stored as strings, even though the original data types for the fields in question were different ones.
Provided that the secret key material used to encrypt the original data record is made available to a specific sink connector, the CipherField SMT can be configured to decrypt the data like so:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "DECRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_keys": "[{\"name\":\"my-demo-secret-key\",\"version\":\"123\",\"material\":\"YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWE=\"}]", // key materials of utmost secrecy!
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "my-demo-secret-key",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "123",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\",\"schema\": {\"type\": \"STRING\"}},{\"name\":\"myArray1\",\"schema\": {\"type\": \"ARRAY\",\"valueSchema\": {\"type\": \"STRING\"}}},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\",\"schema\": { \"type\": \"MAP\", \"keySchema\": { \"type\": \"STRING\" }, \"valueSchema\": { \"type\": \"INT32\"}}}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
Take notice of the extended field_config
parameter settings. For decryption of schema-aware data, the SMT configuration expects
that for each field to decrypt the original schema information is explicitly specified.
This allows to redact the encrypted record's schema towards a compatible decrypted record's schema upfront,
such that the resulting plaintext field values can be stored in accordance with their original data types.
The result after applying this SMT is a record in which all the fields specified in the field_config
parameter are
decrypted using the secret key id that is specified and was used to encrypt the original data.
Below is the decrypted data - represented by its Struct.toString()
output - which is equal to the original record:
Struct{
id=1234567890,
myString=some foo bla text,
myInt=42,
myBoolean=true,
mySubDoc1=Struct{myString=hello json},
myArray1=[str_1, str_2, ..., str_N],
mySubDoc2={k1=9, k2=8, k3=7}
}
name | Description | Type | Default | Valid values | Importance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
cipher_data_key_name | secret key name to be used as default data encryption key for all fields which don't refer to a field-specific secret key name | string | non-empty string | high | |
cipher_data_key_version | secret key version to be used as default data encryption key for all fields which don't refer to a field-specific secret key version | string | non-empty string | high | |
cipher_data_keys | JSON array with data key objects specifying the key name, key version and base64 encoded key bytes used for encryption / decryption. The key material is mandatory if the key_source=CONFIG | password | JSON array holding at least one valid data key config object, e.g.
|
medium | |
cipher_data_key_cache_expiry_duration | defines the expiration duration of the secret key cache To be used if key_source is GCP_SECRET_MANAGER or GCP_SECRET_MANAGER_WITH_KMS |
long | 24 | long value | low |
cipher_data_key_cache_expiry_duration_unit | defines the unit of expiration duration of the private key cache To be used if key_source is GCP_SECRET_MANAGER or GCP_SECRET_MANAGER_WITH_KMS |
string | HOURS | NANOSECONDS, MICROSECONDS, MILLISECONDS, SECONDS, MINUTES, HOURS, DAYS | low |
cipher_mode | defines whether the data should get encrypted or decrypted | string | ENCRYPT or DECRYPT | high | |
field_config | JSON array with field config objects specifying which fields together with their settings should get either encrypted / decrypted (nested field names are expected to be separated by '.' per default, or by a custom 'path_delimiter' config | string | JSON array holding at least one valid field config object, e.g. [{"name": "my-field-abc"},{"name": "my-nested.field-xyz"}] | high | |
key_source | defines the origin of the secret key material (currently supports keys specified in the config or the GCP Secret Manager) | string | CONFIG | CONFIG or GCP_SECRET_MANAGER or GCP_SECRET_MANAGER_WITH_KMS | medium |
kms_key_name | The GCP Cloud KMS key name for decrypting a data encryption key (DEK), if the DEK is encrypted with a key encryption key (KEK) To be used if key_source is GCP_SECRET_MANAGER_WITH_KMS |
string | non-empty string e.g. projects/YOUR_PROJECT/locations/LOCATION/keyRings/YOUR_KEY_RING/cryptoKeys/YOUR_KEY | medium | |
field_mode | defines how to process complex field types (maps, lists, structs), either as full objects or element-wise | string | ELEMENT | ELEMENT or OBJECT | medium |
cipher_algorithm | cipher algorithm used for data encryption (currently supports only one AEAD cipher: AES/GCM/NoPadding) | string | AES/GCM/NoPadding | AES/GCM/NoPadding | low |
cipher_text_encoding | defines the encoding of the resulting ciphertext bytes (currently only supports 'base64') | string | base64 | base64 | low |
path_delimiter | path delimiter used as field name separator when referring to nested fields in the input record | string | . | non-empty string | low |
kryo_output_buffer_size | Initial buffer size for kryo to serialize. | int | 32 | int value | low |
kryo_output_buffer_size_max | Maximum buffer size for kryo to serialize. Default -1 corresponds to no upper limit (up to Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 technically). | int | -1 | int value | low |
The problem with directly specifying configuration parameters which contain sensitive data, such as secret key materials, is that they are exposed via Kafka Connect's REST API. This means for connect clusters that are shared among teams the configured secret key materials would leak, which is of course unacceptable. The way to deal with this for now, is to indirectly reference such configuration parameters from external property files.
This approach can be used to configure any kind of sensitive data such as KMS-specific client authentication settings, in case the secret keys aren't sourced from the config directly but rather retrieved from an external KMS such as Azure Key Vault.
