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xcompiling, install over NFS #6
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charliemirabile
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Nov 17, 2021
The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
charliemirabile
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Dec 9, 2021
To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block, I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp": systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service... kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3). kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/ kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete kdump[467]: saving vmcore BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86 Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008 RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50 R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000 R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8 FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0 Call Trace: read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0 proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0 vfs_read+0x95/0x190 ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on wrong access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly handled via clac()+stac(). To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 997c136 ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
charliemirabile
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Jan 28, 2022
Change the cifs filesystem to take account of the changes to fscache's indexing rewrite and reenable caching in cifs. The following changes have been made: (1) The fscache_netfs struct is no more, and there's no need to register the filesystem as a whole. (2) The session cookie is now an fscache_volume cookie, allocated with fscache_acquire_volume(). That takes three parameters: a string representing the "volume" in the index, a string naming the cache to use (or NULL) and a u64 that conveys coherency metadata for the volume. For cifs, I've made it render the volume name string as: "cifs,<ipaddress>,<sharename>" where the sharename has '/' characters replaced with ';'. This probably needs rethinking a bit as the total name could exceed the maximum filename component length. Further, the coherency data is currently just set to 0. It needs something else doing with it - I wonder if it would suffice simply to sum the resource_id, vol_create_time and vol_serial_number or maybe hash them. (3) The fscache_cookie_def is no more and needed information is passed directly to fscache_acquire_cookie(). The cache no longer calls back into the filesystem, but rather metadata changes are indicated at other times. fscache_acquire_cookie() is passed the same keying and coherency information as before. (4) The functions to set/reset cookies are removed and fscache_use_cookie() and fscache_unuse_cookie() are used instead. fscache_use_cookie() is passed a flag to indicate if the cookie is opened for writing. fscache_unuse_cookie() is passed updates for the metadata if we changed it (ie. if the file was opened for writing). These are called when the file is opened or closed. (5) cifs_setattr_*() are made to call fscache_resize() to change the size of the cache object. (6) The functions to read and write data are stubbed out pending a conversion to use netfslib. Changes ======= ver #8: - Abstract cache invalidation into a helper function. - Fix some checkpatch warnings[3]. ver #7: - Removed the accidentally added-back call to get the super cookie in cifs_root_iget(). - Fixed the right call to cifs_fscache_get_super_cookie() to take account of the "-o fsc" mount flag. ver #6: - Moved the change of gfpflags_allow_blocking() to current_is_kswapd() for cifs here. - Fixed one of the error paths in cifs_atomic_open() to jump around the call to use the cookie. - Fixed an additional successful return in the middle of cifs_open() to use the cookie on the way out. - Only get a volume cookie (and thus inode cookies) when "-o fsc" is supplied to mount. ver #5: - Fixed a couple of bits of cookie handling[2]: - The cookie should be released in cifs_evict_inode(), not cifsFileInfo_put_final(). The cookie needs to persist beyond file closure so that writepages will be able to write to it. - fscache_use_cookie() needs to be called in cifs_atomic_open() as it is for cifs_open(). ver #4: - Fixed the use of sizeof with memset. - tcon->vol_create_time is __le64 so doesn't need cpu_to_le64(). ver #3: - Canonicalise the cifs coherency data to make the cache portable. - Set volume coherency data. ver #2: - Use gfpflags_allow_blocking() rather than using flag directly. - Upgraded to -rc4 to allow for upstream changes[1]. - fscache_acquire_volume() now returns errors. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=23b55d673d7527b093cd97b7c217c82e70cd1af0 [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3419813.1641592362@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAH2r5muTanw9pJqzAHd01d9A8keeChkzGsCEH6=0rHutVLAF-A@mail.gmail.com/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163819671009.215744.11230627184193298714.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163906982979.143852.10672081929614953210.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/163967187187.1823006.247415138444991444.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164021579335.640689.2681324337038770579.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3462849.1641593783@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1318953.1642024578@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v6 Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
theyoyojo
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May 18, 2022
Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep #6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- to=dianders@chromium.org Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651007534-31842-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
