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Fix a typo in the threat model docs #357

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Dec 12, 2024
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/en/about/threat-model.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ It does not guarantee that the signer *should* be able to authenticate (for inst
Further, if Sigstore itself is compromised, this property may not hold; see our analysis below.

**What should I do or keep in mind to mitigate these threats when using Sigstore?**
First, users of Sigstore should ensure that they have tooling to audit Sigstore’s transparency logs for consistency and to monitor the use of their identities in Sigstore. Sistore operators provide [some tooling](https://github.com/sigstore/rekor-monitor) for these efforts. Second, all OIDC accounts used to create Sigstore signatures should have 2FA enabled to reduce the likelihood of a compromise.
First, users of Sigstore should ensure that they have tooling to audit Sigstore’s transparency logs for consistency and to monitor the use of their identities in Sigstore. Sigstore operators provide [some tooling](https://github.com/sigstore/rekor-monitor) for these efforts. Second, all OIDC accounts used to create Sigstore signatures should have 2FA enabled to reduce the likelihood of a compromise.

In this threat model, we consider the compromise of any of the following:

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