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Remove deployment documentation and point to rustls-platform-verifier #140

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33 changes: 3 additions & 30 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -83,36 +83,9 @@ See [`examples/google.rs`](examples/google.rs).

(Background: [webpki-roots](https://crates.io/crates/webpki-roots) is a crate that compiles-in Mozilla's set of root certificates.)

This crate is preferable in many ways to *webpki-roots*.
To sum up the pros and cons:

Pros:

- **This crate respects local configuration of root certificates**: both
removal of roots that the user finds untrustworthy, and addition of locally-trusted roots.
_The latter case is exceedingly important if your application is required to work in
enterprise environments with "transparent" TLS-terminating middleboxes._
- **This crate instantaneously reflects underlying system configuration**. _Since webpki-roots
compiles in root certificates, getting an update to these requires taking regular updates
to this crate, plus recompilation and redeployment of the application. This is a long-winded
process that may become a liability in the event of a severe misissuance._
- **This crate is compatible with developer aids** such as [mkcert](https://github.com/FiloSottile/mkcert).

Cons:

- **Use of the OS certificate store is not the same as relying on OS trust verification**
because platform verifiers might impose additional criteria before deciding whether to trust
a root ostensibly included in the OS certificate store (for example, an expiration date).
- **The OS certificate store is occasionally "attacked" by [malware](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superfish)**
or just [bad software](https://sennheiser.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360011888254).
- **The OS update system may, in fact, be quite poor at keeping the root certificates up-to-date**
if it is disabled or out-of-support.
- **The quality of the `ca-certificates` package on debian-based Linux distributions is poor**.
At the time of writing, this ships many certificates not included in the Mozilla
set, either because they [failed an audit and were withdrawn](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1448506) or
[were removed for mississuance](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1552374).
- **You may prefer to insulate yourself against local configuration** for support or
(perhaps inadvisable) security reasons.
Please see `rustls-platform-verifier`'s documentation on [deployment considerations](https://github.com/rustls/rustls-platform-verifier?tab=readme-ov-file#deployment-considerations) for more info.

Additionally in most cases, the platform verifier is a better option than this crate if you are already considering `rustls-native-certs`.

# License

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