ci(pr-title-checks): Remove default GH workflow permissions and document risk of pull_request_target workflow trigger.
#633
Conversation
…pull_request_target workflow trigger.
WalkthroughThe changes in this pull request involve updating a GitHub Actions workflow file to include a note about the security implications of using the Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)The changes in this pull request do not involve a new feature or modifications to the control flow, so a sequence diagram is not necessary. 📜 Recent review detailsConfiguration used: CodeRabbit UI 📒 Files selected for processing (1)
🔇 Additional comments (3).github/workflows/clp-pr-title-checks.yaml (3)
The added documentation effectively communicates the security considerations for using
The empty permissions block at workflow level and explicit job-level permissions follow security best practices. Let's verify this is the minimal set required. Also applies to: 24-25 ✅ Verification successfulPermissions configuration is correctly minimized The current permissions setup is optimal and follows security best practices:
🏁 Scripts executedThe following scripts were executed for the analysis: Script: #!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the action's required permissions
# Expected: Only pull-requests:read should be required
# Check the action's metadata for required permissions
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/v5/action.yml | grep -A 5 "permissions:"
# Verify no other GitHub API calls are made in the action's code
gh api repos/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/contents/src/index.ts | jq -r '.content' | base64 -d | grep -i "octokit"
Length of output: 366 Script: #!/bin/bash
# Let's try a different approach to verify the permissions by examining the workflow file and action usage
# Check the workflow file for permissions configuration
cat .github/workflows/clp-pr-title-checks.yaml
# Search for any GitHub API related operations in the repository
rg -i "github" .github/workflows/clp-pr-title-checks.yaml
Length of output: 1234 Line range hint While the workflow configuration is secure, let's verify the security of the external action being used. ✅ Verification successfulExternal action security verification completed The
🏁 Scripts executedThe following scripts were executed for the analysis: Script: #!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the security of amannn/action-semantic-pull-request
# Expected: No major security issues and recent maintenance
# Check for security advisories
gh api graphql -f query='
{
repository(owner: "amannn", name: "action-semantic-pull-request") {
vulnerabilityAlerts(first: 5, states: OPEN) {
nodes {
securityVulnerability {
severity
package { name }
vulnerableVersionRange
}
}
}
}
}'
# Check last commit date and release
gh api repos/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/commits/v5 --jq '.commit.committer.date'
Length of output: 650 Script: #!/bin/bash
# Let's try a different approach to verify the action's security
# by checking its source code directly
# Check the action.yml and package.json for dependencies
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/v5/action.yml
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/v5/package.json
# Check the size and complexity of the action
curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request/git/trees/v5?recursive=1
Length of output: 18022 Thank you for using CodeRabbit. We offer it for free to the OSS community and would appreciate your support in helping us grow. If you find it useful, would you consider giving us a shout-out on your favorite social media? 🪧 TipsChatThere are 3 ways to chat with CodeRabbit:
Note: Be mindful of the bot's finite context window. It's strongly recommended to break down tasks such as reading entire modules into smaller chunks. For a focused discussion, use review comments to chat about specific files and their changes, instead of using the PR comments. CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)
Other keywords and placeholders
CodeRabbit Configuration File (
|
kirkrodrigues
changed the title
pull_request_target GH workflow trigger.pull_request_target workflow trigger.
…ent risk of `pull_request_target` workflow trigger. (y-scope#633)
Description
As the PR title says.
Validation performed
The same code has been validated in clp-loglib-py.
Summary by CodeRabbit
en-CA
pull_request_targetevent trigger.