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Project Proposal: Audit Logging SIG #2409

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5094fb1
docs(auditlogs): add audit logging sig proposal
mlenkeit Oct 24, 2024
9337b7f
docs(auditlogs): re-number requirements
mlenkeit Oct 24, 2024
75f2c57
docs(auditlogs): remove template instructions
mlenkeit Oct 24, 2024
f81c2f4
docs(auditlogs): use OTel over OTEL
mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024
65ae32e
docs(auditlogs): list @reyang as first sponsor
mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024
776b821
docs(auditlogs): add Microsoft to interested vendors
mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024
6dd519d
docs(auditlogs): add contacts to vendor list
mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024
2ec002d
docs(auditlogs): use consistent punctuation for requirement list
mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024
d7e265f
docs(auditlogs): minor word change in Challenges chapter
mlenkeit Nov 20, 2024
405ddb5
docs(auditlogs): describe guarantee of delivery in appendix
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
0adb8e5
docs(auditlogs): add sample audit logs to appendix
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
a5ef343
docs(auditlogs): add links to sample audit logs
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
711dc46
docs(auditlogs): add links to appendix A
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
087865c
docs(auditlogs): use GitHub handle only in staffing list
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
3876a31
docs(auditlogs): add svrnm as GC liaison
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
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Merge branch 'audit-logging-sig-project-proposal' of github.com:apeir…
mlenkeit Nov 21, 2024
066501b
docs(auditlogs): minor changes in wording
mlenkeit Nov 22, 2024
70cbac4
docs(auditlogs): shorten requirement ids to pass spell check
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Merge branch 'main' into audit-logging-sig-project-proposal
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197 changes: 197 additions & 0 deletions projects/audit-logging.md
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# Audit Logging

## Background and description

Audit logging describes the capability of capturing audit-trail relevant events of a system to meet compliance requirements. Such events may originate from the infrastructure (e.g. a Kubernetes cluster) up to the application-level. It is a capability that is particularly relevant for providers of enterprise software.

Unlike regular application logs, audit logs are usually subject to long retention periods and software providers must guarantee their completeness (i.e. guarantee of delivery).
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Good points! In addition, these are something we might want to consider:

  1. Audit logs might be considered as a critical part of the business, which could result in a different API design strategy - for example, audit logging might require a different API behavior, if the information provided by the caller is invalid, the API might throw exception instead of failing silently and move on.
  2. Audit log might require some sensitive information without redaction due to the regulation requirements (e.g. user identity and client IP address).
  3. The data path could require higher level of access control or privilege.

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@mlenkeit mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024

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@reyang thanks for mentioning these points.

Especially the API behavior is something that we had thought about initially. However, when we first pitched audit logging on Slack, we received the following comment from Ted Young:

As a rule, the OpenTelemetry API never throws an exception. I understand why you might want this, though it is not present in many audit logging systems, which use regular loggers. So a strong case would have to be made on this particular point.

Based on this initial feedback, we decided to file this SIG proposal without proposing such API changes.


Examples of audit logs include: (see [Appendix B: Examples of Audit Log Events])
- failed login attempts
- permission changes (e.g. of a service account or application user)
- accessing sensitive information
- modification of data

### Current challenges

OpenTelemetry does not have a good solution for audit logging

- no semantic conventions for audit logs in OTel
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Suggested change
- no semantic conventions for audit logs in OTel
- no semantic conventions for audit logs in OTel

Can you provide some examples of what would be part of such semantic conventions? My knowledge on audit logs is very limited, so it would help to understand the problem much better.

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@svrnm our experience has shown that in order to analyze audit logs at scale, it is important to define an (extensible) event catalog. The event catalog standardizes audit log events across workloads/produces. For example, our internal event catalog currently consists of 50+ such events. Ideally, such a catalog would be part of semantic conventions.

To make this more tangible, I've added some examples to the appendix of the document:
https://github.com/open-telemetry/community/pull/2409/files#diff-736e6b0ae9ae655b78d9ba007d08592071abb6cc1ef64d7893ff81642c8ec734R115-R192

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another examples from the security world is https://github.com/ocsf.

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thanks @mlenkeit. Makes it much clearer

The metadata looks like attributes that would be covered by other semantic conventions (e.g. there is a log.record.id for the metadata.id, the timestamp of course and some of the other ones (e.g. for k8sCluster we have k8s.cluster.name. So I would assume here it is more about re-using and extending certain other domains that are not unique to "audit logs"

For the event and data examples you gave, I would argue that they are not "semantic conventions for audit logs" but "semantic conventions for log types that typically require the strict requirements of auditing". What do I mean by that: if we talk about "semantic conventions for audit logs" I think about a namespace called audit. that holds attributes that are specific to the business logic of audit logging, like a signature that helps to tamperproof the log line, or maybe even meta information under which regulation this log is required to be an "audit log"
In contrast "semantic conventions for log types that typically require the strict requirements of auditing" are their own namespaces like the "UserLoginFailure" example would fall into a "authentication" or "auth" namespace, with "auth.login.method" or "auth.login.failureReason" as potential attributes, event.name being set to auth.login.failure or something.