theyoyojo
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While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
theyoyojo
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May 18, 2022
Recent commit that modified fib route event handler to handle events according to their priority introduced use-after-free[0] in mp->mfi pointer usage. The pointer now is not just cached in order to be compared to following fib_info instances, but is also dereferenced to obtain fib_priority. However, since mlx5 lag code doesn't hold the reference to fin_info during whole mp->mfi lifetime, it could be used after fib_info instance has already been freed be kernel infrastructure code. Don't ever dereference mp->mfi pointer. Refactor it to be 'const void*' type and cache fib_info priority in dedicated integer. Group fib_info-related data into dedicated 'fib' structure that will be further extended by following patches in the series. [0]: [ 203.588029] ================================================================== [ 203.590161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.592386] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888144df2050 by task kworker/u20:4/138 [ 203.594766] CPU: 3 PID: 138 Comm: kworker/u20:4 Tainted: G B 5.17.0-rc7+ #6 [ 203.596751] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 203.598813] Workqueue: mlx5_lag_mp mlx5_lag_fib_update [mlx5_core] [ 203.600053] Call Trace: [ 203.600608] <TASK> [ 203.601110] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e [ 203.601860] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x160 [ 203.602950] ? mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.604073] ? mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.605177] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 203.605969] ? mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.607102] mlx5_lag_fib_update+0xabd/0xd60 [mlx5_core] [ 203.608199] ? mlx5_lag_init_fib_work+0x1c0/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] [ 203.609382] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [ 203.610463] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [ 203.611463] process_one_work+0x722/0x1270 [ 203.612344] worker_thread+0x540/0x11e0 [ 203.613136] ? rescuer_thread+0xd50/0xd50 [ 203.613949] kthread+0x26e/0x300 [ 203.614627] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 203.615542] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 203.616273] </TASK> [ 203.617174] Allocated by task 3746: [ 203.617874] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 203.618644] __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 [ 203.619394] fib_create_info+0xb41/0x3c50 [ 203.620213] fib_table_insert+0x190/0x1ff0 [ 203.621020] fib_magic.isra.0+0x246/0x2e0 [ 203.621803] fib_add_ifaddr+0x19f/0x670 [ 203.622563] fib_inetaddr_event+0x13f/0x270 [ 203.623377] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x130 [ 203.624355] __inet_insert_ifa+0x641/0xb20 [ 203.625185] inet_rtm_newaddr+0xc3d/0x16a0 [ 203.626009] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x309/0x880 [ 203.626826] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [ 203.627626] netlink_unicast+0x4cc/0x790 [ 203.628430] netlink_sendmsg+0x762/0xc00 [ 203.629230] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [ 203.629955] ____sys_sendmsg+0x58a/0x770 [ 203.630756] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [ 203.631523] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [ 203.632294] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 203.633045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 203.634427] Freed by task 0: [ 203.635063] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 203.635844] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 203.636618] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [ 203.637450] __kasan_slab_free+0xfc/0x140 [ 203.638271] kfree+0x94/0x3b0 [ 203.638903] rcu_core+0x5e4/0x1990 [ 203.639640] __do_softirq+0x1ba/0x5d3 [ 203.640828] Last potentially related work creation: [ 203.641785] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 203.642571] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9f/0xb0 [ 203.643478] call_rcu+0x88/0x9c0 [ 203.644178] fib_release_info+0x539/0x750 [ 203.644997] fib_table_delete+0x659/0xb80 [ 203.645809] fib_magic.isra.0+0x1a3/0x2e0 [ 203.646617] fib_del_ifaddr+0x93f/0x1300 [ 203.647415] fib_inetaddr_event+0x9f/0x270 [ 203.648251] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x130 [ 203.649225] __inet_del_ifa+0x474/0xc10 [ 203.650016] devinet_ioctl+0x781/0x17f0 [ 203.650788] inet_ioctl+0x1ad/0x290 [ 203.651533] sock_do_ioctl+0xce/0x1c0 [ 203.652315] sock_ioctl+0x27b/0x4f0 [ 203.653058] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190 [ 203.653850] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 203.654608] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 203.666952] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888144df2000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [ 203.669250] The buggy address is located 80 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff888144df2000, ffff888144df2100) [ 203.671332] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 203.672273] page:00000000bf6c9314 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x144df0 [ 203.674009] head:00000000bf6c9314 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 203.675422] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 203.676819] raw: 002ffff800010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 [ 203.678384] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 203.679928] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 203.681455] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 203.682421] ffff888144df1f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 203.683863] ffff888144df1f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 203.685310] >ffff888144df2000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 203.686701] ^ [ 203.687820] ffff888144df2080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 203.689226] ffff888144df2100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 203.690620] ================================================================== Fixes: ad11c4f ("net/mlx5e: Lag, Only handle events from highest priority multipath entry") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maor Dickman <maord@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
