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Prevent user enumeration attacks #384

Merged
merged 2 commits into from
Jan 12, 2020
Merged

Prevent user enumeration attacks #384

merged 2 commits into from
Jan 12, 2020

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danschultzer
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@danschultzer danschultzer commented Jan 12, 2020

Resolves #383 and refactors code from #350.

The logic has been refactored to rely more on a :pow_prevent_information_leak private key in conn so the dev can decide which routes/situations that info leak is permitted.

Since it's not really possible to prevent enumeration attacks unless PowEmailConfirmation has been enabled, the logic lies there currently, but I'll try to see if I can refactor it further and maybe move it to the base extension modules, or Pow core. Previously I checked whether registration paths where disabled, since it would prevent user enumeration attacks for Pow core.

Edit: Updated to move some of the logic out of PowEmailConfirmation, and opted for policy to prevent info leak by default.

@danschultzer danschultzer force-pushed the prevent-info-leak branch 2 times, most recently from f85902e to eec7603 Compare January 12, 2020 20:38
@danschultzer danschultzer merged commit ff44430 into master Jan 12, 2020
@danschultzer danschultzer deleted the prevent-info-leak branch January 12, 2020 20:45
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Prevent information leak when updating an email with PowEmailConfirmation
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