I am just making those things up to exemplify the difference, they will probably take a different form or shape eventually, so to make a long story short, here is a suggestion to rephrase:

Suggested change
- no semantic conventions for audit logs in OTel
- no semantic conventions for audit logs in OTel
- no semantic conventions for log types that typically rquire the strict requirements of auditing, like authentication, authorization and data changes

@renewelches thanks for calling out OCSF, if I remember correctly there were conversations in the past between OTel and OCSF, cc @lmolkova

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Regarding metadata, I fully agree: Most of these attributes are already covered by semconv. We may identify additional attributes in SIG meetings though, depending on the experience/requirement of other contributors/companies.

I understand how "semantic conventions for audit logs" can be misleading. To me, the suggestion that you made has a notion of particularly describe logs that are "already there" (e.g. events emitted by a K8s cluster) and can be considered relevant for audit purposes. Especially in enterprise software, it's common that applications produce logs that are specifically mean to be audit logs (and nothing else). To me, it' s important that we find wording that covers these two types that we do have.

How about the following?

Suggested change
- no semantic conventions for audit logs in OTel
- no semantic conventions for representing and identifying audit trail-relevant events in OTel (like authentication, authorization or modification of

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As mentioned in another comment, this all depends on what attributes are changeable or must be immutable. As of my understanding an attribute could be altered by a processor in the collector. Which is something we would want to avoid or want to prevent in cases of audit logs. If we conclude that we can or should only guarantee immutability for the log itself then we must live with replication/doublication. Otherwise we might have to add the constrain that also certain attributes must be immutable.

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+1 to looking into OCSF for security events and borrowing relevant semantic conventions from there.

- OTel APIs/SDKs do not provide feedback to the application level whether data (in particular logs) have been successfully delivered to a remote endpoint. To guarantee delivery, either the SDK has to give those guarantees, or provide feedback to the application so that it can take care of guaranteed delivery itself.
- OTel Collector instances may lose audit logs in transit (i.e. no guarantee of delivery)

See [Appendix A: Guarantee of Delivery] for more details

### Goals, objectives, and requirements

The goal of this project is to make OTel fit for audit logging purposes that meet compliance requirements of enterprise software providers, in particular:

- REQ-01: Semantic conventions for application-level audit logs are defined
- REQ-02: Semantic conventions for infrastructure-level audit logs are defined
- REQ-03: Guaranteed delivery of audit logs exported via OpenTelemetry SDK
- REQ-04: OTel Collector instances must provide guaranteed delivery of audit logs, including when its process is interrupted

See [Appendix A: Guarantee of Delivery] for more details

## Deliverables

- semantic convention for audit logs
- extend OTel APIs/SDKs for audit logging purposes (in collaboration with the respective SIG)
- extend OTel Collector for audit logging purposes (in collaboration with the respective SIG)

## Staffing / Help Wanted

The following vendors are interested in improving this area:
- SAP (@mlenkeit, @FWinkler79)
- Microsoft (@reyang)

Other vendors are invited to join the discussion.

### Required staffing

* Project lead: SAP (name tbd)
* Sponsors:
- @reyang
- tbd
* GC liaison: @svrnm
* Engineers for API/SDK:
* SAP will provide a prototype in two languages (tbd; likely two of Java, JavaScript, Go)
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I think we need prototype in two parts:

  1. API/SDK - this is where we need three programming languages IIRC.
  2. OTel Collector - higher guarantee on data delivery (completeness, integrity, latency, etc.), data path security.

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@mlenkeit mlenkeit Nov 19, 2024

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Thanks for pointing this out! It's clear to us, but I'll work on making this clearer in the doc...

* Engineers for OTel Collector: tbd
* Maintainers/approvers: tbd

## Timeline

TBD based on community involvement.

## Labels

- audit-logging (tbc)

## Project Board

TODO: add link

## SIG Meetings and Other Info

TODO: add information

## Appendix

### Appendix A: Guarantee of Delivery

In the context of this document, guarantee of delivery describes the ability of delivering audit logs from source to destination through OTel means while ensuring that all such signals arrive at the destination and/or providing the source with a means to handle failed delivery.

Messaging protocols that support different levels of delivery guarantees may refer to this behavior as _at least once_ or _exactly once_, as opposed to _at most once_.

We assume that every component that is involved in the delivery of audit logs from source to destination must support guarantee of delivery individually, rather than assuming that this ability can be provided by e.g. only the collector or SDK.

The implications of guarantee of delivery can be illustrated with an example consisting of a workload, an OTel Collector instance, and a durable storage. The workload acts as the source and produces audit logs via the OTel API/SDK. It writes the data via OTLP to the collector. The collector is configured to export audit logs to a durable storage that acts as the destination such as an S3 bucket.