Below is a quick example of how such a configuration would look like:
- Before you can make use of configuration parameters from external sources you have to customize your Kafka Connect worker configuration by adding the following two settings:
connect.config.providers=file
connect.config.providers.file.class=org.apache.kafka.common.config.provider.FileConfigProvider
- Then you create the external properties file e.g.
classified.properties
which contains the secret key materials. This file needs to be available on all your Kafka Connect workers which you want to run Kryptonite on. Let's pretend the file is located at path/secrets/kryptonite/classified.properties
on your worker nodes:
cipher_data_keys=[{"name":"my-demo-secret-key","version":"123","material":"YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWE="}]
- Finally, you simply reference this file and the corresponding key of the property therein, from your SMT configuration like so:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "ENCRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_keys": "${file:/secrets/kryptonite/classified.properties:cipher_data_keys}",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "my-demo-secret-key-123",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "123",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\"},{\"name\":\"myArray1\"},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\"}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
In case you want to learn more about configuration parameter externalization there is e.g. this nice blog post from the Debezium team showing how to externalize username and password settings using a docker-compose example.
You can use the GCP Secret Manager to manage your secret keys. The CipherField SMT can be configured as follows:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.key_source": "GCP_SECRET_MANAGER",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "ENCRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "projects/YOUR_PROJECT_NUMBER/secrets/YOUR_SECRET_NAME",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "3",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\"},{\"name\":\"myArray1\"},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\"}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
Specify GCP_SECRET_MANAGER
for key_source
, and specify the secret name and version of the Secret Manager to be used by default for
cipher_data_key_name
and cipher_data_key_version
. It is assumed that the Secret Manager stores base64-encoded secret keys.
It retrieves all valid versions of the secret specified for default use at startup and caches them in memory.
Cache expiration can be set with cipher_data_key_cache_expiry_duration
and cipher_data_key_cache_expiry_duration_unit
.
The default is 24 hours. When the cache expires, the secret is evicted and automatically cached again the next time it is accessed.
When encrypting, the default secret version is used, or the matching secret version if specified in field_config
.
When decrypting, the secret key that matches the version prefix of the encrypted data will be used automatically.
If there is no version number prefix, the default or the secret specified in field_config
will be used.
Rotating the secret key is simply a matter of registering a new secret version and updating the secret version used by default. Since the secret version is automatically selected for decryption, data encrypted with an older version of the secret key can be decrypted, unless the older version of the secret is disabled.
Secret keys stored in the Secret Manager can also be encrypted with the Cloud KMS. Use the Cloud KMS for the key encryption key (KEK) and the Secret Manager for the data encryption key (DEK). See Envelope encryption for details. The CipherField SMT can be configured as follows:
{
//...
"transforms":"cipher",
"transforms.cipher.type":"com.github.hpgrahsl.kafka.connect.transforms.kryptonite.CipherField$Value",
"transforms.cipher.key_source": "GCP_SECRET_MANAGER_WITH_KMS",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_mode": "ENCRYPT",
"transforms.cipher.kms_key_name": "projects/YOUR_PROJECT/locations/YOUR_LOCATION/keyRings/YOUR_KEY_RING/cryptoKeys/YOUR_KEY",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_name": "projects/YOUR_PROJECT_NUMBER/secrets/YOUR_SECRET_NAME",
"transforms.cipher.cipher_data_key_version": "3",
"transforms.cipher.field_config": "[{\"name\":\"myString\"},{\"name\":\"myArray1\"},{\"name\":\"mySubDoc2\"}]",
"transforms.cipher.field_mode": "OBJECT",
//...
}
Specify GCP_SECRET_MANAGER_WITH_KMS
for key_source
, and specify the name of the Cloud KMS key for kms_key_name
.
The basic behavior is the same as when GCP_SECRET_MANAGER
is specified,
but the Cloud KMS will decrypt the key when it retrieves the key stored in the Secret Manager at startup.
This can be used when you do not want to store the raw secret key in the Secret Manager. Also, depending on the configuration, it is possible to automate the key encription key (KEK) rotation.
This project can be built from source via Maven, or you can download the package from the GitHub release page.
In order to deploy it you simply put the jar into a 'plugin path' that is configured to be scanned by your Kafka Connect worker nodes.
After that, configure Kryptonite as transformation for any of your source / sink connectors, sit back and relax! Happy 'binge watching' plenty of ciphertexts ;-)
Kryptonite currently provides a single cipher algorithm, namely, AES in GCM mode. It offers so-called authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD).
By design, every application of Kryptonite on a specific record field results in different ciphertexts for one and the same plaintext. This is in general not only desirable but very important to make attacks harder. However, in the context of Kafka Connect records this has an unfavorable consequence for source connectors. Applying the SMT on a source record's key would result in a 'partition mix-up' because records with the same original plaintext key would end up in different topic partitions. In other words, do NOT(!) use Kryptonite for source record keys at the moment. There are plans in place to do away with this restriction and extend Kryptonite with a deterministic mode. This could then safely support the encryption of record keys while at the same time keep topic partitioning and record ordering intact.
Please read the CLA carefully before submitting your contribution to Mercari. Under any circumstances, by submitting your contribution, you are deemed to accept and agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of the CLA.
This project is licensed according to Apache License Version 2.0
Copyright (c) 2021. Hans-Peter Grahsl (grahslhp@gmail.com)
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.