sigtool
is an opinionated tool to generate keys, sign, verify, encrypt &
decrypt files using Ed25519 signature scheme. In many ways, it is like
like OpenBSD's signify -- except written in Golang and definitely
easier to use. It can use SSH ed25519 public and private keys.
It can sign and verify very large files - it prehashes the files with SHA-512 and then signs the SHA-512 checksum. The keys and signatures are human readable YAML files.
It can encrypt files for multiple recipients - each of whom is identified by their Ed25519 public key. The encryption generates ephmeral Curve25519 keys and creates pair-wise shared secret for each recipient of the encrypted file. The caller can optionally use a specific private key during the encryption process - this has the benefit of also authenticating the sender (and the receiver can verify the sender if they possess the corresponding sender's public key).
The sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt operations can use OpenSSH Ed25519 keys
or the keys generated by sigtool. This means, you can send encrypted
files to any recipient identified by their comment in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
.
You need two things:
-
Protobuf compiler:
On Debian based systems:
apt install protobuf-compiler
Consult your OS's package manager to install protobuf tools; these are typically named 'protobuf' or 'protoc'.
-
go 1.13+ toolchain
Next, build sigtool:
git clone https://github.com/opencoff/sigtool
cd sigtool
make
The binary will be in ./bin/$HOSTOS-$ARCH/sigtool
.
where $HOSTOS
is the host OS where you are building (e.g., openbsd)
and $ARCH
is the CPU architecture (e.g., amd64).
Broadly, the tool can:
- generate new key pairs (public key and private key)
- sign a file
- verify a file against its signature
- encrypt a file
- decrypt a file
To start with, you generate a new key pair (a public key used for verification and a private key used for signing). e.g.,
sigtool gen /tmp/testkey
The tool then generates /tmp/testkey.pub and /tmp/testkey.key. The secret key (".key") can optionally be encrypted with a user supplied pass phrase - which the user has to enter via interactive prompt:
sigtool gen -p /tmp/testkey
Signing a file requires the user to provide a previously generated
Ed25519 private key. The signature (YAML) is written to STDOUT.
e.g., to sign archive.tar.gz
with private key /tmp/testkey.key
:
sigtool sign /tmp/testkey.key archive.tar.gz
If testkey.key was encrypted without a user pass phrase:
sigtool sign --no-password /tmp/testkey.key archive.tar.gz
The signature can also be written directly to a user supplied output file.
sigtool sign -o archive.sig /tmp/testkey.key archive.tar.gz
Verifying a signature of a file requires the user to supply three pieces of information:
- the Ed25519 public key to be used for verification
- the Ed25519 signature
- the file whose signature must be verified
e.g., to verify the signature of archive.tar.gz against testkey.pub using the signature archive.sig
sigtool verify /tmp/testkey.pub archive.sig archive.tar.gz
You can also pass a public key as a string (instead of a file):
sigtool verify iF84Dymq/bAEnUMK6DRIHWAQDRD8FwDDDfsgFfzdjWM= archive.sig archive.tar.gz
Note that signing and verifying can also work with OpenSSH ed25519 keys.
If the sender wishes to prove to the recipient that they encrypted a file:
sigtool encrypt -s sender.key to.pub -o archive.tar.gz.enc archive.tar.gz
This will create an encrypted file archive.tar.gz.enc such that the recipient in possession of to.key can decrypt it. Furthermore, if the recipient has sender.pub, they can verify that the sender is indeed who they expect.
If the receiver has the public key of the sender, they can verify that they indeed sent the file by cryptographically checking the output:
sigtool decrypt -o archive.tar.gz -v sender.pub to.key archive.tar.gz.enc
Note that the verification is optional and if the -v
option is not
used, then decryption will proceed without verifying the sender.
sigtool
can generate ephemeral keys for encrypting a file such that
the receiver doesn't need to authenticate the sender:
sigtool encrypt to.pub -o archive.tar.gz.enc archive.tar.gz
This will create an encrypted file archive.tar.gz.enc such that the recipient in possession of to.key can decrypt it.
Suppose you want to send an encrypted file where the recipient's
public key is in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
. Such a recipient is identified
by their OpenSSH key comment (typically name@domain
):
sigtool encrypt user@domain -o archive.tar.gz.enc archive.tar.gz
If you have their public key in file "name-domain.pub", you can do:
sigtool encrypt name-domain.pub -o archive.tar.gz.enc archive.tar.gz
This will create an encrypted file archive.tar.gz.enc such that the recipient can decrypt using their private key.
The file encryption uses AES-GCM-256 in AEAD mode. The encryption uses a random 32-byte AES-256 key. This root key is expanded via HKDF-SHA256 into:
- AES-GCM-256 key (32 bytes)
- AES Nonce (12 bytes)
- HMAC-SHA-256 key (32 bytes)
The input to the HKDF is the root-key, header-checksum ("salt") and a context string.
The input is broken into chunks and each chunk is individually AEAD encrypted. The default chunk size is 4MB (4 * 1048576 bytes). Each chunk generates its own nonce: the top-4 bytes of the nonce is the chunk-number. The actual chunk-length and EOF marker is used as additional data (the "AD" of "AEAD"). The last block has its most-signficant-bit set to 1 to denote EOF. Thus, the maximum chunk size is set to 1GB.
