Merge pull request #1056 from bcressey/restrict-api-socket

isolate host containers and limit access to API socket

packages/os/host-containers-tmpfiles.conf

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
 d /etc/host-containers 0755 root root -
+d /local/host-containers 0700 root root -
+T /local/host-containers - - - - security.selinux=system_u:object_r:state_t:s0

packages/selinux-policy/fs.cil

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
 (filecon "/var/.*" any ())
 
 ; Label local state directories.
+(filecon "/local/host-containers" any state)
+(filecon "/local/host-containers/.*" any state)
 (filecon "/var/lib/chrony" any measure)
 (filecon "/var/lib/chrony/.*" any measure)
 (filecon "/var/lib/systemd" any state)

packages/selinux-policy/object.cil

@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@
 (roletype object_r private_t)
 (context private (system_u object_r private_t s0))
 
+; Files that are the API socket.
+(type api_socket_t)
+(roletype object_r api_socket_t)
+(context api_socket (system_u object_r api_socket_t s0))
+
 ; Files for cached container layers.
 (type cache_t)
 (roletype object_r cache_t)
@@ -118,4 +123,5 @@
   network_exec_t bus_exec_t runtime_exec_t
   any_t etc_t unlabeled_t external_t
   local_t private_t cache_t
-  lease_t measure_t state_t))
+  lease_t measure_t state_t
+  api_socket_t))

packages/selinux-policy/rules.cil

@@ -59,9 +59,11 @@
 ; objects on local storage.
 (typetransition runtime_t local_t process container_t)
 (typetransition runtime_t cache_t process container_t)
+(typetransition runtime_t state_t process container_t)
 (allow runtime_t container_s (processes (transform)))
 (allow container_s local_t (file (entrypoint)))
 (allow container_s cache_t (file (entrypoint)))
+(allow container_s state_t (file (entrypoint)))
 
 ; Allow containers to communicate with runtimes via pipes.
 (allow container_s runtime_t (files (mutate)))
@@ -82,6 +84,13 @@
 ; ... docker's image layers
 (typetransition runtime_t local_t dir "overlay2" cache_t)
 
+; If a system process creates a directory for host container state, it
+; receives the "state_t" label.
+(typetransition system_t local_t dir "host-containers" state_t)
+
+; The socket for the API server gets the "api_socket_t" label.
+(typetransition api_t any_t sock_file "api.sock" api_socket_t)
+
 ; All subjects are allowed to write to objects with their own label.
 ; This includes files like the ones under /proc/self.
 ; They can also set watches on those objects.
@@ -105,8 +114,19 @@
 ; mounts for "local" files and directories on /local.
 (allow unconfined_s local_t (files (mutate watch mount)))
 
-; Confined subjects cannot modify these "local" files.
+; Subjects that control the OS can write to, set watches for, and
+; manage mounts for "state" files and directories on /local. Our
+; runtimes also need to be able to perform these operations so that
+; they can launch host containers.
+(allow control_s state_t (files (mutate watch mount)))
+(allow runtime_s state_t (files (mutate watch mount)))
+
+; Untrusted subjects cannot modify the "state" files.
+(neverallow untrusted_s state_t (files (mutate watch mount)))
+
+; Confined subjects cannot modify either "state" or "local" files.
 (neverallow confined_s local_t (files (mutate watch mount)))
+(neverallow confined_s state_t (files (mutate watch mount)))
 
 ; Trusted components are allowed to manage mounts everywhere.
 (allow trusted_s global (files (mount)))
@@ -126,13 +146,21 @@
 (allow clock_s measure_t (files (mutate watch)))
 (allow network_s lease_t (files (mutate watch)))
 (allow runtime_s cache_t (files (mutate watch)))
-(allow system_s state_t (files (mutate watch)))
 
 ; Other components should not be permitted to modify these files,
 ; set watches for them, or to manage mounts for these directories.
 (neverallow other_s protected_o (files (mutate watch mount)))
 (neverallow other_s immutable_o (files (watch)))
 
+; Only the API server and specific components can use the API
+; socket, as this provides a means to escalate privileges and
+; persist changes.
+(allow api_s api_socket_t (files (mutate watch)))
+(allow control_s api_socket_t (files (mutate watch)))
+
+; Untrusted components are not allowed to use the API socket.
+(neverallow untrusted_s api_socket_t (files (mutate watch)))
+
 ; Only trusted components are allowed to relabel files.
 (allow trusted_s global (files (relabel)))
 

packages/selinux-policy/subject.cil

@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@
 (roletype system_r container_t)
 (context container (system_u system_r container_t s0))
 
+; Processes that run inside containers that control the OS.
+(type control_t)
+(roletype system_r control_t)
+(context control (system_u system_r control_t s0))
+
 ; Processes that run inside highly privileged containers.
 (type super_t)
 (roletype system_r super_t)
@@ -58,7 +63,7 @@
 (typeattributeset all_s (
   kernel_t init_t system_t api_t
   network_t clock_t bus_t runtime_t
-  container_t super_t))
+  container_t control_t super_t))
 
 ; Subjects that are treated as a trusted part of the OS.
 (typeattribute trusted_s)
@@ -82,7 +87,7 @@
 
 ; Subjects that are started from containers.
 (typeattribute container_s)
-(typeattributeset container_s (container_t super_t))
+(typeattributeset container_s (container_t control_t super_t))
 
 ; Subjects that are shipped with the OS.
 (typeattribute host_s)
@@ -104,6 +109,6 @@
 (typeattribute network_s)
 (typeattributeset network_s (network_t system_t super_t))
 
-; Subjects that are allowed to manage system files.
-(typeattribute system_s)
-(typeattributeset system_s (system_t super_t))
+; Subjects that are allowed to control system files.
+(typeattribute control_s)
+(typeattributeset control_s (control_t system_t super_t))

sources/host-ctr/cmd/host-ctr/main.go

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ func _main() int {
 				Source:      "/local/host-containers/" + containerID,
 			}}),
 		// Mount the rootfs with an SELinux label that makes it writable
-		withMountLabel("system_u:object_r:local_t:s0"),
+		withMountLabel("system_u:object_r:state_t:s0"),
 		// Include conditional options for superpowered containers.
 		withSuperpowered(superpowered),
 	)
@@ -375,8 +375,11 @@ func withMountLabel(label string) oci.SpecOpts {
 // when it's `superpowered`.
 func withSuperpowered(superpowered bool) oci.SpecOpts {
 	if !superpowered {
+		// Set the `control_t` process label so the host container can
+		// interact with the API and modify its local state files.
 		return oci.Compose(
 			seccomp.WithDefaultProfile(),
+			oci.WithSelinuxLabel("system_u:system_r:control_t:s0"),
 		)
 	}