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Add info about another attack type #251

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43 changes: 42 additions & 1 deletion index.html
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1353,7 +1353,48 @@ <h4>Cross-site covert channel</h4>
a video conferencing session will typically exert sustained pressure on the CPU that makes it harder to
manipulate the pressure state in a predictive manner.
</div>

<h4>Targeted de-anonymization attacks</h4>
<p>
Targeted de-anonymization attacks constitute a critical class of threats that jeopardize a user's anonymity.
These attacks allow a malicious or partially compromised website (referred to as the “malicious site”) to
ascertain whether a website visitor possesses a specific public identifier, such as an email address or a
social media handle.
</p>
<p>
While anonymity may be a luxury for some, for certain individuals, it is far more than that—it is a matter
of survival. Consider for instance those who engage in political protests, work as journalists covering
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nit
"Consider for instance those who engage in political protests, work as journalists covering sensitive topics, etc"
maybe:
"Consider for instance those who engage with freedom of information."

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I think that is a bit weak and harder to understand

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it s just more generic

sensitive topics, etc.
</p>
<p>
As an example, an attacker can privately share a resource with the target for instance using a public
resource sharing service (“victim site”), and then measure side-effects (indicating successful access)
on loading the resource via side-channels. If the logged in visitor can access the embedded resource
successfully, that indicates that the current visit is indeed the intended target.
</p>
<p>
Specifically, exposing reliable information about the total CPU pressure can let an attacking site
understand if a target of a cross-origin navigation (e.g. an iframe or pop-up window from another site)
performed a CPU-intensive operation.
</p>
<p>
Techniques such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pop-up_ad#Pop-under_ads">pop-under</a> and
<a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22-zaheri.pdf">tab-under</a> can be used to hide the loading
from the user.
</p>
<p>
One possible attack is that the malicious website opens e.g., a popup to a resource on a victim site
to which the user is logged in (e.g. a video streaming site or online document editor) pointing to a
resource shared with specific users.
</p>
<p>
Assuming that loading the resource puts increased pressure on the CPU, this would create a side-channel
reveals to the attacking site if the user is logged into an account with access to the resource,
deanonymizing the user.
</p>
<p>
Given that modern CPUs recover quickly from high pressure, one possible mitigation strategy could be to
temporarily disable readings for a few seconds after loading popup and iframe content.
</p>
</section>

<section>
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