charliemirabile
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The system call gate area counts as kernel text but trying to install a kprobe in this area fails with an Oops later on. To fix this explicitly disallow the gate area for kprobes. Found by syzkaller with the following reproducer: perf_event_open$cgroup(&(0x7f00000001c0)={0x6, 0x80, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x80ffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @perf_config_ext={0x0, 0xffffffffff600000}}, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0) Sample report: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff3ac6000 PGD 6dfcb067 P4D 6dfcb067 PUD 6df8f067 PMD 6de4d067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 21978 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-00363-g7726d4c3e60b-dirty #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__insn_get_emulate_prefix arch/x86/lib/insn.c:91 [inline] RIP: 0010:insn_get_emulate_prefix arch/x86/lib/insn.c:106 [inline] RIP: 0010:insn_get_prefixes.part.0+0xa8/0x1110 arch/x86/lib/insn.c:134 Code: 49 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 40 60 48 89 44 24 08 e9 81 00 00 00 e8 e5 4b 39 ff 4c 89 fa 4c 89 f9 48 c1 ea 03 83 e1 07 <42> 0f b6 14 32 38 ca 7f 08 84 d2 0f 85 06 10 00 00 48 89 d8 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc900088bf860 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: ffffffff9b9bebc0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 1ffffffff3ac6000 RSI: ffffc90002d82000 RDI: ffffc900088bf9e8 RBP: ffffffff9d630001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc900088bf9e8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff9d630000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffff9d630000 FS: 00007f63eef63640(0000) GS:ffff88806d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff3ac6000 CR3: 0000000029d90005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> insn_get_prefixes arch/x86/lib/insn.c:131 [inline] insn_get_opcode arch/x86/lib/insn.c:272 [inline] insn_get_modrm+0x64a/0x7b0 arch/x86/lib/insn.c:343 insn_get_sib+0x29a/0x330 arch/x86/lib/insn.c:421 insn_get_displacement+0x350/0x6b0 arch/x86/lib/insn.c:464 insn_get_immediate arch/x86/lib/insn.c:632 [inline] insn_get_length arch/x86/lib/insn.c:707 [inline] insn_decode+0x43a/0x490 arch/x86/lib/insn.c:747 can_probe+0xfc/0x1d0 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:282 arch_prepare_kprobe+0x79/0x1c0 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:739 prepare_kprobe kernel/kprobes.c:1160 [inline] register_kprobe kernel/kprobes.c:1641 [inline] register_kprobe+0xb6e/0x1690 kernel/kprobes.c:1603 __register_trace_kprobe kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:509 [inline] __register_trace_kprobe+0x26a/0x2d0 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:477 create_local_trace_kprobe+0x1f7/0x350 kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:1833 perf_kprobe_init+0x18c/0x280 kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c:271 perf_kprobe_event_init+0xf8/0x1c0 kernel/events/core.c:9888 perf_try_init_event+0x12d/0x570 kernel/events/core.c:11261 perf_init_event kernel/events/core.c:11325 [inline] perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xf7f/0x36a0 kernel/events/core.c:11619 perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:12059 [inline] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0x4a8/0x2a00 kernel/events/core.c:12157 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f63ef7efaed Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f63eef63028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f63ef90ff80 RCX: 00007f63ef7efaed RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 00000000200001c0 RBP: 00007f63ef86019c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007f63ef90ff80 R15: 00007f63eef43000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: fffffbfff3ac6000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:__insn_get_emulate_prefix arch/x86/lib/insn.c:91 [inline] RIP: 0010:insn_get_emulate_prefix arch/x86/lib/insn.c:106 [inline] RIP: 0010:insn_get_prefixes.part.0+0xa8/0x1110 arch/x86/lib/insn.c:134 Code: 49 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 40 60 48 89 44 24 08 e9 81 00 00 00 e8 e5 4b 39 ff 4c 89 fa 4c 89 f9 48 c1 ea 03 83 e1 07 <42> 0f b6 14 32 38 ca 7f 08 84 d2 0f 85 06 10 00 00 48 89 d8 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc900088bf860 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: ffffffff9b9bebc0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 1ffffffff3ac6000 RSI: ffffc90002d82000 RDI: ffffc900088bf9e8 RBP: ffffffff9d630001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc900088bf9e8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff9d630000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffffff9d630000 FS: 00007f63eef63640(0000) GS:ffff88806d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff3ac6000 CR3: 0000000029d90005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220907200917.654103-1-lk@c--e.de cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt <lk@c--e.de> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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based on:
https://gist.github.com/lategoodbye/c7317a42bf7f9c07f5a91baed8c68f75#raspberry-pi-how-to-cross-compile-and-use-mainline-kernel
https://github.com/underground-software/fedora-rpi4/blob/master/kernel-cross.md
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