The following implications would apply:

- workload produces an audit-relevant event:

The workload emits the event via the OTel API/SDK. It may wait for acknowledgement of receipt from the collector before proceeding. If the event is rejected or receipt is not acknowledged in time, the workload or SDK may act accordingly, e.g. retry, rollback a database transaction, inform the user, etc.

- OTel Collector receives the event:
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To ensure that the event is not lost even if the collector process is terminated or crashes, the collector may need to persist the event before acknowledging receipt to the workload or SDK. If the event cannot be persisted, receipt must be rejected.
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What is the expectation if the collector instance disappeared (e.g., the machine running the collector exploded / was stolen)?

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I think this is the most tricky part, or to put it in a question: do we need guarantee of delivery between 2 components (workload->collector,collector->S3) or end-to-end (workload->S3)?

I would assume "end-to-end" except the collector can guarantee that data is persisted according the auditing requirements

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@mlenkeit mlenkeit Nov 22, 2024

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(e.g., the machine running the collector exploded / was stolen)

If the solution for audit logging with OTel meant that the OTel Collector had an own persistence, I would argue that theft/explosion/etc. are rather in the responsibility of Operations in terms of configuring said persistence such that it is resilient "enough".

Or to make this more concrete: if for example something such as the storage extension was used, Operations would need to make sure that the database/file/redis storage runs in an HA mode.

I'm stressing the if here, because I think is a detail that the SIG should work out. Or do you think that's something that should rather be clarified upfront?

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I'm stressing the if here, because I think is a detail that the SIG should work out. Or do you think that's something that should rather be clarified upfront?

I suggest that we leave this for the SIG to figure out. In the OTEP, I suggest that we avoid "guaranteed delivery" and use something like "certain degree/level of data delivery guarantee". Not a blocker for this PR though (I'm good with the current version).

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+1 for what @reyang wrote. I think it is good to have this in the appendix and some wording around it, since there is many people (including myself) who have a superficial knowledge around audit logs, so it helps to contextualize and understand what this is all about. So no more details are needed in this doc, this would be for the SIG to figure out


- OTel Collector exports the event:

Once the event is exported and the target (i.e. S3) acknowledges receipt, the event can dropped from the collector's persistence.

- the target (i.e. S3) receives the event:

Acknowledges receipt after persisting the event.

Note that this is outside the scope of the OTel. More general, when using OTel for audit logging purposes, it's the users (e.g. Ops) responsibility to configure a suitable export target.

Note that this example may contain implementation details for illustration purposes. The actual implementation may differ as long as the requirements are met.

The example is kept simple for illustration purposes. Many edge cases need to be discussed by the SIG, such as batch-sending of signals or handling of multiple export targets.

It may turn out that all OTel receivers, processors, or exporters can be made compatible with guarantee of delivery for audit logging purposes.

### Appendix B: Examples of Audit Log Events

The following list contains sample audit log events in a YAML format for better readability and intentionally do not follow any OTel-related schema.

An event consists of the event name, event-specific data, and general metadata. The individual properties of these events would ideally be reflected in common or audit log-specific semantic conventions.

- failed login attempts

```yaml
event: UserLoginFailure
data:
loginMethod: oidc
failureReason: userLocked
metadata:
id: 50b925b5-0ba9-42f3-b476-8a6795000046
timestamp: 1732193414483
ip: 10.11.12.13
initiator: john-doe
application: payroll
tenant: fab54af9-f978-463e-9c02-f92db1afc2b4
```

- permission changes (e.g. of a service account or application user)

```yaml
event: AuthnRoleToUserAdd
data:
user: jane-doe
role: editor
metadata:
id: 50b925b5-0ba9-42f3-b476-8a6795000046
timestamp: 1732193414483
ip: 10.11.12.13
initiator: john-doe
application: payroll
tenant: fab54af9-f978-463e-9c02-f92db1afc2b4
```

- accessing sensitive information

```yaml
event: DppDataAccess
data:
channelType: web
channelId: https://payroll.example.com/user/jane-doe/compensation
dataSubjectType: employeeID
dataSubjectId: jane-doe
objectType: compensation
objectId: 1196f42b-8f12-4df0-9b1f-01c98d2c7291
attribute: salary
value: 50000
metadata:
id: 50b925b5-0ba9-42f3-b476-8a6795000046
timestamp: 1732193414483
ip: 10.11.12.13
initiator: john-doe
application: payroll
tenant: fab54af9-f978-463e-9c02-f92db1afc2b4
```


- modification of data

```yaml
event: DataModification
data:
objectType: CronJob
objectId: my-sample-cronjob
attribute: schedule
oldValue: 0 0 1 * * # monthly
newValue: 0 0 1 1 * # annually
metadata:
id: 50b925b5-0ba9-42f3-b476-8a6795000046
timestamp: 1732193414483
ip: 10.11.12.13
initiator: john-doe
k8sCluster: my-sample-cluster
```

<!-- links -->
[Appendix A: Guarantee of Delivery]: #appendix-a-guarantee-of-delivery
[Appendix B: Examples of Audit Log Events]: #appendix-b-examples-of-audit-log-events