We calculate a running hmac of the plaintext blocks; when sender identity is present, the final HMAC is signed via the sender's Ed25519 key. This signature is appended as the "trailer" (last 64 bytes of the encrypted file are the Ed25519 signature).
When sender identity is not present, the last bytes are random bytes.
sigtool
uses ephemeral Curve25519 keys to generate shared secrets
between pairs of sender & one or more recipients. This pairwise shared
secret is used as a key-encryption-key (KEK) to wrap the
data-encryption key in AEAD mode. Thus, each recipient has their own
individual encrypted key blob - that only they can decrypt.
If the sender authenticates the encryption by providing their secret key, the encryption key material is signed via Ed25519 and the signature is encrypted (using the data-encryption key) and stored in the header. If the sender opts to not authenticate, a "signature" of all zeroes is encrypted instead.
The Ed25519 keys generated by sigtool
or OpenSSH are transformed to their
corresponding Curve25519 points in order to generate the pair-wise shared secret.
This elliptic co-ordinate transform follows FiloSottile's writeup.
Every encrypted file starts with a header and the header-checksum:
- Fixed-size header
- Variable-length header
- SHA256 sum of both of the above
The fixed length header is:
7 byte magic ("SigTool")
1 byte version number
4 byte header length (big endian encoding)
The variable length header has the per-recipient wrapped keys. This is described as a protobuf file (sign/hdr.proto):
message header {
uint32 chunk_size = 1;
bytes salt = 2;
bytes pk = 3; // sender's ephemeral curve PK
bytes sender = 4; // ed25519 signature of key material
repeated wrapped_key keys = 5;
}
/*
* A file encryption key is wrapped by a recipient specific public
* key. WrappedKey describes such a wrapped key.
*/
message wrapped_key {
bytes d_key = 1;
bytes nonce = 2;
}
The SHA256 sum covers the fixed-length and variable-length headers.
The encrypted data immediately follows the headers above. Each encrypted chunk is encoded the same way:
4 byte chunk length (big endian encoding)
AEAD encrypted chunk data
AEAD tag
The chunk length does not include the AEAD tag length; it is implicitly computed. The chunk data and AEAD tag are treated as an atomic unit for AEAD decryption.
The Ed25519 private key is encrypted in AES-GCM-256 mode using a key
derived from the user's pass-phrase. The user pass phrase is expanded via
SHA256; this expanded pass phrase is fed to scrypt()
to
generate a key-encryption-key. In pseudo code, this operation looks
like below:
passphrase = get_user_passphrase()
expanded = SHA512(passphrase)
salt = randombytes(32)
key = Scrypt(expanded, salt, N, r, p)
esk = AES256_GCM(ed25519_private_key, key)
Where, N
, r
, p
are Scrypt parameters. In our
implementation:
N = 2^19 (1 << 19)
r = 8
p = 1
The core logic is in src/sign
: it is a library that exposes all the
functionality: key generation, key parsing, signing, encryption, decryption
etc.
src/encrypt.go
contains the core encryption, decryption codesrc/sign.go
contains the Ed25519 signing, verification codesrc/keys.go
contains key generation, serialization, de-serializationsrc/ssh.go
contains code to parse SSH Ed25519 key filessrc/stream.go
contains code that provides anio.Reader
andio.WriteCloser
interface for encryption and decryption.tests.sh
simple round trip test using the tool; this is in addition to the tests insign/
.
The generated keys and signatures are proper YAML files and human readable.
The signature file contains a hash of the public key - so that at verification time, the right private key may be used (in situations where there are lots of keys).
Signatures on large files are calculated efficiently by reading them
in memory mapped mode (mmap(2)
) and hashing the file contents
using SHA-512. The Ed25519 signature is calculated on the file-hash.
The core library in sign/
has extensive tests to verify signing and encryption.
Additionally, a simple shell script tests.sh
does a full roundtrip of tests
using sigtool
.
A serialized Ed25519 public key looks like so:
pk: uxpDh+gqXojAmxA/6vxZHzA+Uk+8wogUwvEhPBlWgvo=
And, a serialized Ed25519 private key looks like so:
esk: t3vfqHbgUiA733KKPymFjWT8DdnBEkiMfsDHolPUdQWpvVn/F1Z4J6KYV3M5rGO9xgKxh5RAmqt+6LKgOiJAMQ==
salt: pPHKG55UJYtJ5wU0G9hBvNQJ0DvT0a7T4Fmj4aPB84s=
algo: scrypt-sha256
Z: 131072
r: 16
p: 1
A generated signature looks like below after serialization:
comment: inpfile=/tmp/file.txt
pkhash: 36z9tCwTIVNwwDlExrB0SQ==
signature: ow2oBP+buDbEvlNakOrsxgB5Yc/7PYyPVZCkfyu7oahw8BakF4Qf32uswPaKGZ8RVz4uXboYHdZtfrEjCgP/Cg==
Here, ```pkhash`` is a SHA256 of the public key needed to verify this signature.
The tool and code is licensed under the terms of the GNU Public License v2.0 (strictly v2.0). If you need a commercial license or a different license, please get in touch with me.
See the file LICENSE.md
for the full terms of the license.
Sudhi Herle sw@herle.net