-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 1.7k
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Remove persist-credentials
or change the default to false
#485
Comments
I can't believe the default is to persist credentials and expose them to other jobs :( this is a major security issue. Just as a heads up for anyone stumbling upon this issue:
So if you want to harden security, apart from setting See https://github.blog/changelog/2021-04-20-github-actions-control-permissions-for-github_token/ for reference. |
+1 |
Agreed this seems a severe security issue, because it means any workflow using @haampie IIUC it is a problem also with no ssh authentication (the default). The GitHub token is given only to this action and maybe a few other actions/* actions ( In other words,
So, depending on whether the token is explicitly passed to some action:
I guess GitHub sees setting token permissions as the more general solution. https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ also has a mention related to this, search for
|
+1 |
persist-credentials
removed or false
by defaultpersist-credentials
or change the default to false
I updated the issue title since v3 and v4 have already shipped, so asking for a new v3 doesn't make sense. |
Fast forward to 2024, and we have https://johnstawinski.com/2024/01/11/playing-with-fire-how-we-executed-a-critical-supply-chain-attack-on-pytorch/
@ericsciple could you please take this issue seriously and disable persisting credentials to disk? |
persist-credentials defaults to true (see actions/checkout#485). It looks like pull_request workflows run without token access, but it's not clear from https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ if that means persist-credentials doesn't leave a secret in the .git directory where a malicious PR could access it.
See: actions/checkout#485 Co-authored-by: alxndrsn <alxndrsn> Co-authored-by: Steven <SourceR85@users.noreply.github.com>
Not sure this is actually necessary. There seems to be a mismatch between the documentated default and the code As I read the code, the 'persist-credentials' value will be false if the input does not contain a 'persist-credentials' entry. The issue should be changed to a 'fix the documentation' if my understanding is correct. |
Change the default value of persist-credentials setting from true to false to reduce the risk of unintentionally exposing the GITHUB_TOKEN secret. Fixes: actions#485 Signed-off-by: Michi Mutsuzaki <michi@isovalent.com>
That https://docs.github.com/en/actions/creating-actions/metadata-syntax-for-github-actions#inputs |
Is there some reference that says that Actons runner creates an environment variable when the item not
|
It is a possible security issue, see [1] for the reference. [1]: actions/checkout#485
It is a possible security issue, see [1] for the reference. [1]: actions/checkout#485
Currently one has to resort to explicitly specifying
persist-credentials: false
to avoid the credentials being persistent. My understanding is that persisting the credentials gives every step in the job that occurs afteractions/checkout@v2
implicit access to the token. This is not what people expect and this leads people to write jobs that expose their repo to more risk than they otherwise would.I propose the
persist-credentials
feature be removed completely and then v3 be released. Otherwise, if that's not practical, then at least the default should be changed tofalse
.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: